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The New World Order and its Impact on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process (1991-1999)

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Doctor of Philosophy



19 JUL 2000

**Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
University of Durham
2000**

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process. It argues that, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the old bipolar World Order has disappeared and a new unipolar one has emerged. The United States of America, as the only remaining single superpower, has enjoyed a great degree of influence and a kind of hegemony in international affairs. Its military superiority and economic, technological and diplomatic strength, in the absence of any competing power, have given it the upper hand to pursue its own policies and its own interests.

This American unipolarity and hegemony are clearly demonstrated in the Middle East peace process. The United States' unipolarity on the international level and its hegemony on the regional level have allowed it to pursue policies to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Regional states, released from the constraints or protection of the patron-client relationships fostered under the bi-polar Old World Order, have adjusted their own policies to take into account this New World Order. A neo-realist understanding of this has been developed which assesses this process in terms of international and regional balance of power and "rules of the game".

This method had been used to understand the reasons for and nature of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations that started at Madrid in 1991 and developed in Oslo in 1993. The thesis argues that these negotiations were in fact a single process which was the direct result of this American-led New World Order. Whether through direct or indirect American involvement or through the indirect or direct acknowledgement by regional actors of the nature of the New World Order, American interests and preferences have been strongly reflected in the peace process.

DECLARATION

I, Saad A. Elfadhil-Elshelmani, the author of this research study declare that the content of this thesis is the original work of the author. None of the material contained in this study has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other University.

Saad A. Elfadhil-Elshelmani

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Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to two women, one man and four girls. The two women are my supervisor Dr Emma C. Murphy and my wife Huda H. El-sarksi. The man is my father Abdel Aal Elfadhil-Elshelmani and the four girls are my daughters, Rwanda, Arig, Sara and Yassmin.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I started my Ph.D. in October 1995 under the supervision of Dr Emma C. Murphy, I was not totally aware of the role of the supervisor. Dr Murphy once told me in her humorous style a story on "the Art of Writing a PhD Thesis". The story goes:

A rabbit is sitting outside a cave and is very intent upon writing. A fox comes along and asks the rabbit what he's doing.

"I'm writing a thesis on how rabbits eat foxes." says the rabbit.

"No way, friend rabbit, you know that's impossible!" says the fox.

"Well, follow me and I'll show you."

So the rabbit takes the fox into the cave and a few minutes later out comes the rabbit looking very smug and holding a fox skull.

Some time later, a wolf comes along and asks the rabbit what he's doing.

"I'm writing a thesis on how rabbits eat foxes and wolves." says the rabbit.

"No way, are you crazy? Where is your academic honesty?" Says the Wolf.

"Come with me and I'll show you." Says the rabbit.

So the rabbit takes the wolf into the cave and a few minutes later out comes the rabbit looking doubly smug and holding a wolf skull.

Some time later, a bear comes along and asks the rabbit what he's doing.

"I'm just finishing my thesis on how rabbits eat foxes, wolves, and bears." Says the rabbit.

The bear roars his disbelief and follows the rabbit into the cave. And, as you might expect, back in the cave is a huge lion who promptly gobbles up the bear, just as he did the wolf and fox. The rabbit bounds happily out of the cave holding his Ph.D.

After four years of doing my Ph.D. I can whole-heartedly confirm this story. Without the help of my Lion supervisor I would not be able to finish this study. Words in Arabic or in English will never be enough to thank her.

Numerous people have helped me greatly in the research and writing of this thesis. My thanks must go first of all to both Professor Tim Niblock and Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami the former and present Directors of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham. Their help and moral support was beyond any description.

I would also like to thank Professor Raymond Hinnebusch of St Andrews University and Professor Yazeid Sayigh of Cambridge University for their advice and support.

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Both Dr Tom Najem of Durham University and Dr David George of Newcastle University deserve my sincere thanks for their specific comments and advice that helped me to improve the quality of this thesis. Any credit that I may receive I would like to share with my friends who have helped me along the way. Its faults, as always, are mine alone.

Finally, the true friend, as Richard Hass once wrote is someone who is willing to devote the considerable time and effort required reading and commenting on a draft manuscript.¹ Dr Emma C. Murphy according to this definition is my true friend. All thanks must go to her, asking Allah to fill her life with joy, success and happiness with her husband, Professor Ehteshami and her cute new-born baby boy Ash.

¹ Hass, R., *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War*, (USA: Council on Foreign Relations Books, 1997), p. 141.

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INTRODUCTION

Introducing this thesis I would start by saying that the impact of changes in the international level on the Middle East peace process is a subject of great importance that justifies its study. This importance stems not only from the importance of the region itself but also from the importance of its stability for world peace and security and thus for the World Order. The topic however has its own sensitivities. National and religious aspects, together with historical grievances, create a huge emotional burden on the shoulders of Arab and Israeli researchers who study the Arab-Israeli issues. Courage, objectivity and a considerable degree of independence are essentially needed.

Although a lot has been written and published on the New World Order on one hand and the Arab-Israeli peace process on the other, linking the two variables in an academic study that follows the developments of the peace process up to 1999 has not yet been fully achieved. The contribution of this thesis is that it tries to present a new understanding or at least a different look at the subject. The impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process as this study will argue is huge, important and evident.

The hypothesis of this study is that "the Arab-Israeli peace process has been not only influenced but determined and shaped by the new distribution of power, rules and conditions of the New World Order in which America has played the role of a single hegemonic superpower". This American unipolarity and hegemony, especially in the Middle East, made the peace process an American-led policy in the first place, both in planning and implementation. The nature of the American-Israeli special relation, and its strategic characteristic that stems from the impact of domestic policies, made this policy in

one way or another a reflection of this important factor. The American sponsored peace process was on the other hand evidence of the USA's international unipolarity and regional hegemony.

This thesis will use a theoretical analysis rather than empirical experiment. The methodology in this research is based on an attempt to apply a theoretical framework on a specific political process. It is based partly on content analysis of documents and agreements of the Arab-Israeli peace process. The theoretical framework will be built on understanding the major theories of international relations and comparing the two international systems (the old bipolar system and the new unipolar system of American hegemony).

Although other school of thoughts will be looked at, a neo-realist approach will be used as the suitable tool for understanding the World Order and thus its impact on regional sub-systems. Neo-realists view the World Order as a product of a stable distribution of power among the major states and regulation of world stability through the balance of power mechanism. A neo-realist understanding also encompasses acknowledgement of "rules" by which states play in the international system. These may be formal or informal rules but are collectively recognised and inform states on how best to pursue their national interests.

As it is important to understand the Old World Order in order to understand the New World Order, it is clear that the Old World Order was, as Barrie Axford pointed out, "constituted by the stable condition of bipolarity known as the Cold War."¹ The Cold War is a term describing the nature of international relations during the period 1945-1989 and

¹Axford, B., *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

was the main feature of the international system during that period, characterized by ideological struggle.

During the Cold War the international relations of the Middle East were determined largely by the superpowers' struggle for power and domination. The international system's impact on the region was intense in the Middle East because the superpowers have penetrated and shaped it far more than other regions. The states of the region aligned themselves with one or other of the superpowers to serve their own interests. The superpowers on their part sought to use regional conflicts to advance their own interests as well. These alignments came to resemble patron-client relationships. This relation inter-linked the superpower conflict with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The hostile relations and lack of cooperation between the two superpowers affected the Middle East more than any other region. This effect will be examined through looking at the Arab-Israeli peace process, arguing that the Cold war stalemate has been imposed on the Arab-Israeli conflict and that the Arab-Israeli peace process was frozen because of the Old "Cold War" World Order.

The New World Order can be contrasted with the Old World Order. The New World Order is a term that describes the new pattern of international relations following the end of the Cold War. The task will be not only to define the term but also to look at the different alternative possible characteristics and prove that the neo-realist notion of unipolarity with USA playing the role of hegemon is the right interpretation of recent international and regional events.

My argument in this study is that the collapse of the Soviet Union gave the USA a role that has no description other than hegemony. This hegemony, even if it does not mean an absolute hegemony in the extreme meaning of the word, does mean a clear ability to impose its political views, especially concerning the resolution of international conflicts. This has been pursued either by using its political, economic and military power or its

influence on international organizations. It has also been the result of the diminishment of patron-client relationships and the recognition by regional states that new "rules" are in operation if they wish to successfully pursue their national interests.

This hegemony cannot be seen more clearly than in the Middle East. The importance of the region for American interests made it the focus of the USA's policy to protect the American interests, most important of which are oil and Israel. To this end, the USA instigated the Madrid Peace process. When this process failed to produce the desired results, it endorsed and in the end directly engaged in the Oslo peace process which was not a totally separate thing from the Madrid peace process but a continuation of it. Both processes emerged from the dynamics of the New World Order and the understandings of regional states of those dynamics. To understand American hegemony and its impact on the peace process, a detailed study of both the Madrid and Oslo peace process is essential.

Analyzing developments of the peace process starting from Baker's trips following the Gulf War and Madrid Conference and later on, Oslo I agreement, the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement and the Palestinian-Israeli agreements of Cairo, Taba (Oslo II), Hebron, Wye River and up to Sharm al-Sheikh's memorandum will be the main focus in this study. This study argues that the Madrid Conference was possible only because of the radical transformation in the international and regional balances of power. The collapse of the Soviet Union on the international level and the defeat of Iraq on the regional level (as well as a number of other related factors), which were symptomatic of the New World Order, enabled or forced the sides to set down at the negotiation table and reach agreements after decades of conflict.

Because of practical reasons this thesis did not carry out any interviews or questionnaires. From the author's point of view they were not essential. For the same practical reasons, the author was not able to make any field study or visit the region during

his conduct of this research, although he originally comes from the Middle East. Instead, extensive reading compounded with close examination of documents, political statements, memoirs and events were the main tools of research. The theoretical structure and content analysis as a base for this study were based on extensive reading of the literature, including a huge flow of information and analysis. Already published interviews with leaders concerned were however used. Those leaders' words were important, but not sufficient in themselves. Reading between the lines and understanding what is happening behind the scene was much more important, because leaders use their political statements as part of their strategies and tactics in the ongoing peace process. Because there is always suspicion that some deals were not made public there was a need for making some speculation.

The contradictory accounts of events by the different parties created an obligation on the author for deeper and careful examination of what has been written and said. Although the author used the English and Arabic languages for reading and examining the material used in this study, materials written in Hebrew were not consulted. Because of Israeli wide use of English for presenting and explaining their views this was not a big problem and did not represent an important gap. It is important to mention here that the continuing and fast developments in the World Order and the peace process created difficulties but at the same time challenges to the hypothesis of this study.

This research has been organized into two parts and five chapters. Part one is a theoretical framework divided into two chapters. Chapter one studies the old Cold War order, while chapter two analyses the New World Order. Part two is about the implications of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process and divided into three chapters. Chapter three is about the history of the peace process from 1948 to 1991. Chapter four discusses Madrid peace process 1991-1993, while chapter five discusses the Oslo peace process 1993-1999.

PART ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER ONE

THE OLD WORLD ORDER

Though the Cold War has preserved the world conflicts it has also ensured that the superpowers have been very anxious to retain some degree of control over their 'clients' and to ensure that conflicts in the Middle East did not lead to direct conflict between the superpowers. The clients have been kept on a reasonably tight rein, though not without risks. So the superpower competition in the region has had the effect of keeping conflicts running whilst seeing that they do not escalate out of control.¹

(Joshua Goldstein)

Introduction

The Old World Order is a term which I am using here to describe the old pattern of international relations that dominated following the end of World War II. There can be no doubt that such a pattern of international relations did in fact exist in the international arena and, more specifically, in relations between the two superpowers of the globe. The most significant features of that Old World Order were its bipolarity and the Cold War.

In order to build up a theoretical and conceptual framework for this study on the relations between the international system and the Middle East sub-system, and consequently the impact of the successive World Orders (Old and New) on Middle Eastern international relations in general, and the Arab-Israeli peace process in particular, I will devote the whole of this chapter to studying the Old World Order. That is the Cold War, which began following the end of the Second World War and continued until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s.

¹ Goldstein, J., *International Relations*, (New York: Longman, 1999), p .20.

In the attempt to arrive at a better understanding of this pattern of international relations, which historically had a strong effect on the Middle East region -as a highly penetrated sub-system of the international system- I will first review the two principal schools of thought in International Relations and define some indispensable concepts and terms such as world order, power and balance of power. I will be choosing to utilise a neo-realist understanding of World Order which assumes the following: that the state is the primary but not the sole actor; that the nature of the international system at any given point in time needs to be considered; that this international system can be viewed as a distribution of power as well as a system of rules that affect the behaviour of states; and that power should not be confined to just military definitions but also economic, diplomatic and other forms of influence.

I will proceed to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the Old World Order. I will conclude that there existed a bipolar balance of power, which resulted from the so-called Cold War between the USA and USSR; that the international system demanded that regional states aligned themselves with one or other superpower – or that they sought to play the superpowers off against one another with policies of non-alignment; and that in doing so they were acting as rational actors advancing their own interests.

I will then clarify, and explain how the Old World Order influenced and shaped Middle East politics. Specifically, I will argue that, with respect to the international system as a whole, the Middle East should be viewed as a highly penetrated regional sub-system, and secondly, as a consequence of this, that it should be understood that during the Cold War the international relations of the Middle East were determined largely, though not exclusively, by the superpowers struggle for domination. Regional states, and in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the PLO, sought alliances with one or other of the superpowers in order to advance their own interests within that conflict,

dividing the region. Equally, however, the regional conflict affected the relationship between the superpowers.

Schools of Thought

Among the many schools of thought and paradigms of international relations, I will examine here the two recognised by Joseph Nye as the most influential; the realist and liberal schools.

Realists see international politics occurring among sovereign states balancing each other's power. For them World Order is the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states. World Order, according to this logic is the regulation of world stability through the balance of power mechanism. Distribution of power between states represents the essential form for maintaining every World Order. World Order is not governed by international law and supra-national government, but by competition between the internationally dominant powers. Thus, a stable World Order can only be achieved by dominant actors or by balance of power between states. This distribution of power and maintaining that balance provides the source of World Order for realists. Change in this distribution of power can lead to change in World Order.

Realism is a theory that maintains that insecurity, aggression, and wars are permanent possibilities in the international state system.²

Both realism (and its offshoot, neo-realism, which is discussed below) sees international relations as a timeless present.

The classical realists see conflict between states as a manifestation of a flawed and unchanging human nature. The neo-realists see an endless interplay of states

² Fukuyama, F., *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1992), p. 254.

wanting to survive, within different distributions of powers, in a condition of anarchy.³

The realist case, it is acknowledged, is “not a homogeneous one as such. Instead, two major variants on the realist theme are accorded significance. The first (the official USA/Western approach) suggests that the Cold War was an inevitable outcome of the post-World War II power structure, in which the victorious democratic powers were confronted by the Soviet Union -an erstwhile ally- now ideologically committed to the destruction of liberal-capitalist principles and, ultimately, to world domination. The second realist variant also blames the Soviet Union for the Cold War.”⁴

The tradition of classical realism focused on the nation-state as the principal actor in world politics. Realism emphasises the role of the state. The state is a unitary, rational actor, a principal actor in international relations and is pre-occupied with national security. “Its central proposition is that since the purpose of statecraft is national survival in a hostile environment, the acquisition of power is the proper, rational and inevitable goal of foreign policy – ‘the struggle for power’ ”.⁵

Neo-realism, however, puts its emphasis on the structure of the international system. It sees the structure of the international system as determining the behaviour of

³ The main exponents of both viewpoints are Niebuhr and Waltz. See Booth, K., “Dare not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future,” in K. Booth., *International Relations Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 12.

⁴ George, J., *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re) introduction to International Relations*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 83.

⁵ Stone, L., *Notes Towards a Definition of Politics*, (Ankara: ATS Publication, 1998), p. 34.

states. The behaviour of states is governed by a set of rational principles based on national interests.⁶

According to Leonard A. Stone, neo-realism has accommodated international economics to the realist line of thought, and also lays greater emphasis on the explanatory power of the character of the international system (especially in terms of the major powers).⁷ Neo-realist or structural realist theories of international politics focus on the effects of anarchy and the global distribution of capabilities on state behaviour and international outcomes. As long as anarchy (in the sense of the absence of an international government) persists, the key variable for understanding international politics is the distribution of world power as measured by the number of the great powers.⁸ In summarising realism and neo-realism, Leonard A. Stone wrote:

For realists and their works, such as Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for power and Peace* (1948), and Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), the key actors are states, who, within certain processes always seek for security (usually defined in military terms). Neo-realism has added a further dimension by offering a wide-ranging analysis of international political economy. For realists, international relations is essentially about states and their interests in maximising their power in a world characterised by struggle for dominance. War is never far away, and peace is held together through balance of power, international law (gradually) and adept diplomacy.⁹

⁶ Keohane, R., *Newrealism and its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 7.

⁷ Stone, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 35.

⁸ See Keohane, R., "*Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond*," in R. Keohane., (1986), Op. Cit., pp. 158-203.

⁹ Stone, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 33.

For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that for both realism and neo-realism, foreign policies are determined in the first place by the international political system.

The second view of World Order according to Joseph Nye is that made by Liberals. Liberals, look at relations among peoples as well as states. They see order arising from broad values like democracy and human rights as well as from international law and institutions such as the United Nations.¹⁰ Liberalism is therefore a tradition of political thought composed of a set of practical goals and ideals. For classical liberal theorists, the individual is the most important unit of analysis and the claimant of rights.¹¹

Neoliberalism, sometimes called "neoliberal institutionalism" or "neoidealism", seeks to build theories of international relations by giving the basic tenets of classical liberalism and post-World I idealism a fresh examination.¹² For the purposes of this thesis, it seems inappropriate to use a liberal school methodology since negotiations in the Arab-Israeli peace process have historically been between states which have themselves shaped their foreign policies with reference to other states and their interpretation of the international system. This thesis will therefore utilise a neo-realist approach, which recognises both the rôles of the state and the international system. However, it is my intention to be flexible enough to include the actions and decisions of non-state actors such as the PLO or the United Nations where relevant. In this study, the

¹⁰ Nye, J., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 83.

¹¹ Viotti, P and Kauppi, M., *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, (Massachusetts: Viancom Company, 1993), p. 230.

¹² Kegley, C and Wittkopf, E., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 31.

neo-realists' definition of World Order as a product of a stable distribution of power among the major states seems appropriate as a starting point for understanding international politics. However, introducing a set of definitions for "World Order" is also essential to understand what is meant by the term. Understanding World Order is important in understanding its effects -at different stages- on the various regional sub-systems and on conflicts that occur at that level. Also one must consider the possibility of the existence of any counter effect of these sub-systems on the World Order.

Defining the World Order

The World Order, or the "Global System" as Ali Hillal Dessouki called it, is defined as the "Pattern of interactions among international actors, which take place according to an identifiable set of rules."¹³

In order to clarify the term further, it seems to me of benefit to review some definitions by different writers to be able to make some comparison and reach a better understanding of how the term has been defined and dealt with. According to Yair Evron, "World Order" is:

A neutral term, it does not mean that the world is orderly or tidy. In each period, he asserted, there was a world order, and world order is simply the characterisation, our conceptualisation of the character of the world: how do the political entities that compose the world behave?¹⁴

¹³ Korany, B., *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), p. 70.

¹⁴ Evron, Y., "The US and the Middle East in the Post Cold War Era," in B. Rubin., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973-1993*, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994).

Writers such as Evan Luard and Joshua Goldstein have emphasised the role of states as such political entities. Luard for example emphasised that states interact within rules.

On this he wrote that:

States interact within a set of well-defined and long-established 'rules of the game' governing what is considered a state and how states treat each other. Together these rules shape the international system, as we know it.¹⁵

With regard to these rules, in their book entitled Global Problems and World Order R.

Mckinlay and R. Little wrote that: "Order in its most general sense can be equated with a pattern; and any attempt to discover a pattern, therefore, can be identified as a search for order."¹⁶

Again, World Order as David Carlton defines it, is "the patterns of relations among the principal actors of world politics -or what has been called the international system- which have varied considerably over time. Actors include states, private groups, and international organisations."¹⁷ Thus, the World Order is the pattern of relations between the world's countries and organisations in a specific period governed by the existing balance of power.

World Order further means or implies the regulation of world stability through the mechanism of balance of power. The distribution of power between states constitutes the main form of control in the World Order. Hence World Order may be viewed as a stable distribution of power between major states as well as a pattern of behaviour or rules governing the behaviour of states.

¹⁵ Luard, E., *Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System: A Study of the Principles of International Order*, (London: Macmillan, 1988).

¹⁶ Mckinlay, R and Little, R., *Global Problems and World Order*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), p. 263.

¹⁷ Carlton, D., *The Cold War Debated*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), p. 105.

The International System

The other term, which is used sometimes in conjunction with the term World Order, is the International System. The International System for Stanley Hoffmann, is "a pattern of relations among the basic units of world politics."¹⁸ For Goldstein, however, the international system is: "The set of relationships among the world's states, structured according to certain rules and patterns of interaction. Some such rules are explicit, some implicit."¹⁹ Again we see the concept of a pattern or rules of behaviour as being important to our understanding of how international relations work.

Power

In order to understand how states -which are the main elements and actors in the international system- behave, and to understand the mechanism of the balance of power, it is very important to highlight some important points about power. The analysis of the international system, as Fred Halliday observed, rests upon, and has recently occasioned, a discussion of the nature of power, and specifically of military power.²⁰ For neo-realists power is the main element. It is found in all levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and the system.²¹ Politics among nations, as Hans Morgenthau has

¹⁸ Waltz, K., *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 43.

¹⁹ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 11.

²⁰ Halliday, F., "The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions," in K. Booth(ed.) *International Relations Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 54.

²¹ Waltz, K., "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in R. Keohane., (1986), Op. Cit., p. 99-130.

said is a struggle for power,²² and Bertrand Russell defined power as “the production of intended effects.”²³

For Robert Dahl, power amounts to the control of behaviour. “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”²⁴ Thus it can be understood as the ability to make others do what they do not want to do. Max Weber’s view of power, like Russell’s, stressed the element of intention or will but unlike him stressed the capacity to realise it and in suggesting that resistance, actual or potential, is relevant to attributions of power. Weber defined power as:

The probability that an actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.²⁵

Talcott Parsons on the other hand understands by power the general capacity of a social system ‘to get things done in the interest of collective goal.’²⁶

In this case, power can be identified as the ability to control outcomes e.g. state A is able to get state B to act in a way which maximises the interests of A.

According to Joshua Goldstein “World Order has always been grounded in power, but order mediates raw power by establishing norms and habits that govern interactions among states.”²⁷

²² See Morgenthau, H., *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 336.

²³ Lukes, S., *Power*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁷ Goldstein, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 333.

The nature of power –or the mechanisms by which control can be exerted– is also subject to debate. Power, from the point of view of pluralists, is multidimensional and resides in a multitude of forms, and at varying locations within the international system.²⁸ It has both sources (inputs) which include geographic location, population and natural resources, and outputs, which include economic strength, military strength and technology.²⁹

Power in my view is this combination of various elements. Military strength can not be maintained without economic strength. Economic strength in itself and without military might to protect it can not allow a state to be considered as powerful. Diplomatic abilities, technological advancements and many other factors are very important as bases for state's power. In this study power is the ability of a state to implement its policies through using its elements of strength.

Balance of Power

The term “balance of power” has come to be associated mainly with the distribution of power among states.³⁰ Many writers, political thinkers and international relations analysts have seen the term as the single most important element in the international

²⁸ Nye, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 83.

²⁹ Halliday, F., “The End of the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions,” in K. Booth., (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 38-61.

³⁰ Wagner, R., “What Was Bipolarity?” *International Organisation*, vol. 47, no. 1, Winter 1993, p. 89.

system. As Ehteshami has argued; "World Order is governed by the competition between hegemonic world powers through the balance of power".³¹

Neo-realism is the school of thought that most emphasised the balance of power as a central concept in international relations. According to neo-realism, a balance of power may be defined as "the distribution of power in the international political system."³² We may view the balance of power as an equilibrium between states but the question is then raised as to how this equilibrium is achieved; historical realists regard it as the product of diplomacy (contrived balance) whereas structural realists regard the system as having a tendency towards a natural equilibrium (fortuitous balance).³³

Either way, theories of balance of power are based on the assumption that the World Order is anarchic. States compete with each other within the international order, driven by their own respective national interests. How then, does the balance of power provide the mechanism for producing World Order?

The World Order as a pattern of the relations between international actors, will depend for its nature on the kind of distribution of power between those actors. There are three or more forms of that distribution. First, if three or more of those actors are relatively equal in their power, the World Order will be described as multipolar; Second, if only two of the actors are relatively equal, the World Order will be described as bipolar; Third, if there is only one powerful state, which has no equal in the real term

³¹ See, Ehteshami, A., *The Changing Balance of Power in Asia*, (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and research, 1998).

³² Waltz, K., "Anarchic Order and Balance of Power" in R. Keohane., (1986), *Op. Cit.*, p. 117.

³³ Baylis, J and Smith, S., *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 122.

of power, the World Order will be described as unipolar.

Alternatively and more traditionally, the concept of a balance of power was associated with the idea that weak states find it in their interest to join together to prevent the hegemony of powerful states.³⁴

The Old World Order that I am going to discuss in the coming pages falls within the second form of distribution of power. It was clearly a bipolar World Order where two superpowers were competing to dominate the world and impose their respective ideologies and ways of life on the rest of the world. While, as the last traditional concept mentioned above suggests, Middle Eastern regional states attempted in the early post World War II years to maintain some kind of non-alignment so as to appear to be independent of the superpowers. As the Cold War progressed they were increasingly drawn into alliances with the superpowers as client states in order to protect their interests. Throughout the period, domestic and regional political considerations (such as commitments to Arab nationalism) had to be balanced with the reality of the balance of power in the international system.

To summarise the methodology selected for this study from the preceding discussion, I have concluded that a neo-realist approach to the study of World Order is most appropriate. This approach considers the state to be the primary but not the sole actor, within the international system. States act within this international system as rational actors pursuing their national interests. To understand the international system, one must view it as a set of relationships determined by distribution of power and guided by explicit and implicit rules. Other non-state actors also play a role in the international system (as we will see with, for example, the PLO and the United Nations). However, order within the international system is achieved by a distribution of power among the states themselves. A stable order requires a balanced distribution of

³⁴ Wagner, (1993), Op. Cit., p. 90.

power, where power is defined as a combination of military, economic, diplomatic, technological and other capacities.

Rules of the Game

As I am taking a neo-realist approach in this thesis, it is important to note here with Joshua Goldstein that neo-realists acknowledge that the rules of international relations often create a security dilemma.³⁵ It is important also to note that a detailed study of the rules of the game is beyond the scope of this study.³⁶ However, a brief idea of the nature of these rules and their content is necessary, as these rules, together with the distribution of power are –as I said earlier- the two components of any World Order.

In every World Order –old or new- there are unwritten “rules” or implicitly acknowledged limitations to and determinants of behaviour, that the states not only understand but also respect and which alter their behaviour according to how they understand them. These rules are determined according to the nature of the World Order and the nature of the distribution of power within it. The concept of “rules” has associated with it the concepts of “game” and “players”. The rules of the game, as Morton Kaplan said, determine the moves a player may make.³⁷

“Rules” may take a variety of forms. There is within the international system a set of well-defined and long-established “rules of the game” governing what is considered a state and how states treat each other. These rules shape the international

³⁵ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 79.

³⁶ Dam, K., *The Rules of the Game*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982).

³⁷ Kaplan, M., *System and Process in International Politics*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957).

system, as we know it.³⁸ They may include formalised institutional rules, such as international laws and subordination to the United Nations, as well as commonly acknowledged limitations to behaviour (such as not initiating a war of aggression). However, since deferment to these types of rules requires acceptance of the prevailing balance of power, and since some states chose to contest the moral or actual basis of the prevailing balance of power, some such states are more likely to confine themselves to more pragmatic “rules” based on national interest and uncoded by any institution or treaty.

Such rules normally, besides being unwritten, carry no obligation. Primarily taking into account the distribution of power among those states, they depend on the understanding by the international actors of the nature of the power distribution and how to deal with it accordingly.

For Joshua Goldstein, the rules of the game are connected to the norms of behaviour. The great majority of state interactions “closely adhere to norms of behaviour—shared expectations about what behaviour is considered proper. Norms change over time, slowly, but the most basic norms of the international system have changed little in recent centuries.”³⁹ It is important to understand that besides being a distribution of power, a World Order is a “set of rules, norms, and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area.” Every actor or player expects to play by the same rules.

States work together by following rules they develop to govern their interactions. States usually do follow the rules. Over time, the rules become more firmly established and institutions grow up around them. States then develop the habit of

³⁸ Goldstein, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 76.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

working through those institutions and within the rules. It is also important to understand some facts about the rules that together with the distribution of power determine the behaviour of states. First, the international institutions and rules that operate today took shape especially during periods of hegemony. Second, rules of international behaviour have become established over time as norms and are often codified as international law. Third, the rules that govern most interactions in international relations are rooted in moral norms; international norms are the expectations held by national leaders about normal international relations. Fourth; when rules are broken in international relations, actors can rely only on the power of individual states to restore order.

In practical terms we notice that during the multipolar World Order, for example, the colonial powers divided the Third World between themselves according to unwritten rules. Every colonial power respected these rules and did not go beyond it. Also throughout the Cold War, the two superpowers dealt with each other in the international arena according to a kind of understanding to unwritten rules and red lines. Each side recognised certain areas in the world as within the other party' sphere of influence. Intervention in those areas was limited according the unwritten rules. Throughout the long period of the Cold War, the rules of the game were adhered to. According to Haim Bresheeth:

- Each player controls its sphere of influence, that is the immediate geographic and political continuum.
- Areas outside the immediate sphere of influence of either side are considered a free-for-all.
- Once a significant number of countries in a region are taken by one of the sides, the other side is defeated, and is required to retreat partially.
- In areas immediately adjacent to one of the superpowers the opposite side is barred from intervention, as those areas are considered the backyard of its rival. Action in those areas, against the wishes of the controlling superpower, is deterred by nuclear threat.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Bresheeth, H., *The Gulf War and the New World Order*, (London: Zed Press, 1991).

In this thesis, since we use a neo-realist understanding of events, the most important “rules” for consideration of developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process are those informal and unwritten rules which determine state behaviour on the basis of national interest. This perspective emerges for two reasons. Firstly, neo-realists are concerned primarily with the balance of power among states. Secondly, the Arab parties to the peace process contest the moral and legal basis of any institutional rules which Israel or the West might seek to apply. (For example, in the belief that the United Nations Security Council is a “tool” of American interests and support for Israel). In some instances, for example the UNSCR 242 and 338, the parties have never agreed on what the “ruling” actually meant anyway). Since there is no consensus on a moral or legal/institutional order, there is no common acceptance of any “rules” within these realms by which the players might “play”. Therefore states’ behaviour must be driven principally by their national interests, as a neo-realist would predict.

The Old World Order: Defining the Cold War

We describe the international system in the period from 1945 to the end of 1980s as the Old World Order in order to distinguish it from what is to be known as the New World Order, which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern communist camp. Thus, the Old World Order is that pattern of relations or system that dominated international relations in the aftermath of World War II and the Yalta conference in 1945. In that period, as Fred Halliday pointed out, this “international conflict known as the Cold War was the dominant issue in world politics from the late 1940s until the late

1980s".⁴¹ Barry Axford has further described the Old World Order as follows, again referring to it as the Cold War:

The 'old' order was constituted by the stable condition of bipolarity known as the Cold War, when antagonism between the superpowers and their cohorts consisted of an 'imaginary war' along the main frontiers which divided the hegemons in Europe and turned bloody only at the margins, in Asia and Africa. During this period of global order, colonialism virtually came to an end, partly as a consequence of the growth of nationalist movements nourished by superpower ambitions. Some Third World states even achieved a sort of power vis-à-vis the superpowers, by playing one off against the other in multilateral institutions like the UN, which were otherwise impotent as a result of superpower rivalry.⁴²

These two writers have identified the Old World Order as both a period of time (the post-World War II era) and a particular relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States that dominated international relations. Clearly, it was only after the end of World War II, that the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves on a collision course, having previously being allies during the war against a common enemy, Nazi Germany. Herbert Ellison observed on that matter that: "The end of World War II marked one of the most dramatic and significant transformations of the global power structure in modern history."⁴³ The main feature of this post-war period was the emergence of these two states as the dominant powers of the new international system – such that the conditions for a bipolar international system were fulfilled. As a transition from the pre-war multipolarity (dominated by European Great Powers) to bipolarity, the Cold War was described by Lewis Namer as "the point at which world power passed

⁴¹ Sayigh, Y and Shlaim, A., *The Cold War and the Middle East*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 6.

⁴² Axford, B., *The Global System, Economics, Politics and Culture*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 182.

⁴³ Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 105.

from the major European states to two essentially extra-European powers, the United States and the Soviet Union."⁴⁴

This competition, or rivalry, has been given the title "Cold War", implying certain specific characteristics or a basic structure to their relations, which remained more or less constant.⁴⁵ Relations during the period in question could be largely described as something between peace and war, first called a Cold War by the American journalist Walter Lippman in an article entitled, "The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy," published in 1947.⁴⁶ The Cold War drew its name from the fact that it did not involve any direct fighting between Soviet and American troops, or the use of nuclear weapons but did involve war between the Soviet Union and the United States by all other means except direct armed conflict. It witnessed proxy war, with American troops fighting against the Soviet Union's allies (Korea, and Vietnam); countries supported by the USA fighting countries supported by the USSR, as in the Middle East; the Soviets using armed forces to install communist regimes in neighbouring countries, (Poland, North Korea etc.) American attempts to overthrow pro-Soviet regimes in Iran and Latin America (Guatemala, Cuba, Nicaragua and Chile), Soviet invasion of countries attempting to get rid of pro-Soviet regimes (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan) and civil wars in which the USA and USSR supported opposing camps (El Salvador, Ethiopia, Congo and Angola). It was a war on all fronts except a direct military clash.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 165.

⁴⁵ Baylis and Smith, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 91.

⁴⁶ Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 100.

⁴⁷ See, Hammond, T., *Witnessess to the Origins of the Cold War*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982), p. 3.

The Cold War, like many other controversial things, was subject to different interpretations, motivated in many cases by subjective political rather than objective academic reasons. As Joseph M. Seracusa pointed out: "The Cold War has come to mean many things to many people. To some, the Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression. To others it was a clash of inevitable national interests."⁴⁸

In reviewing the different interpretations, one must acknowledge that the key structural elements of the Cold War are the political and military (and above all nuclear) rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union; ideological conflict between capitalism and communism; the division of Europe, and the extension of superpower conflict to the Third World.⁴⁹

Herbert M. Levine and David Carlton define the phenomenon of the Cold War as, "The adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union".⁵⁰ Picking up on the structural element of outright superpower rivalry, Thomas Hammond thinks that the term "Cold War" is usually taken to mean the intense conflict between the communist world and the non-communist world that started after the World War II.⁵¹ He has chosen to identify the ideological conflict as the key feature of the bipolarity. On the other hand Lynn Boyd Hinds sees the Cold War as being grounded in a sort of rhetoric. He wrote that the Cold War was a "rhetorical state of mind rather than a description of Soviet-American relations, a rhetorically constructed ideological reality

⁴⁸ Siracusa, J and Barclay, G., *The Impact of the Cold War, Reconsiderations*, (London: Kennikat Press, 1977), p. vii.

⁴⁹ Baylis and Smith, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 91.

⁵⁰ Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 1.

⁵¹ Hammond, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 3.

that was first accepted within the ruling circles of government, then publicly conveyed through major speeches and writings to Americans who generally accepted it as the reality of both foreign and domestic politics.”⁵² According to him political rhetoric creates political reality, and in the case of the Cold War, the universal rhetoric created in the aftermath of World War II created a universal reality.⁵³

Fred Halliday, the author of The Second Cold War, like Levine and Carlton, defines the Cold War as the dominance of international politics by the Soviet-US competition.⁵⁴ However, unlike other writers who apply the term Cold War to the whole period from the end of World War II until the unification of Germany. Halliday divided it into two periods. The first he dates from 1947 to 1953, and the second from 1979 to 1989, with a period of détente in between.⁵⁵ Although, it is important not to ignore the détente period, détente did not in my opinion constitute any big change, as the relations between the two superpowers continued –especially in the Middle East- as a Cold War until the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s.⁵⁶ As William Quandt pointed out, “Each [Superpower] was too deeply committed to allow its friends to be sacrificed for the spirit of détente.”⁵⁷

⁵² Hinds, L., *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginning, 1945-50*, (London: Praeger, 1991), p. 5.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁴ Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 20.

⁵⁵ See, Halliday, F., *The Making of the Second Cold War*, (London: Verso, 1983).

⁵⁶ For more about Detent basic principles and Middle East situation, see Meany, G., “The Case Against Detent,” in Carlton and Levine, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 76.

⁵⁷ Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit., p. 201.

Some writers see the Cold War from the zero-sum game point of view. Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry believe that the Cold War was an intense competition distinguished by extreme hostility between the Soviet Union and the United States. It differed from normal interstate relations in its win-or-lose (zero-sum) competition -the extreme competition that characterises "hot" wars.⁵⁸

Mentioning the role of the nuclear weapons in shaping the Cold War, Richard Hass wrote that:

The Cold War was a relatively structured era of international relations dominated by two great powers and disciplined by nuclear weapons. Rules of the road developed governing competition that reduced the chance the two superpowers would find themselves in direct confrontation involving military forces of any sort. Most other states had their freedom of action circumscribed by their respective superpower patron.⁵⁹

For the purposes of this thesis, an eclectic approach to these definitions is useful since there is some truth in all these definitions. The Cold War, in short, is a term describing the nature of international relations during the period 1945-1989, between the members of the capitalist bloc under the leadership of the United States on the one hand, and the countries or members of the communist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union, on the other hand. The meaning of the term is that the relations were relations of war, but without direct military conflict. Instead it was an economic and ideological war, with extensive use of propaganda and the media, and of the secret services organisations such as the CIA and KGB. It was also reflected in the form of conflicts and limited wars or proxy wars between other countries such as the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Angola and the Middle East.

⁵⁸ Doyle, M and Ikenberry, J., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 2.

⁵⁹ Hass, R., *The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), p. 1.

It is clear that international relations throughout the period were very polarised; with the first pole representing the first world, which comprised the Western European countries, Japan and the USA, and the second pole representing the second world, comprising the Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union and China. The Third World was composed of the rest of the world countries, which included, most significantly, many of the under-developed African, Asian and Latin American countries, most of which were members of the non-aligned movement. The Warsaw Pact was the military instrument of the communist block, while NATO was the military instrument of the capitalist block.

The international system during the Cold War reflected the great degree of competition between the two conflicting international blocs. This competition was both an ideological contradiction, and aimed at achieving contradicting economic and strategic goals. Both superpowers considered the third world, which did not fall under the direct control of either of them as a sphere of influence to fight in, to control its wealth and to prevent the other competing bloc from doing so. Cuba in the Americas, Vietnam and Korea in South East Asia, Congo in Africa and the Middle East are examples of how that international conflict was embodied in different regions of the world. They are examples of how the struggle between the two international blocs found outlets in preventing direct military clashes, and preserving the "cold" nature of the war between the two blocs on all other levels such as ideology, economic, political, media and secret agencies levels.

Thus, the various definitions of the Cold War phenomenon, either as a relationship of competition between the Soviet Union and the United States or as intense conflict between the communist world and the non-communist world following the second world war, agree on some points: First; the relations between the two blocs were tense, hostile and competitive. Second; the degree of intensity in the relations,

reached the point of some kind of war; but did not reach the direct use of arms between the two blocs. Third; this phenomenon called the Cold War was reflected in international relations and world politics from its start by the end of World War II to the collapse of one of these poles and disintegration of one of these blocs by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s.

In sum, my neo-realist understanding of the Old World Order therefore interprets the 1945-1989 period as one of a bipolar balance of power. The United States and the Soviet Union exercised their power against one another through intermediary spheres of influence. They did not use their own direct military power as the primary tool. Instead they used a range of economic, diplomatic, ideological and quasi-military tactics to compete, relying on an international system in which the rules of the game were those of alliance and spheres of influence. The world lined up in two opposing camps, loosely focused on ideological support for either superpower. Those states, which remained un-aligned sought to take advantage of super-power rivalries to advance their own interests. Therefore, they too recognised a bipolar distribution and balance of power.

Origins of the Cold War

There are many views on the actual start of the Cold War. Writers, political commentators and statesmen have differed on who was to blame. In other words the responsibility for the Cold War was directed by supporters of each side to the other. The debate on the Cold War has been characterised primarily by the question of blame; who was responsible for the hostility and tension in the relations between the USA and the Soviet Union?

Some believe that it was the communist ambition to transfer the whole world to communism that led to an American response, in the form of the USA policy of

containment, and thus the Cold War began. Others saw USA imperial policy and President Truman's attempt to force the Soviet Union to allow the Eastern European countries to institute the open door policy as responsible for the Soviet Union's policy of establishing a defensive system surrounding East Europe. De Senarclens observed that many American historians in particular have ascribed the origins of the Cold War to the United States' imperialist ambitions and the internal contradictions of its capitalist regime.⁶⁰

As Lynn Etheridge Davis has pointed out "The origins of the Cold War were numerous and continue to be a matter of controversy, but most writers consider the development of Soviet-American conflict over the political future of Eastern Europe to have been a major cause."⁶¹ Alternatively, the Cold War began, according to Pierre De Senarclens, when Chiang Kai Shek's forces were defeated and the People's Republic of China was established on 1 October 1949. According to him, the outburst of the Cold War is generally associated with the "Truman Doctrine," introduced in March 1947 when the President of the United States declared his country's will to defend the "Free World" against the advance of Soviet totalitarian designs.⁶²

The Truman Doctrine was a response by USA President Harry Truman on 6 April 1946, to the Azerbaijan Crisis when the Soviet Union refused to withdraw from Iranian Azerbaijan. With the presentation of the Truman Doctrine, American strategic

⁶⁰ De Senarclens, P., *From Yalta to the Iron Curtain: The Great Powers and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Oxford: Berg, 1995), p. 264.

⁶¹ Davis, L., *The Cold War Begins*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

⁶² De Senarclens, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 120.

thinking towards the region contributed towards the conception of the Cold War and its political concepts.⁶³

Explaining the origins of the Cold War is a subject that has taken up a lot of energy and discussion. Many writers, politicians, statesmen and philosophers have participated in this discussion. Many theories and school of thoughts have been developed from realist, orthodox, revisionist and classical perspectives among others. Although this dissertation takes an essentially neo-realist view, in the following sections I will briefly shed some light on the orthodox, classical and revisionist theories concerning the origins of the Cold War which have dominated the literature on the subject. (The issue has not been of such great concern to realist scholars).

Classical Theory

An early interpretation placed the chief blame for the Cold War upon the Soviet Union. According to this point of view (traditional or classical theory) Soviet leaders were determined to make the entire world communist, by force if necessary. For this they used the alliance of the wartime with the West to destroy Nazism, and when they achieved that -according to this theory- they renounced the Grand Alliance to achieve the universal revolution. They renounced their promises in Yalta by establishing communist regimes in East Europe and they waited for their chance to do the same in Western Europe especially in France and Italy. Finally according to this theory, the

⁶³ Paterson, T., "American Crisis of the Cold War and their Alternatives," in T. Paterson., *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 14.

United States acted in defence of the basic democracy ideals to oppose the communist expansion with the containment policy and thus the Cold War started.⁶⁴

Revisionist Theory

The revisionist theory on the other hand came from New Left historians who blamed the United States for the Cold War.⁶⁵ These historians emphasised the American economic objectives and saw American foreign policy after 1945 as imperialist and anti-revolutionary. They asserted that the Cold War started when the American President Harry Truman decided to force the Soviet Union to allow the Eastern European countries to enter the open door policy, an American expansionist capitalism and that, according to them, led the Soviet Union to pursue a defensive system over Eastern Europe.⁶⁶

In the aftermath of World War II, in which the USA and the Soviet Union were allied against the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan), an ideological competition started to appear between the two main powers. The difference between their views of the post war world was huge. Capitalism and liberal democracy viewed communism as a danger to all free societies, while communism saw western capitalist imperialism as the great evil. European countries allied themselves with one of the main players, the USA and the Soviet Union, creating two competing blocs.

This competition turned to a real war in all fields except a military direct confrontation. The Cold War between the two superpowers took the form of hot war

⁶⁴ Carlton, (1988), Op. Cit., pp. 91-104.

⁶⁵ Maddox, R., "The Rise and Fall of Cold War Revisionism," in Carlton, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 96.

⁶⁶ For more details see Siracusa, (1977), Op. Cit., p. vii.

only in the peripheral areas such as in Korea, Vietnam, Africa and the Middle East. The conflicts in the Middle East, and in South Africa reflected the struggle between the two camps. The Soviet Union supported the Palestinians and the Arab countries in their fight against the Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, South Lebanon and Sinai. It also supported the African National Congress in its struggle against the Apartheid regime in South Africa and other liberation movements such as SWAPO and ZANO to liberate Namibia and Zimbabwe.

The Cold War witnessed ups and downs, moments of greater or lesser tension between the superpowers. Examples of the high points were the Cuban missiles crisis in 1963, the Suez crisis, and the 1956, 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East. The low points included a period of détente and some time short-lived co-operation between the two superpowers.

Orthodox Theory

The orthodox school sees the Cold War as an ideological war. "The Cold War is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake."⁶⁷ It portrayed the Soviet Union as a major threat to the ideology, institution, norms, and values of the free world.⁶⁸ According to this school of thought, the Cold War had evolved into a limitless contest between freedom and tyranny, a totally revolutionary propelling history down its dangerous course.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Chomsky, N., *Deterring Democracy*, (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 10.

⁶⁸ See, Maddox, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 96.

⁶⁹ Graebner, N., *The Cold War: A Conflict of Ideology and Power*, (Lexington: Heath, 1967), p. vii.

Charles W. Kegley pointed out that determining the origins of the twentieth century's third hegemonic fight for domination is difficult because the historical evidence is amenable to different interpretations. However, he defined three main causes for the Cold War. First, a conflict of interests; second, ideological incompatibilities; and third, misperceptions.⁷⁰

Characteristics of the Cold War: The Importance of Bipolarity

I have already asserted that the Cold War Order was characterised by bipolarity as a form of power distribution and by an international system based on ideological, economic and political struggle and competition between two camps notionally oriented round communism and capitalism. Charles Kegley has identified six primary principles or characteristics of the Cold War:⁷¹

- High level of superpower conflict.
- Periods of intense conflict alternated rhythmically with periods of relative co-operation.
- Reciprocal, action-reaction exchanges were evident.
- Throughout the Cold War contest, both rivals consistently avoided all-out war as their highest priority.
- Both actors displayed a willingness to act in violation of their respective professed ideologies whenever their perceived national interests rationalised such inconsistencies.
- Through a gradual learning process involving push and shove, restraint and reward, tough bargaining and calm negotiation, the superpowers created rules for the peaceful management of their disputes and trust in their mutual willingness to abide by the norms of this security regime.

The heart of Kegley's analysis is the concept of bipolarity.⁷² I shall now examine this form of power distribution, which dominated the Old World Order. The word

⁷⁰ Kegley, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 88.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 120.

⁷² Gaddis, J., *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 172.

“bipolarity” has been used in two very different ways: (1) as a shorthand for the “bipolarity” of the world into two hostile camps as a result of the Cold War and (2) as a description of the distribution of power among individual states. Kenneth Waltz has argued that the two definitions need to be distinguished from one another.⁷³ Nonetheless, both definitions are relevant.

The post-1945 international system can be described as bipolar because of the enormous disparity in power between the two new superpowers, the USA and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the rest of the community of states on the other.⁷⁴ Alternatively, the power that lay with the superpowers was itself divided between them.

This meant that the world was effectively divided between the two superpowers in terms of influence. Although the Third World countries tried through the non-aligned movement to play a major role in the World Order and international affairs, they lacked the power to do so. This kind of distribution of power between the two superpowers during the Cold War period produced, according to many analysts, much more stability than other forms of World Orders such as unipolarity or multipolarity. In one of its editorials, *Middle East International* wrote that: “The bipolar world of the Cold War, for all the chilling talk of mutual annihilation, was in comparison a stable and predictable place – at least for the citizens of the two main power blocs.”⁷⁵

The United Nations and the Cold War

There are two principal types of international organisations, intergovernmental and non-governmental. Intergovernmental organisations share in common the fact that they are

⁷³ Wagner, H., (1993), *Op. Cit.*, p. 81.

⁷⁴ Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), *Op. Cit.*, p. 1.

⁷⁵ Editorial., “The New Cold War,” *Middle East International*, 22 May 1998, p. 3.

composed of states. The United Nations is an intergovernmental organisation that has universal membership. Throughout the four decades from 1945 to 1985 the main feature in the international relations was the United Nations, with its Security Council as the main organ responsible of international security. During the Cold War period neither of the two superpowers was able to act freely regarding the international security matters. In the Security Council, the permanent members used the veto extensively to block any resolution that contradicted their interests, preventing the other power(s) from using the Security Council to legitimatise its action against other countries.

During the Cold War, the United Nations in general and the Security Council in particular was paralysed by the superpower competition and conflict. The extensive use by the permanent members and the superpowers in particular of the veto restricted the United Nations ability to act effectively according to its charter. According to Kegley and Wittkopf:

The Security Council rapidly fell victim to the Cold War. Between 1945 and 1955, the Soviet Union, unable to mobilise a majority on its side, exercised its veto power 77 times to prevent action on matters with which it disagreed. From 1970 until 1992, the United States exercised its veto power 72 times, twice as often since 1966 as all other permanent council members combined. The Security Council was often paralysed as a result, as vetoes severely restricted the ability of the United Nations to undertake collective action.⁷⁶

This restriction on UN was due to the Cold War relations between the two superpowers.

The Middle East in the Old World Order

Concept of the Middle East

The concept of the Middle East or Near East is a western concept, developed from the viewpoint of the British Foreign Office. According to Ken Matthews:

⁷⁶ Kegley, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 155.

The Middle East is a construction of the European mind. The Middle East is a product of the European imperial and bourgeois imagination. The Middle East is a geographical term. It is also defined politically in European terms.⁷⁷

The Middle East -according to the British definition- contains the Arab Orient, Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Afghanistan and the Arab peninsula. North Africa is not included in this concept.⁷⁸ However, the Middle East as a concept can be regarded as a political concept in the first place. It does not constitute a homogeneous geographical unit. This name did not stem from the nature of the area itself and its cultural character, but from its relations with the others. That reflects the Western conception of the area as a mosaic or mix of peoples and national, ethnic and cultural groups, which means not dealing with the Arab world as a one unit. For the West the Middle East includes Turkey, Iran, Cyprus, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Israel while excluding the North African countries.

Importance of the Middle East to the Superpowers

The Middle East is an important region. Its location, resources and its historical importance have for centuries drawn the attention of foreign powers, and thus the interaction between the Middle East and these powers has increased over time. Indeed, the Middle East is arguably the most important region of the international system today, especially for western great powers tied to the region by oil and bilateral commitments.⁷⁹ The global system's regional impact was exceptionally intense in the

⁷⁷ Matthews, K., *The Gulf Conflict and International Relations*, (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 12-13.

⁷⁸ Musallam, S., *Diplomatic History of the Middle East*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997).

⁷⁹ Goldstein, J., "Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence, 1979-1997," (<http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/goldtext/me98.papr.htm>).

Middle East because the great powers, attracted by its strategic location, immense oil reserves and the presence of Israel, have historically penetrated and shaped it far more than other regions.⁸⁰

It can be argued that the relative importance of the Middle East to outside powers increased during the period of the Cold War. As Harold Saunders has observed:

Interaction between the peoples of the Middle East and the world powers was not new in the years after World War II. What became apparent increasingly in those years was that the nations of the region and the world powers on the global stage began to experience profound change as that interaction continued. Politics in the region became more complex; politics in the larger world became more complex; and the interaction between the two arenas became more intertwined.⁸¹

Joshua Goldstein wrote that in the historical context, today's Middle East can not be totally separated from its past.

The great Arab Empire of about AD 600 to 1200 plays a special role in the international relations of the Middle East. Almost the whole of the region was once united in this empire, which arose and spread with the religion of Islam. European invasion -the Crusades- were driven out. This history continues to influence the region in the twentieth century. For example, Pan-Arabism (or Arab nationalism), especially strong in the 1950s and 1960s, saw the region as potentially one nation again, with a single religion, language, and identity. Iraq's Saddam Hussein in 1991 likened himself to the Arab ruler who drove away Crusaders a thousand years ago. The strength of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region today, as well as the emotions attached to the Arab-Israeli conflict, reflect the continuing importance of the historic Arab Empire.⁸²

⁸⁰ Ehteshami, A and Hinnebusch, R., *Syria and Iran, Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 9.

⁸¹ Saunders, H., "A Broader Peace Process for the Middle East," in Kipper and Saunders., *The Middle East in Global Perspective*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 311.

⁸² Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 26.

As Yezid Sayigh observed: "The emergence of the Middle East as a distinct international relations subsystem in the post independence period added new dimension and arenas of interaction"⁸³ to the bipolar system.

After 1945, as the Cold War and the containment of the Soviet Union became the dominant concern of the Western allies, the strategic importance of the Middle East reached new heights. Henceforth it was argued that Soviet penetration of the region would outflank the Atlantic alliance, causing a decisive rupture in the world balance. A second perception was that Soviet control over Middle East oil resources would dislocate the economy of the Western world.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the west, and particularly the USA became more concerned with protecting Israel's security.⁸⁵ "In the 1945-91 period, the Middle East region experienced five Arab-Israeli wars, two Gulf wars and a handful of other (largely) inter-Arab conflicts."⁸⁶

No regional conflict in history has been so intertwined with world politics as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Robert Freedman in his edited book World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict pointed out how the superpowers exploited the regional conflict to advance their interests in the Middle East.

⁸³ Sayigh, Y., *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

⁸⁴ Buheiry, M., "The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East in the Early 1950's and Today." in R. Khalidi and C. Mansour., *Palestine and the Gulf*, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), pp. 120-160.

⁸⁵ Quandt, W., *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976*, (Berkley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 1.

⁸⁶ Ehteshami, A., "Security Structures in the Middle East: An Overview," in H. Jawad., *The Middle East in the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 70.

In the early stages of Arab Nationalism and Zionism, both nationalist movements sought the aid of the great powers to aid them in realising their nationalist aspirations. Then, as conflict between the two movements arose, virtually all the great powers sought to exploit the opportunities⁸⁷ created by the Arab-Israeli conflict to increase their influence in the Middle East.

The superpowers planned their international policies according to how they view the overall picture of their struggle for international power. As Joshua Goldstein pointed out, "One flaw of USA policy in the Cold War period was to see such regional conflicts through East-West lenses. Its preoccupation with communism led the United States to support unpopular pro-Western governments in a number of poor countries."⁸⁸

During the 1950s, 60s, 70s and early 80s, the relations between the states of the Middle East came to mirror the relations between the superpowers. Some countries were governed by conservative western oriented regimes, while others witnessed military coups and were ruled by revolutionary or radically oriented regimes. During that time, the Middle East, as with many parts of the world, was a theatre for superpower competition; its location, natural resources, historical background, and many other reasons, made it a focus of attention. This was compounded by the fact that it was for a long time one of the most volatile areas in the globe. Wars, military coups, inter-Arab disputes, regional conflicts and constant interventions from the superpowers wracked the region.

In terms of alignments with the superpowers, Israel, the Gulf states, Egypt (after Nasser), Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and North Yemen made up the pro-West group; Algeria, Libya, Sudan (since 1969) Iraq, South Yemen, the PLO and Syria made up the pro-Soviet group. The states and peoples of the region saw Israel as a Western

⁸⁷ Freedman, R., *World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 1.

⁸⁸ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 29.

base and spearhead in the region and a foreign entity.⁸⁹ Turkey and Iran (until the 1979 Islamic revolution) were also Western allies and western oriented regimes.

Alliances

Before discussing in detail the issues of regional alignment and patron-client state relationships, it is important to distinguish these from the concept of alliances.⁹⁰ Although there has been some evidence of alliance building in the Middle East, I hope to show that alignments have been based on patron-client relations rather than alliances. It follows then that, if the Old World Order was characterised by patron-client relations between the super-powers and regional states, the decline of one superpower in the New World Order will witness a different pattern of international relations, an altered balance of power and new behavioural "rules".

Throughout the history, states have occasionally formed alliances to pool their military capabilities in the face of a potential threat.⁹¹ As George Liska pointed out, it is impossible to speak of international relations without referring to alliances. "The two often merge in all but name."⁹² Great powers –according to Joshua Goldstein– often form alliances with smaller states, sometimes called client states.⁹³

⁸⁹ Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit., p. 7.

⁹⁰ Camilleri, J., "Alliances and the Emerging post-Cold War Security System," in R. Leaver., *Charting the post-Cold War Order*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

⁹¹ Sorokin, G., "Patron-Clients, and allies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in M. Maoz, *Regional Security in the Middle East*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 46.

⁹² Liska, G., *Nations in Alliance*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968).

⁹³ Goldstein, (Op. Cit., p. 91).

It is clear that alliance is “as original event in politics as is conflict. It associates like-minded actors in the hope of overcoming their rivals.”⁹⁴ It is clear also that alliance play a key role in the balance of power and in how the states can alter the distribution of power.

What an alliance means therefore is a coalition of states that coordinate their actions to accomplish some end. Most alliances form in response to a perceived threat.

States in general try to balance threats. They look at both the capabilities and the intentions of potential rivals to determine whether alliances are necessary. Writers such as Gerard Sorokin distinguish between alliance and patron-client state relationships. The difference between an alliance and a patron-client state relationship is that an alliance is a formal promise of military support while a patron-client relationship is an informal relationship entailing economic, political and military assistance.

Sorokin thinks that any formal or informal military political agreement among states qualifies as an alliance. In other words, alliances are formal agreements between sovereign states for the putative purpose of coordinating their behaviour in the event of specified contingencies of a military nature. Patron-client relationships “are based on informal understandings, trust, loyalty, solidarity and shared interests” but “are not fully legal or contractual”.⁹⁵

Sorokin tells us that “alliances have been rare in the Middle East conflict, because states in the region typically prefer to pursue independent security policies using the assistance of outside patrons.”⁹⁶ However, examples of alliance formation among states in the Middle East can be found. Some of these are the Baghdad Pact,

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Sorokin, (1997), *Op. Cit.*, p. 49.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 47.

Syria-Egypt unity, the Israeli-U.S. alliance, and the international alliance or coalition against Iraq in 1991. The Arab League is also considered by some to be an alliance between the Arab states to coordinate their economic, political and military efforts. The League –especially its summits- played an important role in coordinating Arab confrontation with Israel and in supporting the front line states and the PLO. Indeed according to George Liska, the only overtly offensive alliance since the Axis has been the Arab League.

A mixture of the alliance and the patron-client relationship overshadowed the relations between Egypt and Syria with the Soviet Union on the one hand, and Israel with the United States on the other. The relationship between Israel and the United States is not an official alliance according to a formal agreement but it is an alliance in practical terms, because of the USA's strong commitment to protect Israel and guarantee its security. As Goldstein pointed out, "Two countries may create the practical equivalent of an alliance without a formal treaty, as did the United States and Israel in the 1970s".⁹⁷

In the Middle East, alliances between regional states have generally been undesirable for two reasons: First, access to non-regional patrons that provide low-cost military and economic assistance enables the regional powers to pursue their preferred security policies; Secondly, political isolation makes potential regional allies rare.⁹⁸

The Baghdad Pact is an example of a regional alliance that was formed by outside intervention. In 1955 Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan created the Pact for the purpose of regional defence. Before 1955 had finished Syria had signed a

⁹⁷ Goldstein, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 88.

⁹⁸ Sorokin, (1997)., *Op. Cit.*, p. 66.

military alliance with Egypt and purchased arms from the Soviets.⁹⁹ After the break with Egypt that followed the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961, Syria began once again to pursue its own security policy. The patron-client relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union was tightening. The Friendship treaty between them in 1980 was an affirmation of the patron-client relationship, rather than of an alliance in that the Soviets made no formal commitments to the Syrians.

There was no need for Syria or Israel to form formal alliances with the superpowers because the terms of their patron-client relationships were favourable. Both countries understand that formal alliances would restrict their ability to pursue their policies and limit their freedom of action. For Syria, formal alliance with the Soviet Union would not have been popular domestically and would have damaged its relations with the Gulf States, its main financial donors.

In many ways the Soviet-Egyptian relationship between 1967 and 1974 is archetypal of a patron-client state relationship.¹⁰⁰ Egypt preferred informal alliance with the Soviet Union for the same reasons mentioned in the Syrian case. Obtaining military support without being involved in a much serious formal relationship that might undermine its relations with other countries and affect its domestic politics was much more acceptable to the regimes of both Nasser and Sadat.

Israel also preferred not to be involved in formal alliances, although as has been mentioned its relationship with the United States was strong to such a degree that many describe it as alliance.¹⁰¹ The American-Israeli strategic cooperation understanding

⁹⁹ Kerr, M., *The Arab Cold War, 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology in Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 5.

¹⁰⁰ Shoemaker, C., *Patron-client State Relationships*, (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 82.

¹⁰¹ Mansour, C., *Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: Columbia

memorandum is evidence of this. However, Israel has also developed patron-client ties when useful. Until the Six-Day War, France, rather the United States supplied Israel with weapons, playing part of the role of a patron. During President Johnson's administration, however, Israel clearly became a client of the United States, with economic, diplomatic and military aid being forthcoming.

If alliances were not the principal means by which the superpowers engaged with regional Middle Eastern states, patron-client relationships were a more common feature.

Regional Alignments and Patron-Client Relationships

Long-term patron-client relationships as we will see later are not only alternatives to alliances, but often supersede them in terms of effectiveness and desirability. This kind of relationship may be distinguished from other forms of bilateral interaction by the dominance of several key elements. First, there must be a sizeable difference between the military capabilities of the states involved. Second, the client plays a prominent role in patron competition. Third, there is a critical perceptual dimension to patron-client state relationships. This derived from consistent association between the two states for a recognisable period of time.¹⁰²

At their foundation, patron-client state relationships rest upon two elements that shape their nature and dictate their impact on the international system as a whole. First, patron-client state relationships are inherently unstable. The second fundamental feature

University Press, 1994).

¹⁰² Shoemaker, (1984), Op. Cit.

of patron-client state relationships is that they are, at their most basic level, mechanisms by which patrons compete with each other in a theoretically low-risk environment.¹⁰³

Having established that the superpowers developed an interest in the Middle East region during the Cold War, we now need to determine the impact of superpower penetration on the states themselves and to see whether it conforms to the conditions of patron-client relations listed above. The main argument here is that the Middle East became characterised by efforts of regional states to align themselves with one or other superpower, and that these alignments came to resemble patron-client relationships. In other words, the region was affected by bipolarity in the international system, both in terms of their own relative lack of power compared to the superpowers, and in their reaction to the balance of power between the superpowers.

The particular nature of the struggle between the superpowers prevented them from co-operating even while the balance of terror prevented them from engaging in a hot war. This kind of 'special relation' between the two superpowers, characterised by hostility and a lack of direct war, had a great effect on the rest of the world, where the two superpowers exercised their competition. The impact of that kind of relations on the Middle East was much clearer than on any other region.

The extent of that effect can be measured through looking at the events that took place in the region and how the two superpowers reacted to them. For instance the reaction towards establishing new states in the Middle East, (Israel as an example); the reaction towards changes in the regimes in some Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Yemen as examples); the reaction towards the Palestine problem; the several Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982); the bombing of Libya and the first Gulf war (1980-88)

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 184.

Although the superpowers generally disagreed on recognising new states, according to their interests, the two superpowers both agreed to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, and that reflected the early stages of the Cold War, when the superpowers could still agree on some issues. In this instance, the USA agreed with Great Britain and France on a Tripartite Agreement not to send arms to the parties engaged in the conflict in order not to inflame it. The issue did not immediately become one for superpower competition therefore.

However, the crisis in Iran in 1947 and the overthrow of Mosadaq's leftist government in 1951 witnessed the beginning of real superpower competition in the Middle East, especially after the United States had become directly involved. After World War II, the United States seemed to have inherited the British role in the Middle and Far East. Paul-Marie De la Gorce pointed out in an article published in the Journal of Palestine Studies that after Britain conceded to the USA to play the role it had played in the first half of this century,

The Western states on both sides of the Atlantic were identical: to maintain the exclusive preponderance of the Western powers in the whole of the Middle East and, more particularly, to prevent the penetration of Soviet influence. Thus, at that stage the United States was not seeking to reduce Britain's military and political positions in the Gulf region or even in Jordan or Egypt, because these seemed to contribute to the control of the region by the Western Camp as a whole.¹⁰⁴

As the administration of President Truman established the main lines of America's Middle East policy, to some extent these were inherited from imperial Britain or developed in response to domestic pressures, particularly in the case of Palestine.¹⁰⁵ In

¹⁰⁴ De La Gorce, P., "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, A Survey," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no. 3, Spring, 1997, p. 7.

¹⁰⁵ Buheiry, M., "The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East in the Early 1950's and Today," in Khalidi and Mansour, (1982), *Op. Cit*, p. 122.

that case, American involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and before that USA policy towards Israel and the Palestine problem can be ascribed to the deep Protestant belief. "Affinity for Zionism can be traced to American Protestant rootedness in the Old Testament and an evangelical belief that 'Zion will rise again' in the Holy Land under Jewish hegemony."¹⁰⁶

The USA subsequently pursued a policy of containment, imposing or installing regimes hostile to communism in the areas surrounding the communist block, especially in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The aim was to prevent the Soviet Union from extending its influence to the warm seas. In that context the USA, considered the Middle East sufficiently important that it should not be allowed to fall under the Soviet influence.¹⁰⁷ That was also true of the Indian sub-continent and South East Asia, and was one of the reasons behind the wars of Vietnam, Korea, as well as Middle East conflicts, reflecting the struggle between the two blocs in wars by proxy. When the differences between the two superpowers were reflected in different world areas in the form of local wars, we find that the countries themselves in their struggle against each other found in the struggle between the two blocs an opportunity to rely on the side hostile to his enemy's supporter. Walter Laqueur wrote that:

Despite the fact that during the first stage of the reorientation of Arab politics, the stress was still on 'positive neutralism'. With the erosion of the "Third World" bloc, neutralism gave way to anti-western commitment.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ Peretz, D., "Origins of American Support for Israel," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, vol. iv, no. 3, 1997, p. 40.

¹⁰⁷ Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit., See also, Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 10.

¹⁰⁸ Laqueur, W., *The Road to War, 1967, the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London: The Camelot Press, 1968).

In other words, although the Middle Eastern states, especially the newly independent Arab states, wanted to preserve their independence from superpower influences, this was decreasingly possible, as the superpowers became more interested themselves in Middle Eastern affairs.

The Baghdad pact was the first real example of this. This was the outgrowth of an Anglo-American search for allies in Middle East defence system. Together, they aimed to thereby limit Soviet advances south and eastwards. The Baghdad Pact is nowadays usually seen as the direct result of an initiative taken by the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, after the latter's historic trip across eleven Middle Eastern capitals in May 1953.

This famous tour -the first-ever to the area by an American head of diplomacy- is now generally considered as a watershed in Middle East politics, burying plans for the long-cherished Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), designated to create a regional bulwark against any possible Soviet penetration, and replacing it with plans to set up the so-called 'Northern Tier' collective defence project, based on the voluntary participation of pro-Western Middle Eastern countries lying on the southern border of the USSR.¹⁰⁹

Another major incident of early superpower intervention in the region was the Suez Crisis of 1956. As previously stated, after World War II the joint policy in the Middle East of both the USA and Europe was initially to ban any export of arms to the region. This was evident in the tripartite declaration of 1950. The Cold War period was simultaneous, however, with the struggle for Arab independence, the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and the rise of Arab nationalism, which were important factors to be taken into account by American policy. The USA wished to establish a political,

¹⁰⁹ Sanjian, A., "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2, April 1997, p. 226.

military and strategic system for checking Soviet infiltration, and for establishing the basis for closer relations with the new independent Arab countries.¹¹⁰

In an effort to develop relations with Egypt, the USA offered assistance in financing the construction of the Aswan High Dam. When it discovered, however, that Egypt had agreed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia (in response to Israel being able to purchase weapons after all from France and Great Britain), America withdrew the offer. Gamal Abdel-Nasser subsequently decided to nationalise the Suez Canal to generate revenues, and accepted a Soviet counter-offer to help construct the dam. In the aftermath of the American refusal to finance the Dam, which the Egyptians regarded as an important strategic project, the USSR, had found an opportunity to approach Egypt. Its decision to support Egypt in building the Dam, and supply her with modern Soviet arms to confront the Israeli offensive ambitions succeeded in this.

With the eruption of the subsequent British, French, and Israeli military offensive against Egypt in 1956, the Soviet Union found another opportunity to approach the Arab countries and Egypt in particular. Soviet support for the Arab position and its threats to use its nuclear weapons, which forced the American President Eisenhower to issue his famous ultimatum to the three countries to withdraw, consolidated the Soviet position as a friend to Nasser, a situation which Nasser himself had never actively sought. The Suez crisis was the real end to the British role as a major power in the area. As Charles Smith pointed out in his book Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict "The Suez invasion and its failure signalled the end of Britain's tenure as

¹¹⁰ De La Gorce, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 7.

the dominant imperial nation in the Middle East.”¹¹¹ As importantly, it also signalled the entrance of real direct superpower competition in the Arab-Israeli conflict arena.

The Suez crisis was a starting point for a Soviet infiltration policy in the region, also creating a change in the American policy, as the American warning to end the aggression had its effect through the following decade. In the words of Paul-Marie De la Gorce: “The hallmarks of the ten years following Suez could all be said to be consequences of the shock of 1956. The continuing weakening of European influence in the region; the growth of Arab nationalism; the steady advance of Soviet diplomacy; and the systematic and ever increasing alignment of American and Israeli policies.”¹¹²

In a later war, in June 1967, Israel occupied large areas of Arab lands, composed of all Sinai, the Golan Heights, and parts of Lebanon and Jordan, with the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This was regarded as a defeat for the Soviet arms against the Americans, but for the Arabs there was no alternative than to turn to the communist block in trying to rebuild their armed forces to face the by-now directly American - supported Israel. The war of 1967, was a turning point similar to the 1956 crisis, as after the Israeli military victory, the American-Israeli concern was to maintain the Israeli military edge. In one way or another this was to be the instrument that was used by the USA to impose its role in the region. Also to make it clear to the other states in the region that they had to take the balance of power into account in formulating their own policies and to behave on that basis. The USSR presented the only alternative for the regional states, which were not willing to surrender to the American interests and

¹¹¹ Smith, C., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 173.

¹¹² De La Gorce, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 8.

exertion of power. Thus Syria, Iraq and Egypt went to the USSR to rebuild their military power in an effort to regain the strategic balance destroyed by the Six-Day war.

By now, in its efforts to weaken and ultimately eliminate Western influence from the Middle East and particularly from the Arab world, while promoting Soviet influence, the Soviet leadership has employed a number of tactics. The supply of military aid, the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Euphrates Dam in Syria are prominent examples of Soviet economic assistance. Moscow also sought to solidify its influence through the conclusion of long-term friendship and assistance treaties, such as the ones concluded with Egypt in 1971, Iraq in 1972 and Syria in 1980.¹¹³ Egypt and Syria for example tended to rely on the communist bloc, not through sympathy with its ideology, which is very different from the basic moral and cultural principles of Middle East societies, but because they believed they had no alternatives given the full and unlimited support from the Americans to their enemy Israel.

The Arab-Israeli conflict was clearly becoming an arena for proxy war between the superpowers. Moreover, regional states were being pushed into aligning themselves with one or other superpower in order to defend their own interests.

All three wars, 1948-1949, 1956 and 1967, resulted from balance of power calculations. In 1948-1949, a coalition of five Arab states assumed that the newly established Jewish State would not pose a serious threat to their combined military power. In 1956, Israel attacked Egypt's military capabilities. Finally, the 1967 war was related to a strategic threat that was taking place on Israel's borders.¹¹⁴

In the first war, superpower support for Israel was a diplomatic factor rather than an economic or military consideration. In 1956, Israeli concerns over Egyptian arms purchases from the USSR that might tip the regional balance of power prompted attack.

¹¹³ Freedman, (1979), Op. Cit., p. 54.

¹¹⁴ Marantz, P., *Superpower Involvement in the Middle East: Dynamics of Foreign Policy*, (Boulder: Westview Press 1985), p. 45.

In 1967, superpower engagement was clearly evident in the calculations of both parties. The regional balance of power was increasing reflecting the international balance of power.

By the time the next Arab-Israeli war broke out in 1973, the pattern of superpower intervention and regional state responses was set. Carol Saivetz has pointed out that:

During the October 1973 Middle East war, Washington and Moscow backed their respective clients, and, even as they co-operated to manage the crisis their competition had exacerbated, they risked direct confrontation to preserve their own initiatives.¹¹⁵

In this case, after Anwar Al-Sadat assumed power in Egypt following the sudden death of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, he started talking about economic and political liberalisation, and excluding the leftist elements from the power centres, followed by the deportation of the Soviet technicians from Egypt. This was sending signals to the West about his new tendencies. When he launched the October War, in co-ordination with Syria, he was aiming to bring the world's attention to the conflict, and to push forward the diplomatic process to regain the Arab occupied territories within a peaceful solution. That is why he followed the war with his famous initiative of visiting Jerusalem which opened the way to the Camp David agreements, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord of 1979. The apparent contradiction –that Al-Sadat was sending warm messages to the West but during the war found himself still to be the subject of superpower competition– can be explained by the fact that the USA policy still prioritised protection of Israel when that country seemed under threat. Equally, the Soviet Union still responded to this by taking the “other” (in this case the Arab) side. However, when the

¹¹⁵ Saivetz, C., “Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of Détente,” in O. Westad., *The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations During the Carter Years*, (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997) pp. 72-94.

war with Israel was over, and the threat to Israel reduced, America was able to respond to Al-Sadat's overtures and engage in warmer relations and ultimately mediate the peace process.¹¹⁶

The year 1979, was -as many political analysts believed- a beginning of new phase of the Cold War between the two superpowers (the "Second Cold War", as Fred Halliday calls it) that lasted through the presidency of Ronald Reagan 1980-1988. Although with the signing of the Camp David Agreements, Egypt had been removed from the front line with Israel, the conflict now simply moved to Lebanon, in particular with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 1982, which ended in the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Lebanon and the transfer of its headquarters to Tunis. During this process, the USA was clearly supportive of the Israeli position, while the PLO and the Lebanese leftists (as well as Syria) were seen as Soviet clients. The end result, therefore, represented a change in balance of power within the Middle East region and within the Arab-Israeli conflict itself. This was further evidence, if it were needed, of what Al-Sadat had already concluded; that the competition between the superpowers in the Middle East was swaying in the Americans' favour.¹¹⁷

That was not to say that America did not suffer setbacks. The United States withdrew its forces from Lebanon after suffering huge humanitarian losses, and that enabled Syria to play a major role in Lebanese politics, especially after the killing of the new elected Lebanese president Bashir Gemayel, following his signing of a peace agreement with Israel.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Dawisha, A., "Egypt," in Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 40.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 40.

¹¹⁸ See, Seal, P., "Syria," in Sayigh and Shlaim, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 72.

It is important to note that in that period, and largely as a result of the American president, Ronald Reagan's own vision of the evils of communism, the United States was determined to increase the pressure on the Soviet Union. By the Strategic Defence Initiative the American administration aimed at pushing the Soviet Union into an expensive arms race, to disrupt its economic plans, and weakening it economically. It also increased its support to the Mojahedin of Afghanistan in their war against the Soviet Union.¹¹⁹

Having summarised briefly the development of superpower engagement in the Middle East, and more specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict, we can now assess how this led to patron-client relations as a feature of the Old World Order in the Middle East. The first point to note is that the relationship between a patron and client is necessarily constrained. Great powers face a real danger of being dragged into wars with each other over relatively unimportant regional issues if their respective clients go to war. If the great powers do not come to their clients' protection, they may lose credibility with other clients, but if they do, they may end up fighting a costly war.¹²⁰ Bipolarity and the search by super-powers for allies and clients can increase the bargaining power of the smaller power, leading to a "tail wags the dog" scenario.

According to Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The Middle East is an ideal laboratory for examining this patron-client relationship in the international system." As both the United States and the Soviet Union had vital geo-strategic and economic interests in the area, both endeavoured to gain access to these resources by trying to assemble as many

¹¹⁹ Oberdorfer, D., *From the Cold War to a New Era*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 274.

¹²⁰ Goldstein, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 91-92.

clients as possible in the region.¹²¹ Equally, states in the region were receptive to superpower initiatives.

Intense regional conflicts, the area's high instability, and the difficulty of resolving conflicts -especially the Arab-Israeli conflict- politically caused local states to seek advantages in superpower patronage. Additionally, since the Middle East is a "grey area" (that is, one lacking definitive spheres of influence between the superpowers), competitions for clients is increased and allows high client manoeuvre-ability between patrons.¹²²

During the period of the Cold War, the two superpowers increased their strength economically and militarily; each of them presenting a major political and ideological line, which attracted other countries. Despite the rise of the non-aligned movement after the Bandung conference of 1955, which attracted most of newly independent countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, in reality most of these countries tended to rely on one of the two blocs. They did so either for political, ideological or strategic reasons or because of the need for military support to guarantee their security and also because these countries needed economic aid to reconstruct their economies after a very long period of colonialisation and wars. Thus, both of superpowers worked hard to attract other countries to enter economic or military co-operative relations to extend their own influence. This race between the two poles to expand their influence through the spreading of their ideologies, support for political movements, or through economic and military aid as a means to impose their influence, was more successfully pursued by the capitalist bloc, due to its economic capability and technological advancement.¹²³

¹²¹ Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., *Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 13.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹²³ Slater, D and Taylor, P., *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999).

Even states who were not members of any of the two bloc's political organisations and/or military alliances, found themselves, for political, economic and ideological reasons obliged to search for security umbrellas. One of the most important reasons, for such countries to approach one of the two blocs, was the existence of local or regional conflicts, where the parties needed to obtain political, economic and military support. Thus when one party received support from one bloc, the other party went to the other bloc for support. The two blocs suspected each other's motives in involvement in these third world conflicts and considered them as attempts to expand their influence. The evolution of a pattern of patron-client relations within a region on the basis of a bipolar division of power therefore has a snowballing effect, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.¹²⁴

The establishment of patron-client relationships between the superpowers and the sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict inter-linked the superpower conflict with the Arab-Israeli conflict. This inter-linkage meant that there was some interdependence between the two conflicts in that each one affected the other via the patron-client relationship. In other words, developments and changes in the superpower conflict influenced the Arab-Israeli conflict via the patron-client relationship and vice versa. The degree of influence of each conflict level on the other varied according to the nature of developments and changes in each conflict and to the nature of the main characteristics of each patron-client relationship (Soviet Union-Egypt-Syria- PLO; United States-Israel).¹²⁵

What is clear is that, as mentioned earlier, despite superpower desires to prevent the effects of the Arab-Israeli conflict from leading themselves into direct conflict, they have been unable to look beyond their own competition at methods of achieving or

¹²⁴ Bar-Siman-Tov, (1987), Op. Cit.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

advancing peace between Arabs and Israelis. The patron-client relationships have prevented this. Joshua Goldstein has summarised this ably:

The Cold War competition in the Middle East has had two effects. First the Cold War stalemate has effectively been imposed on the Middle East. As in many other parts of the world, conflicts and disputes arising out of local relationships have been frozen by the determination of the respective superpowers to take one side or another. For the superpowers Middle Eastern policy has constituted merely part of their respective Cold War policies. The dispute between Israel and the Arab states on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other has got caught up in the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union which effectively has prevented a solution. But the other dimension is that though the Cold War has preserved these conflicts it has also ensured that the superpowers have been very anxious to retain some degree of control over their 'clients' and to ensure that conflicts in the Middle East did not lead to direct conflict between the superpowers. The clients have been kept on a reasonably tight rein, though not without risks. So the superpower competition in the region has had the effect of keeping conflicts running whilst seeing that they do not escalate out of control.¹²⁶

It should be repeated, however, that the nature of the linkages between patrons and clients were not simple. Just as the superpowers chose their clients according to a variety of criteria –ideology, strategic value and political structure– so the regional states chose their superpower patrons for a similarly large number of reasons. Arab states like Egypt or Syria turned to the USSR, not out of love of communism but out of a need to find a pro-liberation alternative to Israel's strength.¹²⁷ Thus, it appears that the struggle between the two superpowers ideologically, militarily and politically was reflected clearly in the Middle East region. This happened through the deepness of differences between the countries of the area. Overall, the division was between radical countries rejecting the existence of Israel and the western intervention, especially the USA, on one hand, and moderate countries tending to co-operate with the West in containing the Soviet expansion and willing to resolve the Palestinian problem on the

¹²⁶ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 52.

¹²⁷ See, Hinnebush, R and Ehteshami, A., *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*, (London: Routledge, 1997).

other. The efforts made by King Hassan II of Morocco to mediate secretly between Egypt and Israel which culminated in the Dayan-Tuhami meeting, and the Fahd plan presented by the Saudi king to resolve the Arab Israeli Conflict, which I will discuss later in chapter Three, were such examples.

In summary, the history of superpower involvement in the region outlined above demonstrates that the criteria for identifying patron-client relations were met during the Cold War era. Regional states developed relations with superpower patrons whose military capabilities were far superior to their own and which could be used to defend the interests of the regional states in their own local conflicts. In return, the clients came to play a prominent role in the superpowers' own competition with one another. The lengthy duration of these relationships led to an embedded perception of a region divided according to superpower alignments. Consequently, the balance of power between regional states was multi-dimensional, depending as much on the actual or potential input of superpower patrons as on the capabilities of regional states themselves. Equally, in their relations with one another, regional states were forced to take account of a wider understanding of international relations and the dynamics and imperatives of superpower competition. In effect, unwritten "rules" were established that constrained the actions of regional states.

Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict during the Cold War

A word may briefly be said regarding the role of Europe during the Cold War. Prior to the Cold War, European powers had been dominant in the Middle East, and we need to explain why they were unable or unwilling to continue to play such a role after World War II.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ Gordon, P., *The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

Britain, which had held the Palestine Mandate, effectively abrogated responsibility for the Arab-Israeli dispute when it handed the problem over to the United Nations. With the temporary exception of the Suez crisis, its influence declined thereafter for lack of economic or military means to sustain the empire. France, in the early post-war period was concerned to contain Arab nationalist movements that challenged its own empire. These two factors effectively made Israel their natural ally in the Middle East as both found themselves rejected by the former Arab colonies. This relationship became clear with the collaboration in the Suez war and in French supplies of weapons and nuclear capabilities to Israel. This convergence of interests declined soon after Suez. While Britain, as has already been pointed out, began to tie its Middle East policy to an increasing American role in the region, France under De Gaulle attempted to take a more independent line. Although he was not specifically pro-Arab, the Arabs were able to take advantage of his distancing himself from an American-led alliance. De Gaulle halted the French involvement in the Israeli nuclear programme for example while the French criticism of Israel enhanced its position in the Arab world. The French policy of encouraging those countries that wished not to be part of any of the two-principle bloc gave France a position in the Third World, which continued for many years. France's approach towards the Middle East was by now contradicting that of many of its European partners. The French point of view was that the unconditional support of Israel would lead to increasing the violence, widening the conflict and a Soviet entrenchment, and introducing into the region the most fearsome aspects of the Cold War.¹²⁹

The 1967 war shed light on the behaviour of those European states, which had chosen to align themselves with the American policy. They did not present any proposals to settle the conflict. It is true that Britain, supported by France, proposed

¹²⁹ De La Gorce, (1997), *Op. Cit.*, p. 10.

Israeli withdrawal in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, but the American conditions remained without any major changes.¹³⁰ In sum, the European countries allowed the establishment of a regional strategic and political balance, in which they had no role to play. The reason behind the general European acceptance at being excluded or exempted from the scene, not only in that moment, but in the years to come was partly due to the mentalities resulting from World War II. That mentalities pushed them to believe that every thing depended on the American protection, and their acceptance of the USA as their common leader. In the case of the Middle East, the unwillingness to criticise Israel (especially from Germany) and the sensitivity towards the influence of the pro-Israeli circles played undoubtedly an important role. At the same time, Europe itself no longer had any real great powers who could compete with the USA or USSR for influence – indeed Western Europe depended on the USA to defend it from the East. The European states had no collective mechanism for making a foreign policy together, and were more concerned with preserving their own security through the Cold War than managing that of others. It has been said that the discrepancy between the USA and European positions on the conflict was the result of the different degrees to which the two sides of the alliance depended on Arab oil. Equally likely, is the fact that European governments did not face the same domestic pressures from a pro-Zionist lobby as the USA who argued loudly that Israel was a vital American strategic asset during the Cold War period?¹³¹

As Philip Gordon pointed out:

Two main features have characterised US and European roles in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The first is the pre-eminence of the US in regional diplomacy; the second

¹³⁰ See, Whitbeck, J., "Could Europe Produce Middle East Peace?" *Palestine-Israel Journal*, vol. iv, no. 3, 1997, p. 72.

¹³¹ See, Haikal, M., *Harb Alkhleej, The Gulf War*, (Cairo: 1994).

has been the US alignment with Israel, while the Europeans took a position closer to that of the Arab states.¹³²

Because of the weight of the Jewish community in the USA, the influence of the Zionist lobby was unprecedented. The domination over the media, and the political, financial and economic institutions was evident.¹³³ This fact stood behind the nature of the relationship between the USA and Israel and America's policies in the Middle East. Steven Rosen believed that: "in the 1980s, the existence of a clear and definable threat made it easier for Americans to think in strategic terms. Israel was then more a strategic asset than today when Americans don't have an agreed-on national purpose or strategy."¹³⁴

Those who believe that Israel was and still is a strategic asset to the USA present the case of the 1970 events in Jordan as an example. Charles Krauthammer pointed out in an article entitled "the US-Israel Relationship" published in *Middle East Quarterly* that: "the United States used Israel in 1970 as a very concrete strategic asset to prevent a Syrian invasion of Jordan."¹³⁵ For Europe, there were no such strategic concerns, which Israel could act as an asset to protect.

Therefore, for whatever reason, the West European countries were involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to a far lesser degree than the United States. Unlike the USA, they

¹³² Gordon, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 15.

¹³³ Hayward, M., "The Making of the New World Order and the Media," in Ismael, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 228.

¹³⁴ Rosen, S., "Debate about U.S.-Israel Relationship, Still Special?" *Middle East Quarterly*, December 1998, pp. 54-65.

¹³⁵ Krauthammer, C., "The U.S.-Israel Relationship, *Middle East Quarterly*," December 1998, pp. 53-65.

lacked the power base from which to conduct an influential Middle East diplomacy, and their interest in the region was based mainly on economic factors.

Summary

The purpose of this chapter on the Old World Order was to build a theoretical framework for this study. Together with chapter two (the New World Order) these two chapters will provide the tools of analysis that I want to apply on the Arab-Israeli peace process in its stages throughout these two World Orders.

I have discussed various interpretations for the Old World Order (the Cold War) presented by two schools of thoughts, realism/neo-realism and Liberalism/new-Liberalism. From these I have chosen to utilise a neo-realist methodology which examines international relations through the concepts of balance and distribution of power and "rules of the game".

The Old World Order was defined as "the pattern of international relations that dominated following the end of World War II." The Cold War according to my eclectic approach is a term describing the nature of international relations during the period 1945-89 between the capitalist and communist blocs. The relations were relations of War but without direct military conflict.

In this chapter I also described the characters of the Cold War as bipolarity and competition between two camps. The bipolarity can be understood as a distribution of power between the two superpowers.

The Middle East was highly affected by the Cold War. The superpowers penetrated the region to the extent that it became the main field for struggle between them. The relations between the two states and regional actors of the Middle East came to mirror the relations between the superpowers, with regional states aligning themselves with one or other of the superpowers as client states, and engaging with one

another on that basis. The regional balance of power therefore increasingly reflected the international balance of power.

The evolution of patron-client relation's pattern within a region on the basis of a bipolar division of power therefore has a snowballing effect, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. The superpower conflict (the Cold War) was inter-linked with the Arab-Israeli conflict by the establishment of patron-client relationships between the superpowers and the sides to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two conflicts on both international and regional levels influenced each other.

The Cold War competition in the Middle East had profound effects on its issues. Chapter Three will demonstrate how the Cold War stalemate was effectively imposed on the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process were frozen because of superpowers conflict. As April Carter pointed out rightly "The Cold War between the USA and USSR, which structured world politics for forty years, restricted the possibilities for peace action,"¹³⁶ and thus a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was prevented by the antagonism between two superpowers. Before embarking on that, however, let us turn to an examination of the New World Order; its definition and its implications for the Middle East.

¹³⁶ Carter, A., *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics Since 1945*, (London: Longman, 1992), p. 27.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Today, a New World Order is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle a world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility of freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.¹

(George Bush, 11 September 1990)

Introduction

The New World Order is a term used to describe the new pattern of international relations, which emerged following the end of the Cold War. There can be no doubt that such a new pattern of international relations did in fact emerge in the international arena and, more specifically, in relations between the major powers of the globe. The most significant features of this New World Order are the decline of the Soviet Union and the fact that the USA remains as a superpower.

For writers such as Molly Cochran, who argues that the New World Order represents, "... a unique situation, describing an altered state of international relations from what has gone before,"² the existence of this New World Order has been signalled by a number of events. These events include the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Warsaw pact, the START I and II treaties, the war in Yugoslavia and the military operations authorised by the UN to oust Iraq from Kuwait and to provide humanitarian

¹ Cochran, M., "The World Order and International Political Theory," *Paradigms*, vol. 8, no. 1, Summer 1994, p. 108. See also Appendices, p. 368.

² *Ibid.*, p. 106.

aid to Somalia. For her, as for others, it is clear that talk of bipolar international relations is nonsensical in this new political landscape. Indeed, there is a general agreement between writers and politicians that there has been a fundamental change in the status and politics of the international system, that the ideological struggle, military competition, arms race, media war and other Cold War features which dominated the last forty years ended with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and, thus, the world is now witnessing new and different form of international relations. It is surely new because it is different from the old, although it is not clear yet what it is or what form the new order will ultimately take.

This chapter seeks to define the term New World Order and to determine whether the criteria which justify its usage have actually been present in the post-Cold War era; to identify the causes of such changes and their specific impact upon the international system; to identify the signposts and symptoms which indicate that fundamental changes have occurred in the world order; and, finally, to examine the symptoms of, and impact on the Middle East, of this New World Order. The chapter asserts that a New World Order has indeed emerged since the late 1980s. The principal causal factor in its establishment was the decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union which removed one superpower from a previously bipolar system, allowed the other an unprecedented opportunity at hegemonic self-assertion, and required all of the other states in the international system to re-evaluate their respective positions within it. The chapter continues to identify a number of "symptoms" which provide evidence of this New World Order. These include the bombing of Libya in 1986, the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the nature of the UN's military operations in Iraq in 1991. I will then proceed to examine the characteristics or features of this New World Order and its impact on the Middle East.

A survey of the literature reveals that international relations theories have not been able to keep up with the accelerated changes in the international system in the last decade and that there is no consensus on the direction or future shape of the international order. Analysts have, however, provided a number of ideas and interpretations of the pattern of international relations in the New World Order, including ideas of unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. In truth, the ideas of writers such as Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Nye, Charles Krauthammer, Walden Bello, Michael Hogan, John Lewis Gaddis, Martin Walker, Fred Halliday, Stanley Hoffman and many others,³ appear, frequently, to raise more questions than they answer. From Paul Kennedy's book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, to Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, to Fukuyama's End of History and the articles of Stanley Hoffman's "A New World and its Troubles" and Joseph Nye's "What New World Order?" writers seem unable to establish a clear and comprehensive theory of the international relations of the post Cold War world, and their use of the term "The New World Order" leads to more questions rather than establishing a complete projection of what that order is or will be.

³ See Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, Charles Krauthammer's "The Unipolar Moment", Walden Bello's *Dark Victory: the United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty*, Michael Hogan's *The End of the Cold War*, John Lewis Gaddis's *Toward the post-Cold War World*, Martin Walker's *The Cold War: A History*, Stanley Hoffman's "A New World and its Troubles", Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great powers* and Fred Halliday's *The Making of the Second Cold War*.

Most of those writers⁴ do agree on some points: 1- that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a turning point from one era to another. 2- the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end to ideological hegemony of communism as an alternative to western "capitalism". 3- the end of the Cold War led to a reduction of the possibility of nuclear confrontation and East-West military confrontation. 4- the United States became the only superpower in a unipolar world. They could not agree however on whether the USA would continue to be the only superpower or whether a multipolar system would eventually emerge.⁵

Focusing on the elements upon which most writers are able to agree, in this chapter I will conclude that the neo-realist notion of unipolarity with America playing the role of global hegemon is the most convincing interpretation given the evidence of recent events. However, this may be only a temporary situation since the balance of power is still fluctuating and factors other than military projection capability do play a role in determining relations in the international system today.

Definition of New World Order

As was explained in Chapter One, a World Order is a pattern of relations between the international actors in a specific period, and, when this pattern of relations changes, we find ourselves confronted by a New World Order. According to William Olson, who takes a realist view of international relations, "a New World Order occurs whenever the

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

fundamental power ratio changes.”⁶ In other words, a New World Order occurs when there is a fundamental redistribution of power in the international system.⁷

However, Stanley Hoffman presents a strongly contrasting view of world order. According to Hoffman a world order has usually been understood as the practices that allow for the restraint of parties in international disputes that threaten relative security and stability. Thus a New World Order, in his view, would mean the existence of new practices and rules of play in the international system.⁸

From these two positions, we might assume that a New World Order exists when a fundamental redistribution of power takes place, which in turn creates objective conditions within which new unwritten rules of engagement become relevant for all states within the international community. Although the term ‘New World Order’ was first coined by the then USA President George Bush as late as 1991, such a fundamental shift in the distribution of power had clearly taken place some years earlier as the Soviet Union began to alter its policies and lose its ability to project its own power within the international system in the mid-1980s. The final collapse of the USSR in 1991 led to the end of the bipolar order, which had dominated the international system since 1945 and demanded that the other players in the international system should respond quickly to the absence of a counter-balancing power to the USA.

⁶ Olson, W., *International Relations, Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation*, (New York: Routledge, 1992).

⁷ See, Hoffman, S., “A New World and its Troubles,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, no. 4, 1990, p. 115-122.

⁸ See, Hoffman, S., *Contemporary Theory in International Relations*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1960).

With the collapse of an international balance based on the existence of two superpowers following the effective collapse of one of these superpowers, questions arose such as; will the new balance be based on multiple poles? Or will the USA remain as the sole pole in a unipolar system? And if so until when? Is the unipolarity a transitional stage towards multipolarity similar to the multipolarity of the last century? Or is it the "end of history?" Responses to these questions have varied. There are supporters of the notion that the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet pole presented the ultimate prevalence of Western capitalism, the latter having proved its ability to survive, and that history had given its final judgement that capitalism and Western liberal thought won this battle that continued for about half a century. Francis Fukuyama's argument that we have reached the end of history will be discussed as an example later in this chapter. On the other hand, there are those who feel that the unipolarity is merely a transitional stage that will not continue for long, and that the world will head towards either a new bipolarity or a multipolarity similar to that at the end of the last century. Such arguments are based on the notion that world order requires a balance of power. Until such a balance is achieved, the world order is necessarily fluctuating and in a transition stage. This transformation may be attributed to the diverse nature of global power.

As well as a new balance and distribution of power, a New World Order would require new "rules". According to neo-realist assumptions, states will inevitably continue to pursue their own national interests. However, a New World Order implies that the environment within which they do so has changed, with resulting changes in the limitations and constraints upon their behaviour. It is my argument that in effect the norms emerging from the domination of superpower rivalry over international relations have been replaced with new norms determined by American hegemony over the

international system. In a unipolar New World Order in which the United States has no rival, the rules are being set by the only remaining superpower.

The speech by USA President George Bush to the USA Congress in 1991, which is seen by many as having been the real declaration of the New World Order, outlined what are, arguably, the guiding principles. In his speech, President Bush declared a New World Order in which "the principles of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the strong." In the absence of superpower competition, the United Nations would play a revived and revitalised role in ensuring that states abided by a code of conduct which broadly corresponded to Western ideas of moral right and wrong. Rogue states would be excluded from international activity, while incentives of inclusion would attract many states to play the game. He argued that the major international changes, which had occurred at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, culminating in the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, provided more opportunities for co-operation and consistency in international affairs.⁹ Thus, according to Joshua Goldstein, the "New World Order" is a set of norms, proposed by President Bush, for international behaviour in the post-Cold War era.¹⁰

The "New World Order" envisioned by U.S. President Bush during the Iraq-Kuwait crisis included four principles: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples. Some of the principles are based more on practical considerations (reduced arsenals) and others on more explicitly moral standards (just treatment of all peoples). These principles represent the interest that the United States and other great powers have in a stable world order. This new order found little solid ground to stand on in the post-Cold War era, however. One problem with rapid change is that nobody knows what to expect; norms break down because leaders do not have common expectations. Through a long process of coping with a sequence of cases, international leaders build up new understandings of the rules of the game. In the 1990s the rules have clearly changed. For example, President Bush's last secretary of state, who helped keep the United States aloof from the Bosnia crisis in 1992, said later that if the Cold War had still been going on he

⁹ See President Bush's Speech, appendices, p. 368.

¹⁰ Goldstein, J., *International Relations*, (New York: Longman, 1999), p. 333.

would have advised U.S. leaders to "jump in with both feet." Thus, the end of the Cold War put basic expectations, such as when U.S. military intervention is warranted, up for grabs. These new norms remained unsettled in the late 1990s. New expectations were emerging in such areas as human rights, U.N. peacekeeping,¹¹ Russia's and China's role as great powers, and the role of the U.S. superpower.

There are thus two dimensions to the new "rules" of international relations. Firstly, the international environment is one which is governed by moral and legal norms dictated by the United States rather than by the real-politik of norms negotiated by superpower rivalries. These new norms are to be enforced by international institutions like the United Nations, making such institutions the tools of an international order shaped around US interests and moral judgements. Inevitably these moral judgements and interests are not necessarily shared by all states but for those who reject them in principle, there is no alternative "umbrella" under which to hide. Rather than being on one side or another, states must now be either "in" or "out", with sanctions being levied against those who choose to be "out". On the other hands, states must necessarily continue to seek to advance their own national interests, as they did under the Old World Order. Therefore the dynamic for engagement is the same but the constraints upon that engagement have changed.

According to the new rules other players are not allowed great movement in areas where they used to play an important role. Russia and Europe for example, are not allowed to play important roles in the Middle East peace process. The United States is intervening militarily in areas, which were considered red line areas during the Cold War such as Iraq, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. Chechnya is a clear example of how the rules of the game are respected by the international powers. The United States can not intervene militarily in an area in which Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons in the case of any foreign military intervention. Throughout this thesis, I will show how

¹¹ Ibid., p. 290.

both the distribution of power and the rules of the game affected the behaviour of states and other regional actors.

Having discussed the question of the existence of a New World Order, having found a quite general agreement on its existence as an alternative to the Old World Order (the Cold War and ideological struggle), and having defined that New World Order in terms of new power arrangements and new consequential "rules" governing the international behaviour of states, two questions need now to be discussed. Firstly, it is necessary to determine at what point in time this New World Order can be said to have emerged. To understand this emergence, we also need to identify the indications of its arrival. Secondly, we can attempt to identify the features of this unprecedented order and the new pattern of relations between states, especially between the major powers.

Identifying the Starting Point of the New World Order

The New World Order became a commonplace term by the start of the 1990s. Yet the point of origin for this New World Order has been viewed differently by different analysts, who have, in turn, viewed its emergence from different angles. Although it was not until after the second Gulf War, and, more precisely, the 6th of March 1991, that President George Bush declared a New World Order, the events indicating the beginning of such a New World Order can be traced back to well before that. One clear sign of change was the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union in 1985 and his subsequent pursuit of policies based on "new thinking". While some¹² have identified policies such as reconstruction (Perestroika) and openness (Glasnost) as the starting point for changes towards a different system of international relations,

¹² See, Thomas, F., *Glasnost, Gorbachev and Lenin: Behind the New Thinking*, (London: Polity Research, 1988).

others¹³ believe that it is the effective collapse of the Soviet empire, the independence of some of its former republics and the assumption of power in Russia by Boris Yeltsin that marked the era of change. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan compounded by a severe economic crisis only served to further destroy Soviet prestige in world politics. One might also argue that it was the fall of the Berlin Wall, the declaration of the unification of Germany and the collapse of the other Eastern European regimes, which provided the starting point.

Alternatively, can the Second Gulf War, and the creation of the international coalition against Iraq under the leadership of the USA compounded by Russian cooperation -as presented by its agreement on all UN resolutions concerned- be considered as the starting point for the New World Order? In this context, one might question whether it was the war, the coalition or President Bush's speech to the Congress on 6 March 1991 itself, in which he spoke clearly and publicly about New World Order, that acted as the real starting point for that order.

I would also argue that two other events signified major changes in the international system resulting from, or providing evidence of, a changing balance of power. Both the USA bombing of Libya in 1986 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 demonstrated that the relative power of the United States and the Soviet Union was fluctuating and that a straight forward bipolar division was transformed, with consequences for the way in which other players in the international system had to define their own positions.

¹³ Bluth, C., *The Collapse of Soviet Military Power*, (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995).

New Thinking in Soviet Politics

The new thinking or policies of Mikhail Gorbachev known as Perestroika and Glasnost (reconstruction and openness), undoubtedly marked a turning point, at least in the history of the USSR. It is clear that Gorbachev's reform policies in the middle of the 1980s stemmed from his awareness of the extent of the crisis suffered by the communist bloc in general and the USSR in particular, both at the economic level - presented in the economic crisis which resulted from the ineffectiveness of the planned economy system, and the political crisis which resulted from public dissatisfaction with the political domination of one political party in an age of information revolution.¹⁴ Additionally the military defeat -especially in Afghanistan- provided an early and basic cause of political changes, not only in the Soviet Union but also in the communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Third World in general. The Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan in 1979 but, as with the USA war in Vietnam, the Soviet Union for all its military strength could not defeat rebels supported by the opposing superpower. The Soviets ultimately withdrew after almost a decade of war that considerably weakened the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Not only did the war drain the Soviet economy, but the inability of the Soviet military to assert its control over a territory on which it had set its heart both divided political forces within the union and indicated its weaknesses to internal and external opposition forces.

The centrepiece of Gorbachev's reforms was the launching within the Soviet Union of a process of economic and political liberalisation intended to relieve the crisis.¹⁶ These internal reforms were paralleled by the Soviet desire to liberate itself

¹⁴ See Galeotti, M., *Gorbachev and His Revolution*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).

¹⁵ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 43.

¹⁶ See, Brown, A., *The Gorbachev Factor*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

from its costly commitments to its Eastern European satellites, which had been a buffer zone against the West since the beginning of the 1940s.¹⁷ Combined with pressures for democratic change from within those countries, this led in some cases, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, to the establishment of democratic governments in the former Soviet periphery. The culmination of this process was Soviet support for the unification of Germany in December 1990, although such support was to some extent "purchased" by tens of billions of dollars in German aid.¹⁸ Such events opened the way for many more demands for independence, notably from the Baltic republics, and other southern republics such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine.¹⁹

Gorbachev's new thinking in domestic or internal Soviet Union policy had profound implications for Soviet foreign policy, which witnessed a major transformation based on the abandonment of communist ideology and all that it entailed, for enemies and allies alike. The new foreign policy was based on practical considerations, one of which was the economic cost of strategic competition with the West and the consequent need to end international tensions in such a way as to facilitate the resolution of domestic problems, especially those in the economic sphere.²⁰ To some extent the objectives were similar to those of the Détente Policy, pursued by Brezhnev,

¹⁷ Sakwa, R., *Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985-1990*, (New York: Allan, 1990), p. 316.

¹⁸ Cooper, L., *Russia and the World: New State-of-Play on the International Stage*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999).

¹⁹ See, Lane, D., *Soviet Society Under Prestroika*, (London: Routledge, 1990).

²⁰ Ibid.

in which he aimed at achieving a secure and comfortable international environment in order to be able to promote the Soviet economy.²¹

Gorbachev's new thinking thus required a Soviet foreign policy in line with a new understanding of the place of, and the role to be played by the Soviet Union in today's world. In general terms, the new thinking posited the idea of global interdependence generated by the existence of a global economy and the global nature of problems like the environment and nuclear weapons.²² This interdependence in the modern era demanded, according to the new thinking, a de-ideologisation of foreign policy and a search for a balance of interests between states instead of the pursuit of a zero-sum-game competition.²³ (It is worth noting, however, that some have argued that, in reality, the new foreign policy was simply a new practical and tactical approach for achieving the objectives of expansionism and international hegemony to which the Soviet Union had long adhered.)²⁴ All these factors contributed to producing a new view towards regional conflicts and, as we shall see later in the chapter, were bound to have an impact on the frozen Middle East situation.²⁵

Collapse and Disintegration of the Soviet Union

The combination of weaknesses in Gorbachev's new thinking, the economic crisis and the defeat in Afghanistan was crucial to a series of events which are much more clearly

²¹ See, Brown, A., *New Thinking in Soviet Politics*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992).

²² Ibid.

²³ See, Sakwa, (1990), Op. Cit., p. 316.

²⁴ Brown, A., *The Gorbachev Factor*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

²⁵ Aruri, N., *The Obstruction of Peace*, (London: Common Courage Press, 1995), p.120.

representative of real change in the structure of the world order, notably the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the achievement of independence by some of its former republics.²⁶

The speedy collapse of the Soviet Union and the successive failures of a number of communist regimes in Eastern Europe were a shock to many and posed real challenges to political analysts, thinkers and politicians. The disintegration of the Soviet empire not only unbalanced world politics, but also released previously suppressed energies in the form of national identities which have subsequently proved remarkably unaccommodating to the idea of any newly ordered world.²⁷ Of course, the major result of the collapse of the Soviet Union from the perspective of international politics, was the end of the old bipolar order that had persisted for nearly half a century.²⁸ It is no surprise then that realists date the New World Order from this collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The international security landscape was irrevocably changed. As Douglas Hurd, then British Foreign Minister was to remark, empires have declined and fallen before, "but this one went with unprecedented speed and totality. Consequences of that collapse will be with us for decades to come. No longer do we have the simplicity, albeit an expensive simplicity, of deciding our security policy in the light of a single massive threat from the East".²⁹

²⁶ Goldstein, J., (1999), Op. Cit., p. 44.

²⁷ Axford, B., *The Global System: Economics, Politics and Culture*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 183.

²⁸ Nye, J., "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, pp. 83-96.

²⁹ Hurd, D., "Foreign Policy and International Security," *IBRU*, July 1993, p. 50.

Fall of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe

The collapse of the Eastern European regimes coincided with a swift decline in Soviet power, which culminated ultimately with the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. The loss of their patron state compounded with encouragement from the West for movements demanding democratic change brought about the respective ends of the totalitarian regimes in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and East Germany. This, in turn, was to have a profound effect on the Soviet Union itself, and inspired calls for independence by ethnic and national grounds from within, adding impetus to the processes which led to the final collapse of the Soviet Union itself in 1991. In terms of the New World Order, the fall of the dictatorial communist regimes in Eastern Europe was both a result of a changing international balance of power (in the West's favour) and indicated the response of Eastern European states to the new international conditions created by this change.³⁰

In sum, events within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the 1980s culminated in the relegation of the Soviet Union, and later The Russian Federation from the superpower league, leaving that realm to the sole remaining super power, the United States of America. Consequently, all the Soviet Union's patron-client relations inevitably came in for reassessment: the Soviet Union was no longer either willing or able to fulfil the responsibilities of a patron, forcing its clients to look elsewhere for economic, diplomatic and military assistance. Moreover, regional actors around the world were forced to reassess their own place in the international order and in relationship to the US in particular.

³⁰ Brown, (1992), Op. Cit.

Bombing of Libya in 1986

The evidence of change in the international order was not only seen in and around the Soviet Union itself. The decline of Soviet power left the USA with more room to manoeuvre and pursue its own interests in the international environment. Two clear examples of this, both of which took place within the Middle East region, were the bombing of Libya in 1986 and the military operations against Iraq in 1991.

The USA's bombing of Libya in April 1986 was an early indication of the USA's desire and capacity to act as a lone superpower. It felt able to act without permission from the United Nations Security Council and without fear of any Soviet reaction. Several days after a bomb exploded in the La'belle discotheque in West Berlin, resulting in some injuries to American soldiers, the USA, with help from Britain, bombed the Libyan capital Tripoli, in the west of the country, and Benghazi, the second city, in the east, and many civilians were killed. Although the USA utilised the logistic support of the United Kingdom in this adventure, it did not feel any need to seek a mandate from the United Nations or to consult with the Soviet Union before taking action in an unstable region in which both superpowers had previously been extremely conscious of the ramifications, within the Cold War conflict, of their actions towards regional states. Critics of this act have sometimes attributed the American decision to the personal characteristics of the American president at the time, Ronald Reagan, but irrespective of the attack's causation, the fact that America "got away with it" in this instance, without any meaningful form of international censure, indicates how greatly the international system had already changed since the days of the Cuban missile crisis or the Six Day War. This argument is supported by Dr Majdi Omar, who has pointed out that the period from 1986 onwards also saw the USA tending to intervene directly in other international conflicts, launching an economic offensive on the oil-producing

countries to reduce their prices, and intervening in the policies of the Soviet Union, all indicating, for him, significant early changes in the international arena.³¹

The Second Gulf War

The problem with the Gulf War of 1991 from the perspective of this study, is knowing whether it represented a turning point in the creation of the New World Order, or whether it was simply the first test of such an order, or indeed whether it may be viewed as both. Joshua Goldstein in arguing that the Gulf War, like Bosnia, has been one of the two key defining conflicts of the post-Cold War era³² would seem to be taking the last of those positions. (In his opinion, the New World Order passed its first major test “the Gulf War” but proved much shakier on the second test “Bosnia”). By contrast, Don Oberdorfer saw the Gulf War more positively as demonstrating “unprecedented cooperation between Washington and Moscow [which] gave rise to hopes for a New World Order in which the two nuclear superpowers would stand together against international troublemakers”.³³ This belief was based on the argument that “by the dawning of the 1990s, a web of political and personal connections had been created between the leaders, governments, and peoples of the USA and the Soviet Union”. Given that we have here an analyst who sees the New World Order not in terms of the

³¹ Omar, M., *Altaghiurat fi Al-nidam Al-dawli wa atharuha ala alsharq alawsat, The Changes in the World Order and its Impact on the Middle East*, (Amman: Dar Al-Bashir, 1995), p. 29.

³² Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. xii.

³³ Oberdorfer, D., *From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991*, (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 9.

collapse of the Soviet Union but in terms of superpower cooperation, it is small wonder that there is a lack of clarity as to the role of the Gulf War in the New World Order. The theme of co-operation is also found in Lawrence Freedman's understanding of the New World Order. According to Freedman "the slogan of the USA's vision of the next stage of international relations after the end of the Cold War is the "New World Order" proclaimed by President Bush during the early stages of the Gulf crisis. He emphasised that a set of opportunities for more harmonious and co-operative international affairs had been put at risk by Iraq's act of blatant illegality."³⁴ This vision of cooperation having replaced super-power-led confrontation/conflict in the international system provides an indication that, with the altering balance of power (due to the decline of the Soviet Union) new patterns of engagement in the international system were emerging which included Soviet acknowledgement that, in their state of diminished power and, with crisis on their own doorstep, cooperation with the United States (through the U.N. or otherwise) was a more effective strategy. This suggests that the New World Order was in existence *before* the Gulf War and that the war tested that New World Order. However, the Gulf War itself served to shape the nature of the emerging New World Order.

From the beginning of the Kuwait crisis, the United States monitored and controlled, in one way or another, the diplomatic process to find a peaceful solution to the problem.³⁵ It seemed to many, especially in the Arab world, that the USA had its own agenda and conspired to drive the crisis in a certain direction.³⁶ The Arab

³⁴ Freedman, L., "Order and Disorder in the New World," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1, 1992, p. 22.

³⁵ Haikal, M., *Harb Alkhleej, The Gulf War*, (Cairo: 1994).

³⁶ Ibid.

governments were not allowed to exhaust all possible efforts to find an Arab solution. Instead of trying to pursue more diplomatic routes, the USA started, on the 7th of August 1990 five days after Iraq entered Kuwait, to deploy its forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. It maintained control on all diplomatic channels and influenced all parties to stick to its position of no compromise or concession.³⁷ Consequently, the USA acted to block any proposals that could have made it possible for Iraq to withdraw without losing face. The UN Secretary General was given only the role of a messenger who could not negotiate or take decisions himself to solve the problem.³⁸ In his meeting with Tareq Aziz, James Baker issued ultimatums rather than attempting to use persuasion or find an alternative to the war.³⁹ It can be argued, then, that the USA's hidden agenda was to attack Saddam and to destroy his military machine in order to realise a bigger regional design that served America's interests in the post-Cold War era.

Despite the different opinions as to the starting point of the New World Order, most analysts agree that the speech by the American president, George Bush to the American Congress in March 1991, was the real acknowledgement of such a New World Order. In his speech, which followed the cessation of military operations against Iraq, he declared a new order, in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against the strong."⁴⁰

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided - a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0998, A/1, 16/1/1991.

³⁹ Haikal, (1994), Op. Cit.

⁴⁰ Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Responding to the Economics of Globalisation," *Critique*, Fall 1996, no 9, p. 67.

Now, we can see a New World coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a New World Order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against the strong..." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.

The Gulf war put this New World to its first test and my fellow Americans, we passed that test. For the sake of our principles, for the sake of the Kuwaiti people, we stood our ground. Because the world would not look the other way, Ambassador [Saud Nasir] al-Sabah, tonight, Kuwait is free.

Tonight as our troops begin to come home, let us recognise that the hard work of freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars." Even the New World Order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission.⁴¹

The principles on which the New World Order was therefore to be based were: peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of all peoples.

In sum, as we have seen, there were many indications of profound change in the international system and the World Order dating back to the mid-1980s. Gorbachev's new thinking and policies following his assumption of responsibility as Secretary General of the Communist party in 1985 and the bombing by the USA of Libya in 1986, which at that time had close relations with the Soviet Union, were the earliest indications of a changing balance of power. Evidence of the international community accommodating itself to the new balance of power (and the diminished power of the Soviet Union) came later when the Eastern European states broke free of Soviet domination and indeed when the republics of the Soviet Union itself began to seek, and eventually to achieve, independence. The Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated clearly that this wave of adaptation had spread to regional conflicts beyond the Soviet Union's immediate realms and that the international community, led by the USA was adopting new formulae for international behaviour in a post bipolar era, the terms of which were

⁴¹ President George Bush Address to Joint Session of Congress on the Middle East, See, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. xx, no. 4, Summer, 1991, Issue 80, p. 181.

spelled out in President Bush's speech on 6th of March.

Characteristics of New World Order

Having argued that a New World Order was in evidence by the end of the Gulf War (1991), it now becomes necessary to determine the characteristics or "shape" of that New World Order. In other words, it is crucial to determine the nature of the new global balance of power and the criteria by which states in the international community identify themselves with, or accommodate themselves to, that balance of power.

The World Order and the pattern of international relations which persisted during the period from the end of World War II in 1945 to the end of the Cold War 1990 were characterised by struggle, competition and rivalry between the Soviet-led Eastern communist bloc and the US-led Western capitalist bloc. This struggle had ideological dimensions but was also an economic, geo-political, and strategic struggle between two confrontational camps that competed in all fields. Bipolarisation became the main feature of the international order, with the military race and, in particular, the nuclear balance of terror, acting as determinants for international order.

If that was the character of the World Order during that period which we called "Old", should we now proceed to differentiate it from what has followed. What then, are the characteristics of the New World Order?

The end of the bipolarity opened the door to many possibilities. Unipolarity, multipolarity, bipolarity of a new kind, and a clash of civilisations has all been suggested as the possible outcomes for the New World. Writers, thinkers and political analysts have discussed all these possibilities. I will now discuss each of them for better understand of their distinctive characteristics, and to establish which of them is more credible and nearer to reality. This is essential because of the crucial effect such characteristics will have for determining the pattern of relations with respect to the

regional systems, especially the Middle East. Obviously, the shape of the New World Order may have a very great significance for the central regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli peace process.

No New Order

Some writers believe that there is no New World Order, and that "the world order created in the 1940s is still with us and in many way stronger than ever."⁴²

In an article entitled "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos" G. John Ikenberry wrote that:

What ended with the Cold War were bipolarity, the nuclear stalemate, and decades of containment of the Soviet Union. But the world order created in the middle to late 1940s endures, more extensive and in some respects more robust than during its Cold War years.⁴³

According to him, attempts in recent years describing various versions of the post-Cold War order failed, because there is no such creature. "The task is not to discover a new order but to reclaim the old".⁴⁴

Ikenberry might be right that some aspects of the Old Order are still with us, but we can surely see that the bottom line of that order, namely the bipolar order, which was based on the balance of power and the ideological and political competition has been changed completely.

⁴² Ikenberry, J., "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 79-91.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 79.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 81.

Chaos

There are those who predict that the post-Cold War era will not see new order but a kind of disorder. The world does not need to be reminded that it exists in a formal state of anarchy as Richard Rosecrance for example has written:

There is no international government. Nor is there sufficient interdependence or division of labour among states to transform international relations into a social system akin to domestic affairs. Under prevailing circumstances there are only three methods by which that anarchic system can be regulated or prevented from lapsing into chaos: the traditional balance of power; nuclear deterrence; and rule by a central coalition. Each system has been employed at different times during the last two hundred years.⁴⁵

The New World Order has been seen and described by some Third World governments as a New World Disorder.⁴⁶ The misuse of the United Nations to serve the interests of certain states -in particular the American and Western powers- force many in the Third World to see the proclaimed New World Order negatively.

Bipolarity

Many writers believe that human history has always demonstrated the existence of two worlds, and there has always been a division of people between "us" and "them", our "civilisation" and those "Barbarians", etc. Some scholars have analysed the world on the basis of "Orient" and "Occident", "North" and "South", "centre" and "periphery", "peace camp" and "war camp", "Darul-Harb" and "Darul-Islam". "Bipolarity" is a form of balance of power that polarises the world into two camps. Bipolarity is based on a distribution of power between two main antagonists. Also, it is

⁴⁵ Rosecrance, R., "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 64.

⁴⁶ Media in Iraq and Libya for example described it as such.

a system where power is distributed between the two countries in a form in which the two countries are too powerful and able to defend themselves against any combination of states.

According to Goldstein a "bipolar system has two predominant states or two great rival alliance blocs. This was the structure of world politics during the Cold War. Tight bipolar systems, such as the East-West stand-off in the 1950s, may be distinguished from looser ones such as the one that developed when China and (to a lesser extent) France split off from their respective alliance blocs. The USA-Soviet stand-off seemed to provide stability and peace to superpower relations."⁴⁷

In the aftermath of the Cold War, some thought that a new form of bipolarity might emerge in world politics. Joseph Nye wrote that "Before the failure of the August coup and the final collapse of the Soviet Union, some argued that a newly repressive Soviet or Russian regime would create a harsh international climate and a return to the Cold War."⁴⁸ However, in addition to bipolarity based on ideological diversity (Capitalism/Communism) or two superpowers, there are other forms of theoretically possible bipolarity such as West versus East, industrial countries versus non-industrial and North versus South, for which there is some evidence today.

For example, the increase in wealth, development, unity, Cupertino and coordination of industrial Western countries on the one hand, and backwardness and fragmentation of Third World countries on the other, has created a kind of bipolarity and a hostile relationship in this economic division which embodies a contradiction in interests. This perspective has been interpreted as a North-South axis, to the extent that Alain Lipetz predicted that the twenty first century will start with war between the

⁴⁷ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 85.

⁴⁸ Nye, (1992), Op. Cit., pp. 83-96.

North and South.⁴⁹ As Joshua Goldstein pointed out "The most important global division is now the North-South gap between the world's rich and poor regions".⁵⁰

Others have argued that the end of the capitalist-communist bipolarity of the Cold War has led to the enhancement of a new bipolarity between the industrial liberal west and the rest of the world, made up of the underdeveloped, non-industrial countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The dualism of "west and east", or "west and rest" does not always have an economic base. Indeed, for some, it is primarily to be seen as a cultural bipolarity. For Samuel Huntington, the dichotomy is still more profound.

Clash of Civilisations

In the Westphalian era, wars were conflicts between kings and emperors to expand their territories and economies. With the French revolution, the wars became conflicts between nation states. This pattern of the nineteenth century continued until World War I. Following the Russian revolution and the reactions against it, the conflict between nations evolved into a conflict between ideologies; first a three-way conflict between communism, fascism and liberal democracy, and then, subsequently, between communism and liberal democracy.⁵¹

During the Cold War this ideological conflict was embodied in struggle between the two superpowers. With the end of the Cold War, however, international politics

⁴⁹ Quoted in Bello, W and Cunningham, S, (ed.) *Dark Victory: The United States, Structural Adjustment and Global Poverty*, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), p. 111.

⁵⁰ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. xi.

⁵¹ Ibid.

moved out of this stage and, according to Huntington, its basis became the interaction between western civilisations and non-western civilisations.⁵²

In another perspective on what the world order might look like following the end of the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism and the collapse of the bipolar system with the demise of the Soviet Union, Samuel Huntington has presented his hypothesis that the principal conflicts will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations, and that the source of the conflicts will be cultural.⁵³ This prospect or view might be similar to the bipolarity, which imagines a division between North and South, and may even agree with the multipolarity prospect, as cultures and civilisations are numerous. Thus, every civilisation of the more than six civilisations discussed by Huntington (Western Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Eastern Christianity) may constitute an independent pole.

In an article entitled "The Clash of Civilisations?" published in Foreign Affairs in summer 1993, Samuel Huntington predicted that "The clash of civilisations will dominate global politics, and the fault lines between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future."⁵⁴

During the Cold War, the world was divided into the First, Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no longer relevant.⁵⁵ For Huntington, it is far more

⁵² Huntington, S., "If Not Civilisations, What? Paradigms of the Cold War World," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 5, Nov-Dec 1993, pp. 186-194.

⁵³ Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, p. 22. See also, S. Huntington., *The Clash of Civilisations and Remaking of World Order*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Rashid, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?", *Asian Responses*, (Oxford: Oxford

meaningful now to group countries not in terms of their political or economic systems, or in terms of their level of economic development, but rather in terms of their culture and civilisation. As Amit Gupta pointed out, "the argument that the New World Order would be marked not by a clash of ideologies but by a clash of civilisations seems to be a compelling way to understand the unfolding crisis in the emerging international system."⁵⁶

As Hahm Chaibong observed, "By presenting a new and provocative way of reading and interpreting the world the article on the clash of civilisations has succeeded in raising a sharply focused debate among the students of international relations for whom the 'order' of the 'new world' has been anything but clear."⁵⁷

Nation states will remain the principal actors in international affairs but the main conflicts in the world politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. According to Huntington, this clash of civilisations will dominate global politics.⁵⁸

In my opinion there can be no doubt that the existence of a number of different cultures and civilisations is a matter of history and not a recent phenomenon. The existence of major political theories, ideologies and religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism and others have, in their variety,

University Press, 1997), p. 2.

⁵⁶ Gupta, A., "Are we Really Seeing the Clash of Civilisations?" in Rashid, (1997), Op. Cit, p. 65.

⁵⁷ Hahm, C., "The Clash of Civilisations Resisted: A Confucian Perspective," in S, Rashid, (1997), Op. Cit, p. 109.

⁵⁸ For response to Huntington's thesis see, Ajami, F., "The Summoning," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 4, September 1993, pp. 2-9.

helped to shape the development of mankind. However, although their coexistence has, in some cases, led to the occurrence of religious wars in the past, it is also an undeniable fact that there have been instances of understanding through dialogue between cultures and religions in a way which has been taken by many and which has led to positive results. Examples of religious coexistence which have lasted for hundreds of years can be seen in relations between Jews, Muslims, Christians and Hindus at different times and in different places.

Any increases in cultural and religious differentiation which become causes for conflicts and wars are in many cases due to attempts by some forces which have an interest in promoting these differences in order to achieve their own interests.⁵⁹ It can be said without hesitation, for example, that the colonial powers exploited ethnic, religious, cultural and tribal differences to ignite the fire of wars between communities, to weaken them and make them easier target for colonisation.⁶⁰

Samuel Huntington's analysis presented in both his article and his subsequent book about the clash of civilisations, although having a compelling logic and more than an element of truth which can not be denied, cannot be totally distinguished from attempts, which have increased in the last three decades, to identify and exaggerate an Islamic threat to the Christian-Judaic civilisation.⁶¹ His thesis may be seen as either falling victim to, or actively promoting such interests who feel that the demonisation of the Islamic culture is of benefit to the West. Suspicion is raised by the location of Islam

⁵⁹ Netanyahu is good example for this. See, Netanyahu, B., *Fighting Terrorism: How democracies can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism*, (London: Allison & Busby, 1995).

⁶⁰ Divide and rule is a very known colonial principle.

⁶¹ Huntington, (1993), Op. Cit.

in the same camp as Buddhism, Confucianism and Hinduism, as form of religion and civilisation hostile to Western civilisation. Yet ironically, in my opinion, what links Islam with Judaism and Christianity is as much as what differentiates it from Buddhism and Hinduism.

It is possible to trace some political aims behind the advancement of the theory of a clash of civilisations, especially when we observe the attempt to put Judaism and Christianity on the same side, confronting all other civilisations and particularly Islam.⁶² This conception has found its way in the last few years into policies adopted by the United States and other Western nations, the political institutions and governments of which have been convinced to adopt this analysis as a guide in dealing with Islam as a hostile civilisation and incompatible culture.⁶³ For example, the Arab-Israeli conflict is between Israeli Jews on one side and Palestinian Muslims and Christians on the other. For American policy-makers and influential figures, however, it has been portrayed as being between Jews and Christians (including American Christian interests) on one side and Muslims on the other.⁶⁴ One can even argue that, in order to assert their own cultural and ideological hegemony, the United States and its allies find it useful to propagate the idea of another, threatening, 'civilisation' or culture, one which includes all that is unfamiliar to the West, regardless of whether there is true collective purpose in the civilisations of Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. Thus, an acknowledgement of both the truths and the weaknesses of the clash of civilisations thesis is not incompatible with notions of American hegemony, but may actually support them.

⁶² See, Said, E., *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*, (London: Routledge, 1981).

⁶³ Netanyahu, (1993), Op. Cit.

⁶⁴ Malachy, Y., *American Fundamentalism and Israel*, (Jerusalem: Graph Press, 1978).

Globalisation

The post-Cold War era has also been termed one of globalisation⁶⁵ and it is appropriate to briefly consider the relevance of this assertion to our discussions. As Robert Holton pointed out:

Globalisation has, over the past decade, become a major feature of commentaries on contemporary social life. This global focus extends almost everywhere in business, sport, politics, fashion, the environment, music, law, and cultural identity. Globe-talk also extends to the world of politics. Predictions of the demise of the nation-state in the face of globalisation occur, alongside an awareness of the growth of trans-national political institutions such as the U.N. and transnational political norms such as human rights. New images of world order speak of the emergence of the global citizen and a global civil society.⁶⁶

We may ask how this process of globalisation reflects on, or contributes to, the global distribution of power and the ways in which states relate to one another in the international system. Globalisation is viewed by many in the Third World as a new name for a new imperialism.⁶⁷ Through expanding capitalism and the spread of multinational enterprises, globalisation serves to strengthen the western capitalist system and undermine the aspirations of other parts of the world for satisfactory development and advancement.⁶⁸ The USA as a leader of the western capitalist system and civilisation is seen to be benefiting from this new-old phenomenon called globalisation. In a globalised world, states will be tied up with economic and financial

⁶⁵ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 48.

⁶⁶ Holton, R., *Globalization and the Nation-State*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998).

⁶⁷ Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi, no. 247, 9/1999.

⁶⁸ See, Hutchings, R., *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, (Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

interests. The USA again as a leader within the international economic and financial institutions is therefore seen as a hegemon and presumably will behave as such.⁶⁹

One aspect of globalisation is that global telecommunications, multinational business networks, and transnational ethnic communities are undermining state sovereignty from within, while the nascent supranational authority of the United Nations and the European Union are doing the same from without. The dissolution of borders weakens developing states and makes them more vulnerable to hegemonic assertions by the global organisations like the United Nations may become more authoritative, but they too are the servants of their paymasters, notably the USA.⁷⁰ Thus, we can say that globalisation does not necessarily limit the powers of a global hegemon and, at least for the time being, can increase its capacity to enforce its will.

Multipolarity

For some, the end of the Cold War marks the shift from a world of geo-strategy to a new international arrangement based on geo-economics.⁷¹ Power is seen as being distributed between a number of major powers, each of which draws its own power from a number of different sources. Global balance is achieved through the creation of coalitions and alliances, curbing any ambition for domination by expanding states.⁷² Nevertheless, as a regulator for global security, multipolarity is less effective than

⁶⁹ Baylis, J and Smith, S., *The Globalisation of World Politics: an introduction to international Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Walker, M., *The Cold War: A History*, (New York: Henry Holt, 1994).

⁷² Ibid.

bipolarity in providing mechanisms for security. When a country develops its capability at the expense of its neighbouring countries, and therefore constitutes a threat, a realignment will ultimately rise to contain the power of the aggressor country. Thus, equilibrium governs the potential chaos of international relations.

The notion of multipolarity is drawn from a number of conceptions of power. As Doyle and Ikenbury wrote, "The new multipolarity of the international system mirrors a similar multipolarity of theory."⁷³

For some, such as Rosecrance, multipolarity reflects the distribution of power. He has observed: "the break-up of the Soviet Union, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the Gulf War and the rapprochement between the United States and Russia have lent the world a new concert of powers. Five great bases of power again control the organisation of the world order: the USA, Russia, the EC, Japan and China. The U.N. Security Council is one manifestation of this new central coalition."⁷⁴ However, it can be noted that there should be no confusion between the multipolarity of the end of last century and any multipolarity of the beginning of the coming century. Such comparisons are invalid because the major powers of that time were balanced while the major powers of these days are far from equally balanced.⁷⁵

Most writers see the economic factor as being crucial to the change towards multipolarity.⁷⁶ They argue that because there are many competing economic blocs, which need each other because of the increasing economic interdependence engendered

⁷³ Doyle, M and Ikenbery, J., *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 278.

⁷⁴ Rosecrance, (1992), *Op. Cit.*, p. 65.

⁷⁵ Nye, J., "What New World Order," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, 1992, p. 86.

⁷⁶ Hutchings, (1998), *Op. Cit.*

by the globalisation process, and because this economic importance is more crucial than the military factor, the world will witness multipolarity presented in a number of economic blocs such as the USA, Europe, Japan, China and South East Asia.⁷⁷ In arguing for the primary importance of economic as opposed to military factors, Michael Hogan asserted that: "A multipolar world is emerging in which economic power will be more important than military might ... the economic dependency of the United States, especially its need for foreign financing of the national debt, will deprive the country of its freedom to manoeuvre and render its military power increasingly meaningless"⁷⁸ For him the end of the Cold War is the beginning of a new stage of global economic competition between the USA, Japan and the European Community.

As Joshua Goldstein observed "Power still matters, but economic forms of power now rival military ones."⁷⁹ He observed that the USA position in the international economy has shifted considerably. USA hegemony has declined, USA strengths have eroded, and competitors have gained relative ground (especially in Western Europe and Asia)⁸⁰ Similarly Joseph Nye points out that those who do not give military might the greatest importance argue that there will be three economic blocs: Asian bloc centred around the Yen, a Western hemisphere centred around the Dollar and a European bloc centred around the Euro.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Rosecrance, (1992), Op. Cit.

⁷⁸ Hogan, M., *The End of the Cold War: its Meaning and Implications*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 7-9.

⁷⁹ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. xi.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 401.

⁸¹ Nye, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 87.

If economics can be considered to be one factor, which makes multipolarity inevitable, so too can nuclear capability. As we know, any country, which owns nuclear arms is able to threaten the whole world and put it in danger, and that gives it a weight in international affairs. Thus, for example, the first five declared nuclear states have permanent membership of the UN Security Council and enjoy the veto.

For many writers⁸² multipolarity is the ultimate destination of the world order, even if today's world is one of American hegemony, because of the growth of regional economic blocs, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and because if, and when, American hegemonic power declines, there is no single, obvious successor likely to emerge as a global superpower.

It has been said that states are individuals, albeit on a larger scale. They are born, grow up, become strong, get older and then weaker, and then finally die. The reading of history tells us that no power has lasted forever. The Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the Islamic Empire and others lasted for extended periods but not forever. Civilisations in different part of the world dominated then disappeared during the last ten thousand years, examples being the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilisations. Without contradicting ourselves, we can say that even if the United States is a sole pole and today's world superpower, whose hegemony is clear and evident at least in some regions, its far and even relatively near future is uncertain. As some writers have pointed out, the USA has its own growing weaknesses and social contradictions. Indeed, the theme that the USA is in crisis and that its hegemony is in decline is widespread. In his book, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, Paul Kennedy depicts the decline of American power as part of a cyclical pattern of growth and decline which is largely due

⁸² Lake, D and Morgan, P., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977).

to economic and technological factors.⁸³ So, while, for now the USA seems set to remain a superpower and the dominant force, especially in specific areas and regions, there is much in favour of arguments of inevitable multipolarity.

However, while it is possible to determine the poles around which a multipolar order will develop, there are, as yet, no alternative poles capable of competing with the USA in military as well as in economic or other ways. The USA, is the biggest power in the world, and its role in the multipolar order will be crucial in forming alliances. Europe, Japan, China and Russia seem to be centres of gravity around which a future multipolar balance of power might be built. Currently Japan and Europe cannot form alternative poles to the USA to whom they are still subordinate economically and militarily. The European countries have not yet reached full political unity in spite of the advance of their economic integration. National interests are generally still dominant over European interests. During the Gulf War, for example, European divisions prevented the formulation and implementation of a united foreign policy.

For Japan and Germany to play a full role in a multipolar world, they need to modify their constitutions and rebuild their military capabilities. An alliance between Russia and China is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Russia is recovering from the loss of its republics and is engaged in reconstructing its regional role. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become dependent on economic aid from the USA and its allies, and thus, its global ambitions have been constrained. However, its entry into the exclusive G-8 club indicates its potential as an economic power of the future. Whatever the present weaknesses of potential competitors for global power, there are clearly multiple emerging poles.

⁸³ Kennedy, P., *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), see also, Axford, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 183.

Continuing with the discussion of the characteristics or "shape" of the New World Order and in order to determine the nature of the new global balance of power and the criteria by which states in the international community identify themselves with, or accommodate themselves to, that balance of power, and having already discussed bipolarity, clash of civilisation, globalisation and multipolarity I will now discuss unipolarity and unipolarity as American hegemony.



Unipolarity

Some writers, political analysts and statesmen believe that changes in the international arena following the end of the bipolar system left the United States as the only superpower.⁸⁴ Without any balancing power, they conclude that the main feature of international relations, at least for the present and the foreseeable future, is unipolarity. A unipolar system as Goldstein pointed out, has a single centre of power around which all others revolve. According to him, this is called hegemony, because the predominance of a single state tends to reduce the incidence of war; the hegemonic state performs some of the functions of a government, somewhat reducing anarchy in the international system.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ See for example, T. Ismael., *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994). Also Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Responding to the Economics of Globalisation," *Critique*, Fall 1996, no 9, pp. 67-91.

⁸⁵ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 85.

For Goldstein, as for Murphy, unipolarity includes both a new balance of power and a new "code of conduct" determined by the remaining superpower.⁸⁶ For Francis Fukuyama,⁸⁷ by contrast, unipolarity may be seen less in terms of American military and economic dominance and more in terms of the ultimate victory of capitalism, liberalism, individualism and the ideological components represented by the USA over their communist antitheses. In any case, there can be little doubt that the United States plays a unique role in the New World Order as the sole surviving superpower.

Among the most supportive of the idea of unipolarity as the distinguishing feature of the post-Cold War world is Charles Krauthammer. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, entitled "The Unipolar Moment" he argued that "the immediate post-cold war world is not multipolar, it is unipolar. The centre of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies . . . the most striking feature of post-cold war is its unipolarity." However, he argues that the current unipolarity may be a temporary phenomenon. Thus in his words, "now is the unipolar moment".⁸⁸ His understanding of a "pole" is based on his contention that the notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence is a materialist illusion. He thinks that economic power is a necessary condition for great power status, but it certainly is not sufficient. The USA in his opinion is "the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in

⁸⁶ Murphy, (1996) Op. Cit., pp. 67-91.

⁸⁷ Fukuyama, F., "End of History," *International Interests*, Summer, 1989.

⁸⁸ Krauthammer, C., "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1, 1991, p. 23.

whatever part of the world it choose to involve itself.”⁸⁹ On this basis he can claim at least current unipolarity but also the potential for future multipolarity.

Unipolarity as American Hegemony

The role of the United States in this New World Order has been described by many writers as one of a global hegemon. Hegemony was viewed by Gramsci as the most important face of power.⁹⁰ Hegemony, for our purpose, is the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system, so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted.⁹¹ Such a state is called a hegemon, and when applying the concept to the New World Order, we can see that such a hegemon not only derives from a new balance of power but also determines the new “rules of the game.” (Usually hegemony means domination of the world, but sometimes it refers to regional domination.)⁹²

The theory of hegemonic stability⁹³ holds that hegemony provides some order in the international system, by serving some functions similar to those of a central

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

⁹⁰ Femia, J., *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 31.

⁹¹ Rupert, M., *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁹² Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 86.

⁹³ See, Gaddis, J., *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

government; deterring aggression, promoting free trade, and providing a hard currency that can be used as a world standard. Hegemons can help to resolve, or at least keep in check, conflicts among middle powers or small states.⁹⁴ From the perspective of less powerful states, of course, such hegemony may seem an infringement of state sovereignty, and the order it creates may seem unjust or illegitimate. In contrast to the idea of hegemonic stability, Joshua Goldstein has argued that peace is best preserved by a relatively equal power distribution (multipolarity) because then no country has an opportunity to win easily.⁹⁵

Lawrence Freedman holds to the view that the United States may be viewed as having the potential to be hegemonic. "The United States has attained an international pre-eminence beyond challenge. As leader of the West during the years of confrontation with the Soviet bloc and, most recently, of the international coalition ranged against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, it is now well placed to define both the character of this new stage in international history and the West's role within it."⁹⁶ Freedman's America is potentially hegemonic by virtue of its capacity for military projection. For Joshua Goldstein, however, the USA's extraordinary strength lies in a wider range of capabilities:

The United States is an extraordinary wealthy and powerful state. Its most unique strength may be in the area of international security -as the world's only superpower- but its economic strengths are also striking. It is not only the world's largest economy but also the most technologically advanced one in such growth sectors as computers, telecommunications, aviation and aerospace, and

⁹⁴ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 88.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 90.

⁹⁶ Freedman, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 20.

biotechnology. The US position in scientific research and higher education is unparalleled in the world.⁹⁷

For those who believe in the existence and continuity of American hegemony, and who take into consideration economic strength as much as military might, the USA remains the most influential participant in the world's economy despite the relative decline of USA economic power, for three reasons. The first is the role of the dollar as the main reserve currency and unit of transactions. The second is the very size of the USA economy, which continues, despite Japan's challenge, to exert domination on the financial markets and trade flows of smaller economies. The third is that only the United States, unlike Japan or the European Union, can integrate with its foreign policy a vast array of economic and strategic-diplomatic instruments.⁹⁸ For Barry Axford too, American hegemony is based on the combination of military predominance and economic strength.

The commonly accepted New World Order consists, or more accurately was said to consist, of a number related elements. First, the voluntary withdrawal of the Soviet Union from its 'historical' world role was intended to leave it still intact and militarily capable, but benign as a player with global pretensions. As a result, the United States would be the only real superpower. Second, the prospects for lasting peace and prosperity in the New World Order would be enhanced by revitalised bodies like the United Nations (UN). Freed from the constraints of superpower rivalry the UN would play a more interventionist role in local conflicts, or in eradicating brutish conduct by individual regimes, with American-led coalitions of states acting to enforce the writ of the world community. Third, this globally sanctioned pax-Americana would have an geo-economic dimension, carrying market liberalism to former state-socialist economies through multilateral institutions.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Goldstein, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 401.

⁹⁸ Hoffman, S., "Notes on the US Role in the Middle East," in Kipper and Saunders (ed.) *The Middle East in Global Perspective*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 260.

⁹⁹ Axford, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 182.

Some writers differentiate between unipolarity and domination. In their view, the USA being the remaining superpower does not mean its domination over world affairs. Joseph Nye, for example, does not believe that the USA constitutes a hegemon. He argues that: "the premise is correct that the collapse of the Soviet Union left the world with only one superpower, but the hegemonic conclusion does not follow."¹⁰⁰ In his opinion "the United States is better placed with a more diversified portfolio of power resources than any other country, but the New World order will not be an era of American hegemony."¹⁰¹ Hegemony, according to Nye, is unlikely because of the diffusion of power through transitional interdependence, and because the world economy is tripolar (USA, Europe and Japan) and has been since the 1970s.¹⁰² For Nye, challenges to American hegemony come not in the form of one superpower as in the past but in the form of a collection of fragmented ideological alternatives.

Rather than the end of history, the post-Cold War world is witnessing a return of history in the diversity of sources of international conflict. Liberal capitalism has many competitors, albeit fragmented ones. Examples include the indigenous neo-Maoism of Peru's Shining Path guerrilla movement, the many variant of Islamic fundamentalism and the rise of ethnic nationalism.¹⁰³

In this, Nye is, in fact, responding directly to Charles Krauthammer, who had argued that "the Gulf War marked the beginning of a pax Americana in which the world will acquiesce in a benign American hegemony". Nye believes that nationalism and transnationalism will be "contending forces in the New World politics".¹⁰⁴ The same can be

¹⁰⁰ Nye, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 87.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

said for the trans-national technological changes in communications and transportation. Instead of one global village there will be villages around the globe, more aware of each other than in the past, but still distinct. In sum, Joseph Nye believes in *multilevel interdependence*. For him:

No single hierarchy describes adequately a world politics with multiple structure. The distribution of power in world politics has become like a layer cake. The top military layer is largely unipolar, for there is no other military power comparable to the United States. The economic middle layer is tripolar and has been for two decades. The bottom layer of transnational interdependence shows a diffusion of power.¹⁰⁵

Finally, Nye believes that the realist view of world order, resting on a balance of military power, is necessary but not sufficient; equally the liberal conception of a world society of peoples as well as states, and of order resting on values and institutions as well as military power is more relevant.

Some, albeit a few, contradict the idea of unipolarity itself by emphasising that the image of the USA as the sole remaining superpower is an illusion. Enid Hill for example has examined Henry Kissinger's argument that "The widespread perception that the Gulf War certified America as the last remaining superpower is erroneous... The belief that the USA is the only remaining superpower is an illusion."¹⁰⁶ According to an article by Kissinger, "power will be the nexus of political, military and economic assets"; thus the United States will be one power among others that are emerging in Asia and Europe. According to him "The new order will be more like the European State system of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the cold

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 88.

¹⁰⁶ Hill, E., "The New World Order and the Gulf War: Rhetoric, Policy, and Politics in the United States," in T. Ismael (ed.) *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 195-196.

war.” There will be six major states: the United States, Europe, China, Japan, “whatever emerges in the Soviet Union, and probably India.”¹⁰⁷ Enid Hill takes exception to Kissinger’s list of future world powers for its neglect of the Middle East. After all, the Gulf remains the heartland of oil production and thus of American security concerns.

According to Noam Chomsky, the world is now tripolar: “Germany-led Europe, Japan and its periphery, and the United States.” The USA is undoubtedly the leading military force. “The USA is completely free to use force arbitrarily, anywhere it likes ... in the New World Order there is one very powerful military force” (the United States) and a “lieutenant” (Great Britain) with a “reasonably powerful military force.” Neither of them is dominant economically” and both are “very weak politically.”¹⁰⁸ Because they are politically weak, diplomacy is not a useful option for them and they therefore prefer to engage at the military level such that “force is the way you rule the world. That’s the New World Order”.¹⁰⁹ However, at the economic level a German-led Europe and Japan can, and do, weigh in with the United States.

Joseph Nye’s argument against USA hegemony can be easily countered by his own words. As he demonstrated that he believes that it is the “unipolar moment”, this in itself means that the USA, the sole pole and the only superpower, is a hegemon at least in some areas and regions. The USA does not need to impose itself and show its hegemony everywhere in the world and on every issue it faces. It usually tries to cooperate with its western allies and continues to claim its willingness to create an ideal world of fairness, justice and equality, but in more problematic situations it reveals its

¹⁰⁷ Kissinger, H., “What kind of New World Order?,” *The Washington Post*, 3 December 1991.

¹⁰⁸ Hill, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 196.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 198.

ability and its desire to ensure its hegemony and use its economic and military power to force cooperation with its policies in areas that it considers most important for its national interests. The Middle East is the region where it has most clearly shown a preference for exerting its hegemony and enforcing its policy, not only because it is a strategically important region or only because it has the largest oil reserves, both of which are admittedly, very important elements, but also (for domestic reasons 'the Zionist domination over America's centre of power') to protect Israel and reorder the region in a way that can ensure the integration of Israel into it and eliminate any potential threat to its existence and security.

It seems appropriate to conclude from the above arguments that ideas of USA hegemony stem from its combined economic, military, technological and diplomatic strength. They stem also from the fact that no other country is able or willing to challenge her. The acceptance of most countries -with a few exceptions such as Iraq, Cuba and Libya- of that fact is, in itself, a licence for the USA to behave accordingly. In the Middle East and in the Gulf in particular, the USA was invited in and crowned as a hegemon even before it had proved itself to be so.

Regional states acknowledge that, whether or not the United States is hegemonic in world politics, for the past three decades it has been the dominant outside power in the Middle East, using its position sometimes to try to elicit cooperation among regional actors (as between Israel and the Arab states), and at other times to prevent cooperation (for example, with respect to Iraq and Iran)¹¹⁰

After the USSR retreated to attend to its domestic situation, it became clear that the USA administration began to act as the only superpower that could exercise influence on the world and that it was no longer an administration for the USA alone,

¹¹⁰ Goldstein, J., "Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence, 1979-97," <http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/goldtext/me98.papr.htm>. p. 5.

but an administration for the whole world community. However, despite American claims to the contrary, the USA has been accused of being a dictator who acts single-handedly in international and regional crises, seeking to force its viewpoint and solutions on those crises.¹¹¹

The concept of the New World Order, which the Bush administration raised and whose praises it began to sing and to market on every occasion was a cover to give legitimacy and collectivism to the USA administration's dictatorship and absolute control of the resources of the peoples.¹¹² They think that the USA has begun to practice its hegemony on the UN Security Council and to interfere in their affairs in accordance with its own standards and interests. For example, an Iraqi official statement stated that "Bush's New World Order is one which enables America to impose its complete hegemony on the world and to liquidate all the issues of national liberation and humanitarian struggle. Not only that, but the New World Order the USA wants is that which also gives it the opportunity to control its allies".¹¹³

Tareq Ismael made it clear that the New World Order suggests at least two dimensions in its meaning: the end of an international order determined by the struggle for hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union; and the initiation of a USA, foreign policy doctrine based on USA hegemony in the international order.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Haykal, (1994), Op. Cit.

¹¹² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1015, A/1, 8 March 1991.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ismael, T., *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1994), p. 1.

Summary of New World Order

The New World Order as a pattern of international relations that emerged following the end of the Cold War is a matter of fact. The bipolarity of two great rival alliance blocs is a thing of the past, the rules of the Cold War no longer apply and the fundamental redistribution of power created new rules of engagement. Given that the United Kingdom and France are close allies of the United States, that Russia is going through economic crisis and social turmoil, that Japan is suffering from an economic malaise and has no military projection capability, and that China is very far from becoming a real superpower, it is hard to see any current power existing which can challenge America and the pursuit of American interests in the New World Order. Indeed, the United States is recognised in practice by almost every nation as the only remaining superpower. Its economic and militarily superiority is beyond any doubt.

The signals for the existence of this New World Order are many. Among them were the bombing of Libya, the second Gulf War, the American military intervention in Somalia and later its intervention in Bosnia and bombing of Serbia.

The New World Order as a pattern of relations between the international actors in a specific period became a reality because of the fundamental redistribution of power that took place following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rules of the game of the Old Cold War Order were replaced by new rules that take account of the new distribution of power. The four principles envisioned by president of United States George Bush were as follow: Peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples.

I have argued in the previous discussion that, although a multipolar world order will most likely come to exist in the future, today's World Order is unipolar. The forces of globalisation may in the long term over-ride the dominance of the international system by any single state or group of states which have superior military and political

power (as well as economic strength). In today's World Order, however, the United States of America clearly has superiority in these other realms, allowing it to exercise its hegemonic tendencies. The New World Order is therefore a unipolar one in which the United States exercises something close to complete hegemony in today's world politics. The USA has got the power that amounts to the control of behaviour and has the ability to implement its policies through its unique combination of economic, diplomatic and military strength. The "clash of civilisations thesis" is misleading in so far as it assumes that the USA (and its civilisational allies) on the one hand, and the Islamic (and allied) world on the other, are engaged in international relations on the basis of something other than the very real struggle for, and exercise of, power. However, the form which American efforts to assert its hegemony has taken, and the Islamic World's resistance to the moral and institutional environment that the USA has sought to create, have combined to support the impression of such a "clash".

This chapter will continue to show that this is particularly true in the Middle East where no other power is able to challenge the United States. I shall now proceed to examine how the sea changes in the international balance of power, and the responses of regional states to that balance, have affected the Middle East region. The main body of the thesis can then examine in more detail the particular impact of the New World Order (American hegemonic unipolarity) on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The New World Order in the Middle East

Having determined that the New World Order displays a unipolar balance of power with the United States playing a hegemonic role, it is now necessary to show how this has manifested itself in the Middle East.

The Middle East can be described as a highly penetrated regional sub-system of the international system. As it was highly affected by the Cold War, so it has been by its

end. The demise of the Soviet Union -felt as early as the 1970s-¹¹⁵ and its ultimate collapse in 1991 left their marks on the Middle East and its politics. As every reaction has its equal counter reaction, so Middle Eastern countries that were highly affected by Soviet policies, and strongly supported by its strength and international position, were equally affected by its demise, collapse and subsequent withdrawal from the area.

It seems to me useful at this point to take some examples in order to explain how both the demise and the retreat of the Soviet Union from the region on one hand and the increase of the United States' hegemonic role on the other, has been demonstrated through the actions and policies not only of the USA and Soviet Union, but also of those Middle East actors, during the last two decades. In other words, we shall demonstrate through examples how the alteration in the balance of power (with the USA becoming sole superpower) has enabled the USA to act as a regional hegemon in the Middle East and has forced other regional actors to respond to it as such.

First of all, and in order to assess the Soviet demise and withdrawal from the region, we need to go back a little bit. As early as 1971, during the height of the Cold War, President Anwar Al-Sadat of Egypt declared that the United States held 99% of the cards in a solution of the Middle East conflict.¹¹⁶ This was a very early public recognition by the leader of one of the major Middle East countries that the United States was able to exercise what amounted to hegemonic influence, even though it was not yet the sole superpower. The influence of the Soviet Union, or at least its willingness to exert that influence in the Middle East, had already begun to diminish.

¹¹⁵ Al-Sadat dealt with the U.S. as the only credible hegemonic superpower as early.

¹¹⁶ Quandt, W., *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 50.

Al-Sadat conducted his policies accordingly. Although he was intending to launch a war -in coordination with Syria- against Israel, he knew that the USA would not permit an Israeli defeat. His understanding of the USA's real power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union combined with his own ideological thinking and experience (of the 1967 defeat) led him to reach the conclusion that he could not rely on the Soviet Union for the economic, the military or even the diplomatic support which would enable him to achieve his objectives. His decision to expel the 20,000 Soviet military experts from Egypt prior to the 1973 war surprised many but was understood by the West in general, and by the USA in particular, as an acknowledgement of that fact. Consequently, they responded to Al-Sadat's initiatives much as he desired they would.

The loss of Egypt by the Soviet Union was a big blow. Its centrality to the Arab world and Arab and Middle Eastern order was bound to have great effect on the rest of the region. Ironically, Egypt's new Western orientation contributed to the decline of the Soviet influence in the region. Every step of withdrawal, defeat or retreat by the Soviet Union increased the advantage to the USA. In other words, Al-Sadat's decision to distance himself from the Soviets indicated a desire for much closer relations with the West, and the United States, particularly. American rapprochement and encouragement met this. Henry Kissinger characterised détente in the Middle East (détente took place from 1953 to 1979) as: "A tactic 'to maximise Soviet dilemmas and reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East . . . partly a tranquilliser for Moscow as we sought to draw the Middle East into closer relations with us at the Soviets' expense.'" ¹¹⁷

The United States influence correspondingly increased in the region with its success in bringing Israel and Egypt together to sign a peace treaty in 1979. The

¹¹⁷ Saivetz, C., "Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of the Détente," in O. Westad., *The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years*, (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), p. 76.

importance and strength of these two countries compensated the United States for its almost simultaneous loss of Iran as an ally. Although the Soviet Union tried to mobilise a rejection front against the Israel-Egypt peace treaty and its architect, the USA, it failed to destroy it.

The case of Egypt gives us an early and clear example of the USA scoring points at the expense of the Soviet Union, as mentioned earlier by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. By winning Egypt to its side, the United States secured a very important achievement, which was to bear fruits later during the Kuwait crisis and the 1991 Gulf War. Raymond Hinnebusch summarised this pro-American role played by Egypt as follows:

Al-Sadat forged a strategic alliance with the U.S., which constitutes Egypt's main bridge to the international system. In so far as it remains the hub of the Arab system, Egypt opens the Arab world to U.S. interests. It is now a force for stability against anti-western radicalism and has played a key role in persuading the Arabs to accept Israel. In return, Egypt expects major US economic subsidisation, military aid and security co-ordination, US help in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and acceptance of Egyptian partnership in the workings of the New World Order in the Middle East.¹¹⁸

Carol R. Saivetz gives us another example of how the two rival superpowers see any one's success as a failure of the other or the opposite. She noted that:

In late 1978 and into 1979, superpower competition focused on Iran, where the collapse of the Shah's regime seriously weakened the USA strategic position in the Gulf and seemingly presented the Soviet Union with new opportunities to extend its presence and influence.¹¹⁹

In actual fact, and contrary to expectations, the Iranian revolution although removing a pro-western regime did not prove to be directly to the Soviets' advantage

¹¹⁸ Hinnebusch, R., "Egypt, Syria and the Arab State System in the New World Order," in H. Jawad (ed.) *The Middle East in the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 123-24.

¹¹⁹ Saivetz, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 72.

and Iran did not fall into the Soviet orbit. The Islamic revolution rejected communism and its patron, the Soviet Union, on profound ideological bases, while its course collided with the United States' due mainly to political differences such as past United States support for the Shah regime, its protection of the Shah and his supporters and its support for Israel. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this. First, while a Soviet loss represented a net American gain in the balance of power, an American loss did not automatically equate with a Soviet gain. Thus, the overall advantage remained with the USA. Secondly, hostility to America was essentially surmountable, requiring only changes in USA policy. By contrast, hostility to the Soviet Union was based on the more immutable problems of ideological incompatibility.

The other regional conflict involving the American-Soviet rivalry was in Afghanistan, which developed into a military stalemate. Although President Reagan signed a resolution setting the objective for the USA of driving the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan "by all means available,"¹²⁰ ultimately, it was not the USA, which defeated the Soviet Union. It was the internal problems of the Soviet Union itself that contributed to its most humiliating defeat. Economic difficulties contributed to that military defeat, which in turn resulted in more economic difficulties. Both forced the new Soviet leadership to review the inherited political and economic policies and alter foreign policy accordingly.¹²¹ Thus, the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan marked the corner stone in the political earthquake of the international order. Its importance was not that the strategic gain for the opposing superpower so much as the fact that it provided evidence of the demise of the Soviet superpower itself.

¹²⁰ See, Garthoff, R., *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 712.

¹²¹ Brown, A., *New Thinking in Soviet Politics*, (Basingtoke: Macmillan, 1992).

The Lebanese civil war (1975-1982) and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (June 1982) followed by the American military intervention demonstrated the extent to which the Soviet role in the Middle East had already been reduced.¹²² The defeat of the Lebanese nationalist, progressive and socialist forces and the expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon took place without any significant opposition from the Soviet Union. Its failure to assist its natural allies, indeed its relative lack of interest in doing so, indicated the weakness of the Soviet Union compared to the United States, in terms of their regional policies and profiles. As Raymond Garthoff pointed out, "While the Soviet Union lost standing by not assisting the PLO in any way, it avoided any direct involvement even after the United States intervened. It did, however, reportedly use the Hot Line in 1982 to warn about the consequences of United States' intervention in Lebanon."¹²³

The consequences for regional states, which had grown accustomed to Soviet support, were immense. The defeat of the Syrian anti-air defence system, by the Israeli Air Force indicated further that Soviet military equipment was no match for Israel's equipment, which had mostly been supplied by the United States. More importantly, the Soviet Union declared itself unwilling to help Syria in achieving its goal of strategic parity with Israel.¹²⁴ Thus, the policies of the new thinking undertaken by Mikhail

¹²² See, Gerges, F., "Lebanon," in Sayigh, Y and Shlaim, A., *The Cold War and the Middle East*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), Op. Cit., p. 98.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 691.

¹²⁴ See Joffe, G., "The Implications of the New World Order for the Middle East and North Africa," in *The Middle East and North Africa* (London, Europa, 1992), When President Hafez al-Assad of Syria went on a visit to Moscow in 1987 to promote closer cooperation with the USSR in the context of Assad's "strategic balance" policy, Gorbachev suggested that he abandon that idea and try to resolve the conflict politically.

Gorbachev after the deaths of both Brezhnev and Chernenko, which placed more priority on domestic Soviet problems, and less on supporting ideological allies in far regions, inevitably weakened the Soviet position in the Middle East. When Assad was told by Gorbachev, during one of his visits to Moscow in 1987,¹²⁵ that the Soviet Union would not meet Syria's ambition for strategic parity with Israel, and that he needed to explore a diplomatic solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Assad understood that the war option would no longer be credible and that a new relationship with the United States would be essential for any diplomatic settlement. The end of the Soviet Empire and thus the end of the Cold War therefore played an important role in Syria's realignment. "Without a superpower patron, Syria recognised the need to cooperate more with the United States or face international isolation."¹²⁶ Syria, as Raymond Hinnebusch commented, felt besieged in an USA-dominated world order. Syria's Vice President Khaddam preferred to explain this reality in slightly different, more Middle Eastern, way:

The Cold War is over. We should work toward the creation of a New World Order, based on justice, equality, self-determination of peoples, and non-interference in any country. Syria has a sincere desire to strengthen ties of friendship and co-operation with the USA, government and people. We seek all

This was the first sign of the end of the Cold War in the Middle East. See Rabin, Y., *The Rabin Memoir*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) p. 392.

¹²⁵ According to Emma Murphy "From 1989 Gorbachev made it clear to President Hafez al-Assad that the USSR would no longer support the goal of strategic parity with Israel - promising only strategic defence capability. See Jawad, (1994), Op. Cit., pp. 83-84.

¹²⁶ Sarkees, M., "Disenchantment with the 'New World Order': Syria's Relations with the United States," *International Journal*, vol. 19, no. 2, Spring 1994, p. 357.

means to open the channels of cooperation. We want to improve the climate, and we hope this can be achieved.¹²⁷

While that was how Assad's deputy explained the situation, a more realistic reading of events shows that Syria's foreign policy was being shaped by the breakdown of the bipolar system. "By the 1990s the withdrawal of the USSR as a reliable patron-protector and arms supplier deprived Syria of a war option and made anti-Israeli brinkmanship too dangerous." As Hinnebusch observed, "Syria aimed to be accepted by the USA as the key to peace in the Middle East, whose interests had to be recognised in the peace process . . . and saw the New World Order shaping up and wanted to influence it rather than be its victim."¹²⁸ This was the bottom line of the last Syrian change of heart.

Libya is another Middle Eastern country, which bears many similarities to Syria, not only by being an Arab country, but also in terms of hard-line policies, closer relations with the former Soviet Union, Arab national commitment and hostility towards Israel and the United States, presented another example, albeit in a different form, of the demise of the Soviet Union playing into the hands of the United States. When Ronald Reagan's administration decided to bomb Libya on 15 April 1986, it must have taken that decision secure in the belief that there would be no hostile Soviet reaction. Taking into account the close relations Libya had enjoyed with the Soviet Union, the USA would not have attacked Libya unless it understood beforehand that the Soviet Union would not react in an active or threatening way to the action. This was, in part, due to improvements in the relations between the two superpowers following Gorbachev's coming to power. As Leo Cooper pointed out: "The improvement in Soviet-US relations began in 1985 with the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit. During Gorbachev's first few

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 361.

¹²⁸ Hinnebusch, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 129.

months as General Secretary of the Soviet communist party, there were clear indications of the Soviet leader's determination to improve relations with the United States."¹²⁹ Knowing the new Soviet leader's desire to improve relations, and thereby get economic aid, the United States judged correctly that Gorbachev would not jeopardise these objectives by taking a strong stand on behalf of a small Third World country. After the attack, "the Soviet Union strongly criticised the American move, but did nothing more."¹³⁰

As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the bombing of Libya in 1986 presented an early indication that, on one hand, the United States felt its own superiority and, on the other, that the Soviet Union was unable to react as the superpower that it used to be and that, increasingly, it was not taken seriously by its rival. Odd Arne Westad has argued that history:

Had taken a U-turn. The United States under Ronald Reagan was reasserting its international hegemony, supported by European leaders as diverse as Francois Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl, and Margaret Thatcher. The Soviet Union was mired in a deeply unpopular war in Afghanistan, with international consequences for itself as bad, if not worse, than those of the Vietnam War were for Washington.¹³¹

Or, as Leo Cooper has observed, "The change in the Kremlin leadership in 1985, signalled a change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy"¹³² and "The change in

¹²⁹ Cooper, L., *Russia and the World: New State-of-Play on the International Stage*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999), p. 31.

¹³⁰ Garthoff, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 712.

¹³¹ Westad, (1997), Op. Cit, p. 3.

¹³² Cooper, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 130.

Soviet foreign policy has been ascribed to the preoccupation of the leadership with domestic economic problems.”¹³³

This historic U-turn can be seen in action also in Yemen. Although the Soviet Union's regional interests led it to oppose any merger of its client state, South Yemen, with the North in 1990,¹³⁴ it was unable to prevent the eventual unification of the two states. According to Gerd Nonneman, the developments towards unification were actually made possible and pushed along by the new Soviet policy under Gorbachev. His international accommodationist line (new thinking) which accompanied his domestic policies of Perestroika and Glasnost had its impact in South Yemen as well. The Soviet Union was unable to provide the economic assistance South Yemen needed in order to either resolve its domestic economic problems or take advantage of the discovery of commercial quantities of oil. There was no chance of Soviet investment in that area and other foreign investors were deterred by the Marxist nature of the regime and its affiliations with the Soviet Union. Thus, the end of the Marxist regime in South Yemen and its effective absorption by the Northern Republic of Yemen can be seen as another retreat of Soviet influence and a consequent increase of Western and American influence in the region. It also shows, again, that regional states were responding to this new fact of life and readjusting their own policies and alignments accordingly.

Israel also was a beneficiary of the new reform policy in the Soviet Union, and of that superpower's demise and ultimate collapse. Israel benefited in two ways. First, Soviet political liberalisation enabled Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, thus helping Israel in

¹³³ Ibid., p. 38.

¹³⁴ Nonneman, G., “Yemeni Unification: The End of Marxism in Arabia,” in H. Jawad (ed.) *The Middle East in the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 53-56.

increasing its population and human resource base and in settling the Occupied Territories. Second, as the Soviet Union was the main ally and patron of its enemies, the Arab states, Israel was relieved by its collapse. Having said that, Israel was to face some difficult days in the 1990s, which contributed to its strategic decisions with regards to its relations with its neighbours and to the peace process. The Gulf War illustrated that the removal of the Soviet patron did not guarantee Israel's safety against attacks from Arab enemies. On the contrary, the alliance of major Arab states, like Egypt and Syria, with the United States left Israel oddly isolated and, in its view, neglected by its own patron.

The 39 missiles fired at Israel brought with them a sense of trauma compounded by humiliation over the fact that the country would have to absorb these strikes in its heartland without hitting back. This was the first time since the 1948 war of independence that Arabs had succeeded in striking at Israel's civilian home front.¹³⁵

Or as Levran put it:

The impact of the SSM threat to Israel was more severe and far-reaching than its manifestation in terms of loss of life, material damage and disruption of normal life. The attacks on Israel by Iraqi al-Hussein missiles should be viewed through a broader strategic prism in which psychological and strategic aspects carry great weight.¹³⁶

Israel, moreover, understood that it was in its own best interest not to do anything that might prompt a premature cease-fire when the United States was, after all, demolishing the war machine of one of its most powerful enemies."¹³⁷ Shimon Peres made it clear that following the Gulf War he was convinced that, in the age of ballistic missiles and

¹³⁵ Schiff, Z., "Israel after the War," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 2, 1991, p. 19.

¹³⁶ Levran, A., *Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm, Lessons of the Second Gulf War*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 3.

¹³⁷ See Schiff, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 27.

weapons of mass destruction, security could not be maintained by controlling a portion of land.¹³⁸ Peres also identified the economic and ideological process of globalisation as redefining international and regional relations. In fact he acknowledged that the rules had been changed.

The world has moved beyond having ideological confrontation, and has thus lost one of the principal motivations for military struggle. The world has come to realise that economic opportunity is available for all of mankind, black and white, Southerner and Northerner. Economic rivalries have begun to take the place of military confrontation. The military confrontations required trained armies, fortified borders, constant vigilance and suspicion. Economic advancement requires a very different set of circumstances: open borders, markets that straddle political demarcations, goodwill, good products and constant competition.¹³⁹

For Israel, the problem was clarifying in what ways its strategic relationship with the USA was changing in the New World Order. In his book Beyond Alliance, Camille Mansour pointed out that new changes call into question Israel's place in the New World Order.

The Bush presidency coincided with a radically new situation on the international level (with upheaval in the Eastern bloc) and in the Middle East region (with the Palestinian uprising and the second Gulf War), a new era had begun which could only call into question the place of Israel in US strategic doctrine.¹⁴⁰

This takes us to the question of whether or not Israel continues to be a strategic asset to the United States in the New World Order.

¹³⁸ See, Savir, U., *The Process: 1,100 days that changed the Middle East*, (New York: Random House, 1998), also see Peres, S., *The New Middle East*, (Shaftesbury: Element, 1993), and also Peres, S., *Battling for Peace*, (London: Orion Books Ltd, 1995).

¹³⁹ Peres, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 374.

¹⁴⁰ Mansour, C., *Beyond Alliance, Israel in US Foreign Policy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 144.

Jonathan Jacoby, executive vice president of the Israel Policy Forum, argues that United States-Israeli relations have changed more than once since 1948. With Israel entering its second fifty years, the relationship is changing again - this time largely due to the impact of globalisation and the advent of non-conventional weaponry. Strategies to maintain the special USA-Israel friendship will also change.¹⁴¹

Charles Krauthammer agrees and believes that the notion of Israel being a strategic asset, in the old sense, has passed. Indeed, he argues that in some ways, that notion was never really operational. But if the notion of a "strategic asset" was a bit artificial in the 1980's vis-à-vis the Soviets, Krauthammer feels that it is not at all artificial in the 1990s, when Israel and the United States share threats in common from weapons of mass destruction and missiles at one end of the spectrum to terrorism at the other.¹⁴²

Steven Rosen, director of foreign policy issues at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, thinks that Israel is the number one country in the world working with the United States on missile issues; it is probably also the number one country in the world working with the United States on terrorism issues.¹⁴³

However, with the major changes in Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union, and subsequently with the emergence and then the disappearance of Iraq as a strategic factor, the idea of Israel as an asset faced a serious challenge.¹⁴⁴ Some think that Israel is

¹⁴¹ Rosen, S., "Debate about the US-Israel Relationship: Still Special?" *Middle East Quarterly*, December 1998, pp. 53-65.

¹⁴² Krauthammer, C., "Debate about the US-Israel Relationship. Still Special?" *Middle East Quarterly*, December 1998, pp. 53-65.

¹⁴³ Rosen, S., (1998), Op. Cit, pp. 53-65.

¹⁴⁴ Mansour, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 193.

not always an asset but can be a liability. Louis Cantori for example thinks that "During the Cold War Israel was viewed as not only a responsibility but a strategic asset. After the Cold War, this was no longer the case, as illustrated in the Gulf war."¹⁴⁵ Emma Murphy also pointed out that: "Israel had become, for the period of the war, a liability for the United States."¹⁴⁶ Israel of course does all that it can to prove itself as an asset which, the United States cannot do without. From being a base against the communist danger, Israel wants to convince the United States, and the West in general, that the coming confrontation will be with Islamic terrorism¹⁴⁷ and that it will, once again, be the advance base in this confrontation.¹⁴⁸

For the Palestinians, the events of 1985-1991 did not in any way work in their favour. While the Intifada raised the profile of their plight on the international stage, other developments both internationally and regionally did not help at all. The Soviet new thinking policies allowed thousands of Jews to come to Israel and ultimately settle in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The PLO, which for a long time had enjoyed positive relations with the Soviet Union, had lost a great supporter and ally. The other remaining superpower continued to refuse to recognise the PLO and dealt with it as a

¹⁴⁵ Cantori, L., "The Middle East in the New World Order," in T. Ismael (ed.) *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), p. 453.

¹⁴⁶ Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order," in H. Jawad (ed.) *The Middle East in the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 82.

¹⁴⁷ Mansour, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 292.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 193, and see also, Netanyahu, B., *Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism*, (London: Allison & Busby, 1995).

terrorist organisation. Later on, however, circumstances changed. Charles Smith pointed out:

Arafat's effort to gain international recognition of his peace proposals met finally with success in December 1988 when Washington agreed he had met their conditions of renouncing terrorism and accepting 242. This came after the State Department under George Shultz denied Arafat a visa to address the United Nations in New York, forcing the transfer of the meeting to Geneva where the PLO head again appealed for peace. With American acceptance of Arafat's overtures, a dialogue was established with the PLO through the American ambassador in Tunis where PLO headquarters remained.¹⁴⁹

The PLO and the Palestinian National Council decided as early as 1974, for the first time and again in 1988 to explore a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, in 1991, recognising the new international realities, and in order to overcome its financial difficulties and its political isolation following the Kuwait crisis, the PLO decided to review its position in a more fundamental way. The PLO's acceptance of the invitation to participate -under the Israeli-American conditions- in the Madrid peace process demonstrated its lack of the sort of alternative that it used to have during the Cold War period. Israel was able to dictate its conditions for Palestinian participation, and both the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to force Israel to greater moderation. The PLO had no alternative to accepting the USA role in and dominance over, the peace process. Ultimately, it needed USA economic aid, American pressure on Israel to implement Oslo agreements and later the Wye agreement, and assistance in concluding the final status negotiations. However, the USA's dominant role in the process will always play into Israel's hands.

As I have given some examples of how the New World Order manifested itself in the region, it is appropriate now to discuss in greater detail how the New World Order affected the Middle East.

¹⁴⁹ Smith, C., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 301.

Has the New World Order Impacted Upon the Middle East?

The fact that dramatic developments and upheavals take place in different regions more or less at the same time following a major international change -the end of the Cold war- shows the important effects of international factors on regional conflicts.¹⁵⁰ As

Tim Niblock has argued:

There are significant changes occurring in the political landscape of the Middle East. At the level of intra-regional relations, these stem primarily from the transformation which, has occurred in the global system.¹⁵¹

Bernard Lewis has further argued that:

It is becoming increasingly clear that there are indeed many changes in the Middle East, and that while these vary considerably in their scope, scale and range, few things and few participants remain as they were before.

These changes are related to two sequences of events: one short-term and regional, namely the war in Kuwait and Iraq; the other long-term and global, namely the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some changes may perhaps be ascribed directly to these events; others -probably most- had been in progress for some time and were revealed, and perhaps also accelerated, by the cataclysmic events in the region and in the world.¹⁵²

It is clear to any observer that the "recent dramatic global changes in the international system profoundly impacted on the Middle Eastern regional system and significantly affected its politics."¹⁵³

In my judgement, there can be no doubt that the Soviet demise and its ultimate collapse affected the Middle East more than any other region, almost certainly with the

¹⁵⁰ See Miller, B., "Hot Wars, Cold Peace: An International-Regional Synthesis," in Z. Maoz (ed.) *Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present and Future*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

¹⁵¹ Niblock, T., "A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East?," in Jawad, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 12.

¹⁵² Lewis, B., "Rethinking the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 4, 1992, p. 99.

¹⁵³ Cantori, (1994, Op. Cit., p. 451.

exception of Eastern Europe. Most of the region's countries were affected by Soviet policies in either positive or negative ways, and thus were affected by its absence in one or another way as well.

There can also be no doubt that the Soviet Union's weakness, demise and retreat from the region benefited its main rival, the United States. As Raymond Garthoff pointed out "In the 1980s, the Soviet presence in the Third World markedly diminished while the USA role increased".¹⁵⁴

The discovery by some of the region's states that their patron was no longer a superpower forced them to look for alternative ways to protect their interests. Countries with strong relations with the United States and Western powers considered themselves to be on the victorious side of the Cold War, and acted accordingly. States such as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and the GCC states took comfort in the fact that their ally had become the only superpower. However, some states such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria and organisations like PLO felt displeased with the speedy changes in the international arena, and tried to act with the same speed to face these changes with appropriate policies.

The New World Order in the Middle East was, perhaps, best summarised by Tim Niblock, who wrote that:

With the transformation in the global system which occurred with the break-up of the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern states found themselves in a world where the superpower which was most overtly supportive of Arab regional ambitions (albeit suspected by many Arab governments of harbouring subversive intentions) had effectively disappeared from the scene. The transformation in the global system has forced regional states to review and restructure their relationship to the outside world responding to a new balance of strategic power.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Garthoff, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 678.

¹⁵⁵ Niblock, T., "A Framework for Renewal in the Middle East," in Jawad, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 1.

As it is a matter of fact that there is a New World Order, following the sea changes in the international system in terms of the balance of power and rules of the game, and as it is also an undeniable fact that the United States is the only remaining superpower, it is also a reality that the Middle East is one of the regions most affected by these conditions, so it is of great importance to look at how the United States demonstrated its unipolarity and hegemony in this strategically important region.

American Unipolarity and Hegemony in the Middle East

The new American unipolarity on the international level and its hegemony on the Middle Eastern regional level can be attributed to two facts. On the international level, the collapse of the Soviet Union left it as the only remaining superpower. In the Middle East, the inability and/or unwillingness of other international powers (China, France, U.K. or Russia) to challenge United States in the region allowed it to exert its hegemony. This unwillingness can be seen either as an exchange of mutual interests or a common interest among the United States and the other powers. For example, the USA might be seen as buying its hegemony in the Middle East in exchange for giving a free hand to Russia in places where the latter's interests are more at stake. The same can be said to be the case for China. For the United Kingdom, however, the unwillingness to challenge the United States' hegemony and in fact its support of it might be due to the common interest or what can be termed a strategic partnership and alliance. I will try in the coming discussion to give examples of both the United States' unipolarity and its hegemony in the Middle East.

As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this chapter, unipolarity includes both a new balance of power and a new "code of conduct" determined by the remaining superpower. The United States became the sole pole in a unipolar world in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War.

In the words of Louis Cantori, "The end of the Cold War in 1989 prepared the way for a USA-dominant unipolar international system in the 1990s."¹⁵⁶ While For Emma Murphy, "The New World Order was essentially the extension of unipolar USA influence over the region - and, in turn, the subjugation of the region to USA national interests."¹⁵⁷

United States' Interests in the Middle East after 1990

The United States has a number of interests in the Middle East. As the superpower of the unipolar system and as a regional hegemon, the United States will perceive any development in the region as affecting its interests. Its dominance and superiority will push it to assume the role of the world policeman or the world governor. In order to be able to examine its unipolarity and hegemony in pursuing its interests, we need first to know what these interests are. Although they are numerous and subject to considerable disagreement among scholars and analysts, there are three main interests which most authors agree on. These three interests, in my own judgement, can be ordered as follows: Israel, oil and other interests. Describing USA interests following the end of the Cold War, Louis Cantori wrote that:

It can be speculated that the end of the Cold War has meant the destruction of the U.S. Cold War policy prism. As a result it is now possible for the United States to pursue the goals of secure oil, a secure Israel, and secure air and sea routes with primary attention to the amelioration of regional disputes. The cessation of the bipolar rivalry of the United States and the former Soviet Union has not resulted in an abrupt decline in their interests in the Middle East. Instead U.S. diplomacy

¹⁵⁶ Cantori, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 451.

¹⁵⁷ Murphy, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 82.

has been focused on access to oil and oil pricing and the value of regional stability in maintaining the free flow of oil.¹⁵⁸

Fighting Islamic fundamentalism, stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protecting the traditional ties with friendly Arab states, containing Iraq and Iran and confronting terrorism, can be seen as other American interests or tactics to protect interests. Anthony Lake, the American assistant secretary for the Middle East, former USA ambassador to Israel and National Security Advisor to Bill Clinton, commenting on the same point of USA interests, pointed out that:

In the middle of this era of turmoil and hope, the United States cannot afford to be a bystander. Despite the end of the superpower rivalry, the region remains of vital interest to our nation. The free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the Gulf; the security and well-being of Israel; a secure and lasting Arab-Israeli peace; the stability of friendly Arab countries; our need to contain Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Sudan - the reactionary "backlash states" of the region; and efforts to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction; all these reasons give our nation a very real stake in ensuring a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future.¹⁵⁹

In my view those mentioned interests are no more than tools to protect the main interests, Israel in the first place and then oil. Support for the idea that Israel and oil are the main American interests in the Middle East can be found quite easily. Louis Cantori, for example, observed that:

USA foreign policy in the Middle East previously centred on denying the region to the USSR, guaranteeing access to its oil, preserving the security of Israel, and accessing the crossroads of sea and air lanes that intersect the area.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Cantori, L., "Unipolarity and Egyptian Hegemony in the Middle East," in R. Freedman (ed.) *The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), p. 339.

¹⁵⁹ Lake, A., "Building a New Middle East: Challenge for U.S. Policy," *The Beirut Review*, Fall 1994, no. 8, p. 228.

¹⁶⁰ Cantori, (1994), Op. Cit.

More support can be gained from the comments of American Senator, Brand Gordon, who said clearly that there are several policy goals, which Congress shares with the Administration vis-à-vis the Middle East.

First and foremost is the security and well being of the state of Israel. Secondly, promoting peace and security in the Middle East, protecting American national interests in the Middle East - which include, protecting Israel- but also securing oil in the Persian Gulf, fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region, fighting international terrorism and radical elements that are anti-Western.¹⁶¹

Israel's was -due mainly to domestic politics rather than international considerations- one of two principal USA interests. The Jewish community in the United States is very important, indeed, arguably the most influential of all ethnic communities. Its attachment to the State of Israel is very strong. The role of this community in general, and its active lobby in particular, in influencing the United States' policy towards the Middle East can not be denied by any expert on USA domestic or foreign politics.

Israel and its lobby are doing everything possible to prevent any close Arab-American relations, and to ensure Israel's role as the sole important USA strategic ally in the region. Thus, the American interest in Israel as an important factor in its dual containment policy was doubled by the crucial Israeli role in American domestic politics through AIPAC. Also Israel knows that its strong alliance with the United States is the best security guarantee for its existence. The USA is also Israel's chief defender in the United Nations and supplier of vital economic and technological assistance. AIPAC, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, is one of the most powerful political organisations in Washington. Their power is so overbearing that nobody dares refuse them. Daniel Bloch wrote in the *Jerusalem Post* that: "There is a

¹⁶¹ "American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Interview with Brad Gordon," *Middle East Insight*, vol. xiii, no. 2, 1998, p. 50.

tendency on Capitol Hill to sign any letter originating from AIPAC's offices automatically, even if it says that the sun revolves around the earth."¹⁶²

Charles Brook pointed out that "the fact that almost two-thirds of Congress has been elected since 1990, the pro-Israel political power base is as strong as ever. A case in point is the recent House vote affirming Israel's claim to Jerusalem. Only 19 members out of 435 dissented on the vote, making it one of the most lopsided on any foreign policy issue brought to the floor."¹⁶³

Edward Said is one of those who has a different view. He noted that "The reasons for such a view of things cannot be ascribed to a Zionist conspiracy, or even to Jewish pressures on USA policy. Those pressures play a role but only to the extent that they coincide with the overall USA interests."¹⁶⁴

Regarding oil, since 1948, and even now, the importance of oil as an American regional interest has come second only to Israel. Since oil is one of the resources considered to be of vital importance to the economic and military security of nations, it seems natural that a shortage of oil would pose a great potential threat to national and international security.¹⁶⁵ For the United States, the Gulf's significance increased greatly during the Cold War due to the prevalence of oil in the region. As Louis Cantouri observed, "It is the oil of the Gulf and the security of friendly states that have been the

¹⁶² Bloch, D., "AIPAC on the Right," *Jerusalem Post*, 19/4/1998, p. 8.

¹⁶³ Brooks, C., "The Pro-Israel Community and the US-Israel Alliance," *Middle East Insight*, vol. xiii, no. 2, 1998, p. 56.

¹⁶⁴ Said, E., *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination 1996-1994*, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 211.

¹⁶⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute., *Oil and Security*, (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 11.

focal point of USA policy.”¹⁶⁶ For a long time, the oil supplies from the Persian Gulf, were an American strategic priority for two reasons; the dependence of America's allies on these supplies, and the desire to prevent the Soviet Union from dominating the oil reserves. These two reasons, obviously, were understood in the context of the Cold War. The American administration under the presidency of Jimmy Carter followed its predecessor and making it clear that the Gulf oil reserves are of great strategic importance, and a national interest for the United States. Carter Doctrine declared that an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Gulf region would be considered an attack on vital interests of the USA.¹⁶⁷ The Doctrine restated USA awareness of the importance of the region's oil supply. Consequently, the USA started to build up its military forces and supply arms to the region in order to face any threat to this interest. In an interview with Middle East Insight, the American Senator, Joseph L. Liberman said that the United States has had a number of reasons why it is interested in stability in the Middle East. One clearly is economic, which is the flow of oil from the Gulf countries to the USA and to the West generally.¹⁶⁸

As we have demonstrated earlier, hegemony is the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the international system to the extent that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangements by which international political and economic relations are conducted.¹⁶⁹ According to Tim Niblock, “the collapse of the

¹⁶⁶ Cantori, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 453.

¹⁶⁷ Gordon, P., *The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 46.

¹⁶⁸ “Building Bridges: Listening and Outreach,” Interview with Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, *Middle East Insight*, vol. xiii, no. 2, 1998, p. 41.

¹⁶⁹ Rupert, M., *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American*

Communist bloc left the United States free to pursue its own preferred strategy on Middle East matters, uninhibited by fears that a superpower rival would exploit any opportunity to undermine the United States' influence."¹⁷⁰

Similarly Ziva Flamhaft, in her book entitled Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable pointed out that:

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet state, the maintenance of world order was left in the hands of the only remaining superpower -the United States- even if that required the cooperation of friends and allies and the help of a more potent United Nations.¹⁷¹

Emphasising the same point, Meredith Sarkees mentioned in her article entitled "Disenchantment with the New World Order" that:

The New World Order presented new conditions, and a new framework to international relations in general, and in the Middle East in particular. This framework of the American transitional hegemony will affect the policies of the Middle East countries and lead to a new Middle East.¹⁷²

During the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, the United States continued to implement its hegemonic role and policies in the region. It was driven by its own economic and geo-political interests, mainly its interest in protecting the state of Israel and controlling the oil reserve areas. Both the Zionist lobby and lobbies of the respective oil companies are very strong and active in the American domestic politics. Their influence in the Congress is an undeniable fact. In order to satisfy the Congress, successive USA administrations designed their own doctrines

Global Power, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁷⁰ See, Niblock, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 4.

¹⁷¹ Flamhaft, Z., *Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 76.

¹⁷² Sarkees, (1994), Op. Cit., pp. 355-376.

towards the region. From the Truman Doctrine, through the Nixon and Carter Doctrines, to Bush's New World Order, almost all of the administrations worked hard to set their own distinctive policies towards the Middle East in general, and the Gulf in particular.

To protect Israel and maintain control and domination on the world oil reserve areas, the United States designed a dual containment policy to contain both Iraq and Iran.¹⁷³ In other words dual containment policy was designed to advance the two principal aims.

President Clinton's advisors conceived the policy in 1993 as a reaction to the failure of the previous administration to maintain the balance in the Gulf by playing off Iraq and Iran against each other. The central idea was based on the assumption that "with the defeat of Iraq and the Iranian economic crisis they thought that all the USA needs is to contain both countries, and as for the Soviet Union, they will drop their rejection of the new American dominated order in the Middle East."¹⁷⁴

With these two major regional powers contained, Egypt at peace with Israel and Turkey in alliance with it, no other country in the region can pose any real danger to Israel. By dividing Iraq through enforcing the "no-fly zones" policy, the United States aspires to diminish, once and for all, any possibility for Iraq to be a great regional power again, and, thus, to eliminate any threat it might pose to its oil-rich neighbouring Gulf states and to Israel. With such policies in the Gulf, the United States has effectively established itself as the main protector of the area. Additionally it maintains a military presence which, helps among other things to create a buffer zone between Iran and Israel.

¹⁷³ Quandt, (1977), Op. Cit.

¹⁷⁴ Rathmell, A., "The Demise of Dual Containment," *Middle East International*, 21/11/1997, p. 18.

The United States' hegemonic policy in the Middle East is aimed at reordering the region in a way that can serve its interests as mentioned earlier. If reordering the regional system and redrawing the map will be achieved by dividing Iraq and partitioning Sudan, for example, it should also be noted that the United States uses other tactics to achieve its other aims. Imposing economic sanctions and air embargo against Arab and Islamic countries like Libya, Sudan, Iraq and Iran will serve to contain these countries and prevent them from opposing the United States' plan for the region, especially with respect to the Arab-Israeli peace process. The blacklist of states sponsoring terrorism contains mainly the names of Arab and Islamic countries who oppose the American policy of integrating Israel into the region while it still occupies internationally recognised Arab territories. The blacklist is used as pressure tool to isolate these countries until they accede to the American policy.

Fighting Islamic terrorism is a policy that has been shaped at a high speed during the last few years. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Jonathan Institute have played a major role both in defining the danger of Islamic terrorism,¹⁷⁵ and in presenting Israel's role as being an advanced base and a front line for confronting this new danger.¹⁷⁶ Incidentally, this allows Israel to regain or reclaim the sort of strategic importance it enjoyed during the Cold War as an advanced base against communism. The cruise missile attacks against Sudan and Afghanistan followed by the coordinated international campaign against Islamic movements were an example of the direction that this United States' policy can be expected to take.

In all its recent violent actions in the Middle East, the United States has faced no real challenge and this is due mainly to the changes in the World Order and its

¹⁷⁵ See, Netanyahu, (1995), Op. Cit.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

unchallenged regional hegemony. For many observers, America's leadership in the Gulf War "presaged a new period of multilateral engagement with the world's problems under a benign hegemony."¹⁷⁷ According to Charles Krauthammer, "the Gulf War marked the beginning of a pax-Americana in which the world will acquiesce to a benign American hegemony." Louis Cantouri thinks that:

The end of the Cold War in 1989 paved the way for a World Order dominated by the United States as a sole pole in the nineties, and that the dissolution of the Soviet Union confirmed this outcome period.¹⁷⁸

On the impact of new international changes on the region, Emma Murphy observed that:

The retreat of Soviet sponsorship had another profound implication for its Middle East client states, which was to draw them closer to the United States. . . In 1991 the United States was in a position to develop new and existing ties in the Arab world, unhindered by prior considerations of superpower competition. Equally, the Arab states no longer had a choice of patrons and were forced to come to terms with a new global balance of power in which confrontation with the United States would be a lonely venture.¹⁷⁹

Clearly, the Middle East ranks high in USA foreign policy. Two reasons account for this. Firstly, Middle East oil is important for both the United States and the developed world. Second, United States policy towards the region is also determined by its relationship with Israel, primarily Israeli security. Supplying Israel with all of the elements of strength and power, successive American administrations were told of Israel's strategic importance, first as an advanced base against hostile Arab nationalism and the spread of communism and, later, as an advanced base against Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Axford, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 183.

¹⁷⁸ Cantouri, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 451.

¹⁷⁹ Murphy, (1994), Op. Cit.

¹⁸⁰ Mansour, (1994), p. 193.

Currently, as Joshua Goldstein observed, the United States has military forces and equipment in six Middle East states, including the wealthiest (Saudi Arabia) and the most populous (Egypt), and is the primary ally of the strongest regional military power (Israel). Clarifying the extent of its involvement he wrote:

The United States is the main mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the leader behind international sanctions on Iraq Iran and Libya. Forty percent of all USA foreign aid goes to the region, mostly to Israel and Egypt. No other state comes close to these levels of regional involvement.¹⁸¹

USA's Use of the UN to Serve its Interests

The role of the United Nations following the end of the Cold War changed dramatically. As Charles Kegley observed:

The three barriers to the UN's performance posed by great-power rivalry, insufficient funds, and disunity generally have been somewhat alleviated by the Cold War's collapse. The great powers on the Security Council then began to behave in a manner consistent with what the framers of the United Nations Charter contemplated when they adopted the unanimity principle. Like the end of World War I and World War II, the end of the Cold War has witnessed renewed efforts to empower the United Nations to preserve world order and promote global prosperity. The end of the Cold War holds out the promise that continued major-power co-operation would remove the single most important obstacle to an enhanced UN role in world affairs. The Security Council in particular "has shown that it has the capacity to initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance of peace in a New World Order."¹⁸²

As Susan Strange pointed out in her book entitled, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy all that changed with the end of the Cold War was that there was nothing to stop the United States from making more use of the

¹⁸¹ Goldstein, J., Dynamics of Middle East Conflict and US Influence, 1979-97. <http://www.american.edu/academic.depts/sis/goldtext/me98.papr.htm>. pp. 5-6.

¹⁸² Kegley, C and Wittkopf, E., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 157.

approval of the Security Council, and of the UN's limited peacekeeping resources, to pursue its own unilaterally-determined strategic objectives. To some observers, this seemed to give the appearance of an enhanced role for the UN. But it is a sham. Or as Maurice Bernard, professor at the prestigious Graduate Institute for International Studies at Geneva has observed: "the situation in which the US meets no effective opposition has permitted the United States to transform the UN according to its own views."¹⁸³

There is always clear evidence of the American use of the UN's agencies to serve its policies. In order to facilitate implementing its policies, the USA used the UN as a cover to acquire the international legitimacy it needed. The United States used the United Nations agencies in general, and the Security Council in particular, to achieve its own political objectives. The Security Council resolutions against Iraq and Libya are examples of how the United States exploited its domination in the world's affairs against countries considered by the United States as threats against its interests. Security Council resolutions imposing air embargo and other measures on Libya, concerning the Pan Am bombing and its resolutions against Iraq over the Kuwait crisis have been used to implement USA strategy in the region.

Another example of this misuse of the UN's agencies is the USA's spying on Iraq through the UN's UNSCOM, which facilitated its bombing campaign in December 1998. American-British-Israeli close coordination is always evident too. As the Washington Post reported on 8 January 1999:

The United States for nearly three years intermittently monitored the coded radio communications of President Saddam Hussein's innermost security forces using equipment secretly installed in Iraq by UN weapons inspectors, according to U.S. and UN officials.

¹⁸³ Strange, S., *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 167.

In 1996 and 1997, the Iraqi communications were captured by off-the-shelf commercial equipment carried by inspectors from the organisation known as UNSCOM, then hand-delivered to analysis centres in Britain, Israel and the United States for interpretation, officials said.¹⁸⁴

Emphasising the United States use of the United Nations Barrie Axford wrote that:

The sort of global order mooted by president Bush relied heavily upon a particular vision of the post-communist world. At its root it traded on the idea of co-operation with the Soviet Union and upon the ability of the United States to build a coalition against any aggressor by using the United Nations as a rallying point, or as a symbol of unity to legitimate direct action, as happened in the Gulf War.¹⁸⁵

Aharon Levran in his book Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm: Lessons of the Second Gulf War explained how the Arab states fall under the mercy of the United States.

The Second Gulf War brought home to the states of the Middle East that it is difficult, if not impossible, to fight a war of any consequence without the patronage of a superpower, especially when this patron has no opposing superpower. The Arabs and pro-Soviet countries were undoubtedly aware that their traditional patron, the USSR, had, for all intents and purposes, abandoned its active role in the political arena, including the Middle East, leaving them at the mercy of the only remaining superpower, who happened to be the friend of their foe.¹⁸⁶

Conclusion

It has been argued throughout this chapter that a new pattern of international relations, a "New World Order," is in fact existing. It emerged out of the collapse of the old pattern of international relations, the "Old World Order" that existed before 1989.

The basic cause of the transformation of World Order was the decline of the USSR and removal of one superpower from a bipolar balance of power. The fact that the United States was the only sole remaining superpower led to a unipolar World Order

¹⁸⁴ *The Washington Post*, 8/1/1999.

¹⁸⁵ Axford, (1996) Op. Cit., p. 186.

¹⁸⁶ Levran, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 89.

at least in the immediate term. Even if multipolarity will be the ultimate future characteristic of the World Order, the immediate characteristics is unipolarity and hegemony.

The USA was able as a result of these international and regional changes to exert its own hegemony on the world and on the Middle East region in particular. For the Middle East this process was already evident in the 1980s. In fact it was clear since President Al-Sadat declared that the United States held most of the cards towards war and peace in the Middle East. The second Gulf war signalled the real acknowledgement by regional states of a New World Order. They have since been adjusting their behaviour to the new distribution of power and the new "rules of the game" of the new international system.

The USA now pursues its two basic goals. The first is protecting the state of Israel while the second is protecting the oil supplies to the Western Hemisphere. To achieve its main goals for its own interests, the USA uses series of tactics. The most important of which is the dual containment policy towards Iraq and Iran. The second is the containment and fighting of what it calls Islamic terrorism. Isolation of other 'rogue states' such as Libya, Sudan and Yemen were the other tactics. The other tactic was the manipulation of UN.

The New World Order presented a new situation for the Middle East in general, and the Arab world in particular. The unipolarity, domination and hegemony of the United States in the international system and in the region posed fundamental challenges.

As next chapters will show, the USA also protects its interests by advancing the Arab-Israeli peace process in a way that suits its own and Israel's interests – even at the expense of the other actors in the conflict.

In the Middle East, as Dr Anoushiravan Ehteshami pointed out: "the issues at stake in the post-Cold War environment are not simply to reshape the past to fit a new reality, but rather to shape the future in view of the new realities."¹⁸⁷ Indeed the future of the Middle East is being shaped according to the new reality of the New World Order in which American unipolarity is recognised by almost every single country and its hegemony is felt especially within the Middle East. The implications of this New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process and wider Middle East relations will be discussed in the coming chapters. Particular attention will be given to the Madrid peace conference and the Oslo agreements, to see how the American international unipolarity and regional hegemony affected them.

¹⁸⁷ Ehteshami, A., "Security Structures in the Middle East: An Overview," in H. Jawad., (1994), *Op.Cit.*, p. 70.

PART TWO:

**THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WORLD ORDER FOR THE ARAB-
ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS**

CHAPTER THREE

THE COLD WAR AND THE PEACE PROCESS

The Cold War competition in the Middle East has had two effects. First the Cold War stalemate has effectively been imposed on the Middle East. As in many other parts of the world, conflicts and disputes arising out of local relationships have been frozen by the determination of the respective superpowers to take one side or another. For the superpowers Middle Eastern policy has constituted merely part of their respective Cold War policies. The dispute between Israel and the Arab states on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other has got caught up in the antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union which effectively has prevented a solution.¹

(Joshua Goldstein)

Introduction

This chapter is about the background of the Arab-Israeli peace efforts during the Cold War period. In this period attempts to reach peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, like the events of the conflict itself, were well connected with the events of world politics and the development of the international system and the Old World Order.

Superpower interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict began as early as their support for the establishment of the state of Israel itself. Even prior to this, Britain had supported the creation of the Jewish national home in Palestine, and a Zionist lobby was operating to support the Zionist cause in the USA.

With the development of the Cold War, the two superpowers were increasingly drawn into the developing Arab-Israeli conflict. As the USA and the USSR fought for influence in the region, the emergence of two competing regional poles (Arabs and Israelis) provided opportunity for the superpowers to use economic, political and military support to advance their own interests.

¹ Goldstein, J., *International Relations*, (New York: Longman, 1999).

In their efforts to realize their aspirations, the Zionist and Arab national movements sought the assistance of foreign powers to strengthen their military efforts against the other side. This created a kind of polarization, as each side to the conflict came to depend on one of the world's two poles in confronting the other pole supporting its rival. In the context of the struggle between the two poles for influence in this important region, the Arab-Israeli conflict was a great opportunity and a suitable place for intervention, through the provision of economic, political and military aid to the two sides of the conflict. This international competition that continued from the forties to the eighties reflected itself on the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its stages, on its events, wars, crises and attempts to achieve peace for its peoples.

During the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and the various crises in between, this international involvement was obvious through the supply of arms, economic and technical aid and political support in international forums. Every side in the international conflict supported one of the sides in the regional conflict, with the exception of limited periods where the international powers co-operated in imposing embargo on arm sales to the region or trying to resolve the conflict during the *Détente* period.

The superpowers used various peace processes to try to advance their own interests, not just wars or crises. But while peace processes were intended to prevent direct conflict (or the superpowers getting directly military drawn in) they had two counter effects. First, they encouraged regional parties to take advantage of superpower interest, preventing resolution. Second, the superpowers were actually able to take advantage of the continuation of the conflict.

If the peace efforts reflected in many cases the desire to prevent international confrontation that might result from Arab-Israeli war, the failure of such efforts was due to two factors. First, the conflicting parties were encouraged by the support of one of the

superpowers and aspired to realize their goals through force. Second, the two superpowers, despite their public support for a just and comprehensive peaceful settlement, felt that the continuation of the conflict provided them with the opportunity to intervene in the region, thus serving their strategic interests. As Ziva Flamhaft pointed out, "The vehicle that enabled the superpowers to intervene in the Middle East as part of their global balancing act during the Cold War was the Arab-Israeli conflict."²

It is important to point out that peace initiatives in the Middle East reflected clearly different stages and periods of ups and downs, tensions and détente in the superpowers relation. During the tense periods, which accounted for most of the Cold War period, the cooperation between the two superpowers was nil, peace efforts failed, wars almost or actually happened. Examples of failed efforts were the Jarring mission, the William Rogers' initiative, the African Presidents' mission and the peace plans of Shamir, Mubarak, Reagan, Fahd, and others.

When peace did happen, it was a limited peace or separate agreement, such as Kissinger's disengagement agreements and the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel, which did not lead to the end of the conflict but to its continuation, and resulted in "cold peace" between the two countries.

During the détente periods, some kind of cooperation between the two superpowers enabled them to issue joint calls for a peaceful settlement, or the convening of an international conference to discuss the problem and open the door to negotiate possible solutions. Examples of that were the Joint American-Soviet statement, and the Geneva Conference. But the limits to cooperation, and the continued superpower rivalry prevented more substantial peace agreements.

² Flamhaft, Z., *Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 9.

Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine, there were efforts to resolve the problem and bring about a peaceful settlement. With any escalation of the conflict, there were intensified efforts to find a solution. With every war between the newly established state of Israel on one side and the Palestinians and Arab neighbouring countries on the other, there were major efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, whether it was called peace plan, peace initiative or mediation effort.

It is important to recognize that peace efforts were highly affected by the features of the international system. Not just by superpower bipolar competition but also by the existence of the United Nations and its Security Council. Therefore international organizations and other parties contributed to efforts at peace making.

As the military conflict was taking place within and being influenced deeply by the international environment and the international system, so were the peace efforts. By the end of World War II in 1944 and the establishment of the UN in 1945, a new international system was being created and developed. Two main features characterized that system. The first was the bipolar superpower competition already mentioned. The second was the existence of the United Nations as an instrument to maintain peace and stability in the world. The main organ of this organization was the Security Council, and the main feature of that Council was the right of the main five international major powers (USSR, UK, France, China and USA) to veto any resolution taken by the Security Council. As K.J.Holsti pointed out in his book entitled The State, War, and the State of War.

Post-1945 states were not created solely by armed national liberation movements or by the co-opted indigenous elites of the colonial state. The United Nations, representing the international community and its norms, was also involved in the state-making process. It participated in three ways: (1) by defining the territorial extent and political forms of new states; (2) by establishing the philosophical and political ground rules for de-colonization; and (3) by granting membership to the

organization and providing the new states with a variety of life-support assistance.³

Since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict following the establishment of Israel in May 1948, there have been number of peace attempts, individual or collective, regional or international. The initiatives differed in their goals and methods, some of them were honest efforts and some were designed for public relations purposes to win time or to create facts on the ground. Some of these attempts resulted in peace agreements. Some of them did not succeed but established the ground and made it possible for the following efforts to succeed as it facilitated the mutual understanding between the parties, and was necessary for exploring the initial position of all parties. That fact was emphasized by Saadia Touval who wrote in his book The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1948-1979, that:

It is not for lack of attempts to resolve it that the Arab-Israeli conflict has gone on for so long. For over sixty years, repeated efforts have been made to reconcile the incompatible claims to Palestine made by Arab and Jewish national movements, but to no avail.⁴

Indeed many mediators and negotiations by governments, international organizations and individuals have been part of the total picture in Middle East conflict resolution activities.

This chapter will be devoted to the discussion of the historical background of the peace efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. I will assess these efforts at peace making during the Cold War and examine how they were shaped by; first, bipolar

³ Holsti, K., *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁴ Touval, S., *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. xi.

competition between the superpowers, and second, the response of the international community and regional actors to that competition and the prevailing international system. In this context I will discuss many peace plans which varied in their importance. Also I will discuss many mediation efforts, which have been conducted either by individuals or by groups or organizations. I will start by these mediation efforts as an attempt to understand the mediator background, their proposals to resolve the conflict and the results of those mediations and their effect on the conflict.

These peace efforts intensified following every war because of the danger that deteriorating situation in the region could threaten the world peace and the interests of not only the parties to the conflict but the interests of the major and superpowers.

The patron-client relationship played an important role in preventing peace moves during the Cold War period. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov pointed out that:

“Patron-client relations, together with the interlocking of local and superpower conflict, have generated a multitude of bargaining relationships in the Middle East.”⁵

The failure or success of the peace initiatives that I am going to discuss throughout this chapter is linked to the patron-client relationship. The USA's patronage of Israel and Soviet patronage of Arab states contributed to the failure of many peace efforts because of the rivalry between the two superpowers.

The best way to deal with peace efforts during the Cold War period in my view is to divide the period into five short periods and try to assess those efforts, their motives and results and their relations with the wider international politics. In other words to see how these efforts were affected by the Cold War world order.

The first period will be from the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 to the 1967 war. The second will be from 1967 war to 1973 war. The third will be from 1973 war to the

⁵ Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., *Israel, the Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. xii.

signing of Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979. The fourth will be from 1979 to 1985 and finally the fifth will be from 1988 to the start of Madrid peace conference in 1991.⁶

Peace Efforts Between 1948-1967

For Israelis the 1948 war was a war of independence. For the Arabs and the Palestinians in particular it was a catastrophe. The Six-Day war of 1967 was a victory for the Israelis but was another catastrophe for the Arab countries. However, the period in between witnessed many efforts to find a political solution to the conflict. In this section I will examine some of these efforts and try to find out how they were affected by the Cold War Order. Among these efforts I will focus on the United Nations Partition Plan, the Folke Bernadotte mission, the Ralph Bunche mission, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and Robert Anderson's mission.⁷

The UN Partition Plan

In response to Britain's inability to manage its own mandate in Palestine successfully the United Nations formed in February 1947, a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to recommend on how to deal with the Palestine problem. After investigating conditions in the country, the committee submitted its report to the United Nations at the end of August 1947. On 29 November the General Assembly voted with thirty-three votes to thirteen, and ten abstentions, to approve the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state.⁸ Although the Partition Plan was presented as a solution

⁶ Abdul Hadi, M., *Documents on Palestine (I)*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997).

⁷ Sela, A., *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order*, (New York: State University of New York, 1998), pp. 57-75.

⁸ Smith, C., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: St. Martin's Press,

to the conflicting claims of the two communities they did not see it as such. The plan to partition Palestine into two states, one for the Jews and one for the Arabs, was seen by the Arabs as a plot by the Western powers to create an imperialist base in their midst. Such a creation would effectively divide the Arab world in the middle, in addition to establishing a foreign and hostile entity, which would drive the Palestinians from their homeland. In Walid Khalidi's words, "The UN 1947 partition was not the legal, moral, fair, balanced, pragmatic, practicable 'compromise' formula that it is made out to be. That it was legal at all is moot."⁹ Nevertheless, "the countries of the Arab League pinned all their hopes during this period on diplomacy. None of them was even on speaking terms with the Soviet Union. None had made preparations for war. All were friendly to the United States."¹⁰

For the Israelis, "The right of the Jews to an independent state in part of Palestine had been recognized by the international community, giving legitimacy to Jewish claims for self-rule."¹¹ However, while they accepted the principle of partition, they would not commit themselves to the proposed geography of the plan.

The importance of the Cold War atmosphere on the issue was clear from the start. The USA's position was taken according to its policy towards its rival the Soviet Union.¹² The United States understood on the one hand the impossibility of imposing the partition without military force. On the other hand any military intervention would

1992), p. 138.

⁹ Khalidi, W., "Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. xxvii, no. 105, 1997, p. 9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹¹ Smith, (1992), *Op. Cit.*, p. 140.

¹² *Ibid.*

be exploited by the Soviet Union, a matter that the USA could not allow.¹³ Also the USA feared Soviet involvement in any international police force and therefore rejected giving the Security Council powers to police partition.¹⁴ The Soviet Union was equally concerned that, in the post-World War Two international environment, the USA should not gain the upper hand in the developing world which the USSR considered to fall ideologically within its own domain. The Middle East was a particularly sensitive area, bordering as it did the south/south western boundary of Soviet territory. Any southern access to a warm water port would have to be via the region. Moreover, the Soviet Union's own Muslim peripheries lay adjacent to the Arab and Iranian lands and could potentially be destabilised by religious or nationalist activities therein. Finally, World War Two had illustrated the growing importance of Middle Eastern oil fields for the energy supplies, economic and military capabilities of the superpowers. In sum, the Soviet Union had a profound strategic interest in establishing a presence in the region, whether militarily in the Indian Ocean or diplomatically via regional clients. This was to remain the case throughout the Cold War. Therefore, although the United States dominated peace efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviet Union always tried to find a place and contribute in one way or another in order to advance its interests in the region.

Following World War II and to compete with the United States in the Cold War struggle, the Soviet Union increased its activities and became an effective actor in Middle East international relations. Alan Taylor pointed out in his book The Superpowers and the Middle East that "like the Americans, the Soviets were so

¹³ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 142.

preoccupied with the superpower rivalry itself that they concentrated mainly on a global as opposed to a regional approach,”¹⁵

To do this, the Soviet Union focused its efforts on developing links with the states and peoples of the area around the common element of resisting imperialism. Building an “anti-imperialist” front in the Middle East was a primary objective of the Soviet Union for decades. However it should be understood that: “The Russian attitude toward the Middle East has traditionally been opportunistic rather than benign.”¹⁶ The relationship with Egypt during President Nasser’s period was an example of the Soviet’s policy success in the Middle East and illustrated this fact. Soviet support for Egypt was conveniently portrayed as idealistic, but Nasser had no particular ideological affinity to the Soviet Union, his socialism was not scientific and he was continually nervous of Soviet efforts to impose upon his own foreign and domestic policy-making. The Soviet Union for its part proved uninterested in trying to force Nasser to adopt a political system closer to its own and remained interested solely in Egypt’s regional position under its own sponsorship. Equally military support to Egypt and Syria, especially following the 1967 war, improved its own position in the area and allowed it to develop relations with many other revolutionary countries like Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and the two Yemens. Soviet interests in the region, like those of the USA, were primarily realist in orientation and utilised the notion of patron-client relations from early on.

Robert Freedman pointed out rightly that: “In their ‘zero-sum’ view of Middle East influence, the Soviets were quite concerned that the sharp rise in American prestige

¹⁵ Taylor, A., *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), p. 133.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.134.

in the region meant a concomitant drop in Soviet influence.”¹⁷ Due to this concern, the Soviet Union tried always to participate in any political peace efforts despite the American desire to dominate and conduct those efforts in its own way. Its participation in Geneva conference in December 1973 was a major success in that direction even if the conference did not produce any positive results. The October 1977 joint statement with the United States concerning the peace process was a rare example of co-operation and coordination during that troubled era.

In the case of the Jewish State, the Zionists did not wait for the UN to implement the Partition Plan and on 15 May proclaimed a Jewish state on the area granted to them. The implementation of the UN Partition Plan was not possible. According to Saadia Touval the partition plan, “had run into serious difficulty because of Arab opposition and British non-cooperation. The USA temporarily abandoned its support for partition and proposed instead that UN trusteeship or some other provisional regime be established in Palestine when the British mandate ended.”¹⁸

Thus the impact of the World Order on the Arab Israeli conflict was evident from the start.¹⁹ Even in the United Nations and its main organs, the superpowers’ rivalry reflected itself on the partition issue. In Saadia Touval’s words, “The Cold War paralyzed the work of the Security Council on the Palestinian issue.”²⁰

¹⁷ Freedman, R., *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 14-19

¹⁸ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 25.

¹⁹ Forsythe, D., *United Nations Peacemaking: The Conciliation Commission for Palestine*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1972).

²⁰ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 251.

The Folke Bernadotte Mission

In the context of mediation efforts, it is clear that Bernadotte's efforts were very important. In the period between May and September 1948, following the eruption of the 1948 war between the newly established Israel and the neighbouring Arab states, the United Nations sent the Swedish Count, Folke Bernadotte, to try and reach a comprehensive agreement to the conflict.²¹

Bernadotte tried to reach a quick settlement, to end hostilities, and opposed Israel's leaders' wish to benefit from the Arab weakness in obtaining more territories. He believed that any agreement between Arabs and Israelis must achieve a balance and justice in the territorial gains. For example, the Israeli domination on the Galilee meant that Israelis should have no rights in the Negev, and vice versa.²²

In addition to the Israeli opposition to Bernadotte's proposals of non-acquisition of Galilee and Negev at the same time -which, was accepted by the Americans and the British- they opposed the idea of the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Israeli opposition to his proposals led a Jewish terrorist group to assassinate him in Jerusalem on 18 September 1948.

The unsuccessful end to Bernadotte's efforts was due,²³ even before his assassination to factors such as the lack of resources, which prevented him from influencing the parties' positions, and more particularly to the limited authority of his role as a UN mediator. His mediation came along at the start of the 1948 war, which

²¹ Ilan, A., *Bernadotte in Palestine, 1948: A Study in Contemporary Humanitarian Knight-Errantry*, (Oxford: Macmillan, 1989), p. 1.

²² See Beling, W., *Middle East Peace Plans*, (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

²³ See, Tessler, M., *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 274.

coincided with the Berlin blockade. At this point in time, the Soviet Union and the USA/ Britain were more concerned with events in Europe. The Cold War was taking shape and superpower rivalry was becoming more sharply focused, thus reducing their ability and willingness to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict in a co-operative and effective way.²⁴ Without committed superpower support and under the auspices of a still new and weak United Nations, the mission was destined to fail.

Ralph Bunche's Mission

Following the establishment of Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, a 'new phase' of the conflict began. The focus was –according to Charles Smith- on “Arab-Israeli state and military interactions,” and was affected to a much greater degree than previously by, “great power rivalries and the continuing confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the Western powers.”²⁵

Following Bernadotte's assassination, the UN's new mediator Ralph Bunch initiated truce negotiations between Israel and its neighboring Arab countries in Rhodes between January and July 1949. These agreements exceeded any previous truce or cease-fire, and presented the first official agreements between the parties. His role was important in the agreements between Israel on one side and Egypt, Lebanon and Syria on the other, but less important in the agreement between Israel and Jordan.

Ralph Bunche was more successful than Bernadotte. That success might be due to personal qualifications, his understanding of superpower interests, American support

²⁴ See Buheiry, M., “The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East in the Early 1950's and Today: Retrospect and Prospect,” in R. Khalidi, and C. Mansour, *Palestine and the Gulf*, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1982), pp. 120-160.

²⁵ Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 147.

and the diplomatic assistants provided by it in the Capitals concerned.²⁶ The other reason is that the states dealt with him as an American more than as a representative of the UN and the regional balance of power in that time enabled him to succeed.²⁷

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP)

On the basis of recommendations by Bernadotte and Bunch, the UN General Assembly established the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) through its resolution no. 194 of 11 December 1948.

The period 1949-51 was the only time in the life of the commission when it operated as a three-government organ pursuant to a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁸

The commission persuaded Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to attend a conference in Lusanne, Switzerland, in April 1949. On 12 May 1949, the commission succeeded in obtaining the signature of both the Arabs and the Israelis to two protocols. However, further progress by the commission was impeded by the growing inclination of the superpowers to view the United Nations as an instrument for their own ends. The Soviet Union, in particular, saw the commission as an instrument of the west, being used to limit its own influence in the Middle East.²⁹

America, meanwhile, was unwilling to put sufficient pressure on either Israel or the Arabs to make significant concessions, as it was more interested in winning their

²⁶ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 73.

²⁷ See Finger, S., *The New World Balance and Peace in the Middle East*, (New York: 1975).

²⁸ Forsythe, (1972), Op. Cit, p. 97.

²⁹ See, Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 167.

support in its broader strategic struggle with the Soviet Union. With neither superpower prepared to support the further work of the commission, it too inevitably failed.³⁰

Robert Anderson's Mission

The mission of Robert B. Anderson, the personal envoy of President Eisenhower, came after the end of the mission of Eric Johnson who had been sent to the Middle East in 1953 for a mission which lasted for two and a half years.³¹

Anderson's mission reflected a basic American strategy for dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The major American preoccupation in that period was the Cold War and improving the defensive capability of the non-communist countries bordering the communist bloc, to confront the changes, the most important of which the decline of the British influence.³²

It was no coincidence that the Anderson mission coincided with the establishment of the first Soviet foothold in the region.³³ Following the 1952 revolution, Egypt had begun to develop relations with the Soviet bloc, causing concern to the United States and its western allies.³⁴ However, the USA was unwilling to itself provide Egypt with the arms that it needed to counter Israel's own defence procurement programme (notably from France). The USA offered only economic aid, forcing Egypt

³⁰ See Finger, (1975), Op. Cit.

³¹ See Buheiry, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 70.

³² See Beling, (1986), Op. Cit.

³³ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 135.

³⁴ See Laqueur, W., *The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London: The Camelot Press, 1968).

to look to the Soviet Union for the weapons it sought. Anderson's mission was a highly secret mission to see whether Gamal Abdul Nasser and David Ben Gurion would consent to negotiate.³⁵ The American awareness of Egypt's negotiations with the Soviet bloc to obtain arms and its own wish to undermine those efforts, pushed the USA to undertake this political initiative, before Egypt went too far in its relations with the Soviet bloc.³⁶ However, events during and after the Suez convinced Nasser that the United States was aligned against him and with Israel, (Washington having blocked food and financial assistance in 1956 and 1957), leading him to take a more pro-Soviet stance. This perception was reinforced by the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. With Soviet activities in Europe heightening superpower tensions, there was little prospect that the Soviet Union would accept any results from secret American mediation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Egypt remains sceptical of American objectives. Israel had meanwhile become disillusioned by the American pressure on Britain, France and Israel itself to withdraw from the Sinai and was determined to resist any attempts to force it into a premature peace.

Peace Efforts Between 1967-1973

During the 1960s the Cold War between the two international competing camps intensified. By 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict had become thoroughly intertwined with the East-West struggle. Indeed, the Soviet-American and the Arab-Israeli conflicts had become closely interdependent.³⁷ "From the Soviet perspective, continuing military and

³⁵ Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 168.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 168-169.

³⁷ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 135.

economic assistance to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq provided a wedge for gaining access to the Arab world through governments opposed to Western efforts to maintain their dominance.”³⁸ For the United States, the 1967 war had confirmed its own commitment first and foremost to the defense of the Israeli position. During this period from the Six-Day War of 1967 to the October war of 1973 there were several peace efforts, including an Israeli Nine-point Peace Plan (October 1968) presented by Abba Eban to the United Nations and a Soviet Plan, also presented in 1968. Neither plan offered more than the UNSC Resolution 242 that was issued immediately after the Six-Day War and which became the basis for those initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Soviet Plan, which did call for a return to pre-1967 borders was rejected by Israel as simply reverting to the pre-1967 situation, while the Israeli Plan did not offer to the Arabs as much as even a minimalist interpretation of UNSCR 242.

The appointment of Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring as special representative of the UN Secretary-General was also one of those mediation efforts. The Organization of African Unity contributed towards the Middle East peace efforts by composing a presidential commission.

In the following section I will discuss these efforts and try to find out how they were affected by the wider world politics and the Cold War between the two superpowers.³⁹

³⁸ Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 194.

³⁹ See Lesch, A and Tessler, M., *Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians, From Camp David to Intifada*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

UNSC Resolution 242

Following the 1967 war, and the Israeli occupation of what remained of Palestine, the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and territories in Lebanon and Jordan, the UN Security Council issued its well known resolution in November 1967.⁴⁰ The UNSCR 242 called in one of its paragraphs for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied by force in the 1967 war. Although this paragraph attracted the Arab parties to the resolution, its vagueness made it acceptable to Israel which interpreted it as requiring her to withdraw only from some and not all territories occupied in 1967.⁴¹

The resolution also called for establishing a just and permanent peace in the Middle East, recognizing the reciprocal sovereignty and the territorial integration of states and the political independence of all states in the region. This paragraph, which was accepted completely by Israel at a time when Israel was trying to legitimize its existence in the region, was not fully accepted by the Arab states. They saw it as an attempt to legitimize Israel's existence.⁴² Also the Palestinians, who did not have a state of their own and were out of the picture, saw it in the same way, as ignoring their legitimate rights.⁴³ The importance of UNSCR 242 stems from its calling for exchanging land for peace, and that it was generally acceptable to all parties including the Palestinians, who accepted the resolution at a later stage.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Beling, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 83.

⁴¹ Lall, A., *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

⁴² Smith, (1992), p. 210.

⁴³ See Joffe, L., *Keesing's Guide to the Middle East Peace Process*, (London: Cartmill Publishing, 1996).

⁴⁴ See Beling, (1986), Op. Cit.

It was also important because it constituted a base for other initiatives and plans for peace that followed. Its "land for peace" formula worked as a base and term of reference for the Camp David agreements, the Madrid peace process, the Oslo agreements and the Israel-Jordan peace agreement.⁴⁵ However, the vagueness of the document was exploited by both Arabs and Israel, with each seeking their patron's support in interpreting its terms within the UN Security Council. The resolution itself therefore became a victim of Cold War realities, showing once again how the clients were able to exploit their patrons' own hostilities to advance their causes and in the process obstructing advances in the peace process.

Gunnar Jarring's Mission

Following the 1967 war, and the issuing of the UNSC Resolution 242, which demanded that the UN Secretary General send a special representative to the Middle East, UThant appointed Dr. Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to Moscow, for the mission. "Jarring's mission originated from a familiar procedure of the international community and the UN Secretariat General which responded to the Arab-Israeli conflict by sending some one to the region to improve the situation."⁴⁶

The UNSC Resolution which demanded the Secretary General to send a special representative aimed at two things. First, providing the UN representative with terms of reference. Second, reaching an international consensus on the principles, which might help reach a settlement of the conflict.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ See Appendices, p. 410.

⁴⁶ See Kerr, M., *The Elusive Peace in the Middle East*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975).

⁴⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3922/i, 23/2/1972.

Jarring made a number of proposals, based on an interpretation of UNSCR that demanded full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, a condition unacceptable to Israel. The Golda Meir government was further convinced that the "independent" Jarring would not work towards their own interests as the American National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, would.). Thus they rejected Jarring's intervention in favour of American peace efforts. Their preference for American mediation only enhanced the Israeli-USA relationship, since the Americans were not ready either for a peace agreement on which the Soviet Union could vote (i.e: emanating from the United Nations Security Council. The Egyptians had accepted the terms of Jarring's solution but without Israel's agreement the mission was destined to fail.

Gunnar Jarring's mission failed due to the incompatibility of the parties' positions, in addition to the weakness of the United Nations, its lack of resources or influence to support its representative. Also it might be attributed to the ambiguity concerning the terms of reference, but more important was that the conflict structure overlapped with the struggle between the West and the East.⁴⁸ The intense competition between superpowers to advance their interests in the region prevented them from seeking quick solutions to the conflict. In fact the conflict became the main excuse to their intervention in the region through political, economic and military aid. The major power's interests as Touval pointed out, influenced its policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Each of the powers was motivated by concerns unrelated to the Middle East. France under Charles de Gaul wanted the talks in order to promote its standing as

⁴⁸ See Halliday, F., *Cold War, Third World: an Essay on Soviet-US Relations*, (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989).

a great power that participates alongside the superpowers in shaping the destinies of the world.⁴⁹

The two superpowers played out their competition in the Middle East using its conflict to further their influence. Economic aid and arms supplies were the main tools in the superpowers intervention in the Middle East. While the United States and before that France were the main suppliers to Israel, the Soviet Union was the main supplier to the Arab side of the conflict.

Despite its failure, the Jarring mission caused some changes.⁵⁰ Although it did not achieve a settlement, it caused some side effects, which affected the evaluation of the conflict, and the efforts to reach settlement.⁵¹ Also, it provided Egypt and Jordan with a diplomatic alternative, and enabled Egypt to make some big concessions.⁵²

The William Rogers' Initiative

Growing USA support for Israel in 1960s created Soviet opportunities among Arab states.⁵³ As pointed out clearly and rightly by Charles Smith, "Growing American identification with Israel in the 1960s provided more opportunities for Soviet inroads

⁴⁹ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 150.

⁵⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3921/I, 22/2/1972.

⁵¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3926/A/9, 28/2/1972.

⁵² See Lesch and Tessler., (1989), Op. Cit.

⁵³ See, Safran, N., *Israel: The Embattled Ally*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).

into the region.”⁵⁴ Some Arab countries found themselves with no alternative but to seek Soviet assistance to balance the emerging western alliance with Israel.

“The West sought to neutralize the military capabilities of the antagonists and align its participants, especially those among the Arab states, against any possible Soviet incursion.”⁵⁵ Therefore 1967 and 1968 saw assistance from the superpowers to regional allies increasing.

Elements within the Nixon administration also wanted to make a new start with the Soviet Union, while Saadia Touval thinks that:

Among the Soviet motivations in desiring negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict, obtaining recognition of its legitimate interest and involvement in Middle East affairs was highly important.⁵⁶

Both sides therefore had an interest in reviving the peace process. The USA sought to counter the Soviet tactics with a new initiative of their own. Behind the initiative there was an American desire to reduce Soviet influence and increase the American influence in Egypt and other Arab countries, through reducing tensions between Israel and the Arab countries.⁵⁷ The Rogers initiative (June 1970-April 1972) was therefore an American proposal designed to achieve three objectives.⁵⁸ First, a cease-fire between Egypt and Israel in order to end the dangerous situation of open war, Second, to prevent any development that might bring the American and Soviet forces to

⁵⁴ Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 194.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 152.

⁵⁶ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 151.

⁵⁷ Touval, (1982), p. 166.

⁵⁸ Lukacs, Y., *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Documentary Record, 1967-1990*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 55.

a military clash, and third, to revive the Jarring mission.⁵⁹ The cease fire proposal included a memorandum of understanding on the acceptance of both parties of UNSCR 242 as the basis of negotiations, with a clear indication of Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967.⁶⁰ The Rogers initiative, in addition to its being mediation, conducted by the American Secretary of State himself, was considered to be a peace plan. Immediately after his appointment by President Richard Nixon, Rogers took the initiative to prepare and formulate a peace plan to present to the parties, in order to reach a settlement. William Rogers presented his plan in December 1969, and tried to sell it in 1970.

Egypt and Jordan ultimately accepted the initiative, while Israel not surprisingly rejected it.⁶¹ Although the initiative failed in reaching an interim agreement on disengagement from the Suez Canal, it did reach an agreement on a cease-fire in the war of attrition between Egypt and Israel.

However the incidents in Jordan between the Jordanian army and the PLO elements, and the sudden death of President Gamal Abdul Nasser, in addition to the unripeness of the conflict for resolution, all contributed to ending the initiative before more substantive progress could be made. Additionally, within the American administration there was opposition to the plan, primarily from Kissinger who was to become the dominant figure in events as Nixon became preoccupied with the Viet Nam war and his own domestic problems. The initiative nonetheless without doubt contributed in developing a kind of debate and dialogue of some ideas, and investigating

⁵⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3415/A/2, 27/6/1970.

⁶⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3416/i, 29/6/1970.

⁶¹ Bar-Siman-Tov, (1987), *Op. Cit.*, p. 157.

other views, which were apart and influenced to a great extent by the general framework of the international circumstances and the East-West conflict within the Cold War.

The Soviet response to Rogers was opportunist. An initial rejection showed how the Soviet Union was eager to express its understanding of and support for its Arab allies. However, when the Soviets realised the increasing acceptance among the Arab parties, they offered their own acceptance and support to the initiative.⁶²

Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov viewed the Rogers plan from a patron-client relationship point of view. He thought that "Israel was confronted with USA constraints far earlier than it had expected, when the 'Rogers Plan' was presented to the Soviet Union at meeting between Sisco and Dobrynin."⁶³

Although the initiative can be seen as a failure because it did not bring about an agreement between the parties, the acceptance by most of the parties of the initiative itself can be seen as a major progress.⁶⁴

The OAU Presidential Commission

The Organization of African Unity tried to play a mediation role between Egypt and Israel in the second half of 1971. The African Summit of Addis Ababa appointed a committee of African presidents for that purpose. The committee (known as the ten wise men) was composed of the presidents of Mauritania, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaire, and the emperor of Ethiopia.⁶⁵

⁶² Taylor, A., *The Superpowers and the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger, 1991), p. 134.

⁶³ Bar-Siman-Tov, (1987), Op. Cit., p. 157.

⁶⁴ Rabin, Y., *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

⁶⁵ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., pp. 203-223.

This attempt to mediate was influenced by the fact that the committee was composed of ten countries that had differences between themselves on other issues, negatively influencing the atmosphere of the initiative. Also the initiative suffered from a lack of resources and coherence.

The committee apparently made an attempt to enlist the support of the great powers for its efforts. However, it met with indifference, if not with opposition. The US was in the midst of its attempt to mediate an interim agreement for disengagement and the reopening of the Suez Canal and was not interested in supporting a competing diplomatic effort. The Soviet Union had no interest in pressing Egypt to modify its stand on the Jarring initiative. And both, concerned with protecting their own freedom of action, probably did not view with favour the intrusion of additional actors into a conflict in which their own interests were deeply involved.⁶⁶

The effort is worth noting, however, because it shows how the Arab-Israeli conflict had become a focal point of the international system, and one in which a wide variety of states found they had an interest.

Peace Efforts Between 1973-1979

The 1973 war demonstrated again the “tendency of the Arab-Israeli conflict to draw in the superpowers and endanger the peace of the world.” The war also had other effect.

It strengthened opposition to the policy of détente, since Soviet complicity in the preparations for the war and its strong support for Egypt and Syria during the hostilities were interpreted as violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of Soviet-American understandings, and an indication that the Soviet Union would not abide by the restraints that détente supposedly imposed.⁶⁷

The 1973 war showed how Arab-Israeli conflict drew in the superpowers and disrupted moves towards détente. The war made it more important to find a solution. Following the war the search for an Arab-Israeli settlement assumed a new urgency, making the

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 223.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 226.

Arab-Israeli conflict one of the American priorities. The USA feared that the USSR which a year before had been expelled from Egypt, might be re-invited again to install a military presence, and thus endanger the American position in the region.⁶⁸

American skilful diplomacy enabled the USA to benefit from the crisis, increasing its influence and creating a mediator role for itself alone. Among the peace efforts in that period were UNSC Resolution 338, Henry Kissinger's step by step diplomacy, the Geneva Conference, Jimmy Carter's efforts, the USSR-USA Joint Statement, the Camp David agreement and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

Changes in Soviet-American relations carried in their wake changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neither escalation nor deescalation could take place in the Arab-Israeli conflict without the USA and the Soviet Union regarding the process as relevant to their mutual relations and vital interests.⁶⁹

UNSC Resolution 338 was regarded as another term of reference for peace in the Middle East. It worked as a base for more peace initiatives. This resolution came in the aftermath of the October war, as it was issued on 22 October 1973. It called for a cease-fire and the implementation of UNSCR 242 of 1967 in all its parts. While Egypt accepted it immediately and Israel after some hesitation, the Palestinians rejected it because it did not make any mention of their problem and rights.

The importance of the resolution came from its being a term reference for peace efforts, and because it was considered by all parties, together with UNSCR 242, as a basis for any peaceful solution in the region.

The Arab-Israeli conflict exacerbated superpower competition,⁷⁰ not only that superpower competition affected the Arab-Israeli peace process.

⁶⁸ See Bar-Siman-Tov, (1987), *Op. Cit.*

⁶⁹ Touval, (1982), *Op. Cit.*, p. 136.

⁷⁰ Carlton, (1988), *Op. Cit.*, p. 79.

Henry Kissinger's Step by Step Diplomacy

The events of the war obliged Egypt and Israel to think seriously about negotiating a disengagement of their forces on the front lines, and a peaceful settlement. Under these circumstances the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger was able to bring the two countries to arrange new truce lines, disengagement of their military forces, buffer zones under UN monitoring, and to negotiate peace.

Kissinger's mediation led to five agreements, the cease-fire between Egypt and Israel, the Geneva Conference, the disengagement between Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel, and a second agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1975.⁷¹ His ability to bring about all these unexpected agreements was unbelievable, especially since he was seen as biased towards Israel by the Arab parties.

Kissinger was accepted although he was not regarded as impartial. He was not only the secretary of state of a power that was a *de facto* ally of Israel but he was also a Jew, and therefore presumably doubly biased against the Arabs.⁷²

The Cold War atmosphere was always behind the superpowers action. In the international context, the success in limiting the Soviet influence in Egypt and establishing American domination, was the ultimate goal behind these agreements.

As Saadia Touval pointed out:

Kissinger was a successful mediator not only because he brought about the conclusion of five agreements, but also because his mediation produced some of the political consequences at which his efforts were ultimately aimed. The elimination of Soviet influence in Egypt and the establishment of American dominance there were one.⁷³

Kissinger's step by step policy was based on dividing the issues into individual elements, each of which would be negotiated individually, as a gradual approach toward

⁷¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4996/I, 2/9/1975.

⁷² Touval, (1982), *Op. Cit.*, p. 226.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

reaching peaceful settlement. It was criticized by many,⁷⁴ because its approach towards a separate agreement destroyed the opportunity to achieve a comprehensive peace.⁷⁵ Kissinger's efforts as Saddam Hussein said, were an attempt to find partial solutions to the 1967 aggression; these would not have a radical effect nor contribute to the stability of the region.⁷⁶

The Geneva Conference

The relationship between the regional conflict and the international conflict is evident and important. Changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict altered the Soviet-American political and strategic balance in the region, carrying with them global ramifications.⁷⁷ Influenced by the atmosphere of October war and UNSCR 338, which called for the implementation of UNSCR 242, and the oil crisis which resulted from Arab oil embargo, the two superpowers agreed to make a joint initiative in what seemed to be an atmosphere of détente between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the course of his visit to Moscow in October, Kissinger agreed with the Soviet leaders that a conference would be convened in Geneva under joint American-Soviet auspices with the participation of Israel and the Arab states.⁷⁸ They invited all parties concerned to attend a peace conference under their auspices in Geneva in December 1973.⁷⁹ The

⁷⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4998/I, 4/9/1975.

⁷⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/ 4997/I, 3/9/1975.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 136.

⁷⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4472/I, 10/12/1973.

⁷⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 4484/I, 24/12/1973.

conference, which lasted for two days, was an important symbolic event but did not provide the setting for substantive negotiations.⁸⁰

Despite what appeared to be détente in the relations between the USA and the USSR, the lack of seriousness on the part of the two superpowers towards resolving the conflict was the main reason for failure.⁸¹ They both regarded the conflict as serving their interests, and as allowing them to extend their influence in the strategic Middle East region.

As Alan Taylor pointed out,

“The Soviets did manage to work themselves into the center of peace diplomacy through their participation in the Geneva Conference of December 21, 1973, but when the conference ended without any progress having been made, the initiative reverted to the United States.”⁸²

According to Kissinger “The Geneva conference [of December 1973] was a way to get all parties into harness for one symbolic act, thereby to enable each to pursue a separate course, at least for a while. It was as complicated to assemble the great meeting as it was to keep it quiescent afterward while diplomacy returned to bilateral channels.”⁸³ In reality, then, the USA interest in the conference was limited. The preference was for bilateral talks in which the USA could advance its own interests.

⁸⁰ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 241.

⁸¹ Evron, Y., “The United States and the Middle East in the Post Cold-War Era, in B. Rubin., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations 1973-1993*, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994), p. 219.

⁸² Taylor, A., (1991), Op. Cit., p. 140.

⁸³ Primakov, E., “Soviet Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in W. Quandt, *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 391.

The attempt to reconvene the Geneva Conference indicated a change in US motives. Kissinger had aimed at replacing Soviet influence in Egypt and lessening the likelihood of another oil embargo.⁸⁴

The USSR-USA Joint Statement: October 1977

Because of the centrality of the security of Israel in American foreign policy, and the power of the Israeli lobby in the United States, the American administrations presented great concern about the Arab-Israeli conflict, and attempted to achieve a solution that would guarantee security, recognition and peace for Israel.

The Carter administration was not an exception from this rule. Carter started his administration by launching an active role to revive the Middle East peace process through reviving the Geneva conference of 1973.⁸⁵

During Jimmy Carter's administration, there was a determination to reach a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially between Egypt and Israel. With the visit to Jerusalem by President Anwar Al-Sadat, the door was opened to more American efforts. Thus Carter's mediation efforts played an important role in facilitating the dialogue between Anwar Al-Sadat and Menahem Begin. But Jimmy Carter, like other USA presidents, was still under Zionist pressure to get comprehensive peace agreement, which ensured Israeli security.⁸⁶ Carter therefore tried to revive the Geneva conference process. He recognised Soviet pressure on Arabs would be needed, therefore he had to have a process which included the USSR.⁸⁷ The USSR responded

⁸⁴ Touval, (1982), Op. Cit, p. 286.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 286.

⁸⁶ Mansour, C., *Beyond Alliance: Israel in U.S. Foreign Policy*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 129.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

positively to the idea because it created the opportunity to cement its relation with its allies and advance its interests and allow for direct participation in the international efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli issue.⁸⁸

The joint Soviet-American statement opened a new, albeit brief, period of Soviet-American co-operation in the Middle East. The document indicates concessions by both sides from their previous positions on a Middle East peace settlement.⁸⁹

The plan was ruined by Israeli opposition. Israel did not want the USSR to be involved and preferred an USA mediated bilateral format.⁹⁰ American mediation under President Carter led to two agreements between Egypt and Israel in September 1978. In March 1979, in Washington, Al-Sadat and Begin signed a peace agreement between their two countries.

The success of President Carter's mediation efforts to reach the Camp David agreements and the Egypt-Israel peace agreement was due partly to the personal involvement of the President himself, in addition to the previous agreements that achieved direct contacts between Israel and Egypt.

Because of the deep differences between the parties' position, Carter demanded that the USSR enter a process of pressurizing the parties. The two superpowers issued a joint statement, calling for an international conference.⁹¹ The statement focused on the main elements that any statement on the subject would focus on, including the points that did not contradict with UNSC Resolutions nos. 242 and 383. The main points of the

⁸⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5631/I, 4/10/1977.

⁸⁹ Freedman, R., *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970*, (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 304.

⁹⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5632/I, 5/10/1977.

⁹¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5630/I, 3/10/1977.

statement were the desire of reaching comprehensive settlement to the conflict through the participation of all parties, and the discussion of all issues including the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and resolving the Palestine problem.

It was clear and evident that Israel was "highly suspicious of the Soviet Union, and had misgivings about the American efforts to bring the Soviets into the peace negotiations."⁹² Israel used its lobby in the USA as usual to advance its policies and advocate its positions. In the USA the powerful pro-Israeli lobby took action to oppose the USA-Soviet Communiqué.⁹³

In spite of the importance of the statement, and its timing, the dramatic visit of President Al-Sadat to Jerusalem diverted the attention another way.

The Camp David Agreements 1978

The various peace efforts made during the period from 1947 to 1977, especially those of Henry Kissinger following the 1973 war and resulting in the disengagement agreements, had had a profound effect in breaking the ice and allowing the opportunity at least for the parties to meet. However, the mediation efforts of Kissinger, together with the vital leadership factor, pushed the peace process in a whole new direction at least on the Egyptian-Israeli track.⁹⁴

⁹² Touval, (1982), Op. Cit., p. 287.

⁹³ Quandt, W., *The Middle East: Ten Years after Camp David*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1988).

⁹⁴ See Kamel, I., *The Camp David Accords: A Testimony*, (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986).

In this context, President Anwar Al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was an important transformation in the history of the conflict. It broke the psychological barrier as Al-Sadat himself termed it, and was a fundamental factor in initiating a new peace process.⁹⁵

On September 17, 1978, and after series of extensive meetings in Camp David, under the supervision of President Carter, the Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and Egyptian president Anwar Al-Sadat signed two "Framework agreements," which came to be known as the Camp David Agreements.⁹⁶

The first was called "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" while the second was called "A Framework for Peace between Egypt and Israel." The first agreement suggested granting self-rule to the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a five years transitional period. The second presented a framework for peace between Egypt and Israel.⁹⁷

There was no doubt that what was achieved by President Carter was a success for USA foreign policy in the region, at least in that period of time. His success in bringing the parties together and applying economic and political pressure to achieve this result was not separate from previous efforts made by his predecessors, Nixon and Ford.⁹⁸

It did not happen in a matter of days, but as a result of a long negotiation process, lasting for more than eighteen months. These agreements were a turning point in the

⁹⁵ Quandt, W., *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986).

⁹⁶ Quandt, (1988), Op. Cit., p. 359.

⁹⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 5920/I, 19/9/1978.

⁹⁸ Quandt, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 320.

history of the region, and were seen by many –with the exception of the Rejection Front countries- at the time as laying the ground for more peace treaties between Israel and other Arab parties. However, these agreements were criticized heavily as they come short of or were unable to achieve a comprehensive settlement including resolution of the Palestinian question.⁹⁹ One of those critics was Ismael Fahmi, the former Egyptian foreign minister who resigned in protest over Anwar Al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. He saw the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" as containing contradictions that led to different explanations with long-term effects.¹⁰⁰

From an American point of view, the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty were a major achievement. The agreements allowed the USA to develop and expand its relations with both Egypt and Israel. Despite critics of the agreements pointing out that they failed to achieve a comprehensive peace that included all the parties, many thought that the agreements changed the course of events in the region, and created a real transfer in the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Camp David agreements were a success for USA policy because they advanced USA influence over Egypt and Israel in the Middle East, effectively cutting the USSR out of the peace process and because they made Israel secure on at least one front. This "success" was flawed by the fact that the agreements did not represent a comprehensive peace.

The implications of the Camp David agreements were numerous. First, taking Egypt out of the Arab-Israeli conflict reduced available choices for the other Arab parties of the conflict, especially the armed struggle choice (war). Without Egypt, launching a full- scale war against Israel would be very difficult if not impossible.

⁹⁹ Quandt, W., *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967-76*, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1977).

¹⁰⁰ See Kamel, (1986), Op. Cit.

Second, achieving peace between Egypt and Israel would reduce gradually Israel's fears, and gives it the feeling of security and confidence, which encourage her to reach peace agreements with the other parties. Third, the agreements proved to many that negotiations under American auspices can lead to agreement, based on "the "land for peace" formula.

As to their effect on the other tracks, the Camp David agreements avoided mentioning any Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian Occupied Territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip), any freeze on Israeli settlement activity, or any final Palestinian self-determination. What resulted from the agreements and taking Egypt out of the armed confrontation with Israel was the Israel's negotiating position vis-à-vis other Arab parties was strengthened.

Analysing the Camp David agreements and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty leads to some important points. First, Israel achieved an important and long dreamed goal, that of dealing with the Arabs, not as a bloc, but as different parties. Dealing with every Arab country separately keeps Israel in a much stronger position, and allows her to play on all tracks. It also increases suspicion between the Arab parties. Second, the agreements did not become –as was hoped for– a framework for a comprehensive solution for the conflict, because it did not provide a solution for its core, the Palestinian issue. Third, the agreements helped in uniting those in the Arab world that opposed achieving peace with Israel. The Arab reaction to the agreements was the establishment of a rejectionist front. The front was composed of the Palestinians and the revolutionary countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria and Sudan. It was supported by the eastern bloc countries in what can be seen as a reflection of the superpowers relations.¹⁰¹ The USSR supported the rejectionist front because the Camp David

¹⁰¹ For more on the Second Cold War, see, Halliday, F., *The Making of the Second Cold War*, (London: Verso, 1983).

Agreements had excluded it from playing the role (and influence) which it wished to play. This was the America advancing influence over Egypt through the agreements. Fourth, the strength Israel achieved as a result of the agreements became clear during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, as that would not have been as easy, if Egypt had not been out of the conflict. Fifth, the Camp David agreements were an implementation of American strategy, or served that strategy of enhancing the USA role and influence in the Middle East region. The returning of Sinai Peninsula was important to win Egypt back to the American side, and including her in the strategic alliance as a strategic partner, without weakening Israel's position as a strategic ally.

Thus, it is possible to view Camp David as a successful attempt, not to achieve a comprehensive, just and permanent peace but to throw out of the struggle context, the most important Arab party. The reason behind this can be seen as to fragment the Arab ranks, by weakening them to force them to negotiate peace agreements from a position of weakness. In other words, it was a process of preparing the ground for an American-Israeli solution, and that's exactly what happened, as we will see in the coming chapters.

Therefore, USA policy under Carter towards the peace process continued to be based on a desire for increased USA influence and promoting Israeli interests rather than a real solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Peace Efforts Between 1979-1988

The European Declaration of 1980

On many occasions, the Europeans expressed their views and positions on the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They expressed their preference for comprehensive settlement, instead of the step by step approach.

At the European Economic Community conference held in Venice in 1980, the

nine member countries issued a declaration emphasizing that the UNSC Resolutions nos. 242 and 338 should govern any solution.¹⁰² They supported the rights of all countries in the region to security. They called also for justice for all peoples, recognition of the legitimate rights for the Palestinian people, recognized and secure borders for all states in the region; negotiations to include the PLO, no individual initiative to change Jerusalem's position and free passage to the holy places for every one. The declaration's importance stems from the fact that it expressed a common European opinion and that it was clear in its pointing out the legitimate Palestinian rights, especially their right for self-determination, and the participation of the PLO in any negotiations. Nonetheless, since Europe at this time played a relatively minor role in shaping the international system, the impact of the Declaration was muted. It was only later, when the USSR withdrew from superpower competition, that Europe's voice began to attain real significance as an alternative to that of the USA.¹⁰³

The Fahd Plan (August 1981)

The Fahd plan was a set of principles for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict presented by the King of Saudi Arabia in August 1981.¹⁰⁴ It was based on the lowest common denominator, which the King believed could be acceptable to all Arab countries as well as the PLO. He explained that his country was thinking of an "alternative to Camp David" that would not require confrontation with Egypt and at the same time would present the Arabs' desire for peace. The proposals, which were published in August

¹⁰² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 6447/I, 17/6/1980.

¹⁰³ See, Gordon, P., *The Transatlantic Allies and the Changing Middle East*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹⁰⁴ Lukacs, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 55.

1981, presented a willingness to recognize the existence of the state of Israel in return for complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967, including East Jerusalem.¹⁰⁵

The Saudi plan, contained the following provisions: 1- The Israelis should withdraw from all Arab territories captured during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem. 2- All Israeli settlements established in the Occupied Territories since the 1967 war should be dismantled. 3- Freedom of religious practice should be guaranteed to the Moslem, Christian and Jewish faiths with particular reference to the Jerusalem holy places. 4- The rights of the Palestinian people should be recognized and acted upon, including the right to compensation for those who did not wish to return to their homeland. 5- An Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be followed by a transitional period not exceeding a few months during which these areas would be placed under UN supervision. 6- The transitional period should be followed by the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. 7- Affirming the right of all countries of the region to live in peace. 8- Implementation of the above principles should be guaranteed by the United Nations or by some of its member states.¹⁰⁶

The fact that the plan was presented during the Cold War period influenced the international response to it. The response however, varied from one party to another. For the USA and Israel in particular, it was important and positive to see an Arab peace plan that explicitly or implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist in peace and security. The PLO saw some positive points in the plan and thus accepted it while Israel under a Likud government saw the plan as went so far in its demand of Israeli withdrawal and

¹⁰⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME6797, 10/8/1981.

¹⁰⁶ *Keesing's Record of World Events*, p. 31912.

creating Palestinian State.¹⁰⁷

The Reagan Plan (September 1982)

In an article published in the Washington Post on August 15, 1979, during his election campaign, Reagan defined the key issue in the Middle East region as “the menacing Soviet threat.” Only Israel stood as a reliable bulwark in the face of this danger. Inter-Arab quarrels, it was implied, were more dangerous than the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁰⁸

Let’s not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they were not engaged in this game of dominoes, there would not be any hot spots in the world.¹⁰⁹

Reagan’s conviction that the Soviet Union was an “evil empire” that needed to be contained at all costs was that subsequently to shape his policies towards regional conflicts as much as direct USA-USSR relations. As William Quandt pointed out, it is worth noting that “Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander Haig shared the President’s view that the Middle East should be viewed primarily through the prism of the US-Soviet rivalry.”¹¹⁰

Early in the Reagan administration, Haig began to speak of the need to try to forge a “strategic consensus” among the pro-western regimes in the Middle East...trying to focus the attention of “our friends” in the region on the Soviet threat, while simultaneously attempting to push parochial local conflicts to the back burner.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME6797/A/4, 10/8/1981.

¹⁰⁸ Quandt, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 361.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 362.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 361.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 362.

On September 1, 1982, Ronald Reagan gave his first and only major speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The core of the initiative was still Camp David, but with important substantive additions.¹¹² The USA President declared new American proposals to achieve an overall settlement in the Middle East.¹¹³ In his televised speech, in which he explained his administration's plan to achieve a "just and lasting peace in the Middle East" Reagan affirmed that the story of the search for peace in the Middle East was a tragedy of missed opportunities. He thought that following the Lebanese crisis, there was a chance to reach a wider settlement. His plan was rather different from Camp David framework, however. It emphasized the Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, and proposed that the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip should be a political entity connected with Jordan. The plan found some acceptance within some Arab leaders, especially King Hussien, but was rejected immediately by the Israeli Likud government, as a diversion from the Camp David agreements signed on 1978.¹¹⁴

The Fez Plan (September 1982)

Within days of the Reagan initiative, the Arab states held a summit meeting on 6 September 1982 in Fez, Morocco and adopted a Saudi counter proposal that came to be known as the Fez plan.¹¹⁵ At the end of its discussions, the conference called for settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, based on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, together with guarantees from the United Nations Security Council to all the states of the region.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 365.

¹¹³ Lukacs, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 72.

¹¹⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 7122 /I, 4/9/1982.

¹¹⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 7128 / A / 1, 11/9/1982.

The plan called for an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 including East Jerusalem. It called also for the dismantling of settlements established by Israel after 1967, affirmation of the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, the placement of the Occupied Territories under United Nations protection for a short period, and the establishment of a Palestinian State. The plan was accepted by the Palestinians but rejected by Israel. Although the plan was discussed by some Arab leaders with the five permanent states member of the Security Council, the plan did not get a sufficient support, thus was abandoned.¹¹⁶

In July 1984 the USSR proposed an international conference. Israel's objections to the Soviet proposal were not only that the USSR had no diplomatic relations with it and therefore could not be a mediator, but also that peace was best achieved in direct talks.¹¹⁷

The reasoning behind Israel's objection to an international Middle East conference was simple. Firstly, Israeli officials said, it is inconceivable that a country, which has no diplomatic ties with one of the sides to the conflict, should see itself in the role of mediator. Israel's second objection was that peace would best be made in direct negotiations between the parties rather than at big international gatherings.¹¹⁸

The Jordanian-Palestinian Agreement (February 1985)

In response to the Reagan plan, Jordan and the PLO expressed their intention to establish a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation after a full Israeli withdrawal from the

¹¹⁶ Tessler, M., *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

¹¹⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 7710/ I, 1/8/1984.

¹¹⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 7710/A/1. 1/8/1984.

Occupied Territories, and expressed their wish for negotiations through a joint delegation to an international peace conference.¹¹⁹

Israel rejected this plan which called for land for peace and self-determination for the Palestinians.¹²⁰ Also the USA was not willing to meet with a Palestinian representative because the PLO did not recognize the Security Council Resolutions nos. 242 and 338. It is important to notice the following points: First, this was a period shaped by the new USA president's (Reagan's) particular understanding of the Cold War and the need to prevent the spread of communism at all costs. Second, this meant USA policy was prepared to be more flexible in dealing with the Arabs, but ultimately not at Israel's expense. Third, it all led to a flurry of new peace initiatives but the basic conditions, which prevented resolution of the conflict, remained intact.

Peace Efforts Between 1988-1991

The Shultz Plan (March 1988)

The actions of the USA during the 1980s leave no doubt that the chief goal of its military and political domination in the region was the preservation of its position, which, on the whole, it saw in terms of USA-Soviet confrontation. The USA attempted to minimize the role of the Soviet Union in regional affairs and perhaps even to oust it from the Middle East.¹²¹

The Shultz Plan was an important involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace making

¹¹⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ME 7874 / A / 4, 13/2/1985. See also Fest, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 92.

¹²⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 7875 / A / 7, 14/2/1985.

¹²¹ Quandt, (1986), Op. Cit., p. 387.

process.¹²² The USA Secretary of State George Shultz explained the general aims of comprehensive peace through direct bilateral negotiations based on UNSCR nos. 242 and 338. The essential difference in his plan was that negotiations on final settlement would not depend on agreement on interim status. Some points of his plan were achieving comprehensive peace for all states in the region and the legitimate rights for the Palestinian people. Also the convening of an international conference as a forum for negotiations. The Palestinians rejected the plan, while the Israelis were divided. The plan was accepted by Shimon Peres but rejected by Yitzhak Shamir.

For the Palestinians, despite Arafat's own growing conviction that a negotiated peace was now the only route to statehood, the American proposals still emanated from an essentially pro-Zionist American administration. They contained no guarantees for Palestinian statehood and failed to satisfactorily address critical issues such as the return of Palestinian refugees or the status of Jerusalem. With the Intifada now underway in the Occupied Territories, Arafat needed any peace negotiations to address at least some of the concerns of the rioting youths in Palestine. The Israelis were meanwhile divided as the nationalist right-wing elements of the coalition government were being increasingly radicalized through pressure from the extreme right settler groups. Shamir's own relationship with the USA was always uncomfortable, with successive American administrations preferring to do business with the pro-peace Labour party and particularly with Peres himself and later Rabin. Clearly the USA-Israeli patron-client relationship was not immune to tensions arising from domestic Israeli political debate as well as personalities.

It should be noted, however, that in this instance the Soviet Union was not an obstacle to the proposals, principally because the Gorbachev leadership was preoccupied with domestic reform within an economy under pressure and as the military was

¹²² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0111/I, 28/3/1988.

suffering reverses in Afghanistan. The Cold War was already winding down with the Soviet inability to engage in confrontational behaviour and its readiness to extend détente to new dimensions. In this period of transformation in international relations, regional players were to be the obstacles to peace initiatives rather than the superpowers. In the following plans it becomes clear that the end of the 1980s saw problems in the USA-Israeli patron-client relationship (which resulted from right-wing radicalisation in Israel and its role in government) dominating the nature of peace proposals or Israeli rejection of them.

The Shamir Plan (May 1989)

In this context, the Shamir Peace Plan of 1989 was more a tactic to delay real peace than a genuine effort towards it. During a meeting with President Bush in Washington on 6 April 1989, the Israeli Prime Minister clarified his four points plan. His proposals made official on May 1989 were based basically on conducting elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to facilitate the formulation of a non-PLO Palestinian delegation to participate in the negotiations on "interim settlement" after a "Self-government administration" might be established. The "interim period" would be serving as an essential test of co-operation and co-existence" and would be followed by negotiations on "the final settlement" in which Israel would be prepared to discuss "any options" presented.

The Palestinians rejected the plan.¹²³ They saw it as an Israeli manoeuvre without substance. Their plan was met with other plans from PLO, Egypt and the United States. The PLO presented its plan for elections. Egypt presented what to be known as

¹²³ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 04601, 18/5/1989.

Mubarak plan and the new American formula presented by its Secretary of State James Baker. All of these plans addressed the issue of elections presented in the Shamir plan.

The PLO Election Plan (May 1989)

According to Ziva Flamhaft, an unprecedented development that could have marked a new chapter in Middle East diplomacy did occur at the Arab summit in Algiers on June 7-9, 1988. During the summit a senior PLO official and a personal aide to Yaseer Arafat, Bassam Abu Sharif submitted a statement entitled "PLO View: Prospect of a Palestinian-Israeli Settlement." The statement called upon the PLO and Israel to attend UN-sponsored negotiations for a "two-state solution." The statement represented a dramatic shift in PLO politics. It is worth mentioning here that as early as the twelfth Palestine National Council in June 1974, the PLO abandoned the goal of creating a democratic secular state in all of Palestine, calling instead for the creation of "a Palestinian national authority in any Palestinian areas liberated from Israeli control".¹²⁴

In response to the Shamir plan, the PLO presented through Bassam Abu Sharif, Arafat's special advisor, a program composed of six points. The PLO support of the election in the occupied territories; the two state solution; the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and its replacement with international forces; international observation of the election and the protection of the electorate; provisional stage under international auspices under which the legislative body will select a negotiation team; an international conference based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 to discuss all issues.¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

The Baker Initiative (May 1989)

On 22 May 1989, James Baker, the American Secretary of State spoke to the AIPAC, the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee in Washington DC. He shed light on the main points of the American position on Arab-Israeli conflict and the ways to resolve it. This initiative affirmed once again the points that were made by previous American administrations. Of these points, that the permanent settlement can be achieved through negotiations based on the Security Council resolutions nos. 242 and 338 and land for peace formula, recognition and peace for Israel and the political rights for the Palestinians. Also an international conference as a start for direct negotiations, self government for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and free elections for the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories. Israel was to relinquish the idea of Greater Israel and the Arabs to remove the boycott imposed on Israel, the Palestinians to renounce violence, and amend their covenant and the Soviet Union to restore its relations with Israel and help in reaching a peace settlement.¹²⁶

The plan was accepted by the Palestinians, but the right wing Israeli government rejected it, fearing that its acceptance would challenge its claim of sovereignty over Jerusalem and would also led to direct negotiations with PLO. This refusal led to the fall of the national unity government.

The Mubarak Plan (September 1989)

In an attempt to contribute in advancing the Middle East peace process, and in order to play an active role in the politics of the region as a peace mediator, as the only Arab

¹²⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0466 A/8, 22/5/1989.

country at the time to have relations with Israel, President Mubarak of Egypt presented a ten-points plan, to be known as Mubarak's plan.¹²⁷

In addition to regional and international reasons, Egypt has had its domestic reasons behind presenting the initiative, as the advancement of the peace process provide the regime with stability and legitimacy which face pressure from the radical groups opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

The main points of this plan which, was in someway a response to the Shamir plan, were elections in the Palestinian territories to choose a delegation to negotiate with Israel, international supervision for the election process and an Israeli commitment to recognize its results. Also an Israeli commitment that the elections and negotiations would not lead only to self government but to final settlement implying the Security Council resolutions nos. 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace.

The United States announced its willingness to discuss the plan. The PLO considered it as good and comprehensive while Shimon Peres said that he saw "nothing wrong" in the initiative. "The problem is that Israel can not accept the ten points as they are."¹²⁸

The Baker Plan (October 1989)

An additional peace attempt occurred when details were released on 10 October, 1989 of a series of unofficial proposals put forward by USA Secretary of State James Baker, which became Known as "Baker's Five Points"¹²⁹ composed of: 1- The USA understands that because Egypt and Israel have been working hard on the peace process

¹²⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0559I, 12/9/1989.

¹²⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0595 i 12/9/1989.

¹²⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0587I, 14/10/1989.

there is agreement that an Israeli delegation will conduct a dialogue with a Palestinian delegation in Cairo. 2- The USA understands that Egypt can not substitute itself for the Palestinians and Egypt will consult with the Palestinians on all aspects of that dialogue. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the USA. 3- The USA understands that Israel will attend the dialogue only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out. Israel will also consult with Egypt and the USA. 4- The USA understands that the government of Israel will come to the dialogue on the basis of the Israeli government's May 14 initiative [The Shamir plan]. The USA further understands that the Palestinians will come to the dialogue prepared to discuss elections and negotiations in accordance with the Israeli initiative. The USA understands, therefore, that the Palestinians will be free to raise issues that relate to their opinion on how to make elections and negotiations succeed. 5- In order to facilitate the process, the USA proposed that the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Egypt and the USA meet in Washington within two weeks. Unlike the Reagan plan, which was motivated by the aftermath of the Lebanon war, or the Shultz plan, which was motivated by the Intifada, the Baker plan was the result of various diplomatic developments, beginning with the PLO's recognition of Israel and ending with Mubarak's peace plan. Thus Baker's peace proposals were introduced under international or regional conditions more favourable than the conditions that existed when either the Reagan or Shultz initiatives were launched.¹³⁰

Shimon Peres said that he believed Israel should respond favourably to Baker's proposals, while the PLO rejected the plan which "constitutes U.S. support for the Israeli position".¹³¹

The Shultz plan, the Shamir plan, the PLO plan, the Baker initiative and the Mubarak plan collectively happened at the end of 1980s. The new Soviet openness

¹³⁰ Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 73.

¹³¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0585 i 12/10/1989.

policy created an atmosphere of change. The USA and the parties felt that the time was suitable for presenting new initiatives. The immigration of the Soviet Jews created a crisis atmosphere and combined with the Palestinian Intifada brought the conflict to a new stage that needed great attention especially from the USA.

Summary and Concluding Remarks

In this chapter I tried to explain the peace efforts within the context of the Cold War Old World Order. The peace efforts during that period were constrained by the conditions of the superpower rivalry. The rules of the game of the bipolar international system allowed both superpowers and their client states to play in a more favourable atmosphere. Knowing that they would not be forced to accept any initiative they did not see suitable and confident of the ability of their patrons to defend their decisions, the parties were able to resist compromise and wait for more suitable circumstances.

Summarizing the whole argument I think of the importance of mentioning some points:

1. Since the very beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, even before the state of Israel was established, there have been numerous efforts to find a peaceful/diplomatic resolution. The great powers (UK and France) and later the superpowers (USA and USSR) have consistently viewed such a resolution to be desirable.
2. During the Cold War era, the superpowers' own struggle for influence in the Middle East prevented them from taking advantage of opportunities to 'make' peace; first, because USA support of Israel led the USSR to actually support Arab states. The establishment of patron-client relations prevented either superpower from being able to act as impartial mediator. Instead the interests of the superpowers became complicated by their desire to see their own clients "win"; Second, both

superpowers came to view the Arab-Israeli conflict not on the basis of its own merits but in terms of how it reflected their own relations vis-à-vis- one another.

3. Because of the interests of the superpowers, the parties were unable to really deal with each other directly, in a way isolated from larger events. Other factors always had to be taken into consideration in peace negotiations. Equally the superpowers could use their influence to encourage their client states to resist making peace on terms which might adversely affect the superpowers' own interests. Soviet support for the Arab states rejecting the Camp David agreements was a clear example.
4. The only peace agreement which was made involved two states which both wanted to be USA clients. This did signify a recognition by Egypt of a change in the international balance of power in favour of the United States, but even so Egypt could only get peace by abandoning the core issue of the conflict – Palestinian rights.

Therefore, the bipolar Cold War Old World Order was not conducive to the achievement of a just and lasting peace, as it was characterized by super-power self interest and patron-client relations that actually acted to prevent peace, despite a common interest in avoiding wars into which they might be drawn. Clearly the status of the peace process at any one time was dependent upon the international (superpower) balance of power and the resulting balance of power within the region. This balance of power determined the way in which regional states sought to advance their own national interests. When those interests required peace, as in the case of Egypt in the 1970s, action had to be taken to alter the regional balance of power (expelling the Soviet advisors and initiating a war to draw the United States back into the negotiations). Clearly states were operating from realist perspectives, with the rules of the Cold war determining their engagement (or not) in the peace process. By the end of the 1980s, the

alteration in the status and capacity of the Soviet Union was already leaving its mark on the behaviour of regional states and on the dynamics of the peace process.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE MADRID PEACE PROCESS

The Madrid conference is set up in such a way as to make substantive progress extremely unlikely. Israel will get its way on matters of procedure. After a largely ceremonial opening session, separate negotiations between Israel and the surrounding states will take place. But Shamir has reassured his constituency over and over again that there will be no compromise on the Golan Heights - and no compromise that would grant sovereignty or national self-determination to the Palestinian people . . . [They would get "limited autonomy" which] would allow Palestinians control over municipal functions such as fire and police services, garbage collection and street repair. Shamir's plan would not allow Palestinians' control over land and water resources, would not protect them from the increasing expropriations of land on behalf of Israeli settlers ...¹

(Michael Lerner)

Introduction

The Middle East was to be the first test theatre for the end of the 'Old' Cold War Order and the emergence of the American-led New World Order. The 'Desert Shield' and 'Desert Storm' that resulted in largely destroying Iraq's military capabilities that were viewed by USA as a potential challenge to its handling of Arab-Israeli issue contributed greatly in changing the situation in the Middle East.

The unprecedented deep division in the Arab world over the Kuwait crisis, the weak position of the Palestinian side, and the United States' hegemonic position in the region made it a suitable opportunity for getting the Arabs to accept, recognise and integrate Israel in the Middle East. The USA's diplomacy wasted no time in seizing the opportunity created by the previously explained international and regional changes to advance its plans and designs for the region. Central among those plans and designs was

¹ Quoted from: Said, E., *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination 1969-1994*, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 172.

the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict within a comprehensive settlement through direct negotiations. The convening of the Madrid peace conference in October 1991 was the starting point for what was to be known as the Madrid peace process. That process started in Madrid but continued in Washington and other places elsewhere in the world. In this chapter I will discuss the impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli conflict embodied in the holding of the Madrid conference and the start of the Madrid peace process.

First, I will try to investigate the background to the Madrid conference and the circumstances in which the parties to the conflict were willing or rather obliged to participate in the conference. In this section I will demonstrate how the new realities of the New World Order were the real reason behind the acceptance of the parties to attend the conference.

Second, I will follow the United States' diplomatic moves and proposals, including Secretary of State James Baker's marathon trips to the Middle East capitals, to convince the leaders of the parties to attend the conference.

Third, I will examine in detail the eleven rounds of Washington bilateral negotiations. I will also shed some lights on the multilateral negotiations held in other places such as Moscow, Tokyo and Ottawa.

I will argue that the implications of the sea changes in the international system and the realities of the New World Order on the Middle East were profound; that the convening of a peace conference with the participation of Israel and all Arab parties was not possible without the new regional and international situation created by the end of the Cold War, the second Gulf War and the realities of the New World Order.²

² See Bickerton, I and Klausner, C., *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London: Prentice-Hall, 1998), p. 255.

Background to Madrid Conference

It is my argument that the Madrid peace conference became possible only after the dramatic changes on both regional and international levels. The parties to the conflict found themselves in a position where there were no alternatives other than accepting the invitation made by the United States and the Soviet Union to attend a peace conference. The end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War created as I mentioned in chapter two a new atmosphere, in which the old international rules of the game no longer existed. In this section I will clarify the background of the situation in the Middle East region following the important changes in both regional and international levels and in some cases in the local or domestic level as well.

International Level

On the international level as I emphasised throughout my previous chapters, there were many important changes that made our world different from what was going on a few years ago. To begin with, there is no doubt that Gorbachev's reform policies greatly weakened the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that those policies were intended to improve its economic and political position, the result was to the contrary. The Soviet Union's military defeat in Afghanistan and its subsequent total collapse and disintegration, the collapse of the communist bloc and East European regimes and the end of the Warsaw pact all had a radical and strong impact on different regions of the world and on the international system and world politics. On the Middle East in particular the impact was bigger and much more crucial, and that was due to the fact that the area was highly affected and penetrated throughout the Cold War order and competition between the two poles. For example, Gorbachev informed Syrian President Assad that the Soviet Union was no longer willing or able to provide military support that would give Syria strategic parity with Israel. Instead it would provide sufficient

weapons for a defence capability but even those would have to be paid for in hard currency. This kind of alteration in the Soviet's perception of their role as patron inevitably altered the regional balance of power (in this case in Israel's favour) and impelled the regional actors to reassess their own behaviour in the light of effective "new rules". Again in this instance, the result was to be seen in the Syrian-American alliance during the 1990/91 Gulf War and in Lebanon.

That these changes at the international level were reflected so directly in the Middle East (and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular) was due to the strong link of the conflicting parties with the international players and the international game during the Cold War.

The fact that some parties lost their strategic ally in an unexpected way while other parties found their strategic ally and protector as the only dominant superpower was unprecedented. That had a long-term decisive effect that upset many balances and forced the parties to comprehensively review their strategies, tactics and plans to adjust themselves to the new changes. It also encouraged the only world superpower to revive its effort to achieve peace in the region. Ben D. Mor, for example wrote on that respect that:

The Middle East peace negotiations began in late 1991, against the background of changing international and regional realities shaped by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-90 and the Gulf War of early 1991. The latter two events had a major impact on the international politics of the Middle East. The Soviet withdrawal from the region (a process that had begun before its collapse) removed a long-time superpower patron from the scene, producing a realignment of Middle East coalitions. The implications of this structural transformation became clearly evident during the 1990 Gulf crisis, when the U.S. assumed a leading role in organising an unlikely coalition, composed of western powers alongside conservative and radical Arab regimes, to thwart Saddam Hussein's attempt at a *fait accompli* in Kuwait. The success of the military campaign, as well as the ability of the Bush administration to secure Israel restraint during the Iraqi Scud-missile attacks, provided further evidence of America's newly acquired and uncontested position of influence in the region. Thus, following the war, the U.S. capitalised on its hegemonic status and convened the Madrid peace conference in October-November 1991. The peace process can be interpreted not as reflecting a fundamental change in preferences for mechanisms of conflict management, but

as a shift of strategy - the product of constraints imposed by a hegemonic power -
within a structure of coercion.³

The end of the Cold War paved the way for a more co-operative approach between the USA, the remaining superpower, and Russia, the heir of the previous Soviet Empire.⁴ That co-operation became clear during the Kuwait crisis and the Second Gulf War. The Soviet Union did not support Iraq despite the friendship agreement signed between the two countries in 1979. Also it did not try to veto UNSC Resolutions concerning the crisis. In fact the Soviet Union voted with the majority in the United Nations and supported the USA-led coalition against Saddam Hussein.⁵ Bickerton and Klausner pointed out in their book entitled, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, that:

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War dramatically altered the dynamics of superpower rivalry in the region. While the United States emerged as the one important superpower on the world stage, the new Russian State was provided with opportunity to play a different role in the post-Gulf War discussions about regional stability in the Middle East and a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Russians would achieve recognition of their continued importance on the world stage and their interest in the Middle East by being a co-sponsor, along with the United States, of the Madrid Peace Conference.⁶

The transformation of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the USA from one of competition to one of co-operation and partnership contributed in changing attitudes

³ Mor, B., "The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Security" in Z. Maoz, *Regional Security in the Middle East, Past, Present and Future*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 184.

⁴ Hinnebusch, R. and Drysdale, A., *Syria and the Middle East Peace Process*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), p. 215.

⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 255.

⁶ Ibid., p. 240.

and strategies of many parties in the region and paved the way to a new thinking.⁷ During a trip to the Middle East where he visited Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt in 1989, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward A. Shevardnadze suggested that the superpowers abandon their policy of trying to exclude one another from the region "in favour of constructive co-operation for the sake of peace and tranquillity."⁸

The joint sponsorship of the Madrid peace conference later on was evidence of this new phenomenon. As Raymond Hinnebusch explained "With the end of the Cold War, the United States has no good reason to exclude the Soviet Union from the peace process and excellent reasons to give it a stake in its success."⁹

The USA encouraged the new Soviet approach of co-operation and tried to use it to advance its policy in the Middle East. Bringing the Soviet Union in and engaging it was better than excluding it from the area. In his opening speech to the Madrid conference President Bush said: "Who in the early 1960s would have believed that the Cold War would come to a peaceful end, replaced by co-operation – exemplified by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are here today – not as rivals, but as partners." He added "President Gorbachev and his senior associates have demonstrated their intent to engage the Soviet Union as a force for positive change in the Middle East. This sends a powerful signal to all those who long for peace."¹⁰

⁷ King Hussain of Jordan in his speech to the General National Congress on 12 October 1991 mentioned some of the factors, events and developments that had brought about the renewal of efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁸ Hinnebusch and Drysdale, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 162.

⁹ Ibid., p. 215.

¹⁰ Abdul Hadi, M., *Documents on Palestine, volume II: From the Negotiations in Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp. 11-12.

Gorbachev also pointed to the USA-Soviet co-operation and the change in the international system, as the main force behind the progress towards peace in the Middle East. In his opening speech to the Madrid conference he pointed out that:

It was the will of history that, without an improvement and then a radical change in Soviet-U.S. relations, we would never have witnessed the profound qualitative changes in the world that now make it possible to speak in terms of an entirely new age, an age of peace in world history. Movement in that direction has begun, and it is only in this context that we can understand the fact that a tangible hope has emerged for an Arab-Israeli settlement.¹¹

The reality behind the altered Soviet (and later Russian) position was that the Middle East was no longer a principal arena for the development of Soviet interests. Their attention had turned to domestic affairs, primarily the deteriorating economic situation at home. The key to improving matters as far as Gorbachev was concerned lay in a reduction of defence expenditures, a withdrawal from Afghanistan and Western financial assistance, none of which would be possible without a more co-operative relationship with the United States. A more conciliatory position on the Arab-Israeli conflict was a small price to pay, especially since the Arab states, with their own economic troubles, were decreasingly inclined to turn to socialist economic alternatives or anti-imperialist rhetoric for solutions. However, the Soviet Union did not entirely abandon its friends or its own interests in the region. It relocated its own diplomacy into the United Nations, where it retained its UN Security Council veto so that America was unable to act entirely autonomously within the region. It can be argued that Gorbachev's personality and leadership were key factors in this process, but at the end of the day the policies pursued advanced the Soviet (and later Russian) national interests in line with realist behaviour. The old patron-client relationships of the Cold War no longer served Soviet interests and, as the Soviet Union's commitment to them waned, so the regional

¹¹ Ibid., p. 13.

clients were forced to readjust their own perceptions of the balance of power and their interests within it.

Regional Level

The Middle East regional system had witnessed a great deal of change over the last three decades. As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, the interaction between both the international and the regional systems can not be clearer anywhere more than it is in the Middle East. The patron-client relationship was one of the main features of Middle Eastern international relations. According to Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, three types of constraints that a local state confronts are: "(1) those of patron, (2) those of the rival patron, and (3) those of the rival client. These constraints create bargaining dilemmas for a local state."¹²

Patron constraints determine a local state's decisions and actions to a greater degree than do rival patron constraints. Although rival patron constraints are more threatening militarily, political constraints by the patron are more crucial in shaping client behaviour.¹³

This is true in the cases of Israel, Egypt, PLO, Lebanon and Syria. American pressure (loan guarantees as an example) succeeded in bringing Israel to line, while Soviet hints to Syria to pursue a peaceful as against a military option were one of the reasons behind its policy of seeking a diplomatic solution to its conflict with Israel.

Important events can explain to what extent the regional system was penetrated and affected by changes on the international system. Although the October war brought a psychological victory for the Arab side, the Camp David agreements divided the Arab

¹² Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., *Israel, The Superpowers, and the War in the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger, 1987), p. 25.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

world. With Egypt at peace with Israel, the war option for the Arabs became unrealistic. Israel was able to invade Lebanon and evacuate the PLO from Beirut. The Iran-Iraq war also contributed in deepening the division between Arab countries, at a huge cost in lives and resources. The 1991 Gulf crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War also played an unprecedented role in shaping the Middle East region and reordering its regional system.

The invasion and occupation by one Arab major country of a smaller sister country destroyed much of the meaning of Arab solidarity. The Arab requirement for foreign, non-Arab and non-Islamic western help in countering an 'Arab and Islamic aggression' broke a long-held belief in an Arab and Islamic united stand against any foreign intervention. The Arab failure to resolve the crisis within their institutions (such as the Arab League) opened the door for outside intervention. The West, however, was blamed -by many Arabs- for blocking any Arab success in finding Arab solution.¹⁴ The Iraqi action of firing Scud missiles on Israel and its attempt to link the crisis with the Israeli occupation of Palestine moved the Arab streets and gained Saddam Hussein popularity among Arab masses without necessarily accepting his invasion of Kuwait.¹⁵ The Kuwaiti and Gulf States' reaction towards that popular support for Saddam was very negative. Leaders like King Hussein and Yasser Arafat who tried to follow the public opinion in their own countries were seen as siding with the Iraqi aggression and thus were liable for political and financial punishment.¹⁶

¹⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0998 A/6, 16/2/1991.

¹⁵ Coban, H., "Israel and the Palestinians, from Madrid to Oslo and beyond," in R. Freedman., *Israel under Rabin*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 258.

¹⁶ Ibid.

The rejection by Arab countries of the Iraqi demand that the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait be linked with a similar Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories angered the Palestinians and Arab masses in many parts of the Arab and Islamic worlds.¹⁷ The crisis created a great confusion among Arab peoples and regimes and resulted in unprecedented division.¹⁸ On the other hand the Israeli 'restraint' towards the Iraqi Scud missiles, that created a shock in the Israeli society, gave it some leverage with the United States and the European Community.¹⁹ It was reminded however that only peace and reconciliation with its neighbours and not more controlled land could bring it security.

The shock that resulted from these dramatic developments encouraged the United States to revive its efforts regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hanan Ashrawi, the Palestinian negotiator and spokeswoman for the Palestinian delegation to Madrid observed that:

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker decided to take advantage of this collective shock to reorder the region in a way that would safeguard American interests (particularly the oil) and the security of its allies (mainly Israel). The Palestinians, as the major cause of instability in the region, had to be brought in, and the Palestinian question -the major Arab grievance- had to be resolved somehow. Thus began the Madrid peace process.²⁰

The shock was great, the rift was deep and the material, financial, economic and environmental damage was beyond imagination and unprecedented. Thus the regional balance was disrupted in an unprecedented manner, in a way that encouraged a

¹⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0959, A8, 1/1/1991.

¹⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 0982, A/7, 29/1/1991.

¹⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1007 i (b), 27/2/1991.

²⁰ Ashrawi, H., *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 11.

redrawing of the map of the region, which can be seen through the no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq as one example only.

The Arab side was the big loser from the changes on the international and regional levels, especially the Palestinian side. Both Syria and the PLO had lost out from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist block, their major ally and source of political, economic and military support. As Pedro Ramet pointed out:

Soviet-Syrian relations have become ever closer during the period of Asad's rule. They were closer in 1975 than they had been in 1970, closer still in 1980, and much closer by 1984, with the Soviets by then routinely delivering top-of-the-line equipment to Syria before deployment elsewhere outside the USSR. Since Syria has no domestic arms industry, it counts heavily on the USSR for arms transfusion, which, in the 30-year period, 1954-1984, amounted to a total market value of \$13.8 billion. By 1978, there were more Soviet and East European military advisers in Syria than in any other less developed country.²¹

That policy became clear when the Soviet leadership informed Syria officially that it would not help her to achieve the strategic parity with Israel. According to Hinnebusch and Drysdale, Gorbachev has told Syria that "Israel's interests must be taken into account" and that "the Soviet Union would not support any attempt to reclaim the Golan Heights through military action."²² It is important to note here that, although Syria did lose out because of the collapse of the USSR, it used the Gulf War to recoup some of these losses to realign itself with the USA and win financial aid from the Gulf.

Meanwhile what made the Palestinian position worse was the PLO's solidarity with Iraq and its opposition to the international intervention, which angered the USA, Western major powers and the European Community. Following a European meeting, Douglas Hurd, Britain's foreign secretary said, "The PLO have done themselves very

²¹ Ramet, P., *The Soviet-Syrian Relationship since 1955*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 124.

²² Hinnebusch and Drysdale, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 215.

considerable harm under the present leadership in backing the aggression of Saddam Hussein.” Portugal’s foreign minister said that Yasser Arafat had put the PLO in the loser’s corner.²³

Thus the PLO came under great political and financial pressures. The cutting off of the great financial support from the oil producing countries in the Gulf, and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from these countries had a strong effect. The GCC countries were an important source of the hard currency in support of the PLO and the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories, which from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone exceeded, according to Cheryl Rubenberg, US \$100 million per year. The cuts led to a financial crisis, followed by an internal crisis within the PLO. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, no actors were -as Cheryl A. Rubenberg pointed out- in a weaker or more vulnerable position than the Palestinians.

They lost the financial support of their major Arab states backers and the political support of a significant number of other states, their bargaining power was markedly diminished, the Intifada had come to a virtual halt, their leadership was in crisis, and a new exodus of Palestinians had begun -this time from Kuwait-²⁴ adding another painful chapter to the Palestinian tragedy.

By August 1992, Kuwait had expelled all but 20,000 of the 450,000 Palestinians who had resided in that country prior to the Gulf war. This resulted in the loss of some US

²³ Mortimer, J., “Europe and the PLO: Backing the Wrong Horse,” *The Middle East*, April, 1991, p. 16.

²⁴ Rubenberg, C., “The Gulf War, the Palestinians, and the New World Order,” in T. Ismael, (ed.) *The Gulf War and the New World Order*, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), p. 317.

\$100 million dollars in annual contributions to the Occupied Territories.²⁵ Arafat's estimation however was 1.5 billion dollars.²⁶

Arafat thought, however, that the PLO lost from an economic point of view, but gained politically from the Kuwait crisis. He noted that:

From the political viewpoint, we gained. Now, everyone has realised that the Palestinian problem must be solved. The link initiated by Saddam Hussein is continuing. As it is, Baker is coming to the region with plans. President Bush officially announced to Congress that something has to be done for the Palestinian people and that otherwise there will be double standards.²⁷

All this was added to the Arab side's loss of Iraq as an accounted regional military power when the military operations, which had been launched against it in the beginning of 1991, resulted in the destruction of most of its military power and economic infrastructure. That destruction led to its transformation from a regional power to a pre-industrial society or as Edward Said wrote: "Iraq was reduced to a noncivilization, a noncountry."²⁸

In the middle of these circumstances of the collapse of the international and regional balances, the USA announced the rise of the New World Order based on the principles of justice and fair play. As President George Bush declared in his speech to

²⁵ Ibid., p. 325.

²⁶ In an interview with Turkish TV on 6 May 1991 Arafat said that "We incurred the greatest damage from the Kuwait crisis.. our loss is approximately 10-11 bn dollars... our people living in the occupied territories lost the aid they were receiving from their relatives. This in itself totals approximately 1.5 bn dollars yearly. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1066, A9, 8 May 1991)

²⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1066 A/9, 8 May 1991.

²⁸ Said, E., *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination 1969-1994*, (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 164.

the USA Congress on March 6, 1991, the pillars of that order on the regional level were regional disarmament, regional security, regional economic development, and the revitalization of the Arab-Israeli peace process.²⁹

To achieve the building of any of these pillars, in order to create a favourable regional order, that could serve its interests and fit its own designed and led New World Order, the United States had to start with resolving the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict and thus advancing the peace process. During the war against Iraq, the Middle East team in the State Department had stated that they believed –as William Quandt, mentioned- that the outcomes of the war would create the atmosphere in which Arab-Israeli negotiations would be possible because:

The defeat of Iraq would convince even the most die-hard Arabs militants that a military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was impossible. The fact that the Soviet Union had co-operated with the United States during the crisis would further demonstrate that the old cold war rules of the game were being rewritten, and that the United States, more than ever, occupied the key diplomatic position. Palestinians and Jordanians, who had allowed their emotions to draw them to Saddam's side, would now realise that they had lost support among Arab regimes and that time was working against their interests. Out of weakness, therefore, the Palestinians might be expected to respond positively to any serious diplomatic overture. American officials also hoped that patterns of co-operation during the Gulf War might carry over into the post-war diplomacy.³⁰

The point here is that the situation in the area, that resulted from these international and regional changes in addition to some domestic changes -such as the Palestinian Intifada, the weakness of the PLO, the deterioration of its financial and political position and its increased international isolation as a result of its vague position during the Gulf Crisis, Israel's shock from the fall of some Iraqi missiles on its territories together with Iraq's

²⁹ Murphy, E., "The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the New World Order" in H. Jawad, *The Middle East in the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's press, 1994), p. 81.

³⁰ Quandt, W., *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 396.

attempts to link Kuwait crisis with the Palestine problem- encouraged the American administration to revive its efforts to achieve political settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thus, the Madrid peace conference was made possible not only because the parties love peace or because they have desired to solve the long lasted conflict, but because of many factors on the three mentioned main levels: international, regional, and domestic levels. It can be regarded as an acceptance by the parties to the conflict of the new distribution of power and new rules of the game.

Why Did the Parties go to Madrid?

The issue, of whether the New World Order was behind the sudden advance of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the convening of Madrid peace conference or not, can be answered by defining and analysing the parties' reasons for participating in the conference. In general, several factors contributed to the breakthrough to Arab-Israeli peace in the 1990s. For Donald Neff, these included,

The long term evolution of Arab politics toward concluding that war was futile, compromise was inevitable, Israel was not going to be destroyed, and that continuing the conflict damaged both Arab state and Palestinian interests. The perception of these new conditions permitted a shift in Israeli policies as well. Global changes – including the USSR's collapse, the Cold War's end, and the United States' emergence as the world's sole superpower – made vital contributions to the altered situation.³¹

The specific reasons to go to Madrid peace conference, although different, were in some ways similar for the Middle Eastern leaders. Most leaders of the region understood the changes to the international and regional distribution of power and the new rules. King Hussein for example spelled out in a clear and frank way the reasons for seeking a

³¹ Laqueur, W and Rubin, B., *The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 479.

settlement. First, he thought that the Palestine question was in decline and that every opportunity offered less than its predecessor and the failure to deal with events within what is reasonable led to one lost opportunity after another, even as Israel confiscated 65% of the West Bank.³² Second, the Israeli recent leadership in 1991 clearly felt that it could benefit from the status quo of 'no war no peace,' which could be exploited by Israel to change facts on the ground. Third, the world was heading towards peace, nuclear disarmament, reduction of armies, reduction or elimination of some weapons of mass destruction, the settlement of all regional conflicts and the protection of the world environment.³³ Fourth, the collapse of the Arab order and the upset in the Middle East balance of power resulting from the Gulf crisis had led to new alliances and a clear drift towards regionalism. That had a direct impact on the way the Arabs dealt with the Palestine question as well as on the security considerations of each Arab country. Fifth, Jordanians and Palestinians were surrounded and were the directly affected parties with the continuation of the status quo of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sixth, the USA was showing an increased interest in post-Gulf war stability in the Middle East, a stability

³² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14/10/1991.

³³ Regarding the effect of this state of affairs on the Middle East, the USSR has shifted from the position of a rival to that of a partner of the U.S. in the proposed peace process. This shift was effected by a shared concept of the two countries of a new world order succeeding the cold war era. The USSR has also ceased to be a source of threat to Western, and particularly U.S., interests in the region -a fact that has deprived Israel of its most significant asset, namely, that of being the U.S.'s strategic ally in confronting the USSR.

based on the containment and management of crisis as has been the case until quite recently.³⁴

For Israel, the right-wing Shamir government was not supportive of the idea of convening an international conference. William Quandt pointed out that: "To win Israeli support, any such conference would have to be stripped of coercive authority, providing little more than a venue for the parties to negotiate directly. Israel would resist any UN role as well."³⁵ In contrast, the Arab parties were emphasising the idea of a full international conference with strong participation of the UN and the European community. Under American pressure, Shamir was to accept to attend, but under conditions which made the conference a ceremonial event to be followed by bilateral negotiations with the Arab parties. Israel obtained with the help of the USA most of its demands and conditions.³⁶ These conditions included, the absence of any UN role, the brief period of the conference, the nature of the invited parties and the nature of the Palestinian participation. The latter included no separate Palestinian delegation to the talks; no participation of Palestinians from Jerusalem; no Palestinians from the diaspora and no PLO representation or participation.³⁷

Neill Lochery, in his study of the Israeli Labour Party, pointed out that the American pressure was not the only reason for Shamir to attend the conference. He observed that although many thought that Shamir went to Madrid under American pressure, which has some elements of truth, the fact remained that he was seen as someone who succeeded in imposing his own views and achieving what he wanted.

³⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14/10/1991.

³⁵ Quandt, (1993), *Op. Cit.*, p. 401.

³⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1206 i, 18/10/1991.

³⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1206, A/3, 18/10/1991.

Shamir was perceived as having successfully neutralised the conference before agreeing to attend. Mr. Shamir had removed the East Jerusalem representation (one of the reasons for the break up of the National Unity Government in 1990) and had effectively sidelined the PLO, only allowing Palestinian participation as part of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.³⁸

Not only this but Shamir also described the conference as an historic achievement.

Lochery made it clear that:

Crucially, the results of the conference were not binding and it was only to serve as a problem to bilateral talks to take place in Washington some five weeks later. Mr Shamir unsurprisingly, described the conference as an historic achievement, arguing that: It was the first time that Israel met together with representative of all its neighbours without any pre-conditions. This was an achievement in itself even if you do not take into account the results of it. It was important for us (Israel); it gave us more standing and prestige. It was clear that we would have to get peace with negotiations one day, also it was very clear according to the Camp David agreements that we would have to find a solution for the unresolved question.³⁹

Washington had been trying to make some progress in the Middle East peace process since before the second Gulf War. Shamir's refusal in 1990 to consider peace talks proposed by the USA led to the breakdown of a coalition government between Likud and Labour as the government failed to win a confidence vote on March 15.⁴⁰ Following the Gulf War, however Israel was not able to resist Washington's pressure. Since the USA president declared "The time has come to put an end to the conflict in the Middle East," the Israeli Prime Minister told the USA Secretary of State, James Baker, that he wished to talk to the Arabs. He was trying to avoid any compromise while avoiding at the same time angering Israel's main protector, the United States. In other words Shamir

³⁸ Lochery N., *The Israeli Labour Party in Opposition and in the National Unity Government, 1977-1992*, (PhD thesis, University of Durham, 1996), p. 235.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 236.

⁴⁰ Beilin, Y., *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), p. 32.

was trying to kill two birds with one stone, by attending a conference that would be a conference in name only, without any real meaning or authority, while appearing to accept the USA' idea.

The diplomatic observers were divided in explaining the Israeli acceptance of talks. The optimistic felt that the Israeli acceptance to enter negotiations was the first important step towards real peace talks, and that when talks started, they could lead to useful results.

The pessimistic felt that Shamir would not negotiate with any real desire for compromise.⁴¹ Hanan Ashrawi recalled the saying that goes, "you can bring a horse to water but you can not make it drink; you can bring the Israelis to the negotiating table, but you can not make them negotiate."⁴²

Clearly Shamir felt that the conference could be a chance for winning some gains without making any concessions. Of these possible gains a de facto Arab recognition, restoration of relations with the Soviet Union and some other countries, abolition of the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism,⁴³ and getting the loan guarantees featured highly. The other reason for Israel was that it knew that it could go to the conference armed with its own agenda and conditions.⁴⁴

The Palestinians had many reasons to try to participate in the peace process and

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Hawatmeh, G., "Too Short for Progress," *Middle East International*, 24 January 1992, p. 9.

⁴³ Law, J., "Nonetheless: Zionism is Racism" *Middle East International*, 20 January 1992, pp. 19-20.

⁴⁴ Barhoum, K., "What Price Madrid for the Palestinians?" *Middle East International*, 17 April 1992, pp. 15-16.

any international conference concerning the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The PLO leadership in particular needed the participation to overcome its international isolation and political and financial crisis.⁴⁵ The PLO awareness of changes in international and regional balances following the end of the Cold War and the second Gulf War was the other important reason to seek participation in the peace conference. It is worth mentioning here that the Palestinians shared some of the reasons mentioned by King Hussein, especially the feeling that every opportunity offered less than its predecessor did. They also did not want to be excluded from the settlement or to leave others to decide their fate.⁴⁶

Syria decided to participate for three main reasons. First, Syria felt that its participation in the international coalition against Iraq and its adjustment to the realities of the 'new rules of the game' might give her some advantage and a favoured position with the only remaining superpower and the guardian of the Conference, namely the United States. Second, the lack of an alternative to the peace option became very clear after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, the desire to show the world that it was not an anti peace or terrorist country as the international media portrayed it.

Lebanon was Asad's first priority. Lebanon is the source of both legitimate and illicit revenue, the most prominent businessmen in Syria are Lebanese, and the country occupies a strategic position of vital importance; any settlement that diminish his stature in Lebanon is sure to be rejected. Contact with the USA is also vital to him, and he attaches the highest importance to having his country's name dropped from the list of states sponsoring terrorism and from the list of states dealing in narcotics; only then will he be eligible to receive American aid.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Beilin, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 78.

⁴⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1207 i (a), 19/10/1991.

⁴⁷ Beilin, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 203.

Lebanon was mainly under Syrian influence or co-ordination. In sum, all the parties realised that the sea changes had happened in all international, regional and domestic levels and tried to respond accordingly.

United States' Interests in Promoting the Madrid Conference

In order to win their support in the Gulf War the United States had promised its Arab allies that it would –after liberating Kuwait- concentrate its efforts on finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The American administration and Arab leaders repeatedly confirmed that a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute would be found after the conclusion of the Gulf War. President Bush himself promised that following the war he would embark on the difficult task of securing a potentially historic peace.⁴⁸

The evident American domination in the region, and the transformation of the Soviet Union, the main rival to the USA, to a co-operative position had altered the rules of the game and given America the major role in the region to establish the conditions for peace and determine its march. The USA was looking to reviving the peace process, feeling that it would achieve stability and serve its interests, presented in protecting oil supplies and protecting Israel and legitimising its existence and integration in the area.⁴⁹

Reviving the peace process would enhance the peace between Israel and Egypt, while the continuation of the tension would increase extremism in the area and strengthen the position of the radical trends and generate increasing violence. That violence might spread not only across the region but also to Western interests elsewhere and around the whole world as well.

⁴⁸ Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 254.

⁴⁹ Hinnebusch and Drysdale, (1991), Op. Cit., p. 174.

There was a great belief generated within the American side that the regional climate after the second Gulf War and the international climate after the end of the Cold War had created a new situation, which made the negotiations to solve the conflict a clear possibility. The President, the Secretary of State and members of the Middle East team in the State Department emphasised the importance of seizing the moment and taking advantage of the new international and regional situation or what they see as a New World Order.⁵⁰

Understanding the United States policies in the Middle East in 1990/91 can not be complete without mentioning the Zionist influence. Concerning the influence of the Jewish Lobby on the American Middle East policy, a team that was considered to be pro-Israeli, enhanced by the strong Zionist lobby was designing the American policy in the Middle East at the time.⁵¹ Cheryl A. Rubenberg observed that:

The intimacy of the US-Israeli relationship was further evidenced in the number and position of high officials in the Bush administration with strong pro-Israeli sentiments. In late October 1991 the composition of the U.S. group consisted of the top Middle Eastern advisors, who had surrounded the administration since its inception, including Dennis B. Ross, Director of the State Department's policy Planning Staff; Aaron David Miller, State Department Policy Planning staff member; Daniel C. Kurtzer, deputy assistant secretary of state, Policy Planning Staff; William J. Burns, principal deputy director of State Department policy

⁵⁰ The exception, however, is Richard Haass, the special assistant at the national security Council to President George Bush for near Eastern and South Asia affairs who advised that "The U.S. should reduce its involvement in schemes intended to produce a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East, pay greater attention to the Israel-Egypt relations, sustain a continued but narrow dialogue with the Soviet Union and increase action against terrorism. See, M. Abu Fadil., "Arab-Israeli Conflict; Don't Raise Your Hopes," *The Middle East*, May 1991, p. 10.

⁵¹ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 121.

planning Staff; and Richard N. Haass, special assistant to the president for national security affairs.⁵²

It is important however to say that the Middle East foreign policy team was much closer to the moderate trend in Israel, presented in Labour and leftist parties, than to the radical right wing parties. Therefore, while they saw this as an ideal time to advance the peace process to Israel's benefit, they were not necessarily on good terms with the government of Yitzhak Shamir.

The USA policy to protect Israel through Arab acceptance and international peace agreements stemmed from an increasing awareness that security was no longer achievable by keeping control of some land in the age of long range ballistic missiles and the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.

As Ziva Flamhaft pointed out, one of the main ideas behind the international conference was to provide an umbrella of international legitimacy to collective peace efforts.⁵³ It was also to provide the parties who had fought each other for many years, with the opportunity to meet within a bigger forum that would allow them later to meet face to face and negotiate their disputes. We have already seen that although the idea of convening international conferences for the purpose of solving the Arab-Israeli dispute was relatively new, it did not start in Madrid. The first Middle East peace conference met in Geneva in December 1973, after the October war. It assembled under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, and the Soviet Union and the United States co-chaired. In that instance, however, the United States managed to substitute the

⁵² Rubenberg, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 332. See also her book, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1983).

⁵³ Flamhaft, Z., *Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 55.

conference with 'step by step diplomacy'. Israeli opposition to a greater UN role in the peace process also contributed to the failure of Geneva conference.⁵⁴ In 1977 the Carter administration proposed another international Middle East peace conference, but Egypt and Israel were both opposed to an increased Soviet role in the area.⁵⁵ The situation in the early 1990s and immediately after the second Gulf War, however, created a situation that has been seen by many as suitable for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict through such a conference. The Soviet role was by now less suspect and America would be in a stronger position to influence the direction taken by the conference.

The war in the Persian Gulf held the promise that the defeat of Saddam Hussein would not only create a 'New World Order' but would also enhance regional security in the area. The Bush administration assumed that the war would provide a window of opportunity in which the United States, utilising its new credibility, would be in a position to shape events in the Middle East including a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵⁶

By the beginning of 1990 Baker felt that he had got Egyptian and Palestinian support for his basic approach and focused his efforts on convincing Shamir of what he saw as the Shamir plan in all but name. Baker had very difficult talks with Shamir, who was insisting, on many conditions, which were very difficult for the other parties to accept. The elimination of any UN role contradicted Syria's demand. His insistence on forbidding PLO members or even Palestinians residents of Jerusalem from participating in the Jordanian delegation was a very difficult condition for the Palestinians to accept. The Arab parties wanted an international conference, a strong role for the United Nations and a full implementation of the Security Council resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 according to a 'land for peace'

⁵⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1060 A/12, 1 May 1991.

⁵⁵ Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 55.

⁵⁶ Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 254.

formula. Shamir was opposed to this Arab position. He said following the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee meeting on 29 April 1991, that:

The Arab countries, of course, preferred a continuing international conference, but our position was to convene it and then immediately afterwards to hold direct negotiations. Israel would oppose any role for the UN... With reference to the UN, we said from the start that the process should not be tied to it in any way.⁵⁷

Israel wanted direct negotiations with all parties and wanted the conference to have no more than ceremonial role and no coercion role. Israel also has a different understanding of the Security Council resolutions. The Shamir government wanted to trade peace for peace not for land. It took the security issue as an excuse to keep the territories under its control in the Golan heights, South Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Shamir himself repeatedly emphasised the 'peace for peace' slogan as against the 'peace for land' formula.⁵⁸ Israel's right-wing government was ideologically committed to settling the entire Eretz Yisrael, and rejected the "land for peace" principle.⁵⁹

The Secretary of State James Baker started a series of visits to states of the region following the end of the military operations in the Gulf, until he got the acceptance of all parties to the conflict to attend a peace conference in Madrid to start in October 1991. Baker made eight trips to the region. He met with the leaders of Israel, Syria, Jordan and most importantly with some Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, opening the way -although indirectly- for the PLO to participate in the peace process.

⁵⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. ME/1060, A/12, 1 May 1991.

⁵⁸ Shamir, Y., *Summing Up: Un Autobiography*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994).

⁵⁹ Sela, A., *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order*, (Albany: State University of New York, 1998), p. 333.

All these events and developments, and the regional and international interactions they have entailed, subsequently brought about one essential outcome, namely the renewal of efforts in an attempt to arrive at a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence came the USA-Soviet initiative to convene a Middle East peace conference.⁶⁰

Thus, understanding the situation as it was, the USA was determined to launch a serious and immediate attempt to bring the parties together under an acceptable forum and according to a suitable formula for the purpose of achieving a peaceful settlement to the dispute.

The nature of the conference that was ultimately convened, represented a significant shift in American policy towards the peace process. Previous methods of direct engagement in the negotiations (on the lines of either Kissinger's "small steps" or Carter's Camp David) were abandoned and a new method of "constructive ambiguity"⁶¹ was pursued. This entailed the United States seeking to prevent the talks from becoming bogged-down in specific issues by reducing the process to a procedural one. To do this, it had to remove itself from the negotiations themselves, allocating to itself the task of procedural arbiter. Thus Baker could point out to Israel that its land expropriation and settlement building were obstacles to the process of peace-making, just as he could persuade the Palestinians to accept a joint-delegation with the Jordanians for the sake of getting the negotiations themselves underway. The method was based on Bush's personal belief that peace could not be imposed on the region but could only be reached through direct negotiations between the parties themselves. He could afford to hold this

⁶⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14/10/1991, pp .1-6.

⁶¹ Massalha, O., *Towards the Long-Promised Peace*, (London: Saqi Books, 1994), p. 59.

view since, without an aggressive Soviet presence in the Middle East, American interests were no longer threatened in such a way that would impel America to try to shape the specifics of such a peace process. Moreover, Palestinian and Arab weakness at the time ensured that it was unlikely that a negotiated peace would be disadvantageous to Israel. Indeed, Bush and Baker could afford to put pressure on Israel when it suited them to do so, urging it to make a peace which was in America's interests and which the American administration believed would also be in Israel's long-term interests.

United States' Diplomacy

President George Bush's speech to the joint session of Congress on 6 March 1991, was followed by the eight famous Baker's trips to the region that ended with the convening of the Madrid conference. In June 1991 George Bush sent letters to the presidents and kings of Jordan, Syria, Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia presenting the idea of holding an international conference. It was only after many visits and meetings with the Arab leaders and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir that the parties accepted the idea.

In order to understand the Madrid peace conference and process we need to look back a little bit and examine the extensive diplomacy conducted by USA Secretary of State James Baker that led to the convening of the conference.

As William Quandt pointed out, Baker's speech at the AIPAC annual conference in 1989 indicated Bush administration's desire to redesign Shamir's initiative into something which could be acceptable to the Palestinians.⁶² Baker became more involved in the Israeli-Arab diplomacy, and tried –indirectly– to convince the PLO to allow the

⁶² Quandt, W., *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 389.

negotiations with Israel to start without its direct participation, in other words to accept the idea of a delegation of people from the Occupied Territories. The dialogue between the PLO and the USA had been suspended in June 1990, because of what was perceived by the USA as a terrorist operation by one of the PLO factions. The Palestinian raid on an Israeli beach was in fact committed by a non-PLO organisation, but nevertheless affected the USA's decision to stop the dialogue, because it did not accept the terms by which Arafat condemned the operation.⁶³ Egypt and especially President Mubarak, had then played an important role as an effective communication channel with Arafat. Baker's efforts although intensified following the second Gulf War can thus be traced back to 1989. By the end of that year, the Egyptians had confirmed to him that Arafat had accepted his five points plan, one of which was that the Palestinians could bring in any position towards the peace process to the negotiations table.

James Baker's diplomacy proved its success in bringing about an agreement on convening the conference. Bush was determined in his pressure on Israel to participate in the conference despite criticism from democrats and the Israeli lobby concerning the loan guarantees, the matter that contributed towards the failure of Republicans to win the election.

James Baker started his first post Gulf war tour of the Middle East on 7 March 1991, meeting with the Foreign Ministers of the six GCC states, Egypt and Syria, and agreeing a USA plan for collective security in the region.⁶⁴ He followed it by visiting Israel on 11 March for the first time since his appointment as Secretary of State. He met with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and a 10-member Palestinian delegation led

⁶³ Smith, C., *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 280.

⁶⁴ Keesing's Record of World Events, May 1991, p. 38210.

by Faisal al-Husseini, and proposed a gradual approach to regional peace and called on Israelis and Arabs to initiate confidence-building measures. He completed his first post-Gulf war tour by visiting Syria on 13 March.

On 8-10 April Baker visited Israel at the start of his second Middle East tour; he discussed the concept of a 'regional conference,' and received an Israeli agreement to attend a 'limited' conference. Baker again met with a delegation of Palestinians led by Hussein, then visited Cairo for talks with president Mubarak and Saudi Arabia Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal; and discussed possible Palestinian alternatives to PLO representation at a conference. He ended his second tour by visiting Syria, which maintained its opposition to a 'regional conference' and pressed for a full international conference with a UN presence.

In his third visit to Israel on 18 April James Baker failed to persuade Shamir to alter his position on an international peace conference, and failed also in his attempts to persuade the Syrian president Hafiz Al-Assad to moderate his position. USA-Soviet co-operation and co-ordination towards the Middle East peace, appeared clear by the visit made by the Soviet Foreign Minister. After meeting with Baker on 25 April in Kislovodsk, Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Foreign Minister, announced that the Soviet Union was willing to act as a co-sponsor with the USA for a peace conference. He visited Syria on 8 May for talks with president Assad at the start of a regional tour aimed at promoting Middle East peace efforts. His arrival in Israel on 10 May marked the first visit of a high ranking Soviet official to Israel since the severing of diplomatic ties in 1967. Following a meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi, Bessmertnykh said that "The atmosphere was very good" and that "we really have a chance to begin a peace settlement process."⁶⁵

⁶⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1069 i, 11 May 1991.

The offer by the six GCC countries to send an observer to a regional peace conference in a statement issued in Luxembourg on 11 May was important as it satisfied Israeli demands that all Arab states play a role in the peace process. This statement came three weeks after the refusal of Saudi Arabia to take part in a regional conference.⁶⁶ Israel saw progress in the concept of observer status for the GCC states at a conference a progress, but wanted all the Arab states to play a role in the peace process as this would be a sort of recognition and normalisation.⁶⁷ The change of position was due to some extent to American pressure.

The fourth tour to the region by Baker after the Gulf war began on 11 May by visiting Syria where President Assad reiterated his demands that the UN play a significant role in a peace conference and that the conference should re-convene periodically. He met Bessmertnykh and Mubarak in Cairo on 12 May in what the Financial Times described as an 'against-the-odds attempt' to 'kick start' the peace process. After the talks in Cairo between Bessmertnykh, Mubarak and Baker, the Soviet foreign minister said that the peace process "reached a rather large plateau," but added that the possibilities for a conference "are growing." Baker pointed to "significant" differences between Syria and Israel, especially on the question of UN involvement in a conference.

The meeting between Bessmertnykh and Arafat in Geneva on 14 May was very important in that the idea of a peace conference was discussed, followed by Arafat's call for a five party meeting of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and the PLO to discuss current Middle East developments. On the same day, 15 May, Baker confirmed in a statement issued in Israel, after talks with Shamir, that two issues remain unresolved:

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. ME/1071 I, 14 May 1991.

the role of the UN in the conference and whether it would hold more than one session.

On 18 July James Baker embarked on his fifth tour of the Middle East since March visiting Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. Before leaving Israel, Baker told reporters that it was "a moment of historic opportunity." Syria, together with Jordan and Lebanon, formally accepted the USA proposals for the convening of the conference.⁶⁸

The sixth trip of Baker to the region was on 1 August. During this visit Shamir announced that Israel would participate in the talks, provided that his conditions on the composition of the Palestinian delegation to the conference were met. The seventh trip to the region happened in September with much more optimism. During his eighth trip on October 18, Secretary Baker concluded his effort, and with the Soviet foreign minister, Boris Pankin, announced in Jerusalem that having had an extensive consultation with the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, both the United States and Soviet Union stated that they believed that a historic opportunity for a genuine peace in the region was available. Their governments had consequently invited Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestinian representatives to attend a Middle East peace conference to be held on October 30 in Madrid.

The end of the second Gulf War with all its regional and international implications forced both of them to co-operate to find a solution for the long-standing Arab Israeli conflict. They sent invitations to the parties concerned to attend a peace conference under their mutual auspices. The invitations made clear that both superpowers were ready to assist the parties in reaching a permanent, just and

⁶⁸ Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 79.

comprehensive peace, through direct negotiations based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 383, and that the aim of the process would be real peace.⁶⁹

According to the letters of the invitations, the conference was to be held on 30 October 1991, in Madrid, and the bilateral talks would start four days after the opening of the conference.⁷⁰ For participation, the invitations were sent to Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians and Egypt. The invitation was also extended to the European Community, to be represented by its presidency, and the secretary general of the GCC and a representative of the UN Secretary General as observers. The Soviet-American co-operation was vital for the peace efforts to succeed. The Soviet influence on Syria and the PLO was needed to convince them to respond positively to the invitation. Israel as well needed a resumption of its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand the American influence on Israel was needed to convince her to agree to the conference. Syria and the PLO as well needed an American acceptance and political and financial support. The co-operation between the two –which is one of the New World Order's main features-, was critical to the agreement of the parties to attend the conference.

In addition, both Arabs and Israelis recognised and understood the determination of the USA and even the Soviet Union to get some kind of conference. The statements made by President Bush and his Secretary of State made it clear for the parties concerned that the USA meant business. Neither Israel nor the Arabs wanted to be the party which prevented the holding of the conference.

⁶⁹ Institute for Palestine Studies., *The Palestinian Israeli Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record*, (Washington DC, 1994), pp. 3-7.

⁷⁰ Abdul Hadi, M., *Documents on Palestine: Volume II: From the Negotiations in Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), p. 10.

Letters of Assurances

Understanding the new realities of the post-cold war international system, and recognising its position as the only remaining superpower, the parties nonetheless asked the United States for letters of assurances. Responding to their demands and to convince the parties to attend the conference, the United States sent those letters of assurances to all of them. For the Palestinians, these assurances comprised an American understanding, consistent with United States policy, which did not contradict UNSCR nos. 242 and 338. These assurances expressed the USA' confidence that there must be an end to the Israeli occupation, which could only occur through meaningful and serious negotiations. Also that the USA believed that the Palestinians should control their political, economic and other decisions which affected their lives and fates. The American understanding of the importance of the Palestinian attachment to East Jerusalem, made it important to assure them that the structure of their delegation would not affect their claim to East Jerusalem. The USA also expressed its opposition to the settlement activities in the territories occupied in 1967.⁷¹

In the letter of assurance sent to Israel, the USA emphasised the nature of "the special relations between our two countries" and the continuity of the American commitment to Israel's security, the commitment of its qualitative advantage and its right to secure and defensible borders. Also it assured Israel of the ceremonial role of the conference, and its non-support for the establishment of a Palestinian state. In the case of the Golan Heights, the USA emphasised the assurances made by President Ford to the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1975, in which the USA would support

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 8.

the position that a comprehensive settlement with Syria must assure Israel's security from any attack from the Heights.⁷²

Syria received assurances that the USA considered Israel's 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights to be illegal, and that UNSC Resolution 242 applied to the Golan and the West Bank.⁷³

The USA's letters of assurances were contradictory. One example is the firm American position that Jerusalem must never again be a divided city,⁷⁴ contradicting its non-recognition of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. The American main purpose and before any thing else was to bring the parties to the negotiations table at any cost and with any assurances even when they might not be easy to keep. Since the PLO, Syria and Israel accepted assurances which they knew to be contradictory, they were all convinced that it was more important to have something on paper from America than that an agreement on issues should be reached before they met. This shows how important USA recognition of their claims was to them.

The letters of invitation sent to the parties on 18 October 1991 appointed the day of 23rd of October as the ultimate date to receive the answers. All parties accepted the American and Soviet invitation for the conference in Madrid to be held on 30 October 1991.

⁷² Ibid., pp. 9-11.

⁷³ Smith, (1992), Op. Cit., p. 313.

⁷⁴ Abbas, M., *Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo*, (Reading: Garnet, 1995), p. 131.

The Madrid and Washington Bilateral Negotiations

On October 1991 the world witnessed an important event in the history of international relations and of the Middle East in particular. That event was the opening of the Madrid conference on peace in the Middle East, where the main parties of the Arab-Israeli conflict together with many other Arab, European, Asian and African countries under the auspices of both the USA and USSR, met for the first time. The objective was to reach a peaceful settlement for the long lasting Arab-Israeli dispute.

The Madrid peace conference opened on 30 October 1991 under the joint chairmanship of Presidents George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, with the participation of Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Also present were representatives of the United Nations Secretary General and the European Community. The conference lasted only for a few days. It was mainly a ceremonial opening, where all parties to the conflict and the two sponsors delivered speeches. The official speeches declared the parties' desires to reach a just, comprehensive and permanent peace, and also reflected the international desire to bring peace and security to the Middle East especially after the 1991 Gulf war.

In his speech to the conference, the American President, George Bush, emphasised that peace could only come as a result of direct negotiations, compromise, give and take, and that peace could not be imposed from outside, either by the USA or any other party. He emphasised that he saw the peace process as a process of direct negotiations on two tracks, the first between Israel and the Arab countries, the second between Israel and the Palestinians, and on the basis of UNSCR nos. 242 and 338.⁷⁵ He made it clear that:

The real work will not happen here in the plenary sessions, but in direct bilateral negotiations. This conference cannot impose a settlement on the participants or

⁷⁵ Abdul Hadi, (1997), *Op. Cit.*, pp. 11-13.

veto agreements, and just as important, the conference can only be reconvened with the consent of every participant.⁷⁶

For the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, President Bush said that no one could predict the final result, but some thing might develop, acceptable to Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, which would give the Palestinian people meaningful control over their lives and fate and give Israel acceptance and security.⁷⁷

In his opening speech, Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that: "The composition of the participants, as well as the nature and objectives of the conference, are eloquent testimony to the fact that we are participants in an event of major importance in New World politics." He continued as saying that: "It is for the delegations directly participating in the conference to sort out the details of this enormous task."⁷⁸

The Palestinian speech delivered by Haidar Abdelshafi expressed the hope of the Palestinian people for peace and their dream for justice and freedom. "To reaffirm a wholeness of vision which once brought about a reverse of civilisation and a world order based on harmony in diversity... Even in the invitation to this peace conference, our narrative was distorted and our truth only partially acknowledged...An invitation to discuss peace, comes to only a portion of our people...We have been denied the right to publicly acknowledge our loyalty to our leadership and system of government."⁷⁹

The speech of the Israeli Prime Minister was an example of a radical position, especially from a right-wing government, which did not recognise the land for peace principle, the principle on which the other parties attended the conference with

⁷⁶ Quandt, (1993), Op. Cit., p. 504.

⁷⁷ Abdul Hadi, (1997), Op. Cit., pp. 11-12.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

American assurances. He focused on ideological and historical issues instead of using the language of reconciliation. He mentioned for example that "We are the only people who have lived in the land of Israel without interruption for nearly 4,000 years."

We know our partners to the negotiations will make territorial demands on Israel but, as an examination of the conflict's long history makes clear, its nature is not territorial. It raged well before Israel acquired Judea, Samaria, Gaza, and the Golan in a defensive war. There was no hint at recognition of Israel before the war in 1967, when the territories in question were not under Israel's control. We are a nation of 4 million. The Arab nations from the Atlantic to the Gulf number 170 million. We control only 28,000 square km. The Arabs possess a landmass of 14 million square km. The issue is not territory, but our existence. It will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory. It is the quickest way to an impasse.⁸⁰

In general, the convening of the conference was a clear breakthrough, and a success in bringing all parties to the negotiation table, especially since it was the first time the Palestinian side had participated in the negotiation process. The Madrid conference differed completely from the Geneva conference because of the totally different international and regional circumstances. The end of the Cold War and the realities of the New World Order forced the new Soviet leadership to pursue a different policy by seeking co-operation with the USA instead of confrontation. Its internal economic and political crisis made it vulnerable to the USA's assistance.⁸¹ In this kind of circumstances the Soviet Union was keen to co-operate with the USA in its Middle East policy, even though it was clearly an American show. The regional circumstances were also different. The Gulf War and its consequences convinced the Arabs and Israel that accepting the American proposed conference was the only alternative to take. All these

⁸⁰ Institute for Palestine Studies., (1993), Op. Cit., p. 27.

⁸¹ Bazhanov, E., "Russia's Middle East Policy under Gorbachev and Yeltsin," in B. Rubin., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973-1993*, (New York: New York University Press), pp. 207-217.

international and regional factors were determinant to the likelihood of success. The success can be described at this stage as the ability to bring the parties to the negotiation table, even if the conference did not result directly to any agreements.

The Arabs and Israelis who had met around one table then broke up into separate bilateral negotiations. The negotiations rounds were held in December 1991, January, February, March, April, August, October and December 1992 followed by meetings in Rome, but without important intervention from the United States. That lack of intervention was explained by the American administration as a fear of raising the expectations of the Arab parties that America will be able to get Israeli concessions. From the beginning it had been clear that the Israeli right-wing government was ideologically committed to settling the entire 'Eretz Yisrael', and rejected the 'land for peace' principle.⁸² Shamir saw the territory of Greater Israel as sacrosanct.⁸³ Nevertheless the Arab parties went to the conference hoping that the USA could use its influence on its own protectorate to advance the negotiation process, and America was eager to distance itself from any such commitment. The USA determination not to mediate and only to facilitate the talks themselves reflected to some extent a new American policy in which it felt confident in its status as the only remaining superpower. This policy differed greatly from the Kissinger diplomacy of Camp David in which the American administration played major role in mediating between Israel and Egypt. The USA in the New World Order was no longer worried about dangerous Soviet influence in the region and thus was able to play a much more relaxed and confident policy.

⁸² Sela, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 333.

⁸³ Editorial., "Arab-Israeli Talks: Land (and not much more) for peace," *The Middle East*, October 1992, p. 12.

The structure of the talks was complex to some extent. What was going to happen was that the plenary would be the only occasion at which all participants would discuss the main issues. Following the plenary, Israel and every Arab delegation were to negotiate their separate issues. The Israelis would start talking to the Palestinians separately from the Jordanian delegation. The multilateral talks, which would negotiate five issues of mutual concern, namely water, arms control, economic development, environment and refugees would start in different places around the world.

The second round of the bilateral talks took place in Washington in December and revealed much about the negotiating strategies and aims of the various parties.⁸⁴ This round opened in the offices of the USA State Department on 10 December and ended on 18 December with no progress having been achieved.⁸⁵ At the start of negotiations, the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation claimed that Israel had agreed at Madrid to enter into (two track) negotiations. They had envisaged that Israel would enter into separate talks with the Jordanian and Palestinian sections of the joint delegations. Each section would have symbolic representation from the other section, but the effective outcome would have been face-to-face Israeli-Palestinian talks. The Israeli delegation rejected such an interpretation and insisted that it would only negotiate with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. When this round of negotiations started, the Israeli fear of being rushed towards undesirable compromises still influenced its policy, and it sought to confine the talks to the procedural issues. Explaining this trend, the analyst Lawrence Freedman pointed out that:

Because recognition is the main thing Israel wants from its neighbours, it has tried to shape the negotiations to achieve this without major territorial concessions. It is

⁸⁴ Sayigh, Y., "The Peace Negotiations: Dim Hopes for 1992," *Middle East International*, 10 January 1992, pp. 15-16.

⁸⁵ Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 38693.

such a small country, and has so little confidence in the trustworthiness of its neighbours, that it sees every territorial concession as a high risk to its security.⁸⁶ But without concessions of land, the Arabs will not concede full recognition.

The first procedural problem was the Israeli non-recognition of the Palestinians, and its attempt to deal with them through sub-committees within the Jordanian delegation, in contrast to Palestinian insistence on negotiating their problems with Israel separately from Jordan.

The third round of the Middle East peace negotiations, held in Washington on 13-16 January, ended with no agreement having been reached on the date or venue of the next round of bilateral negotiations.⁸⁷ The negotiations started positively, with agreement on separate Palestinian representation within the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the issue, which had caused the collapse of the second round of talks. During the Israeli-Palestinian talks both sides put forward proposals for Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Under Israel's proposed "interim self-government authority," the Palestinians would have some measure of autonomy, but no control over security, foreign affairs or settlement. The Palestinian counter-proposal included measures to assure participation in self-rule by Arab residents of Jerusalem and the election of an organ to assume authority over all people, land and resources in the Occupied Territories until the final status was decided. The Israeli delegation refused to discuss the controversial issue of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ King, J., *Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace?* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994), p. 86.

⁸⁷ Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 38740.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38740.

The Israeli side appeared to be more enthusiastic; the reason behind this might have been their desire to win the American congress' sympathy for its requested loan guarantees, which had been delayed by President Bush until after Madrid. According to Yezid Sayigh's analysis at the time "Israel ... will seek to portray the bilateral talks as progressing satisfactorily, in order to persuade Congress that there is no need to link the housing loans offer directly to the peace process."⁸⁹ In this round, a kind of success was achieved in solving a procedural problem, enabling both parties to set and talk together. Thus from now the Palestinians were to talk to the Israelis separately. The Palestinians presented a document dated 14 January 1992, entitled "Outline of Model of the Palestinian Interim Self-government Authority (PISGA)." One of the other important developments was the convening of the first session of multilateral talks in Moscow which was supposed to be attended by Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, under the auspices of the peace talks and other concerned countries in January 1992. The Palestinians refused to attend this time in protest against the Israeli refusal to meet with a team selected by the Palestinians themselves and its own insistence that the members of the delegation must be from the Occupied Territories. The issues under consideration were security, arms, economic development and co-operation, water sources, environment and refugees.

The fourth round of bilateral talks opened in Washington on 24 February.⁹⁰ The 10-day round of talks had made little progress by the end of February.⁹¹ At the close of the round on 4 March no significant progress had been achieved. The Palestinian delegation presented a 16-page plan for the election of a Palestinian legislature to

⁸⁹ King, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 89.

⁹⁰ Massalha, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 45.

⁹¹ Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 38786.

govern a demilitarised West Bank and Gaza Strip. The document was entitled "Expanded outline: Palestinian Interim Self-government Arrangements: Concepts, Preliminary Measures, and Elections Modalities," Predictably, the plan was rejected by the chief Israeli negotiator Elyakim Rubinstein, who described it as; "a plan for a Palestinian state in all but name."⁹² Israel presented a counter text. The Israeli text mentioned an interim arrangement for the Palestinian inhabitants but not the land; the Palestinians considered it as completely inappropriate.⁹³

Another round of negotiation was held on 27 April. This fifth round was more positive, as the Israelis presented their proposals concerning elections in the Occupied Territories. These proposals were not totally rejected by the Palestinian side but were not totally accepted by the PLO in Tunis, as they focused on presenting the inhabitants but not the land with autonomy. The authorities in the proposals did not carry any sovereign rights. Commenting on the progress of the latest round of negotiations, the Middle East Economic Digest of 8 May, said that all sets of talks had finished procedural details and "begun to tackle the real issues". In the Israeli-Palestinian talks, the Israeli delegation formally tabled a set of proposals for the holding of municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and an offer to permit Palestinian control of local health services. Although the offer was not completely rejected by the Palestinian side, they made it clear that it fell short of Palestinian aspirations for a legislative council to take over control of the Occupied Territories from Israel.⁹⁴

Meanwhile, Israeli talks with Syria made little headway on the major dispute

⁹² Ibid., p. 38837.

⁹³ See Murphy, E., "After Madrid: Slim Prospects for a Land-for-Peace Deal," *Middle East International*, no (413), 22/11/1991, pp. 16-17.

⁹⁴ Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 38885.

between the two countries that centred on Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights. But the talks between Israel and Jordan were held after weeks of renewed speculation about the possible declaration of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. The talks centred on the issue of water rights over the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, while talks between Israel and Lebanon focused on conditions for a possible Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

On 24 August 1992, following elections in Israel, bilateral negotiations resumed in Washington for the first time since the change of government in Israel when detailed proposals on Palestinian autonomy in the Occupied Territories were presented by the Israeli delegation on 25 August. They defined the role of a Palestinian autonomous authority or administrative council in controlling health, education, justice and transport. There was no mention in the document of Israeli troop withdrawals, nor of territorial demarcations.⁹⁵ When this sixth round of negotiations started,

Rabin [the new Israeli Prime Minister] seemed to signal a clear break from the policy of his predecessor on the Syrian track by replacing Shamir's chief negotiator there, Yossi Ben-Aharon, with his own chief negotiator, Itamar Rabinovich. On the Palestinian-Jordanian track, no such personnel change was forthcoming; Shamir's nominee, Elyakim Rubinstein, was kept on as head of this Israeli delegation until January 1993.⁹⁶

Israel presented a document entitled "The Administrative Council of the Interim Self-government Arrangements," and there was optimism that the new Israeli government wanted to go forward, (although it was quickly to end, especially when the USA allowed the loan guarantees to be made to Israel).

Although the chairman of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, pointed out that "fourteen months of talks after Madrid was zero," many proposed documents were presented. The Palestinians presented a "Draft Proposal: Framework Agreement on Arrangements for

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 39070.

⁹⁶ Freedman, R., *Israel Under Rabin*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 95.

Palestinian Interim Self-Government” dated on 1 September. The Israelis responded with a document dated 14 September, entitled “Informal Concept of the Interim Self-government Arrangements: Building Blocks for Agreement.”

This sixth round of bilateral negotiations closed in Washington on 24 September 1992, and was the longest. As pointed out by Mahmoud Abbas,

With the holding of the sixth round of negotiations on 24 August 1992 an atmosphere of optimism reigned in international circles as well as in the Arab world. This was due to the victory of the political alliance in Israel, which arrived bearing a programme based on the need for direct negotiations with the Arabs in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and also concessions on all fronts.⁹⁷

Yitzhak Rabin indicated that Israel was ready to accept territorial compromise over the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria or as he said:

In exchange for a peace treaty which promises an end to war and opens the borders between Syria and Israel, diplomatic relations and normalisation, Israel is ready to implement (UN Resolutions)⁹⁸ 242 and 338 . . . this implies, of course, some sort of territorial compromise.

The seventh round of the talks was held in October, but there was no real progress. In fact the Israeli deportation of more than 400 Palestinians to Lebanon increased pessimism in the possibility of advancing the peace talks. The weeks leading up to the seventh round were busy with the launch of various diplomatic initiatives.⁹⁹

The eighth round of peace talks opened on December 7 in Washington. It was overshadowed by the Israeli expulsion of 415 Palestinians, which seemed to show that Rabin’s new moderacy was only skin-deep and did not extend to real policy.

⁹⁷ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit.

⁹⁸ Keesing’s Record of World Events, p. 39119.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 39167.

The ninth round of bilateral talks opened in Washington on 27 April 1993. This was the first session to take place since the inauguration of USA President Bill Clinton.¹⁰⁰

In the course of this ninth round of talks, the two official delegations exchanged drafts of a 'Declaration of Principles' between them. One of the main sticking points was the issue of the nature and extent of the jurisdiction of the self-government authority.¹⁰¹ The Palestinian delegation demanded legislative, executive, and judicial powers for the future Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority and full territorial control over the occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem).¹⁰²

The session ended on 13 May in deadlock. No concrete progress was recorded during this round on the Israeli-Palestinian track: the two sides failed to reach agreement on a so-called "statement of principles" on self rule in the occupied territories.

The tenth round of negotiations started on 15 June. The Israelis presented a draft "Agreed Statement of Principles," while the Palestinians presented a "Draft Proposal for a Declaration of Principles." The Americans on their side presented a "Draft of the Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement," on 12 May, and presented a "Draft of Israeli-Palestinian Joint Declaration of Principles" on 30 June 1993.

The eleventh round of bilateral talks were held in Washington in July. The status of Jerusalem arose as a key obstacle to progress during this round. Despite Palestinian efforts to raise the issue, the Israeli delegation remained adamant that it was not negotiable.¹⁰³ As in previous rounds of talks, Israel and the Palestinians failed to reach agreement on a so-called "statement of principles".

The twelfth round started in September without recording any progress.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 39436,

¹⁰¹ See Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 97.

¹⁰² See Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 87.

¹⁰³ Keesing's Record of World Events, p. 39532.

According to John King,

The characteristic atmosphere at the talks had become one of obfuscation, complexity,¹⁰⁴ and an almost retrograde movement as issues were defined and redefined.

These rounds of peace negotiations began without doubt against the background of changing international and regional realities. The end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War changed the distribution of power both regionally and internationally and new rules were developed and understood by the states of the region. Their acceptance of attendance and engagement in peace negotiations was in itself a sign to those changes.¹⁰⁵

Economic Pressure and the Loan Guarantees Issue

The American administration under President George Bush applied a kind of a rare pressure on Israel through the loan guarantees asked by Israel. According to William Quandt:

On September 6, 1991, President Bush asked the congress for a 120-day delay before considering the Israeli loan request. After encountering congressional resistance, Bush went public on September 12, and spoke out forcefully against Israeli settlements and against the Israeli lobby.¹⁰⁶

The United States turned out to be tougher than Israel had anticipated.¹⁰⁷ The clash between President George Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir over his settlement

¹⁰⁴ King, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 105.

¹⁰⁵ Mor, B., "The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Security", in Z. Maoz., *Regional Security in the Middle East*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 183.

¹⁰⁶ Quandt, (1993), Op. Cit., p. 403.

¹⁰⁷ King, (1994), Op. Cit., p 68.

policy led to "the USA President's postponement of \$10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel to resettle the ex-Soviet Jews who were flooding into Israel."¹⁰⁸

The USA used the loan guarantees issue to press Israel on its settlement policy because it was seen by Bush administration as a major obstacle for peace, which became one of the pillars for its policy in the Middle East in the New World Order.¹⁰⁹ Many observers saw Bush's action as a sign of transfer in the American policy towards Israel and as a reflection of the New World realities. Although, it is not clear how that American policy affected the Israeli decision to attend the conference, the Arab governments saw the adoption of the policy itself at least as a new thing, which need to be appreciated. The Shamir government insisted that Israel would not be subject to any foreign pressure and Israeli decisions on its security and future would remain in Israel's hands. Israel, according to him would not allow any intervention in its policies. "The pressure that the Bush administration had brought to bear on Israel was something new in Israel's experience and unique in American foreign policy."¹¹⁰ Shamir's policies were criticised by Yitzhak Rabin as a major cause for weakening the USA-Israel relations. In order to improve relations with the USA, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared following his victory in June 1992 elections (which I will discuss in the coming section) a partial freeze on establishing new Jewish settlements, and in August 1992 President Bush announced support for the loan guarantees. This became a new beginning in the American-Israeli relations that affected the peace process.

¹⁰⁸ Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 2.

¹⁰⁹ See Murphy, E., "Settling the Territories: The Cost to Israel," *Middle East International*, no. (426), 29/5/1992, p. 19.

¹¹⁰ King, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 102.

Impact of the 1992 Israeli Elections

By the beginning of May 1992 attention was focused on the Israeli general elections. The Israeli election brought to power the Labour Party under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin. In his inaugural speech on July 13, 1992, Rabin said that: "This government is determined to embrace every possible effort, pave every road, and do every possible and impossible thing for the sake of peace and of preventing war. We will change the national order of priorities."¹¹¹ He announced dramatic changes in Israel's approach to the peace process and promised to accelerate negotiations and offered the Palestinians far-reaching autonomy.¹¹²

Palestinian hopes for an improvement in the climate of the talks were raised because of the different Labour view from Likud concerning the ideological idea of Greater Israel, and also because of its coalition with left-wing parties, such as Meretz, which supported peace with Palestinians. In addition there were some indications that the Rabin government had realised the impossibility of ultimately preventing established peace with the Palestinians. One of these indications was the partial freeze on settlement building in Occupied Territories. As Marvin Feuerwerger observed, "Rabin announced a reordering of Israel's priorities and quickly began to reverse the decade-long increase in Israeli settlement activity."¹¹³ Concerning relations with the United States, Rabin said that:

¹¹¹ Laqueur, W., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 589.

¹¹² Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 11.

¹¹³ Feuerwerger, M., "Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era," in Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 10.

In making peace, we will also be joined by the United States, whose friendship and special closeness we sincerely appreciate and hold dear. We will spare no effort to tighten and improve the special relations we have with the only superpower in the world.¹¹⁴

Indeed, Rabin won over the Bush administration, which restored the loan guarantees. He found no difficulty in dealing with the new American administration of Bill Clinton. He also received strong commitments from him to increase economic and military aid as well as diplomatic support.¹¹⁵

Impact of the 1992 American Elections

The American elections on the fall of 1992 brought a new Democratic administration under the presidency of Bill Clinton, replacing the republican administration of George Bush. This, in addition to the election of the new left-wing Israeli government to replace the right-wing Likud government had an important effect on the negotiations. During his election campaign, Clinton described Israel as "our strongest democratic ally in the Middle East."¹¹⁶ He was sharply critical of what he termed the Bush-Baker's "one sided pressure on our democratic ally Israel".¹¹⁷

The Palestinians felt that they would lose the little understanding they had got during Bush administration, which stood firmly on the face of the Likud government. As Marvin Feuerwerker pointed out "Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was hardly

¹¹⁴ Laqueur, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 593.

¹¹⁵ Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 3.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 54.

¹¹⁷ Gruen, G., "American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel: Continued Support in the Face of Dramatic Change," in Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 54.

at ease with the Bush-Baker approach.”¹¹⁸ Also the Bush understanding of the changes in the international circumstances and its effect on the possibility of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict contributed to his tougher position.

Baker and President Bush had played an important role in unseating extremist Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and ending fifteen years of Likud rule, which was violently anti-Palestinian. “Bush and Baker pressured Shamir to end his ambitious settlement program, and Baker openly urged Israel to “reach out to the Palestinians as neighbours who deserve political rights.”¹¹⁹

Examples of Bush’s firm policy are important in order to examine in comparison way Clinton’s policies. One important example can be found in his dealing with the Israeli settlements issue. He once said that: “My position is that the foreign policy of the United States says we do not believe there should be new settlements in the West Bank or in East Jerusalem.” He added, that is “our strongly held view.”¹²⁰

The election of President Bill Clinton in November 1992 however, reinforced the positive trend in USA-Israeli relations following the election of Rabin.

Clinton had promised strong support for Israel during his campaign. He pledged to support \$3 billion in annual assistance to Israel and promised to enhance U.S.-Israeli military and technological co-operation. Clinton also pledged to create a joint American-Israeli high-tech commission to work on research and development of the technologies of the twenty-first century. Clinton indicated that

¹¹⁸ Feuerwerker, M., “Israeli-American Relations in the Second Rabin Era,” in Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 9-21.

¹¹⁹ Neff, D., *Fallen Pillars: US Policy Towards Palestine and Israel since 1945*, (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies 1995), p.126.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 146.

he would push vigorously to end the Arab economic boycott of Israel and that he would strengthen U.S. efforts to preserve Israel's qualitative edge.¹²¹

During Rabin's visit to Washington in March 1993, Clinton signalled his intention to "raise US-Israeli relations to a new level of strategic partnership –partners in pursuit of peace, partners in pursuit of security."¹²²

According to George Gruen "The team of officials that Clinton appointed to advise him on Middle East policy is certainly at least as experienced and probably more sympathetic to Israel's concerns than that of any previous administration."¹²³

Clinton retained Dennis Ross, Edward Djerejian, Dan Kurtzer, Aaron Miller and added Martin Indyk and Samuel Lewis in his Middle East peace process team. As Yossi Beilin pointed out "This was a team decidedly dominated by Jews, proving that Bill Clinton was not afraid of making such appointments, which twenty years earlier would have been unthinkable."¹²⁴ The fact that the Jewish lobby contributed to his election affected his Middle East policy in a way that differed from the previous Bush administration.

Most American Jews do not doubt that Clinton's heart is in the right place when it comes to Israel. Clinton was never willing to put pressure on Israel. His Secretary of State, Warren Christopher made that clear during his visit to the region in February 1993, when he declared that: "I am not in the business of pressuring the Israelis to do

¹²¹ Feuerwerger, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 9.

¹²² Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 11.

¹²³ Gruen, G., "Jewish Attitudes Towards Israel: Continued Support in the Face of Dramatic Change," in Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 54.

¹²⁴ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 121.

anything. It is a government that takes action in its own interests".¹²⁵

He expressed strong support for Israel's view that peace with the Arabs must mean full peace. He also made pledges of support including the maintenance of Israel's qualitative edge.¹²⁶

Comparing Clinton's policies with Bush's is important in understanding how it is more pro-Israel. Concerning the Israeli settlements and as Donald Neff observed, "Under the Clinton Administration, Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem for the first time went ahead with the open, if tacit, approval of Washington. Edward Djerjian said that: There is some allowance for construction activities in existing settlement. And that's basically in terms of . . . natural growth and basic, immediate needs in those settlements."¹²⁷ With the coming of the Clinton Administration in 1993 Washington began funding construction of Jewish housing in a vastly expanded area called Greater Jerusalem and appears to accept Israel's claim to the city as its "united and eternal capital."¹²⁸ Under Clinton, the settlements were neither illegal nor obstacles to peace. They became a "complicating factor." Clinton's Assistant Secretary of State Robert H. Pelletreau described Israel's settlement policy not as illegal as it was described by previous American Administrations but as a complicating factor. He said: "I think [settlements are] a complicating factor."¹²⁹

Summarising Clinton's policy, Donald Neff pointed out rightly that: "The

¹²⁵ Freedman, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 13.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

¹²⁷ Neff, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 148.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 151.

ultimate aim of the Clinton Administration strategy was to eradicate the past and turn the Israel-Palestinian conflict into a strictly local affair.”¹³⁰

The Bilateral Talks and the New World Order

The failure to make significant progress in the bilateral talks was ultimately the result of Israeli intransigence and American unwillingness to impose sufficient pressure on Israel to make necessary compromises. It is ironic that, when the United States no longer needed a strategic ally to counter Soviet influence in the region, it was nonetheless unable and unwilling to use its considerable military, economic and diplomatic might to force Israel into behaving in a way compatible with America's own interests. This was symptomatic of the transformation of relations between international and regional powers in general with the decline of the Old World Order. With little to fear from Soviet support of its Arab enemies, Israel could afford to be less compliant with American preferences. This did not mean that the relationship was necessarily damaged (although it undoubtedly was temporarily harmed by Shamir's personality and stubborn refusal to compromise). But it did mean that a new basis for that relationship had to be established which acknowledged Israel's graduation from "client-hood". This had actually been happening for some time, with Israeli economic and technological development giving it greater relative strength within the relationship. The equation was thus altered from "American diplomatic, military and economic support in return for a pro-American Israeli position and Jewish support in Congress" into "American diplomatic, military and economic support in return for Israeli economic and technical partnership, support against Islamic terrorism, and Jewish support in Congress". It became a more equal partnership, and the American Presidency was therefore less able

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 177.

to impose solutions upon Israel.

President Bush's vision of the New World Order did not anyway consider this a useful or necessary thing to do. As long as the American vision of that order prevailed, it was considered in the interests of both Israeli and Arab states to make peace themselves on terms that they could all live with. Not to do so risked diplomatic and economic isolation which none could afford, while working towards peace would bring economic and political rewards, as well as moral credibility. This vision proved flawed in so far as the right-wing Israeli government of Shamir did not perceive its own national interests in the same way as the American government. How the impasse between Bush and Shamir would have been resolved had Labour not won the election in Israel remains an open question. It is worth noting, however, that American influence was partially responsible for facilitating the Rabin victory. America was not above interfering in domestic events to ensure that regimes complied with its own vision of the New World Order, even if it found it harder to directly pressure Israel to adapt to that order.

Multilateral Talks

Multilateral negotiations were less important than the bilaterals. Without success in the bilateral talks, the multilaterals would be no more than waste of time, at least as some parties, namely Syria and Lebanon, saw it. For them, they could even be dangerous because they create a kind of normalisation and co-operation before addressing the bottom line issues. Their fear that the Arab bargaining power in the bilateral negotiations could be reduced was the main reason behind Syria and Lebanon's decision to boycott these multilateral talks. According to Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen):

The Arabs did not view the multilateral negotiations with the same enthusiasm as they did the bilaterals. The Syrians and the Lebanese refused to participate in the

multilaterals without giving specific reasons and tried to enlist wide Arab support for their position.¹³¹

For the USA and Israel however, the multilateral talks had significant importance. The USA, in its endeavour to formulate its New World Order, sought to reduce the tension and wanted to create a new order in the Middle East, which was peaceful, co-operative and conducive to stability. In order to achieve this, it had to get all the states of the region talking to each other about the issues that either divided them, or could lead to their co-operation.

It seemed that the United States and Israel did not want the regional normalisation and co-operation to be dependent on waiting for an Arab-Israeli peace. The multilaterals were designed to address USA-Israeli interests regardless of peace agreements. Syria and Lebanon boycotted the multilateral negotiations as their leaders wished to emphasise the importance of resolving the bilateral issues and establishing peace before any normalisation of relations.

The multilateral talks did not often receive much attention because the media focused on the bilateral negotiations. Nonetheless they had a great importance as they consisted of discussion over Five issues: 1- Arms control. 2- Environment. 3- Waters. 4- Refugees. 5- Economic development.¹³²

The idea behind the multilateral negotiations stem from the fact that in the environment of the aftermath of the Cold War, security and economic development became new ideas, and were beyond the ability of one state. Security could be enhanced by regional co-operation.

The multilateral talks also served other purposes. According to Joel Peters, they were devised with two broad aims in view.

¹³¹ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 97.

¹³² See Appendices, p. 402.

In part the intention was to facilitate progress at the bilateral level by creating a separate arena in which Israel, its immediate Arab neighbours and the wider circle of Arab states in the Gulf and the Maghreb could discuss what are technically considered non-political issues of mutual concern in such a way that developments in these areas would serve as confidence building measures between the parties.¹³³

The multilateral talks would examine a range of primarily non-political issues, which extended across national boundaries. The resolution of these issues was essential for the promotion of long-term regional development and security. The multilateral negotiations would focus on the future shape of the Middle East. Their idea was grounded in a 'functionalist view of international co-operation and peace'. Economic interdependencies, from this point of view would force the region's countries to set aside their political and ideological rivalries.

The USA Secretary of State outlined the thinking behind initiating the multilateral talks in his opening remarks to the organisational meeting in Moscow in January 1992. He said:

It is for these reasons that we have come together - to address those issues that are common to the region and that do not necessarily respect national boundaries or geographic boundaries. These issues can be best addressed by the concerted efforts of the regional parties together with the support of the international community and the resources and expertise that it can provide ...What we are embarking upon here in Moscow is in no way a substitute for what we are trying to promote in the bilateral negotiations. Only the bilateral talks can address and one day resolve the basic issues of territory, security and peace which the parties have identified as the core elements of a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours." But it is true that these bilateral negotiations do not take place in a vacuum, and that the condition of the region at large will affect them. In short, the multilateral talks are intended as a complement to the bilateral negotiations: each can and will buttress the other.¹³⁴

¹³³ Peters, J., *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks*, 1996, p. 5.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Structure of the Multilateral Talks

In the coming section I will briefly shed some light on the structure of the multilateral talks and the main issues under consideration. When the opening session of the multilateral talks was held in Moscow at the end of January 1992, invitation were issued by the co-sponsors of the peace process, to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, the European Community, Turkey, Canada, a representative of the EFTA countries, Japan and China.

The multilateral negotiations were conducted through two groups. The Steering Group was the main committee which co-ordinate the work of the other committees. The primary role of the Steering Group was to oversee the activities of the working groups and to effect any changes in the structure, composition and operating procedures of the whole multilateral track. There were five working groups; on water resources, environment, refugees, arms control and regional security, and regional economic development. Each of the five groups has met for seven rounds of talks since the convening of the opening meeting in Moscow.¹³⁵

The multilateral talks have been the hidden dimension of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the multilateral talks do not carry the same immediacy and importance as the questions at the heart of the bilaterals, they have nonetheless and contrary to all expectations,

Performed a valuable role in the peace process and in fostering the conditions for future co-operative arrangements in the Middle East.¹³⁶

According to Joel Peters, they have provided a unique forum for low-risk communication and exchanges between Israel and the Arabs. It is important to notice

¹³⁵ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 98.

¹³⁶ Peters, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 106.

that participation in these talks and the inter-sessional workshops has afforded the parties an opportunity to evaluate the feasibility of future co-operative arrangements and generate ideas for creative solutions. The talks also allowed Israel and the Arab states to acquire new sources of information, which may change positively their perceptions and attitudes. They have helped them to rethink their old assumptions, reduce their fear of risk and uncertainty. Furthermore to explore possibilities for joint problem-solving. They have presented an opportunity for each side to gain an insight into the goals and intentions, the perceptions and anxieties, the flexibility and limits of the other.¹³⁷ The multilaterals have also provided a mechanism for the development of bilateral relations between the Israeli government and its Arab counterparts.¹³⁸ It is the multilaterals, which have allowed the Gulf States, most notably Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, and the North African states of Tunisia and Morocco, to become engaged in the peace process.

As Joel Peters observed, "the multilateral track has allowed the parties to attend to long term issues, which need to be addressed if and when a settlement is reached."¹³⁹ The Syrian and Lebanese position towards the multilaterals was justified as it put the cart before the horse. If the multilaterals were to continue, creating a process of normalisation and co-operation in all fields, Israel would have less interest in making territorial concessions and reaching bilateral agreements with Syria and Lebanon. Even if the multilateral talks did not produce quick results; they have still achieved an important objective of the American-led New World Order that seeks to bring Israel and its neighbours together with other countries in a negotiation process that could lead slowly to a kind of normalisation and integrate Israel in the Middle East.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 64.

¹³⁸ Ibid., p. 64.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 66.

The mixed results of the multilaterals can be explained in terms of the New World Order. On the one hand, the subjects of discussion, the range of participation and the approach taken to collective problem-solving all indicated that the majority of states recognised the need and opportunities for a new approach to regional conflicts which would include dialogue and co-operation in a wide-range of areas. The fact that the USA and the Soviet Union were co-operating in this instance removed many of the ideological and pragmatic obstacles that had prevented states –previously clients of one or other superpower– from doing this. On the other hand, the refusal of Syria and Lebanon to participate indicated that the process of transformation from Old to New World Orders was not yet complete. In their view, Israel's behaviour must first be brought in line with the moral and legal principles of the New World Order, before all states could collectively benefit from the new order. If only some states were subject to those principles, the order would have no credibility and would simply be a vehicle for the subordination of weaker states by stronger states. National interests still dominated the policies of all states, and their main concern remained how to advance those interests in the face of altered regional and international balances of power.

Conclusion

In the New World Order the USA enjoyed a hegemonic position. Following the end of the Cold War and the second Gulf War, the USA used its unique position to advance its own interests. The main interest for the USA in the region was a peaceful stable Middle East in which Israel could be protected and oil supplies could flow to the Western hemisphere with reasonable prices. For the USA, the new international and regional circumstances opened a window of opportunity especially in getting peace and recognition for the state of Israel. The new American policy in the Middle East to

achieve the main objectives took a form of fulfilling promises made to the Arabs during the 1991 war against Iraq.

The United States promised its allied Arab countries to try and find a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict. To fulfil this promise the Bush administration chose to convene a peace conference in which all the parties would meet and discuss issues of dispute.

The World's only remaining superpower could rub its hands together in satisfaction at the prospect of the ending of a prolonged international conflict, to the resolution of which it had contributed so much in terms of money, manpower and diplomacy.¹⁴⁰

This was facilitated by the new USA-USSR relationship. The willingness of the USSR to co-operate in pushing towards peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was –to some extent– a new phenomenon that reflected the reality of the New World Order. The recognition by the regional actors of the new international circumstances contributed to the possibility of convening the peace conference. One of these new circumstances was the new role for the USSR. The other was the absence of alternatives for the regional actors as a direct result of the American hegemony, particularly in the Middle East.

The United States hegemonic role allowed her to bring about the parties' agreement to attend the peace conference in Madrid. It was able to shape the conference without being worried about any Soviet role. The USA was also able to shape the conference in a way that could met Arab demands that it should be international and Israeli demands that it should be simply ceremonial with the presence of all Arab countries and the Palestinians. The way in which the conference operated and the venue of the negotiations confirmed America's total influence over the peace process. The bilateral negotiations were tailored to Israel's demand while the multilateral

¹⁴⁰ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 123.

negotiations became a de-facto recognition of Israel and another track to advance other American interests (regional stability and co-operation). The USA did not play a role of mediator but of facilitator and thus did not exert any significant pressure –especially on Israel- to reach an agreement.

The USA enjoying its new hegemonic role in the self-claimed New World Order was able to achieve at least some of its goals. It cemented its role in the region, as the USA was recognised by almost all the regional actors as the main player. The USA succeeded also in getting the Arabs talking to Israel with no real Israeli concession. By getting the sides talking directly to each other for the first time, they effectively reduced the potential for regional instability, which is an American interest.

While the Madrid peace conference succeeded in bringing the parties together around the negotiation table, it did not succeed in achieving a real peace. This failure to produce peace agreements can be attributed to the fact that the USA would not use its hegemonic role to apply pressure on Israel to make concessions needed for the peace process and conference to succeed. Israel itself was not prepared to make real concessions particularly concerning relinquishing Arab lands occupied in 1967. The main reason could be the whole structure of the peace process, as the United States and Israel saw their own interests not in creating the conditions for peace.

The lack of progress within Madrid peace process led Israel and the PLO to conclude an agreement through secret channel in Norway. The Oslo peace process that started late 1992 and still continue will be the subject of my next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE OSLO PEACE PROCESS

The Oslo Accords were predicated on an "amnesiac, unthinkable abandonment" of the tragedy of Palestinian history, "not a sentiment I can share or easily forgive." Oslo is a "skewed and unworkable" agreement, which does not offer adequate redress for Palestinian suffering.¹

(Edward Said)

Introduction

In the New World Order and since the Madrid peace conference of 1991, Arab-Israeli relations have seemed for many commentators to be heading towards reconciliation and peace. Although the process has faced many setbacks and has at times seemed to have faltered, important progress has been made. It can be argued that the Declaration of Principles, signed in Washington on September 1993 by the PLO and Israel, (also known as the Oslo Agreement) was simply another stage in a process begun in Madrid but one which moved to another 'location' for functional reasons.²

The reasons that drove Israel and the PLO to engage in secret talks in Oslo were not totally different from those that took them to the Madrid peace conference. The changes on both international and regional levels with all their dire consequences were the main vehicle behind the need to reach a peaceful settlement between Israel and the

¹ Michael, A., "A Different Voice," *Jerusalem Post*, 29/3/1999.

² Indeed Madrid and not Oslo seems to be the starting point of the peace process as far as the PLO leader Yasser Arafat is concerned. Arafat said in a meeting with Israeli Journalists in Ramallah that "while at Wye the Palestinians again accepted and approved the principle of reciprocity, "let's not forget –in Madrid we agreed to reciprocity: land for peace. Shamir went to Madrid on this principle."

Palestinians. Yossi Beilin, the Israeli deputy Foreign Minister at the time stated that: "We consider that part of the 'New World Order' proclaimed by president Bush should also be a new regional order".³

The Oslo Agreement was seen at the time of its signing to be a real breakthrough. Indeed, it paved the way for further progress, as the Cairo agreement in February 1994; Taba agreement in September 1995 (Oslo II); the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement in October 1994; the Hebron protocol in January 1997 and the Wye River agreement in December 1998 followed it.

In this chapter I will discuss the Oslo agreement, not as an isolated accord but as part of the much wider peace process initiated in Madrid. First, I will explore the background to the Oslo secret channel, explaining why this represented a development out of Madrid rather than an alternative to it. In this context I will examine the dynamics which led the Israeli government and the PLO to explore a new opportunity for dialogue presented by the Norwegian government. I shall also discuss how preparatory contacts were made, by whom and how. I will assess how this demonstrated the developing New World Order.

Secondly, I will examine the negotiation process itself in Norway from its start in January 1993 to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. At each stage of the negotiations various issues were raised and dealt with by the parties. Through an examination of these developments we can identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved and how their positions were shaped by dynamics beyond the process of the talks themselves.

Third, I will analyse the text of the Declaration of Principles itself to see how it reflected the strength or weakness of the respective parties. After summarising the

³ Beilin, Y., *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), p. 40.

technical contents of the agreement, I will turn to the deficiencies of the agreement, demonstrating how it served Israeli interests within a context that both sides knew to be acceptable to the United States. Palestinian interests were barely served, although the PLO itself was to gain, but with no allies and without the likelihood that the USA would intervene to adjust the agreement in its favour. The Palestinians had little choice but to accept what was the lesser of two evils and preferable to a Madrid-based agreement signed by a non-PLO delegation. In doing so I will discuss the main reasons behind the 'success' of the Oslo secret channel in achieving a breakthrough and the justification for the two parties (the Israeli Labour government and the PLO leadership) in concluding the agreement. Once the first agreement was signed, and indeed even in its signing, the United States was to become very heavily involved in the Oslo peace process.

The fourth section will examine the other subsequent agreements that are seen as part of, and a continuation of, the Oslo process including the Cairo, Taba (Oslo II), Hebron and the Wye River agreements. The main task of the chapter will be to examine the role and nature of USA involvement in pursuing the Oslo peace process. In the first stage of Oslo I negotiations, America's role had been marginal. There is evidence that it was consulted and informed of the process but that it was not directly involved itself. However, the parties' decisions and positions were continually informed by the dynamics of the American-designed and dominated New World Order. During these later stages, however, American involvement was very direct. The continuation and conclusion of the Oslo peace process fitted neatly into American interests in the Middle East, into its vision of how regional conflicts should be resolved, and into its understanding of its own role in such resolutions.

The chapter will conclude by drawing together the evidence that the Oslo agreements and the peace process, which has emerged from them, have been shaped by the American-led New World Order. At times this has been through direct American

involvement and at other times through indirect acknowledgement by regional parties of the nature of the New World Order.

Background to the Secret Channel

Information about the background to the secret channel can be found in many sources. Some of the most important to mention are Shimon Peres's *The New Middle East*, Jane Corbin's *Gaza First, the Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO*, John King's *Handshake in Washington, The Beginning of Middle East Peace?* Mahmoud Abbas's *Through Secret Channels, The Road to Oslo*, Uri Savir's *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, David Makovsky's *Making Peace with the PLO: the Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* and Yossi Beilin's *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*.⁴

All of these sources have agreed that the Oslo process did not start in Oslo but before that. It was true that there had been some contacts between Palestinians and

⁴ See 1- Peres, S., *The New Middle East*, (Shaftesbury: Element, 1993) 2- King, J., *Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace*, (Reading: Ithaca, 1994) 3- Corbin, J., *Gaza First: the Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO*, (London: Bloomsbury, 1994) 4- Abbas, M., *Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel*, (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd, 1995) 5- Savir, U., *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, (New York: Random House, 1998) 6- Makovsky, D., *Making Peace with the PLO*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996) 7- Beilin, Y., *Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999).

Israelis during previous years, especially between scholars and academics.⁵ However those contacts had not been official and did not have any approval from the decision making institutions in Israel, despite the fact that they served a purpose in exploring ideas and preparing studies, and probably broke some psychological barriers to allow future official contacts.⁶ The PLO leader Yasser Arafat said in an interview with Israeli Television in Washington on the 13th of September 1993: “we must understand that this has come after long efforts. Do not forget the 22 months of negotiations, the many secret contacts. The Norwegian channel was not the only one. There have been many channels.”⁷ Also the Oslo secret talks channel was not planned only on an academic level but on a political level as well. According to some analysts, it was initiated by Yossi Beilin, a prominent member of the Israeli Labour Party in the early 1990s who was later appointed as Israel’s deputy Foreign Minister by Shimon Peres following the 1992 Israeli elections. For others it began with a Norwegian initiative started by Thorvald Stoltenberg, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, and his deputy Jan Egland at around the same time to build bridges between Israel and the PLO. They provided the material support to a study by a Norwegian academic called Terje Larsen and his wife Mona Juul, in the Occupied Territories. This was to be an important factor in helping Norway to construct a team designed to bring the conflicting parties together.⁸

On one of his visits to Israel in order to complete his study, Larsen met Yossi Beilin. They agreed on a mutual understanding of the existence of an historical opportunity to establish peace in the Middle East, following the international and

⁵ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 18.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/10, 15 /9/ 1993.

⁸ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 105.

regional changes at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. Beilin and Larsen are both academics with specialism in international politics. Both were familiar with the changes, which were happening in the international balance of power, and the opportunities created by that change (the New World Order) for resolving regional conflicts. Yossi Beilin was known for his writings regarding previously missed opportunities and was an advocate for not missing any new opportunity to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁹ Once he wrote,

I would like to talk about missing opportunities, the subject I love most. I think that one of the reasons why opportunities were missed is that people believed that time was on their side. You need the process, and the process is long, and time is there and you can do something today, something else tomorrow, then something else next week, and eventually something will happen.”¹⁰

For him, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a New World Order had opened the door for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.¹¹

Terje Larsen was a Norwegian social scientist who headed FAFO; a major European peace research institute that was conducting a study of Palestinian living conditions in the Occupied Territories. Larsen and Juul visited the region frequently and had good relations with Palestinian leaders, PLO officials and their own Norwegian government. In particular they were friends with Johan Jorgen Holst, the Norwegian Foreign Minister who was later to supervise the Oslo negotiation process. On one of his visits to Israel, Larsen had offered, with the approval of his government, to act as a

⁹ Beilin, Y., *Israel: A Concise Political History*, (London: Weidenfeld, 1992), pp. 109-127.

¹⁰ Beilin, Y., “The Opportunity that was not Missed,” in B. Rubin., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973-1993*, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1994, p. 23.

¹¹ Ibid.

facilitator in establishing a secret channel between Israelis and Palestinians.¹²

In his meeting with Larsen in April 1992 Beilin presented his wishes to explore ways to advance the peace process, in case the Labour party won the elections in June 1992. Larsen responded by proposing that Norway might use its good relations with the PLO to arrange secret contacts (a second track) which might be a sideshow to the Washington talks. Beilin's response was enthusiastic to benefit from this academic who had strong links with the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Ministry. As a start, Larsen proposed establishing bridges with local Palestinian personalities and he started by arranging a meeting between Beilin and Faisal Husseini to discuss the possibility of establishing a second track and the Palestinian contribution in supporting the Labour party in the elections. The two also agreed, at a later meeting in September 1992, to set up informal talks between Israeli professors and PLO officials. On the Israeli side, the Israeli academic, Yair Hirschfeld, who had already established relations with Palestinian political and business figures, was the one selected to start the process. He was chosen because he had close relations with members of the local Palestinian leadership on one hand and members of the Israeli Labour party, especially Yossi Beilin, on the other. It was made clear that he would be acting as an individual in the talks and would have no official status in these contacts.¹³

On the Palestinian side, one of the first to be introduced to the process was Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala), the director of Samed (the PLO investment fund). As such, Abu Ala was the second one in the PLO after Arafat to know about the deteriorating financial situation of the organisation. He had also been a member of the negotiations follow-up committee in Madrid and a supervisor for the Palestinian team to the

¹² Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.* See also Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 105.

¹³ Beilin, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 64.

multilateral talks. In February 1992 he was sent to the Norwegian capital, Oslo, to discuss the possibility of financial assistance from the Norwegian government. While there he met Jan Egeland and Terje Larsen. Larsen told him of his survey research in the Occupied Territories, and expressed his wish to develop links between the two parties. Abu Ala urged him to persuade the Israelis, and he assured him that he would support these efforts and encourage other PLO leaders to also do so.¹⁴

The process was given a major boost by the Israeli elections in June 1992, in which the Israeli Labour Party was elected to power promising that new and more committed efforts would be made to secure peace with the Arabs.¹⁵ Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister and appointed Shimon Peres as his Foreign Minister. Peres for his part appointed Beilin as his own deputy. Rabin, Peres and Beilin believed that Israel should respond to the changes both in the world Order and regional order. They were convinced that the New World Order would create new realities that could help achieve peace if the parties understand them and act accordingly.

The Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, ordered Jan Egeland and Mona Juul to visit Israel. Terje Larsen, still in contact with Beilin, was already in Israel. The new Israeli Prime Minister had run his election campaign on the basis of a pledge to get the peace process moving forward.¹⁶ Rabin pledged that he would cease all non-strategic

¹⁴ PASSIA (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs)., *Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution in the Middle East*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), p.20.

¹⁵ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1417/ A/ 1, 26/9/1992.

¹⁶ Nonneman, G., "The Arab-Israeli Dimension: Background Assessment", in G. Nonneman (ed.), *The Middle East and Europe: The Search for Stability and Integration*, (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1993), pp. 113-118.

settlement activity and would move quickly on Palestinian autonomy. In fact, before the elections, Rabin had promised a deal with the Palestinians on autonomy within six months to a year.¹⁷

Rabin made several goodwill gestures. He freed more than 800 political prisoners, halted most settlement activity, barred private Israeli building permits in the occupied territories, and reiterated the Labour party position of land for peace. Rabin accepted Diaspora Palestinians at the multilateral talks and said that he would seek repeal of the ban on contacts with the PLO.¹⁸

The political changes in Israel in the 1992 elections persuaded one of the most important PLO leaders, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to think that there was an opportunity to be seized. Abu Mazen had been known for a long time for his moderation. His appeal to the Palestinian National Council in 1977, to allow contacts with the "enemy" and his success in obtaining that resolution which allowed *the contacts with the democratic forces in Israel* was an example.¹⁹ When the Labour party won the elections in June 1992, Abu Mazen observed Rabin's desire to negotiate some form of Palestinian autonomy. He noticed that Rabin distinguished between a political

¹⁷ Sela, A., *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order*, (New York: State University of New York, 1998), p. 337.

¹⁸ Bickerton I and Klausner, C., *A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 1998), p. 259.

¹⁹ In its session held in March 1977 the PNC took a decision emphasising the importance of establishing relations with democratic and progressive Jewish factions which were struggling within and outside Israel against the letter and spirit of Zionism. This decision was reaffirmed at the fifteenth session, 9 to 11 April 1981, the Sixteenth, 14 to 22 November 1983, the eighteenth, 20 to 25 April 1987 and the Nineteenth, 12 to 15 November 1988, (Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 14).

and a security settlement, that he didn't call the West Bank Judea and Samaria as the Likud party did, and that any PLO approach would not automatically be refused as in the past. For him these were optimistic indications.

In sum the Israeli elections in the summer of 1992 had provided a unique opportunity for advancement in the Arab-Israeli peace process, with both the Palestinians and the Israelis seeing the new Israeli government as offering a unique opportunity to move the peace process forward. The previous many months of negotiations under the Madrid framework and with a Likud Government had brought no substantive progress, and now with the election of a new government and the possibility of a new framework for negotiations, there were hopes for a genuine breakthrough.

Following the elections, Shimon Peres, through his new deputy, Yossi Beilin, started indirect monitoring of contacts between the Israeli academics and Palestinian officials with Norwegian go-betweens. In September 1992 he had met with the Norwegian delegation (Egeland, Larsen and Juul) and presented to them Yair Hirschfeld. However, he was unable to agree to a Norwegian proposal to meet with a PLO official himself since the Israeli law still forbids such official contacts. He did, however, meet with Faisal Husseini, whom he considered to be one of the new moderate leadership compared to the PLO leadership in Tunis.²⁰

On the Israeli official level, Rabin kept Eliakim Rubinstein as chief of the Israeli negotiation team in Washington and continued with the Madrid peace process. However, since there seemed no prospect of an imminent breakthrough there, and since Rabin had promised in the election an agreement within six months, an alternative strategy was pursued. Peres tried to bring the Palestinian negotiating team from Washington together with the Israeli academics, Hirschfeld and Pundak. Hirschfeld and Pundak met Palestinian local leaders (Faisal Husseini, Hannan Ashrawi, Ziad Abu Ziad

²⁰ Savir, (1998), Op. Cit.

and Sari Nuseibeh), and prepared for the two direct secret meetings between Peres and Hussein in December 1992 and January 1993.²¹ The clear message delivered by Ashrawi and Hussein in Washington, however, was that they –as the official team in Washington- could not deliver a peace agreement without the PLO and that the PLO must be part of any negotiations either directly or indirectly. Hannan Ashrawi in her book, This Side of Peace wrote that in a conversation with Dennis Ross she told him that “you were the first to be asked to set up a back channel. I personally asked Ed and you several times on behalf of the chairman to host or participate in serious and discreet trilateral talks, but you refused. Without the PLO, nothing can happen. We know it and you know it.”²² It seems clear that both the PLO leadership and the local Palestinian leadership within the Occupied Territories wanted the United States to be involved in their negotiations with the Israelis. This conversation between Ashrawi and Dennis Ross shows that the Palestinians recognised how vital the USA was to achieving any deal with Israel. Their awareness of their weakness compared to the strength of the Israeli position made them feel that only the USA, if it wanted to, could put some pressure on or persuade Israel to take the Palestinians seriously and negotiate with them a peaceful and fair deal. As Israel’s patron in the patron-client state relationship, the United States, especially with its new status as the only remaining superpower trying to establish the rules of a New World Order can influence Israel to compromise and reach a deal with the Palestinians.

Although there was no doubt that there were differences between the PLO leadership and the personalities of the inside delegation, which confirm the theory of

²¹ Beilin, (1999), Op.Cit.

²² Ashrawi, H., *This Side of Peace: A Personal Account*, (London: Simon and Schuster Ltd, 1996), p. 250.

Arafat that an alternative leadership to his was being cultivated, the fact remained that the latter were taking their orders from the outside leadership and reporting to it.²³ [This became much clearer with the fact that, since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the members of the Washington delegation were given high posts in the new administration. Examples for this are Hannan Ashrawi, Saeb Erekat and Nabil Shaath].

Since the official Israeli position was that the government could have no contact or negotiations with the 'terrorist' organisation PLO the Israelis decided to pursue this channel through the unofficial academic group.²⁴

According to Abu Mazen, the next stage was when Abu Ala was asked by Faisal Husseini, Hannan Ashrawi and Afif Safieh during a meeting of the multilateral negotiations leadership committee held in London on 3 December 1992 to meet Yair Hirschfeld.²⁵ At this point, Hannan Ashrawi and Yossi Beilin were the co-ordinators of the strategy. Hannan Ashrawi pointed out that later she was to be blamed and held responsible for Oslo.²⁶ Pundak pointed out that at this meeting that took place in the Cavendish hotel, Hirschfeld tried to give the impression that the meeting was unofficial, and that he was speaking as an academic who was not committed to anything and had

²³ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 67.

²⁴ Savir, (1998), Op. Cit.

²⁵ Abbas, M., *Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo: Senior PLO Leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel*, (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995), p. 112.

²⁶ Akram Haniyyeh told Hanan Ashrawi "You are the one responsible," "It was the channel you had set up between Ya'ir Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik on the one hand and Abu Ala on the other." See Ashrawi., (1995), Op. Cit., p. 260.

no authority to speak for the Israeli government.²⁷ He claimed to be exploiting a twilight zone in the Israeli law, which left the possibility for journalists and academics to meet PLO officials open.

A second meeting took place later in the same day. Pundak took its result to Beilin. Although neither Abu Mazen nor Savir in their respective books explained what exactly happened in that meeting, it is clear that it was about exploring the possibility to set up a secret channel between Israel and the PLO in Oslo.²⁸

The reason for the subsequent negotiations to be started in Oslo was the role played by Terje Larsen. The Israeli academics knew that in order to continue their meetings with Abu Ala they needed a facilitator, and the Norwegians were fit for this duty while FAFO would be able to assist the secret channel financially.²⁹ Meanwhile, on 20th January 1993, the Israeli Knesset issued a law abolishing the ban on contacts with PLO. The timing of this step seemed to facilitate any possible contacts between any Israeli officials and the PLO leadership.

The engine for altering this law was principally Yossi Beilin. He wrote that:

The decision to open the track and try to reach an understanding with the PLO was indeed mine and it wasn't an easy decision, since I had to take on myself the responsibility of initiating important processes without authorisation from my superiors.³⁰

The fact that Beilin was behind both the altering of the mentioned law and the secret channel compounded with his position in the Labour party and strong relation

²⁷ Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 115.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, See also Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.*

²⁹ Pundak, R., "First and Second Track Diplomacy: From Madrid to Oslo", in PASSIA Seminar(1997), *Op. Cit.*, pp.76-80.

³⁰ Beilin, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 163.

with Shimon Peres made it clear that the Labour government had the existing contacts with the PLO in mind when it presented the new law to the Knesset. According to David Makovsky, shortly after Rabin's victory in the Israeli election, Peres called upon Rabin (at Beilin's behest) to implement the Labour party decision and have the Knesset reverse its six-year-old ban on private Israeli contacts with the PLO. Rabin was concerned about the timing, given the upcoming USA elections. When Bush lost the election in November 1992, Rabin no longer worried about the ramifications of repealing the ban, and on December 1 the Knesset gave preliminary approval to do so. It is important to point out here that this showed the difference of one party (in this case Israel) to American interests and needs. Israel now clearly acknowledging that USA's domestic and external interests are leading the whole process. Hirschfeld was following the progress of the Knesset bill closely and deliberately asked the Norwegians to schedule the first Oslo session for January 20, the day after it was to become law.³¹

A paper written by Abu Ala on regional development and regional economic co-operation in the Middle East had impressed Beilin and others in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³² Recognising that contacts had already been made at the unofficial level with Abu Ala, and given that Rabin had rejected a possible alternative secret channel proposed by Abu Mazen which would have gone through Egypt, he made a strong effort in the Knesset to get rid of the law which prohibited contact with PLO members.³³ Clearly, expanding the channel of talks between the Israeli academics and the PLO via Norwegian assistance was the best option for an alternative to the stalled Washington

³¹ Makovsky, D., *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord*, (London: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 19-20.

³² Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit.

³³ PASSIA, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 79.

talks.

In Tunis, Abu Ala informed Abu Mazen of his contact with Hirschfeld and the latter's relations with Beilin. He also informed him of the Norwegian connection and the fact that the USA did not seem to have any problem in accepting Norway's go-between role because of its small size and its neutrality.³⁴ It is important to note that, contrary to many perceptions about the Oslo process, the Americans were clearly being consulted at this early stage and their preferences were being taken into account in the deliberations of both Israelis and Palestinians.³⁵

Two weeks later, Larsen went to Tunis. He met Abu Ala and other Palestinian officials. Abu Ala asked about the possibility of a Norwegian role in further facilitating the contacts with the Israelis. He was concerned about Hirschfeld, and he wanted to know more about him. Larsen told him that Hirschfeld was Beilin's man. After meeting Arafat, who reiterated the Palestinian wish that Norway should continue to play the role of go-between, Larsen became more convinced that the PLO had the most crucial influence on the Palestinian people, and that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to reach a solution without its participation. He also clearly admired Abu Ala, whom he considered to be very moderate, compared to the old-style leaders in the PLO.³⁶

Arafat for his part had been informed by Abu Mazen and consulted regarding Abu Ala's meetings in London in December 1992. Abu Mazen had advised Arafat that

³⁴ Ibid., p. 77.

³⁵ Nofel, M., *Qissat Itfaq Oslo. (The Story of Oslo Agreement)* (Amman: Al-Ahliyah, 1995). See also, Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 133, 136 and 185, and Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., pp. 62-88.

³⁶ Corbin, J., *Gaza First, The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the PLO*, (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 35.

this opportunity must not be missed. Arafat agreed that Abu Ala should attend more talks in Oslo and had thus made his request of Larsen.³⁷

On the Israeli side, Beilin was now making it clear that Hirschfeld was authorised by him to negotiate, but he still emphasised the right of total denial in case of any leak of news about the secret meetings and a secret channel running parallel to the Madrid framework.³⁸

To provide cover for the secret channel, Larsen's institution, the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science (FAFO), paid the salaries of Hirschfeld and Pundak in order that they could distance themselves from any allegations that they were working for the Israeli government, and to give the meetings an academic nature, on the basis that the participants were academics who participated in the survey research on the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Stoltenberg, informed the Prime Minister who agreed. Egeland informed Dan Kurtzer from the American State department, that Norway was establishing links between the PLO and Israel. Again, it is clear that the American perspective and reaction was being considered before the negotiations had even really begun in Oslo and that they were kept fully informed of procedures and progress.³⁹

The decision that the actual negotiations should take place in Oslo was the result of a Norwegian initiative. According to Abu Mazen "It was not a Palestinian choice nor an Israeli choice...It was a Norwegian initiative that was directed initially at the Israeli side, which accepted it in principle."⁴⁰ Norway was considered to have good relations

³⁷ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit.

³⁸ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 68.

³⁹ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 133, 136, 185, See also Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 88.

⁴⁰ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 103.

with both Israel and the PLO, was officially non-alignment with either of the two parties, and had expressed its willingness not to intervene in the negotiations but merely to facilitate them.⁴¹ Importantly, the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark) did not arouse American sensibilities, because of their minimal political ambitions and their limited political influence.⁴²

Again we can see that American considerations were being worked into the equations of the negotiations. In his book entitled 'Qissat Itfaq Oslo' (the Story of the Oslo Agreement) Mamdouh Nofel said that Yasser Abed Rabbo confirmed to the author that Warren Christopher was aware of preparations for the secret channel and was personally following its progress. However, American knowledge was restricted to Kurtzer, Christopher and Clinton themselves and other officials of the state department were not informed. It was understood that the PLO and Israeli teams had agreed in the presence of Terje Larsen that the negotiations should not be an alternative to Washington. Rather, any agreement reached in Oslo would be presented as an American proposal to the Washington talks after the sides had agreed on the scenario for the presentation of such 'proposals'. It was further agreed that the Norwegians would take responsibility for keeping the Americans updated on the negotiations at every stage, including the atmosphere, any results and any possibilities.⁴³

⁴¹ According to Terje Larsen, Norway is a completely non-biased player in the process. While America, being both an 'honest broker' and also having an interest-stake in the region and in the process, is per se another player. You need both kinds of third parties, they have complementary roles. (Middle East Insight, November 1998, p .32.)

⁴² Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 113.

⁴³ Nofel, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 56.

Implications of Clinton's Election on the Oslo Process

The background to the Oslo process can not be understood fully without mentioning the 1992 USA's presidential elections. As I mentioned in Chapter Four, the American elections in the fall of that year, brought a new Democratic administration under the presidency of the Democrat candidate, Bill Clinton, replacing the Republican administration of George Bush. The defeat of George Bush and the victory of Bill Clinton in the election had, as it became evident, great implications on the Middle East peace process. The contribution by the Jewish community towards winning the election also played a major role in Clinton's support to Israel.⁴⁴ Clinton's commitment towards Israel was not only a traditional pursuant of normal American policy towards the Jewish State but a real commitment that stems from ideological and moral basis.

Clinton's affection for the Jewish state was perhaps best expressed in an interview recorded by the New York Times the day before the Israeli-PLO agreement was signed in Washington: "The only time I went to Israel was with my pastor, who told me after I got back that he thought one day I would be president. ... And he said 'Just remember, God will never forgive you if you turn your back on Israel'".⁴⁵

As Donald Neff pointed out, "Clinton's problem, as usual for American presidents in the past half-century, is the enormous clout of Israel's supporters in USA domestic politics." However, the existence of a left-wing government in Israel makes it much easier for Clinton to pursue his Middle East policies concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Clinton administration was aware of

⁴⁴ Neff, D., "Has Clinton the strength or the will to save Oslo?" *Middle East International*, no. 548, 18 April 1997, p. 3.

⁴⁵ Flamhaft, Z., *Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 98.

the Oslo secret negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government, but being informed does not mean that it was involved. It did mean however that the parties were negotiating a deal that needed to be acceptable to, and take account of the only superpower and the leader of the New World Order, the USA's interests.⁴⁶ The pro-Israel new administration and its Middle East team took policies that favoured the Israeli side and facilitated achieving its strategic aims and tactical approach. The degree of USA involvement in the negotiation process during its various stages reflected the new administration's willingness to serve the Israeli plans, as I will discuss in the rest of this chapter.

The establishment of the secret channel illustrated two features of the New World Order: firstly, the regional actors had recognised that their national interests now lay in dealing directly with one another, rather than through any international powers. For Israel, America's desire to limit its participation to one of procedure rather than substance provided the Jewish State with the opportunity to negotiate unconstrained by American requirements that it should seem even-handed. Israel was negotiating from a position of strength relative to the other (Palestinian) party even as the secret nature of the talks meant that it risked little should they fail. The Palestinians, meanwhile, conscious that Jewish pressures on the American administration meant that it would never be truly even-handed, had little to lose by negotiating directly, while the PLO had much to gain from Israeli de facto recognition. Clearly national self-interest determined that the two parties should participate while the diminishment of old patron-client relations enabled them to do so directly and without mediation. Secondly, just because the USA was not directly involved in the talks did not mean that it played no role. The parties all recognised that American support for and approval of the talks was vital. America itself saw no reason to get involved as long as the parties were talking –

⁴⁶ Nofel, (1995), Op. Cit.

it did not matter if Madrid was going nowhere as long as an alternative channel was making progress. As we shall see, the USA only intervened directly when such talks stalled and America's own interests (peace in the Middle East) were threatened. It is important, therefore, to recognise that the indirect nature of the American role did not mean that American interests were not ultimately guiding the process.

Secret Negotiations in Oslo

In his book entitled The New Middle East Shimon Peres wrote that the Oslo channel lasted eight months until the deal was reached on the morning of 18 August 1993.⁴⁷ Terje Larsen arranged the first meeting for what became known as the Oslo Secret Channel. Three teams -an Israeli, a Palestinian and a Norwegian- were invited to attend a FAFO Seminar in Oslo.

On 20 January 1993 the seminar was opened in a villa in Sarpsborg, 80 kilometres south of Oslo. It was the first time a PLO delegation had been sent by Arafat to meet Israelis to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Norwegians however did not intervene with mediation efforts or proposals, but played an important role as facilitators.⁴⁸

Participating in this first round, Hirschfeld and Pundak came from the Israeli side and Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour and Maher al-Kurd, from the Palestinian side. In their first meeting, Abu Ala and Hirschfeld agreed on the importance of focusing on reaching agreement on, as many issues as possible while postponing negotiations on those issues that were most controversial. When Abu Ala suggested that the peace process start with

⁴⁷ Peres, S., *The New Middle East*, (London: Element, 1993), p. 100.

⁴⁸ For more about Oslo Back-Channel, see S. Peres., *Battling for Peace*, (London: Orion Books, 1995), pp. 380-402.

an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, probably from Gaza first, Hirschfeld considered this early proposal as a real intention from Abu Ala to reach an agreement.⁴⁹ This was an important step. The idea of giving Gaza first had been proposed by Shimon Peres in 1980. The Palestinians had refused it then because they knew that the Israelis wanted to get rid of it. It represented for them a security nightmare and as fraught with social and economic problems, being a crowded portion of land characterised by violence.⁵⁰ Also the Palestinians had feared that it would become Gaza "first and last." The fact that the Palestinian team was now the side proposing this move, suggests that their own perception of their position had changed and that what had previously been an unacceptable condition was now considered a reasonable starting-point. The weakness of the Palestinian position was thus evident from the very start of the talks. Moreover, from the start Abu Ala was working to proposals which would have been unacceptable to the Palestinian delegation in Washington but which the PLO felt it could deliver on.

However, according to Abu Mazen, the first round of discussions dealt with many issues mostly in a superficial way without concentrating on specific topics. He has pointed out that there was no focus on, or any in-depth discussion of, any of the points raised and that the first session had become more of an introduction than negotiations. Thus at the end of the first round it was not the points raised that had to be analysed, but rather the atmosphere of the talks and the Israelis' opinion.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Savir, U., *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 60.

⁵⁰ For more information see: S. Roy., *Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development*, (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995).

⁵¹ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 119-127.

The two delegations returned to Tunis and Israel and informed their leaders of the results of the talks. Beilin informed Peres of the (Gaza first) proposal, as it had been re-suggested from the Palestinian team. According to Uri Savir, Peres had long been in favour of testing Palestinian autonomy in Gaza before extending it to the West Bank.⁵²

David Makovsky pointed out that in the very first round of talks,

Hirschfeld and Abu Ala agreed on three main ideas: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, gradual devolution of economic power to the Palestinians and a 'Marshall Plan' to the Palestinian entity. They also established the ground rules of no dwelling on past grievances, total secrecy, and re-tractability of all positions put forward in the talks.⁵³

The second round started on 11th of February 1993. The Palestinians presented a plan, based on terms of references and aims of negotiations which would lead to a final settlement, which would include gradual transfer of Palestinian jurisdiction, both territorial and in terms of competence over a transitional period, a 'Marshall plan' for Gaza, and an indication as to Jerusalem's future. Hirschfeld brought an Israeli counter-proposal, which included a declaration of principles from the Israeli view, including the Gaza first option and ideas about economic co-operation, a gradual transfer of authority, and the building of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure. From the Israeli perspective, the offer to allow the building of Palestinian infrastructure after decades of deliberately undermining Palestinian efforts to do so, was a significant concession and one that was designed to indicate a willingness to move towards some form of Palestinian autonomy.⁵⁴

⁵² Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 6.

⁵³ Makovsky, D., *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord*, (Boulder: Westview Press. 1996), p. 23.

⁵⁴ Corbin, J., *Gaza First, The Secret Norway Channel to Peace Between Israel and the*

This round concentrated on basic issues such as a declaration of principles (in which reference to UN Resolutions was a controversial point), a Palestinian Council, Jerusalem, territorial jurisdiction, withdrawal from Gaza, and economic development. Significantly "The features of the main articles of the declaration of principles began to emerge, and the way was now open for the drafting of one or more drafts for the declaration."⁵⁵

February's meeting ended with a joint paper of principles, written by the Israelis. There was a determination from Beilin that only the Israelis should actually put the words on paper. This was a pattern that was to be repeated during subsequent negotiations and which placed the Palestinians in the position of either accepting or rejecting what were essentially Israeli proposals. The Palestinians were denied the flexibility that would come from contributing to the formulation of texts. This became particularly important in later negotiations when the Israelis brought in legal advisors. Pundak therefore typed the paper, and the two teams returned with their copies of the document to Tunisia and Israel. Peres felt that the paper, (the so-called Sarpsborg Document) was an indication of the PLO's willingness to make concessions to reach an agreement.⁵⁶

For the Palestinian leadership, the first round of negotiations in Sarpsborg was not important because of the points raised but because of the atmosphere of the talks and the Israelis' opinions. After careful study of the minutes of the meeting they arrived at two important conclusions. The first was that Pundak and Hirschfeld were indeed not far removed from the Foreign Ministry and were not just academic researchers. The

PLO, (London: Bloomsbury, 1994), p. 60.

⁵⁵ Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 132.

⁵⁶ Beilin, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 74.

second was that Knesset member Yossi Beilin was really backing them. According to Abu Mazen the analysis of the minutes indicates that Israeli 'red lines' had hardly been defined, a fact which would "enable our team in the coming rounds to raise all the subjects we considered necessary for a framework of a Declaration of Principles".⁵⁷

The third round was held on the 20th of March 1993.⁵⁸ Although the Declaration of Principles was redrafted, and both leaderships were consulted, the Palestinian side started questioning the extent of the officiality of the Israeli representative, and the reason behind the unwillingness of the Israeli government to send officials to be present in the negotiations. The explanation for this could only be that the Israelis still wanted the negotiations to be secret and unofficial in order to be able to abandon and deny them if they did not achieve what the Israelis wanted them to achieve, or to upgrade and recognise them if they succeeded in reaching a good deal. This strategy increased the pressure on the PLO to make significant compromises early on in order to achieve the official recognition of the PLO participation in negotiations with Israel that Arafat was seeking.

This round ended with a review of the document that had been prepared as a draft Declaration of Principles. Yair Hirschfeld confirmed that he would take the document back to Israel. More importantly, it was mentioned that the document had already been studied in detail by American Under-secretary of State Dan Kurtzer, who was in telephone contact with the American Embassy in Norway over American views of the document. It was further agreed that a final draft should be taken by a Norwegian official to Washington the following Tuesday.⁵⁹ Clearly, both sides were keen that any

⁵⁷ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 118.

⁵⁸ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 76.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 134.

agreement reached should have the support of the Americans. For the Israelis this represented a guarantee that their own interests would be protected, for the Palestinians it meant that American weight would be given to enforce implementation of any agreement.

On 30 April and 1st of May 1993, the fourth round of the secret negotiations was held in Helmenkollen in Oslo. Here it was proposed that Jericho should be added to Gaza as an autonomous area in the first stage. This encouraged the Palestinians to continue with the Oslo channel, allaying Palestinian fears that 'Gaza first' would end up as 'Gaza first and last'. At this meeting of the secret channel, however, Abu Ala insisted on the upgrading of the Israeli representation to counter the fears associated with Israel's continued insistence on secrecy. At the end of this fourth round Abu Ala informed Hirschfeld that the PLO had agreed to "exclude Jerusalem from interim self-rule" and also to "finesse the issue of whether Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem could both stand as candidates and vote in elections." Abu Ala asked for the upgrading of the Israeli presentation or he would end the talks in Oslo.⁶⁰

Round five was held on 8 May, at the Norwegian government's guesthouse near the royal palace.⁶¹ This round produced a draft Declaration of Principles based on the discussion of the first four rounds. According to Abu Mazen, the language employed by the Israelis suggested that they still lacked confidence in this channel, had not yet endorsed it and that it was still under scrutiny.⁶² In contrast to Abu Mazen's analysis and expectations the Israelis upgraded their representation in the next round.

⁶⁰ Makovsky, (1996), *Op. Cit.*, p. 42.

⁶¹ Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 140.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 143.

Round six was held in Holmenkollen Park, Oslo on 21 May. Following the previous five rounds, Rabin and Peres had decided to upgrade the level of representation in Oslo by sending Uri Savir to meet Abu Ala. That was the first meeting between an Israeli official and a member of the PLO (which was still considered by Israel to be a terrorist organisation). Nonetheless Rabin insisted on the continuation of secrecy and that the Palestinians should not abandon the Washington channel because of the Oslo channel. In doing so, Rabin made it clear that he was trying to offer some reassurance to the Palestinians in the form of upgraded Israeli representation, but that he was not prepared to put all his eggs in one basket or to allow the Palestinians to reap the benefits of this representation until substantive progress had been made.

Savir's impression had been positive when he had read the Sarpsborg document. He subsequently stressed the idea that negotiations should advance in stages.⁶³ He stressed the issue of Israeli security and the secrecy of the negotiation channel. He discussed the issues of Jerusalem and Jericho and the arbitration on any dispute after the beginning of the first phase.⁶⁴ When he returned to Israel and met Rabin and Peres, Savir informed them of the seriousness of the Oslo secret channel, and that the government should engage in serious negotiations, and that they needed a very good lawyer for that task. Yo'el Singer was their choice. After analysing the document he recommended its redrafting. Abu Ala on the other hand gave his impression of Savir and his seriousness in negotiating a peaceful settlement to Abu Mazen.

In retrospect it is clear that Arafat, by sending his 'big gun', Abu Ala, from the start had little flexibility in how the Palestinians presented their demands. The Israelis, in contrast, used the prospect of upgrading their representation gradually to tempt and

⁶³ Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.*, p. 13.

⁶⁴ Corbin, (1994), *Op. Cit.*, p. 84.

pressure the Palestinians into making compromises. The continued need to refer back to Jerusalem allowed them the possibility of strategic retreats as well as getting the best Israeli legal and political minds to assess the implications of any proposal in depth before the Israelis accepted it.⁶⁵ Abu Ala did not have access to the same professional advice, being restricted to telephone calls with Arafat and the PLO hierarchy in Tunis. The tactical advantage therefore lay with the Israelis throughout the negotiations, as well as the strategic advantage that arose from the fact that they were the Occupiers and the Palestinians the Occupied.

The Israelis also benefited from the fact that they were much better informed and had access to good intelligence compared to the Palestinians. Examples for this are many. Uri Savir tells a story that can highlight that point. While Savir was in the Inter-Continental Hotel in Paris, meeting with Abu Ala and Larsen in the latter's suite, a call came through from Mona Juul about a meeting of the Joint Liaison Committee, co-chaired by Peres and Abu Mazen which the Norwegians were planning to host within forty-eight hours, and the task was to contact Abu Mazen. Taking the phone, Abu Ala tried to locate Abu Mazen in Tunis. "Protocol and a sudden attack of mischievousness" said Savir "prevented me from telling Abu Ala that I knew Abu Mazen was in Morocco." After a string of fruitless calls, Abu Ala finally gave up. "Let me find him for you," said Savir and soon he had Abu Mazen on the line from the Hyatt Hotel in Rabat. "I could see from Abu Ala's face," said Savir, "that his esteem for Israel's intelligence community had risen even higher and I did nothing to alter his impression".⁶⁶

The Palestinians, for their part, did try to play similar tactical games. For

⁶⁵ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit.

⁶⁶ Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 106.

example, the Palestinian delegation to Washington continued to insist on Palestinian authority being extended over the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories, including East Jerusalem during any transitional period, and that a Palestinian state must be declared immediately, while in Oslo the PLO was willing to compromise. This can be attributed to a desire on the part of the PLO leadership to convince the Israeli government that dealing directly with the PLO would be more beneficial and practical than dealing with the Washington's delegation that had no authority to conclude any agreement without permission from Arafat.⁶⁷

Round seven was held on 13 June 1993. In this round, the Israeli negotiation team was increased to four. Yo'el Singer, the lawyer who had been a legal adviser to the Israeli delegation during the first and second disengagement talks with the Egyptians and the disengagement talks with the Syrians in the 1970s, was now included.⁶⁸ With the PLO offer of greater flexibility than the Washington delegation in mind, the Israelis, especially Singer, focused on the issues of Jerusalem and the settlements to see exactly to what extent the position of the PLO could be changed from that held by the team in Washington. Singer criticised the Sarpsborg draft DOP. He wanted to get rid of the UN trusteeship idea. He wanted also "the part about Jerusalem being outside of the deal in writing, and not just a verbal promise."⁶⁹

Round eight was held on 25-27 June, where according to Pundak, the Israelis discussed the new elements of the DOP with the Palestinians.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Beilin, (1999), *Op. Cit.*, p. 67.

⁶⁸ Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 151.

⁶⁹ Makovsky, (1996), *Op. Cit.*, p. 52.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

On the 4th of July, a new meeting between the two teams was held. This ninth round was held in Gressheim near Oslo during the period from the 4th to the 6th of July, with Abu Kush replacing Maher al- Kurd in the Palestinian team. The talks covered five points: the inclusion of UNSCR nos. 242 and 338 which called for Israeli withdrawal, the negotiations of the final settlement for the future, the Gaza-Jericho approach, the elections in Jerusalem, and the fate of 1967 war refugees. Both sides criticised the way that the Americans were handling the Washington talks, and in addition the bridging proposals which they had presented.⁷¹

The Israelis presented a new formal written draft of the declaration that was, from their perspective, better constructed than the previous one.⁷² It posited a three-stage process in which autonomy would be instituted first in Gaza and Jericho; then an interim agreement would be concluded on extending autonomy within the rest of the West Bank; and finally negotiations would be held on a permanent settlement of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. They expressed a desire to reach a final accord that would be signed in two stages: first, between the PLO and the representative of the Government of Israel in Oslo; and second, between Shimon Peres and Faisal Husseini at an official ceremony in Washington.⁷³

Round ten was held, according to Makovsky, on 10-11th July or according to Abu Mazen on the 21st of July in a hotel in Halvorsbole. Abu Ala, on behalf of the Palestinian delegation, read a letter from Arafat in which new demands were made such as elections in Jerusalem, the status of the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and the

⁷¹ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 104.

⁷² Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 35.

⁷³ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 159.

importance of international guarantees and outside mediation.⁷⁴ The Israelis considered this new document to be totally unacceptable and asked him to withdraw it. Abu Ala proposed instead to return to the previous document prepared by Hirschfeld.

Although the two sides had reached agreement on some points, it was clear that the negotiations were losing momentum and that direct intervention by the respective leaderships was needed to revive progress. Therefore, on the 13th of July Jorgen Holst visited Tunis with Terje Larsen and Mona Juul and met Arafat. He then sent Terje Larsen and Mona Juul to Israel, with a letter to Peres that contained an assessment of Arafat's views, his position towards Abu Ala and his mental status. Larsen and Juul explained in details their meeting with Arafat, to Peres, Beilin, Savir, Hirschfeld and Pundak. Peres then informed Rabin. Holst's letter convinced Rabin that there was good reason to resume the negotiations, and the Israeli team returned to Oslo. When the Israeli team met with the Palestinian team on 25th July, in Halvorsbole, they combined the two documents, 'Gressheim' and 'Sarpsborg'. There were twenty-five points, sixteen of which were not agreed upon. The Israelis divided the sixteen points into two groups of eight. The first were about the security issues, such as the military protection of the settlers, the army control of borders with Jordan and Egypt, and the free movement of Israeli soldiers in the Gaza-Jericho areas; the second about Gaza-Jericho first, such as the authority of the Palestinian Council, the place of the Council, and the crossing from Gaza to Jericho. The Israelis proposed solutions to all those points and insisted on a Palestinian acceptance of the package as a whole, requesting a Yes or No answer. The deal was that Israeli concessions on the second set of eight points would be met by Palestinian concessions on the first set.

⁷⁴ Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.*, p. 38.

However, additionally and concerning the issue of mutual recognition, the Palestinians suggested that it be part of the declaration of principles, but the Israelis refused that link.⁷⁵

Round eleven was held on 25-26 July 1993. The eleventh round got under way in an atmosphere of considerable tension.⁷⁶ Both delegations exchanged their drafts. The Israeli delegation objected to the Palestinian amendment of the document and threatened that this could lead to the end of the channel. The Palestinians demanded ten thousand Palestinian policemen in Gaza and Jericho, Palestinian control of the border crossings, Israel's withdrawal from Gaza within three months, and that the scope of every further re-deployment be determined by negotiation.⁷⁷ In that round the two delegations tried to reconcile the July 6 text with the points in the Palestinian document. During these latest rounds, severe crises had developed between the Israeli and Palestinian teams.⁷⁸ At one point Abu Ala had left the talks altogether saying that he was unable to proceed with the process of the terms set by the Israelis. The Palestinian delegation in Washington was insisting on immediate solution of the status of Jerusalem as part of the interim agreement, while Arafat was ready to postpone that to the final status negotiations.⁷⁹

To prevent the crisis from ending the talks, Savir presented seven points and asked Abu Ala to persuade Arafat to accept them in order for him to persuade the Israeli

⁷⁵ Corbin, (1994), *Op. Cit.*, p. 144.

⁷⁶ Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 166.

⁷⁷ Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.*, p. 44.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-50.

⁷⁹ See, Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.*

leadership to recognise and negotiate openly with the PLO and with Arafat. The seven points were:

- 1- Recognition of Israel's right to exist in security and peace.
- 2- Resolution of the conflict by peaceful means.
- 3- Acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
- 4- Renunciation of terrorism.
- 5- Resolution of differences through negotiation.
- 6- A halt to the Intifada.
- 7- Rescinding the clauses of the Palestinian Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel or otherwise contradicts the peace process.⁸⁰

Round twelve was held on 13-15 August 1993.⁸¹ In this meeting, the two parties tried to specify the points of disagreement and moved on to the question of mutual recognition. The two teams started negotiations in Oslo on mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles. The Palestinians insisted on including the timetable of the final status talks in the DOP and that the final status talks should lead to implementation of UNSCR nos. 242 and 338. But there still remained some aspects of a Gaza-Jericho first approach and the timetable for withdrawal and the Israelis security in those areas.

However, at the beginning of August, there were important developments in the general atmosphere of the Middle East which were to force both parties back to the table and which centred on renewed American initiatives to pursue the Syrian option.

Warren Christopher met Rabin on 3 August. Their talks centred on the Syrian track, and it seemed that this move was deliberate in order to disturb and pressure the Palestinians. Rabin agreed that the Syrian track was more promising. The PLO was

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 50.

⁸¹ See Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 175. See also Savir, (1998), *Op. Cit.*, p. 52.

known to be sensitive to the prospect of being left behind and knew that other separate agreements between Israel and either Jordan or Syria or both would further weaken the Palestinian position. The Israelis and the Americans also knew this and knew that concentrating on the Syrian negotiations would force Arafat to moderate his position and make more concessions in order to get an agreement before any other party could. It is reasonable to assume that the United States must have been collaborating with Israel at this time, making the talks go in Israel's favour. It can be said then that the USA was indirectly involved in the Oslo process.⁸²

There was still a need for a high level intervention to solve the remaining issues. Shimon Peres visited Scandinavia, and met secretly with Holst in Stockholm, and made a telephone contact with Arafat through Holst to finish the remaining points.

Seven hours in the lifetime and history of the Palestinian people were recorded; Seven hours of dialogue by telephone ended a twentieth-century conflict, outlined the first steps along the road to liberty and freedom for the Palestinian people, outlined the features of the future of the region and accomplished what twenty months of fruitless negotiations in Washington had failed to do. These seven hours saw the conclusion of a total agreement on the arrangements for the interim autonomy period.⁸³

Initial agreement was reached, and on 19 August, the two teams met again. An initial agreement was signed on 20 August by Abu Ala and Uri Savir with the attendance of Peres and the two teams. On 26 August, Foreign Minister Peres declared that Israel had the intention of withdrawing from Gaza and Jericho first, and the Palestinian National Council started a debate on the draft of the Declaration of Principles reached in Oslo. On 30 August the draft of the Declaration of Principles was approved by the Israeli

⁸² PFLP-GC communiqué BBC Summary of World Broadcasts ME 1808 MED/2 1/10/1993, See also Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 185 and Beilin (1999), Op. Cit., pp. 68-88.

⁸³ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 175.

Knesset, and announced by both parties. On September, Peres declared that Israel might recognise the PLO if it renounced violence and eradicated the points in its Charter concerning the destruction of the state of Israel.⁸⁴

On 9 September, more negotiations in Paris led to agreement on mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO. Then on 13 September the signing of the Declaration by Peres and Abu Mazen, and the historic handshake between Rabin and Arafat took place in Washington. The fact that the agreement was signed in Washington has a significant meaning. It clearly indicates the parties' acknowledgement of USA's vital role and again clearly shows the USA's link to and approval of the process.

From analysing the negotiation process it appears clear that the Israelis entered it with a defined and carefully studied strategy. They deliberately divided their participation in the negotiations into two stages. The first exploratory one, conducted by Israeli academics, continued for the first five rounds and produced what is coming to be known as the Sarpsborg Document. The second continued for the other six round or so, conducted by officials and a legal expert and produced the so called Greesheim Document and the actual final Declaration of Principle.

Their reason behind this was that in the second stage the Israelis would be able – after careful examination of the text- to reduce any risk, correct any mistakes, retreat from any dangerous concessions and get more concessions from the Palestinian delegation. The participation of Uri Savir followed by Yo'el Singer reduced the Palestinian gains that had been achieved in the first draft produced in the first five rounds of negotiations (Sarpsborg Document).

By agreeing at the beginning of the talks on the idea that there would be no retraction of any offer made at any point, Abu Ala's hands were tightened while the

⁸⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 1782 MED/6, 1/9/1993.

Israeli side benefited from upgrading their representation and their control of drafting the text.

In the first document there was a mention of many important issues that disappeared in the final documents; for example, the Israeli complete withdrawal from Gaza Strip within two years and the idea of placing it under a sort of trusteeship which had the implication of a transition towards a Palestinian State. There was a mention not only that Jerusalem and settlements would be discussed in the final status negotiations but also that sovereignty and borders would be on the agenda. The first document also did not specify the powers to be transferred to the Palestinians in the interim period thereby suggesting that it might be total. Above all Israel agreed to binding arbitration if a dispute occurred between the two parties. All these Israeli 'concessions' were undone or removed from final drafts by the Israeli official team in return, effectively, for their official presence at the negotiations with the PLO.⁸⁵

The Oslo Agreement (DOP)

The document reached in Oslo was entitled, Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-government Arrangements (DOP). The text consisted of nine pages, with fourteen pages of four annexes and the agreed minutes.

Analysing the document is not an easy task but not an impossible one. The fact that the Israelis assumed the duty of writing the document allowed them to choose an ambiguous language that would serve them as the stronger party during the implementation process. As Edward Said pointed out rightly "The document has been

⁸⁵ Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit.

revealed as an interpreter's nightmare, full of deliberate ambiguities and incomplete procedural suggestions."⁸⁶

The tilt of the balance of power in Israel's favour allowed it to impose the terms of the negotiations. The fact that Israel held almost all the cards gave it the upper hand and allowed it to exchange few of its cards for almost all the Palestinian cards. With its total control over the Palestinian land, people and resources together with its political, economic and military might it held the status of a giant facing a dwarf. With the American unconditional support and strategic alliance –especially under the new Clinton administration- Israel was under no pressure to rush itself into an undesirable concession. As Ziva Flamhaft pointed out, President Clinton's stand on Israel was another reason for the Oslo breakthrough.

As a candidate, Clinton criticised the Bush administration for linking peace talks to humanitarian efforts to settle Soviet immigrants; praised Rabin for the steps he had taken as prime minister to revive the peace process and called upon the Arab side to reciprocate; repeatedly asked the Arabs to end their boycott against Israel; and promised to help Israel maintain its qualitative military balance in the Middle East. As president-elect, Clinton publicly disclosed that he would end the policy of pressuring Israel to make unilateral concessions to its Arab opponents, adding that 'a Clinton Administration will treat the Arab-Israeli conflict as one in which the survival of Israel is at stake.'⁸⁷

The PLO on the other side was facing its most difficult situation on all domestic, regional and international levels since its expulsion from Beirut in 1982. Its financial and political crisis had been worsened by a carefully planned American-led isolation at both regional and international levels. The international media exaggerated the PLO stand with Saddam Hussein and the result was an expulsion of the Palestinians from the

⁸⁶ See Said, E., *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian self-determination 1969-1994*, (London: Vintage Press, 1995), p. 413. See also Corbin, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 168.

⁸⁷ Flamhaft, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 98.

Gulf States and the cutting of vital financial assistance.

The Agreement called for an Israeli Army withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho, which would then fall under the civilian control of a Palestinian autonomy government headed by PLO chairman Arafat. All Israeli settlements would remain intact, and the new Palestinian police would work together with the Israeli Army to guarantee internal security and fight terrorism. In nine months, the Israeli Army would re-deploy throughout the remainder of the West Bank to prepare for Palestinian elections and the extension of autonomy to the entire West Bank. The most contentious issues -settlements, refugees, borders, Palestinian statehood, security, and Jerusalem- would be deferred until another set of talks, scheduled to begin in the third year of autonomy. The Declaration of Principles itself was accompanied by mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and by a commitment from Arafat to end terrorism and remove calls for Israel's destruction from the PLO charter.⁸⁸

In addition to the mutual recognition, the agreement aimed at a final settlement based on UNSCR nos. 242 and 338 after five transitional years, during which a degree of autonomy would be established, under a "Palestinian Interim Self Government Authority." One of the main aspects of the Oslo Accord is its division of the peace process into two stages, and the absence of any term of references to the crucial transitional stage, in which Israel transforms limited and gradual administrative jurisdictions to the Palestinians. As Uri Savir describes it, the Declaration of Principles on Interim self-government Arrangements was a "step-by-step approach toward a settlement according to certain clear-cut principles. 'Gradual' was the key word

⁸⁸ Perlmutter, A., "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3, June 1995, p. 60.

describing the transition from occupation to self-rule, from violence to peaceful coexistence, from a political road map to true reconciliation.”⁸⁹

An important point to be mentioned here is that the agreement did not refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as Occupied Territories, thus dealing with them as a disputed areas. The inapplicability of international law and UNSCR no. 242 on the transitional stage relegated the status of these territories during the transitional negotiations to “disputed” thus giving Israel equal rights in its territorial claims. The Oslo agreement provided mainly for the establishment in the first instance by the PLO of a self-governing authority in Gaza and Jericho. Palestinian authority would extend to the remaining Palestinian population centres of the West Bank in a second phase, coinciding with general elections to form a governing council, the nature and powers of which were yet to be negotiated.⁹⁰

These documents, (the DOP and the accompanying documents on mutual recognition) themselves do not yet constitute a full peace agreement.⁹¹ In addition, the declaration left many issues without clear definition, and postponed the most important issues for the future. For many Palestinian opponents to the agreement, this was reason enough for their position. In their opinion the PLO squandered its final card -recognition of Israel and the end of the Intifada- for no more than the transfer of some authorities and without any hope for establishing a Palestinian state. Israeli opposition to the agreement was meanwhile grounded on fears of the establishment of a Palestinian state.

⁸⁹ Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 59.

⁹⁰ Sayigh, Y., *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 658.

⁹¹ Said, E., *Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993-1995*, (London: Vintage, 1995), p. 19.

The Declaration of Principles lays the foundation for a limited, interim Palestinian self-rule in those areas of Palestine occupied by Israel since 1967: the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. This includes about 20 per cent of the Palestine that the United Nations decided to separate into two states in 1947.⁹² Israel's security responsibilities would include defence against external threats, full responsibility for Israelis living in the settlements, and full responsibility for Israelis travelling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinians would be responsible for carrying out security actions designed to fight terror (such as confiscating illegal arms) in areas under their security control.

Edward Said and George Giacaman have both agreed that the weak PLO position was fully exploited by Israel to achieve and implement the Oslo accords. According to George Giacaman "The two Israeli-Palestinian agreements (Oslo I and Oslo II as they came to be called) represent the terms of settlement after the defeat, or more specifically, after the acceptance of defeat by the Palestinians."⁹³ Edward Said on his part pointed out that "it is evident that the Israelis brilliantly exploited the weaknesses and inequities in the Declaration of Principles."⁹⁴ Edward Said also made it clear that, "On all matters having to do with security, sovereignty, water, settlements, and Jerusalem, the Palestinians have in effect gained nothing, as the expropriations have

⁹² Butenschon, N., *The Oslo Agreement: From The White House to Jabal Abu Ghneim*, in Giacaman, G and Lonning, D., *After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 19.

⁹³ Giacaman, G., "In the Throes of Oslo: Palestinian Society, Civil Society and the Future," in G. Giacaman, and Lonning, D., *After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 1.

⁹⁴ Said, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 63.

proceeded as before, the settlement have expanded, more of Jerusalem has been incorporated by Israel, curfews, killings, closures and imprisonment have continued, and no real end to the occupation has ever been forecast.”⁹⁵

Arafat, however, spoke proudly of the declaration as the first step on the road to victory and emphasised its real significance for Palestinians by telling them: “It has put us on the geographical and political map.”⁹⁶

According to Uri Savir “Arafat misrepresented the agreement to his associates as a guarantee of a Palestinian state according to a fixed timetable. He also ignored its details, whenever possible, and was in no rush to start negotiating its implementation.”⁹⁷

The rise and increasing popularity of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, combined with the Israeli-American attempt to create an alternative Palestinian leadership in Madrid, added more pressure on Arafat and the PLO leadership. The Oslo agreement was the result of this asymmetry of power.

In the coming section I will try to point out some points that can clarify the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian accord.

- First of all, the DOP left the Palestinians subordinate, as Israel remains in charge of East Jerusalem, settlements, sovereignty and the economy.⁹⁸ “The issues which form

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 62.

⁹⁶ Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 95.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 94.

⁹⁸ Said, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 1.

the substance of Palestinian existence, or non-existence, are left out of the agreement, their postponement reflects the regional balance of power.”⁹⁹

- The document was ambiguous. Its ambiguity was deliberate, paving the way for different interpretations during the implementation stage, and gave the advantage to the strongest party. Between these vague points, as analysed by Laura Drake, was for example the use of the term ‘interim period’, instead of ‘transitional’. In her opinion “The concept of ‘transition’ carries the implication of historical change through forward, irreversible motion. The word ‘interim’ however, refers simply to an interregnum, which, in the words of a Washington Post editorial, is “dependent on Israeli consent for further evolution.”

If the Palestinians are to enjoy a “transition” they can expect real and historic change away from occupation and toward independence. If the upcoming stage is “interim,” however, it could indicate nothing more than a period of restructuring for an existing occupation.¹⁰⁰

- Despite mentioning the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, which gives the agreement some basis in international law, the resolutions in themselves are not clear toward the Palestine problem. There was also the possibility of interpreting their clauses in favour of one side, namely Israel. In particular the mention of “secure and recognised borders” was exploited by Israel to justify its control over territories considered by her as important for security; it might use it to control East Jerusalem, and along the Jordan valley.
- The point about preserving the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the interim period does not make clear whether this integrity will be preserved after the

⁹⁹ Drake, L., “Between the Lines: A Textual Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement,” *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 16 no. 4, 1994, pp. 1-35.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 3.

interim period or only during it, thus leaving the door open for the Israelis to detach East Jerusalem or any other land after the interim period.

- The Oslo accord talked more about a military redeployment than about withdrawal of an occupying force. The Israeli intention seemed mainly concerned with getting its soldiers out of the Palestinian cities' streets after six years of Intifada that caused them a lot of domestic as well as regional and international trouble, and to charge the PLO with security responsibilities in this troubled areas.
- Although there was a mention of the Palestinians' political rights which was an improvement on Camp David, there was no mention in the DOP of freedom or self-determination, which the Palestinian people had struggled to achieve for many decades.
- By focusing the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip the Declaration effectively divided the Palestinian people into those who lived inside the Occupied Territories and those who lived abroad as refugees. This different treatment caused a division within the Palestinians and affected the reconciliation process in the long term. Also, the agreement did not define what it meant by the West Bank. This ambiguity made the stronger party (Israel) effectively decide the definition. The agreement did not make it clear if territorial integrity would be maintained after the end of the interim agreement.
- In its clauses about the relations and co-operation with the neighbouring countries the agreement effectively designates the future of the Palestinian entity as an Israeli protectorate that acts as an Israeli bridge to the larger Arab and Islamic world.
- Although the DOP mentioned settlements, it never mentioned settlers. Rabin's distinction between political and security settlements imply that some of the settlements might be dismantled but the failure to mention the settlers means that

Jews will be able to live wherever they chose, not only in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but in any place in the region.¹⁰¹

The placing of Palestinian economic development under Palestinian-Israeli joint authority is effectively placing it under indirect Israeli control. The concept of joint authority is translated in practice to the authority of the stronger power which under the existing asymmetry of power is not the PLO but Israel. When the document mentioned the borders and the neighbours, it did not clarify which borders with whom.¹⁰² Was it borders between Israel and a Palestinian state or between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or between Jordan on the one hand and Israel with a Palestinian entity under its control on the other? A brief look at the map makes one wonder how the Israeli insistence on controlling the Jordan valley could allow any possibility for a Palestinian mini state or even a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. The reference to the "relations and co-operation with other neighbours"¹⁰³ binds the Palestinian entity to Israel, as it is impossible for the Palestinian entity to establish any co-operation with Arab countries without consultation and combination with Israel. This means, in a sense, that the intention is to create a situation whereby the Israeli and Palestinian entities merge their regional policy-making apparatuses to the point of being inseparable. In an interview with Israeli journalist Asher Davidi, Dov Lautman, President of the Israeli Manufacturers Association was quoted as saying: "It's not important whether there will be a Palestinian state, autonomy, or a Palestinian-Jordanian

¹⁰¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/1-3, 13 September 1993.

¹⁰² Abdul Hadi, M., *Documents on Palestine: From the Negotiations in Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA), p. 145.

¹⁰³ See Article 3 and Annex III and IV of the DOP. See Appendices, p. 376.

state. The economic borders between Israel and the territories must remain open.”¹⁰⁴ It can be argued that with its well-developed economic institutions, Israel will in effect incorporate the territories economically, keeping them in a state of permanent dependency. Then Israel will turn to the Arab world, using the political benefits of the Palestinian agreement as a springboard into Arab markets, which it will also exploit and is likely to dominate.¹⁰⁵

The primary consideration in the document is Israel's security, with none for the Palestinians from Israel's incursions. In his 13th September 1993 press conference Rabin was straightforward about Israel's continuing control over sovereignty; in addition, he said, “Israel would hold the River Jordan, the boundaries with Egypt and Jordan, the sea, the land between Gaza and Jericho, Jerusalem, the settlements, and the roads. There is nothing in the document to suggest that Israel will give up its violence against Palestinians or compensate the victims of its policies for forty-five years.”¹⁰⁶ As ex-Secretary of State James Baker said in a TV interview “Israel has given up nothing, except a bland acceptance of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.” The security of Israel was the main concern not only for Israel but for the United States as well. “If autonomy does not improve security for Israel, Secretary of State James Baker said, there will be no Palestinian autonomy.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Davidi, A., “Israel's Economic Strategy for Palestinian Independence,” *Middle East Report*, no. 184, September/October 1993, p. 24-26.

¹⁰⁵ Said, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 11.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 19.

Response to the Oslo Agreement

Response to the Oslo Accord (the Declaration of Principles) was enormous. It was something like a political earthquake. The fact that the signing of the agreement happened in Washington under the sponsorship of the president of the USA, the only remaining superpower, and in the atmosphere of New World Order influenced the response of most world leaders. The stand of the USA and even Russia left very little space for manoeuvring to those who wished to reject it.

The news of the breakthrough was widely welcomed in the West and the USA in particular. However, in the Middle East itself the reaction was mixed. Although many Israelis and Palestinians welcomed the agreement, many on both sides saw it as a betrayal of their national rights and existence.

The PLO itself witnessed a split. Ten of its sub-organisations declared their condemnation of the secret channel and its results. George Habash, Nief Hwatmah, Ahmed Jebril and many others declared their organisations' rejection of what they called a national treason and a black day for Palestinian history.¹⁰⁸ Hamas and Islamic Jihad expressed their rejection of the agreement by increasing what they consider their martyrdom operations (suicide bombings). Members of the PLO executive committee resigned their positions. Shafeeq Alhut, Taysir Khalid, Abdurraheem Malluh and Abdullah Hurani declared their resignations immediately after the White House signing ceremony on 13 September 1993. Chief Palestinian negotiator Dr Haydar Abd al-Shafi has reiterated his opposition to the agreement and voiced his reservation on many of the provisions enshrined in it.¹⁰⁹ Iraq, Libya, Iran, Syria and Lebanon rejected the accord as a break from the Arab united stand. Qaddafi for example described the mutual

¹⁰⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/8, 13 September 1993.

¹⁰⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/13, 13 September 1993.

recognition between Arafat and Israel as one of the "comedies in history." "The reciprocal recognition" -he said- "between the so-called PLO and Israel, is one of the comedies in history. And should be considered as an object of ridicule and a farce and not a serious matter."¹¹⁰ Rafsanjani of Iran said the deal with Israel is "the most degrading juncture of history."¹¹¹

On the other hand Jordan, Morocco, GCC countries and Tunisia welcomed the PLO-Israeli agreement. Tunisia's Foreign Minister spoke of pride in Tunisia's role in the agreement, while the Jordanian Crown Prince saw the PLO-Israel agreement as an "historic breakthrough."¹¹² The Saudi Council of Ministers hoped for Middle East peace; The UAE cabinet welcomed and supported PLO-Israeli agreement and Kuwait welcomed "positive developments" in Middle East peace process.¹¹³

In Israel, the peace camp welcomed the news of the agreement. The right wing parties however did not receive the news with enthusiasm. Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, said Rabin has "no mandate" for an "event of national humiliation."¹¹⁴ One year after the signing of the DOP in Washington, Jordan and Israel signed a peace agreement on October 1994.

¹¹⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/17, 13 September 1993.

¹¹¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/22, 15 September 1993.

¹¹² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 17, 13 September 1993.

¹¹³ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 14, 15 September 1993.

¹¹⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 25, 15 September 1993.

The Parties' Reasons behind the Agreement

A series of crucial questions needs to be asked if we are to understand why the Palestine Liberation Organisation agreed to the opening of a secret channel in Oslo to negotiate with the Israeli Labour government under the leadership of Rabin and Peres, in spite of the continuation of the official negotiations within the Madrid framework in Washington since 30 October 1991. Also why did the Rabin-Peres Labour government desire the diversion toward a secret channel to negotiate with the PLO to reach an agreement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, instead of continuing with the official channel in Washington with the mediation, and under the auspices of the USA, the main ally of Israel.

The reasons for the Israeli government and the PLO to negotiate a settlement through secret channel were numerous. We can summarise them as follow starting by the Israeli government reasons.

First, as Raymond Hinnebusch pointed out: "Asad's insistence, in talks with USA Secretary of State Warren Christopher, that Syria would not conclude a separate settlement apparently convinced Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin that his initial "Syria first" option would not fly. Ironically, this led Rabin to pursue the 1993 Oslo agreement with the Palestinians"¹¹⁵

On the other hand in 1992 the new Israeli Labour government realised that the negotiations with the Palestinian delegation to Madrid would not lead to any quick and acceptable agreement, especially since the Palestinian delegation was not able to make any concessions without permission from the PLO and its leader, Yasser Arafat, in Tunis. As Rabin himself said about the Palestinian delegation to Washington, "They

¹¹⁵ Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Want Peace?" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 42-57.

were unable to make decisions without getting the green light [from the PLO].”¹¹⁶ Thus there was no possibility of avoiding making direct contacts with Arafat and his organisation, which needed a new law from the Knesset allowing that kind of contact. According to Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Rabin only changed his mind and agreed to come to an agreement with the PLO after the change in global-political reality and when he realised that this was a better way to serve the same strategic interests.¹¹⁷

Second, Israel insisted always on its refusal to recognise the rights of the Palestinian people and on considering the organisations under the PLO’s umbrella as terrorist organisations backed by Arab regimes and International Communism. It insisted always on its historical rights in all Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. Thus it was never going to be easy to recognise the PLO before knowing that it would accept Israel’s conditions, one of which was recognising Israel’s right to live in peace and security. So Israel was concerned that any contact must be secret, and should not become public before it could satisfy its main desired points, most important of which was the PLO’s unconditional recognition of Israel’s right to exist and acceptance of Jerusalem as Israel’s eternal capital. Therefore Israel was effectively negotiating with two delegations and would go ahead with the one that made most concessions and showed most flexibility. In an interview with IBT, TV on 10 September 1993 Rabin said:

Efforts were made in various directions. I decided to see which avenue was more successful.” He added “I was interested in the following points: First under no circumstances should Jerusalem’s unity or our sovereignty over it come to be

¹¹⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 1-3, 13 September 1993.

¹¹⁷ Raz-Krakotzkin, A., “A Peace without Arabs: The Discourse of Peace and the Limits of Israeli Consciousness,” in Giacaman, and Lonning., *After Oslo, New Realities, Old Problems*, (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p. 61.

affected in any way. Second, no settlement will be uprooted. Third, the IDF's deployment must not be impaired. It will remain present wherever it is necessary.¹¹⁸ Finally, the options of the permanent arrangement must remain open.

Third, the secrecy in negotiations and getting a surprise accord with the PLO would serve Israel's strategy of fragmenting the Arab parties. Israel's goal was always not to deal with Arab parties as a block but rather as individuals and directly rather than with a mediator. In other words, reaching an agreement with the PLO would create shock and mistrust among the other parties, namely Syria and Jordan.

Fourth, the secrecy of the negotiations was to limit the PLO's ability to consult with many Palestinian experts in negotiations and legal matters. With Israel's insistence on secrecy and the threat to abandon the channel in case of any leak, the PLO was obliged to involve only a handful of Arafat's most trusted people who were not qualified to conduct such complex and sensitive negotiations.¹¹⁹ Also the inability of the PLO delegation in Oslo to ensure secure contacts with PLO headquarters in Tunis made its strategy and tactics open to the Israelis, who benefited from advanced technology in maintaining secret and credible contacts during the negotiation process.

Fifth, open public and media covered negotiations involve the participation of the public opinion in one way or another in negotiations. An agreement on the Israeli terms would not be easy to reach, and in the dark and in secrecy it was easier to get an agreement, which will be a *fait accompli* regardless of the public opinion acceptance or refusal.

Sixth, Israel was aware that it had to negotiate with the PLO in order to resolve the conflict, especially when it found out that the Palestinian delegation in Washington

¹¹⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 2, 13 September 1993.

¹¹⁹ See Abbas, (1995), *Op. Cit.*, p. 185.

received its orders from Tunis, in what they described as negotiations by fax and telephone.

Seventh, Israel under the leadership of the leftist Labour party, with Rabin as Prime Minister and Shimon Peres as Foreign Minister, was relatively more willing than the right-wing Likud government to reach an agreement with the Palestinians. It was searching seriously for a way to reach that conclusion, in contrast to the former right-wing Likud government that preferred and benefited from any Palestinian inflexibility to delay any agreement and dragging the negotiations for many years until there was nothing left to negotiate as Shamir said before the start of Madrid conference.

Eighth, the Labour government was fully aware of the changes in the international political system, the realities of the New World Order and the new opportunities offered by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PLO main superpower ally. They were also aware of the regional changes after the second Gulf War, the deep division of the Arab ranks and the weakness of the PLO and its financial crisis. It sought to seize the opportunity to get a good agreement from a strong position, which could serve Israel's long term interests. According to David Makovsky: "Rabin's willingness to explore the Oslo channel derived in part from his analysis of international and regional changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and the political shifts caused by the Gulf War."¹²⁰

Understanding the huge change in the international arena, and the emergence of a new set of ideas, seemed very clear on the Israeli Labour government's side. In Shimon Peres words,

The world has moved beyond having ideological confrontation, and has thus lost one of the principal motivations for military struggle. The world has come to realise that economic opportunity is available for all of mankind, black and white, Southerner and Northerner. Economic rivalries have begun to take the place of military confrontation. The military confrontations required trained armies,

¹²⁰ Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 107.

fortified borders, constant vigilance and suspicion. Economic advancement requires a very different set of circumstances: open borders, markets that straddle political demarcations, goodwill, good products and constant competition.¹²¹

Ninth, by using its long-range missiles against Israel, Iraq had participated in changing Israel's view of security. It became clear that by keeping land Israel could not guarantee its security. That security can be achieved by peace, and peace can be achieved by reconciliation and mutual recognition. This shock convinced many Israelis of the necessity of reaching peace with the Palestinians to secure internal security to be able to face external challenges. Uri Savir noted that: "It was the perception of the threat posed by Iranian fundamentalism, and the proliferation of non-conventional weapons in the hands of fanatic governments such as in Iraq, that encouraged the Oslo decision makers -Rabin and Peres- to start building new coalitions against common enemies."¹²²

Tenth, the internal struggle for power within Israel, and the deep ideological division in the Israeli society between the radical ideological right and the moderate left contributed to the Labour government's pursuit of Oslo. Reaching an agreement with the PLO would create facts on the ground and end the ideological claims that formed the basis for the Israeli right.

Eleventh, the Israeli leadership presented by Rabin and Peres was aware that Israel needs in the long term the acceptance of its neighbours, integration into the region and that it can not stay isolated for ever from its immediate environment or dependent on the power of the USA to protect it. It was also aware that the road to this acceptance and recognition starts with reaching settlement with the Palestinians as this is the core of the conflict and agreement with the Palestinians is the key to peace with Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and ultimately to comprehensive peace in the Middle East and recognition

¹²¹ Peres, (1995), Op. Cit, pp. 374.

¹²² Savir, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 312.

from and economic integration into a new Middle East.

Twelfth, the moderate leftist Israelis –the peace camp- believe that Israel's control of another people and treating them with brutality under military occupation destroys Israel's moral bases and the tradition of the Jewish people which was oppressed throughout its history and does not want to oppress another people. Thus to improve its image, which had been highly damaged by the Intifada that started in 1987, was important to them.

Thirteenth, there was a strong belief, which was later proved correct, that any agreement with the PLO would lead to take Israel out of its international isolation or its international wilderness as Uri Savir put it. Thus obtaining recognition from more countries and improving its economy by lifting the Arab boycott that was imposed on international companies dealing with Israel.

Fourteenth, Rabin and Peres as historical leaders and veterans who had a very long experience with the conflict and its suffering wished to resolve the conflict and achieve some thing for their people and to write their names in the history book.

Fifteenth, Rabin realised that the time was suitable for reaching an agreement with the PLO, specially after all changes in its doctrine in the last two decades.

If we ever want to give a serious chance to a solution of the Palestinian-Israeli problem, now is the time and the partner is the PLO, after it rid itself of all things for which I loathed it.¹²³

Sixteenth, The Israeli leadership realised before any thing else that unless they recognised the 'new' PLO and sign a deal with it in which it can impose its control on the Occupied Territories the increased popularity of the militant groups together with the deterioration in the economic and social situation in the territories will make any acceptable solution impossible. This has been emphasised by the Israeli president Ezra

¹²³ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED/1, 13 September 1993.

Wiesman, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin told the Israeli people in an interview with IBA TV that "If we did not provide the Palestinians with a ray of light and hope, their despair would have played into the hands of the murderous, extremist Islam."¹²⁴

For the PLO the reasons behind its going to secret negotiations in a back channel in Oslo with Norwegian help and under academic cover are also many; international, regional, domestic and personal.¹²⁵

First, on the international level, there is no doubt that the changes to the structure of the international system and the conditions of the New World Order were an essential reason behind the dramatic change in the PLO position. Arafat pointed out in an interview with Shlomo Ganor that:

Both of us (Rabin and he) realised that there had been international changes. The Soviet Union had ended. The Berlin Wall fell. There have been changes in the world. Seeing these changes, people can not stand with folded arms amid these sweeping currents that are shaking the whole world. Therefore, and given this thinking it was necessary for us to find a way to reach an agreement. The agreement on principles that we have reached is a step on the road. This means that we have both understood the international equation under the New World Order.¹²⁶

Second, the defeat of Iraq and the changes in the regional balance of power in Israel's favour, the unprecedented division of the Arab countries together with its loss of the financial and diplomatic support especially from the GCC countries which led to its bankruptcy, contributed in pushing the PLO leadership towards making more concessions which it might have refused to make had it enjoyed Arab, international and superpower support.

¹²⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 1, 13 September 1993.

¹²⁵ Tessler, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 754.

¹²⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 10, 15 September 1993.

Third, the PLO saw in the coming to power in Israel of the Labour party an opportunity to be seized.¹²⁷ Any initiative should be responded to positively even if it was not good enough, in the hope of improving it gradually and taking the carpet from under the feet of the Israeli right-wing which sought to accelerate the creation of facts on the ground by expanding settlements and realising the dream of Greater Israel. As Yezid Sayigh pointed out: the election of Labour Party leader Yitzhak Rabin at the head of a new government in Israel in June 1992 raised PLO hopes of significant progress in the peace talks.¹²⁸

Fourth, the PLO sought to exploit the sympathetic atmosphere created over the previous five years by the Intifada, which had changed the world view of the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories to a people who were fighting to achieve their independence and who wished to reach with this momentum a positive result before the Intifada could cool down with time.¹²⁹

Fifth, the PLO's leaders sought international recognition as the sole representative for the Palestinian people. Thus they sought to reach any agreement through themselves instead of through the Palestinian delegation in Washington, which might give credibility to the leadership of that delegation which was composed of local representatives from the Occupied Territories.¹³⁰

Sixth, some believe that the PLO's acceptance in entering the Oslo process and accepting a phased solution did not contradict its plan of liberating Palestine in stages,

¹²⁷ Tessler, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 755.

¹²⁸ Sayigh, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 652.

¹²⁹ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 26, Also Karsh, E., *From Rabin to Netanyahu: Israel's Troubled Agenda*, (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 124.

¹³⁰ Karsh, (1997), Op. Cit., p. 140, See also Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 67.

starting with establishing a Palestinian State on any liberated part of historical Palestine.

The reasons behind the PLO's going to Madrid and Oslo were summarised by Abu Mazen in his book Through Secret Channels. He wrote that:

The peace accord we signed at the White House in Washington DC on 13 September 1993 did not just happen by chance, nor did it happen as a result of negotiations in the United States or Oslo. Rather, it resulted from a cumulative build-up to which the media and the political and military activities of the Palestinian Revolution had contributed. Moreover, there was the immense contribution of the six years of uprising, the Intifada, which had claimed and maimed thousands of children, women and men as its victims. The end of the Cold War and its consequences, the break-up of the socialist camp and the trauma caused by the Gulf war also played their part in the political windmill. The extensive networks of contacts which the PLO had set up with local Israeli and international Jewish factions, which were (or became) champions of peace, played an important role in the transformation and convergence of Israeli public opinion.¹³¹

Yair Hirschfeld wrote that Abu Mazen explains that the 1982 Lebanon War and the subsequent expulsion of the PLO from Beirut were major steps in this process, as they enabled the PLO "to see clearly the totality of both the external and internal issues," rebuild their "inner structure", and strengthen their "links with the occupied territories in order to gain support for the nascent features of political settlement." Abu Mazen also portrays the Intifada as a milestone by stating that the uprising induced and forced the PLO to accept United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This in turn, allowed the Palestinians to begin discussing the possibility of becoming Israel's negotiating partner.

Seventh, the financial crisis that faced the PLO after the Gulf Crisis not only pushed it to agree on Palestinian Participation in Madrid under the Jordanian umbrella but also to enter a secret negotiation with Israel to survive its ever worst position.¹³²

¹³¹ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., pp. 17-18.

¹³² Hassassian, M., "U.S. National Interests in the Middle East," *Palestine-Israel Journal*, vol. iv, no. 3, 1997, p. 50, See also, Beilin, (1999), Op. Cit., p. 87.

Eighth, the speedy decline of its popularity in the Occupied Territories played a role in the PLO's participation in Madrid and then obliged it to agree on the secret channel in order to reach a speedy solution that could rescue her from bankruptcy and decline.¹³³

Ninth, the PLO's attempt to benefit from the political changes inside Israel, following the victory of Rabin in the 1992 election forced it to agree on any method that could lead to its re-engagement in the peace process.¹³⁴

These reasons, and others that were less important, played a role in changing the PLO's initial position, towards the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For all these reasons and others the two parties, the Israeli Labour Government and PLO leadership, found themselves in great need of a secret channel to negotiate directly to reach a breakthrough and define principals for settlement in the form of a Declaration of Principles to clarify the main lines for the solution. There is no doubt that there were previous secret contacts between the PLO and a number of Israeli peace activists but they never mounted to an official level, and that was mainly due to the Israeli law that ban any contacts with the PLO as a terrorist organisation.

The idea of getting a third party to facilitate contacts and the idea of starting the talks secretly under academic cover, were all aimed in Israel's point of view at keeping the way open, as not for the contacts to be a kind of recognition of PLO before making sure that the PLO will agree on all its main conditions, especially accepting the interim transitional solution of five years, recognition of Israel and its right to live in peace and security, postponement of all issues perceived by Israel as sensitive and difficult to

¹³³ In Netanyahu's view, the PLO was on the verge of collapse, but Israel breathed new life into it. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/ 1782, MED/7, 1/9/1993.

¹³⁴ Hassassian, (1997), Op. Cit., pp. 50-51.

solve because Israel will not be ready to make concessions on it such as Jerusalem, settlements, refugee and borders.

Implementation of Oslo Agreement

Following the signing of the DOP in Washington, the Israeli government and the PLO faced the difficult process of implementing the written document. The difficulties arose from different angles, first of which was the ambiguity in the texts themselves. The second was the time frame, which delays the full implementation by five years. The third was the strong opposition by extremists on both Israeli and Palestinian sides. The fourth was the American position towards the process and its failure to persuade Israel by any means to implement the signed agreements within the schedule set by the agreement and witnessed by the USA president himself.

The increasing violence within Israel and the Palestinian Occupied Territories immediately after the agreement created fears and mistrust among both peoples. The Hebron massacre in particular was a great blow to the process as it happened just a few weeks before the conclusion of the negotiations of the first detailed agreement on the practical implementation of the DOP. The implementation process took different stages and required several agreements and difficult and complex negotiations mixed with many involving bloodshed incidents. The assassination of Rabin by an extremist Israeli Jew and the assassination of Fathi Shaqaqi and Yahya Ayash and other Palestinian militants by Israel have also had a negative impact on the whole reconciliation process.

The subsequent agreements will be discussed in the coming section in an attempt to understand not only their content but also the atmosphere in which they were negotiated and signed. The Cairo agreement, and Taba agreement (Oslo II) that were negotiated and signed during Rabin's period will be discussed, along with the Hebron protocol and the Wye River memorandum that were negotiated and signed during

Netanyahu's period in office. The negotiation process is continuing and will take another few years to be completed under the new Barak government but this will be beyond the scope of this study.

The Cairo Agreement

On the 4th of May 1994, after seven months of negotiations the Israeli government and the PLO agreed on the practical terms of implementing the Gaza-Jericho agreement. The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was signed in Cairo by Arafat and Rabin and consisted of a preamble and 23 articles.¹³⁵ It provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and the transfer of civil powers in these areas to a Palestinian Authority.

For Yitzhak Rabin: "The interim agreement consists of two parts: giving the Palestinians authority to run their lives; and giving ourselves responsibility for Israel's external security and defence of the settlements, including settlers' movements within the territories. Gaza-Jericho is the first stage of the interim agreement."¹³⁶ The atmosphere during that time was dominated by the suicide bombing of Hamas militants and Hebron Massacre by a Jewish extremist settler on 25 February 1994.

The response to the Cairo agreement was similar to the response to the DOP. Shimon Peres said of the agreement "A new baby has been born", despite problems at signing ceremony.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ See Appendices, p. 380.

¹³⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 4, 6 May 1994.

¹³⁷ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED, 4 May 1994.

Those who rejected the previous agreement continued their rejection to the new one. Syria declared that it rejects any phased, partial, separate solutions.¹³⁸ The Lebanese Foreign Minister wished the Palestinians success, but criticised the agreement. Libya rejected the Cairo agreement as it rejected the previous one and said there would be “no stability or security in the region until Israel is removed.”¹³⁹ The PFLP and DFLP rejected the agreement and PFLP-GC leader Ahmed Jibril denounced it as:

An actual translation of the capitulatory deal Arafat accepted in Washington ...the agreement completely avoided mentioning Jerusalem, the capital of the Palestinian people...it was also void of the right to repatriation and self determination and did not mention the large scale settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹⁴⁰

Jordan, the GCC countries and Tunisia welcomed the agreement. Morocco however said the agreement was a good start but was not enough in itself.¹⁴¹ The agreement was carried out in the atmosphere of the suicide bombing and the Hebron massacres. In other words, it was initially delayed and then ultimately shaped, by the environment in Israel and the Palestinian areas. It was also the first instance of Israel abandoning of the timetable set by the DOP. The signing of the agreement on May 1994 was effectively a delay of six month on the originally agreed upon time schedule.

The Taba Agreement (Oslo II)

The Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, (Oslo II) agreement was signed by Arafat and Rabin in Washington on 28 September 1995. The

¹³⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 2, 2 May 1994.

¹³⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 12, 6 May 1994.

¹⁴⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 11, 6 May 1994.

¹⁴¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, MED 11, 6 May 1994.

400 page agreement was initialled by Arafat and Peres in Taba on 24 August, and detailed the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.¹⁴²

Not only President Clinton attended the signing ceremony but also King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt. As John Roberts observed, that meant that: "should any future government in Israel consider formal repudiation of the agreement, in political terms it would be tantamount to saying they did not accept the validity of Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, and that they did not accept the necessity for close relations with the United States."¹⁴³

There was to be a staged Israeli withdrawal beginning on 8 October; in the first stage, the Israeli Army will withdraw from the cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem; in the second stage, a further 450 Arab towns and villages would see an Israeli withdrawal. However, overall security in the region was still to be maintained by the Israeli Army.

The agreement was attacked by Syria and from the Palestinian organisations opposed to the Oslo process. The PFLP for example accused Yasser Arafat of abandoning Jerusalem and leaving Hebron under the control of the Israeli army and Jewish settlers. The atmosphere in which the Taba agreement was negotiated and implemented was similar to that of the Cairo agreement. The agreement was seen by many Israelis as "fundamental heresy" and contributed to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 and the start of a new stage.¹⁴⁴

The assassination of Rabin a few weeks after the signing of the agreement left its

¹⁴² See Appendices, p. 392.

¹⁴³ Roberts, J., "Oslo II: The September 1995 Palestinian-Israeli Accord," *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, vol. 3, no. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 41-43.

¹⁴⁴ Abdul Hadi, (1997), *Op. Cit.*, p. 328.

implementation in jeopardy. Shimon Peres who became Prime Minister promised to continue the process but delayed some of its parts (withdrawal from Hebron) hoping that this would help him win the general elections. The February and March 1996 suicide bombings and the Grapes of Wrath military operation in Lebanon contributed to his defeat and the coming to power of Benjamin Netanyahu, heading a right wing and anti Oslo coalition government. The first test for this government was the implementation of the signed agreements, first of which was Hebron agreement.

The American involvement in negotiating both the Cairo and Taba agreements was minimal. This was due to the fact that the USA administration saw the Rabin-Peres government as a 'peace' government that should be allowed to conduct the negotiations with less intervention or involvement from outside parties. This policy was to change slightly when the American interests were to be affected by the right-wing Netanyahu's government, as we will see when discussing the Hebron and Wye River agreements. It should be noted, however, that the United States was determined that its own administration should play a leading role in the ceremonies of the agreements, indicative of the fact that they took place with American endorsement and conformed to America's vision for the Middle East. In other words, Clinton took some credit for the agreements and made sure that America's role in the region remained predominant.

The Hebron Agreement

The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel's Prime Minister in May 1996 marked a turning point. His victory was due to the nature of Israel's first direct prime ministerial elections and his constructing a coalition with a new 'peace with security' agenda. As Bickerton and Klausner pointed out "in the 1996 election campaign, Netanyahu played the terrorism card and won."¹⁴⁵ His coalition of right wing and religious groups took a

¹⁴⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 300.

very different approach towards peace from that of the Labour government under Rabin and Peres. Land and security were the main problematic issues in the relations between the two sides. While the Oslo process was based on a negotiated transfer of land within a five-year period designed to build confidence and bringing them to a compromise final solution, Netanyahu began his rule in June 1996 with his widely known reservations about the whole 'peace process'. In his campaign speeches he had asserted that Jerusalem would remain Israel's undivided capital, and that Israel reserved the right to enter the Palestinian self-rule areas if necessary.¹⁴⁶ He declared his intention to renegotiate the agreement in line with his campaign slogan "peace with security", a euphemism for sweeping annexation.¹⁴⁷ John Whitbeck wrote that: "Netanyahu pledged to his Likud Party's congress in September 1996 that: "You can dream every night and you will still wake up every morning and see there is no Palestinian state . . . there is not and there will not be a Palestinian state." He insisted that "the most the Palestinians will get within the frame of the peace process is a limited autonomy" which, logically and legally, would require Israeli annexation of the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip. He even declared that the West Bank is 'part of Israel proper'.¹⁴⁸ Nonetheless, Netanyahu was eventually pressured into starting implementation of the Hebron Agreement against his own and his party's wishes. This period saw the United States taking a more determined role in events. It was not prepared to see the peace process stall and adjusted the nature of its own participation accordingly. The expectation that USA should play a

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 301.

¹⁴⁷ Aruri, N., "The US role in the peace process. and Leaving redeployment to Israel," *Middle East International*, no. 551, 21 March 1997, pp. 16-17.

¹⁴⁸ Whitbeck, J., "The Palestinian state exists," *Middle East International*, no. 576, 5 June 1998, p. 21.

direct role had stemmed in part from the fact that the original Cairo and Taba agreements, of which Hebron was a part, were signed under the USA's auspices. It was inconceivable, therefore, that they should be allowed to fail as that would imply weakness on the part of the USA.

The signing of the Hebron agreement on the 17th of January 1997 did not present an essential turning point in the Middle East peace process. The original Hebron agreement was in fact signed between the Israeli Labour government and the Palestinian National Authority on 28 September 1995. The implementation of the redeployment that was suppose to start in March 1996 was postponed until after the Israeli elections so as not to affect Peres' chances of winning it. It seemed that Arafat agreed to this postponement -in addition to the fact that he could do nothing to force its implementation- to prevent the Benjamin Netanyahu-led Likud Party from using this sensitive issue in its campaign against the Peres-led Labour Party. The defeat of Shimon Peres and the rise of Netanyahu to power affected not only the Hebron agreement but also the whole Oslo process, as we will see in the coming discussion. There is no doubt that the suicide bombings in January and February 1996 illustrated Peres's weakness and affected his position. On the other hand it played into Netanyahu's hands and made him preferable to the Israeli electorate.

It took more than seven months after Netanyahu assumed power and one hundred and twenty six days of complex and difficult negotiations that continued from 9 September 1996 to 15 July 1997 to finally reach and sign the Hebron Agreement.¹⁴⁹ In fact a re-negotiation took place of the Cairo agreement.¹⁵⁰ The text of the agreement

¹⁴⁹ See Appendices, p. 397.

¹⁵⁰ Middle East Studies Centre., *Hebron Agreement: A Likud Model for the Final Settlement*, (Amman: Dar Al Bashir, 1997), p. 11.

showed the expected approach of the Likud party in dealing with the issues of the final status, and the domination of security issues on most of its articles and annexes. The text is full of exceptional security arrangements for the 400 Jewish settlers.

The agreement mentioned that "The Palestinian police take the jurisdictions in the area H1 similar as those in the other West Bank cities" while Israel hold in its hands security responsibilities in area H2, in addition to overall security responsibilities for Israelis.¹⁵¹ The Hebron agreement, as Edward Said, wrote did not do any thing to change Israel's control on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and showed the Palestinian Authority's acquiescence to the continuation of Israeli sovereignty. Its significance – according to some- lay in the acceptance by Netanyahu of the Oslo formula, the acquiescence by Arafat in the presence of Jewish settlers in Hebron, and the critical role played by the United States in securing the accord.¹⁵²

The division of Hebron makes it possible for the Israelis to use it as a precedent to maintain their settlements all over the West Bank.¹⁵³ Netanyahu told the Knesset that "We are not leaving Hebron. We are not re-deploying from Hebron but in Hebron."¹⁵⁴ The Hebron agreement is effectively a division of the city that maintains Israeli security control and, most significantly, legitimises the existing Israeli settlements in its heart.¹⁵⁵ This might undermine Palestinians' position at the final status talks.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 7-43.

¹⁵² Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 305.

¹⁵³ Said, E., "The Real Meaning of Hebron Agreement." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no 103, p. 31.

¹⁵⁴ Andoni, L., "Hebron – the danger of a precedent." *Middle East International*, 7 February 1997, p. 17.

The Hebron issue showed how ultimately, and despite its willingness to become actively involved in the peace process when the prospect of failure loomed, the United States was not able or willing to put enough pressure on Israel to fully implement even the signed agreements. The intervention of President Mubarak and King Hussein in what seemed at the time a very big crisis around renegotiating and implementing a previously signed agreement showed the difficulties ahead in negotiating the final status issues especially under an Israeli right wing government. As Bickerton observed "President Clinton was unable to persuade Netanyahu to moderate his views."¹⁵⁶

In the final analysis the Hebron agreement crisis showed more than any thing how the Oslo general framework was vague and ambiguous and how the stronger party which is in this case uses its ambiguity clearly is Israel. It showed also how the absence of the arbitration issue that the Israelis succeeded in removing from the first draft of the DOP affected negatively the Palestinian side during the difficult implementation process.

Nasser Aruri pointed out rightly that,

The single most dangerous aspect of this new agreement (virtually Oslo III) is Arafat's acquiescence to the decision to cede to Israel, now in writing, the right to determine the extent of territory and number of forces that would be affected by the required redeployment in Area B during the interim phase.¹⁵⁷

The new negotiation terms and concepts imposed by the Netanyahu government, and the American reluctance to face the Israeli breach of signed agreements, all together with the new concessions the Palestinians were obliged to make even over the Oslo framework itself, gave a clear indication of where the whole process was going. The

¹⁵⁵ Said, (1997), Op. Cit., pp. 31-36.

¹⁵⁶ Bickerton and Klausner, (1998), Op. Cit., p. 301.

¹⁵⁷ Aruri, N., "The US role in the peace process. 1) From Madrid to Hebron," *Middle East International*, 7 March 1997, p. 17.

crisis in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations continued even after the signing of Hebron protocol. The unwillingness of the Netanyahu government to implement the further withdrawal required by previous agreements, plus its opening of a Hasmonean Tunnel exit onto the Via Dolorosa and the expansion of settlements created an explosive atmosphere. It forced the USA to play a much more active role in order to calm the situation that could, if it escalated, damage its interests in the region. The USA's invitation to the parties to hold extensive negotiations in Wye plantation and President Clinton personal involvement marked a different American approach.

Wye River Memorandum

Apart from the Hebron agreement which showed the new Israeli Likud government's attitude of disrespect towards the Oslo process by its renegotiations of a signed agreement, nothing more happened to advance peace and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians for some time.

Netanyahu's government decision on March 17, 1997 to begin construction of a new Jewish settlement on Gabal Abu Ghneem (Har-Homa in Hebrew) in East Jerusalem angered the Palestinians and brought the peace process to a halt.¹⁵⁸ The Palestinian extremists responded with more suicide bombings while the Israeli government confirmed on 2 April 1997 that it has approved further expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. The crisis in the peace process continued through 1997 with Netanyahu's government's failure to implement the further withdrawal required by the signed Oslo agreements.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19/3/1997 (ME/ 2871 MED1).

¹⁵⁹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 2893 MED/ 10, 15/4/1997.

USA intervention to find a way out continued but Dennis Ross failed on May 6, 1997 to convince both parties to soften their positions and Netanyahu turned down on March 20, 1998, an American proposal that Israel withdraw from 13.1 percent of the West Bank.¹⁶⁰ It was only in August 24, 1998 that Netanyahu accepted the USA's proposal to turn over 13.1 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians as long as 3 percent of it was designated as a nature reserve and USA Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced in Gaza that a peace summit would be held in the United States.¹⁶¹ Amid a personal scandal for President Clinton, Arafat and Netanyahu met him at the White House on September.¹⁶² The summit restarted on October 15 at the Aspen Institute's Wye River Conference Centre and culminated in an agreement known as the Wye River memorandum.¹⁶³

The Wye Plantation memorandum was signed on 23 October 1998 by Arafat and Netanyahu under USA auspices, and presented another example of the clear American alignment to Israel.¹⁶⁴ As Donald Neff observed, "In a highly unusual admission of the administration's dependence on the Israeli lobby, one official admitted, anonymously, that Clinton particularly did not want to alienate conservative Jews, many of whom support Israel's hard-liners, because the Democratic party is relying on them to help pay off the large debt left over from its costly 1996 election campaign."¹⁶⁵ The agreement

¹⁶⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3183 MED/ 1, 24/3/1998.

¹⁶¹ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3316 MED/ 10, 27/8/1998.

¹⁶² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3345 MED/1, 30/9/1998.

¹⁶³ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME 3361 MED/1, 19/10/1998.

¹⁶⁴ Seal, P., *Al-Hayat*. 18/11/ 1998. p. 5.

¹⁶⁵ Neff, D., "Has Clinton the strength or the will to save Oslo?" *Middle East*

was a package of measures designed to restore the peace process. These measures included Israeli withdrawal from 13 % of the West Bank over a period of 90 days, transfer of 14.2% of West Bank land from joint Israeli-Palestinian control to Palestinian control, setting up a joint Palestinian-Israeli committee to discuss third-phase troop withdrawals, the create of safe passage corridor for the free movement of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, opening a Palestinian airport and seaport, releasing 750 Palestinian political prisoners in three stages, Palestinian action against militant groups and arrest of 30 people accused by Israel of terrorism, Palestinian submission of detailed plan of action against alleged terrorists to the CIA and eliminating anti-Israeli clauses in the Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel.¹⁶⁶

Netanyahu, with American support, managed to swap the land for peace principle that is the basic element in Madrid process with land for security. Arafat made many concessions and got very little. Under American pressure he committed his Authority to crackdown on Hamas and to destroying its civilian and military infrastructure and protecting Israel -a duty- that exceeded the Palestinian authority's capability. At Wye, as Dilip Hiro mentioned, "Arafat signed another chapter of what (in Edward Said's analogy) has become the Palestinian Versailles."¹⁶⁷

Although many Palestinians —especially those who opposed the Oslo process— see this agreement as another betrayal by Arafat and that it stops a lot shorter than their expectation of Israeli withdrawal from all the West Bank or even the 30% that the

International, no. 548, 18 April 1997, p. 3.

¹⁶⁶ BBC Summary of world Broadcasts, ME 3368 MED/1, 27/10/1998.

¹⁶⁷ Hiro, D., "The End of Oslo: The Fateful Date of 4 May 1999," *Middle East International*, no. 586, 30 October 1998, p. 15.

Palestinian authority was asking for, some Israelis see it from a similar angle. An article in the *Jerusalem Post* predicted that “the Wye Memorandum will come to be known in Israel’s troubled history as the Great Betrayal.”¹⁶⁸

It encompasses the betrayal of solemn promises made to the people of Israel, the betrayal of the Jewish inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza and the hitherto greatest threat to Israel’s security... It follows in the footsteps of its predecessors, the Oslo I and II Agreements... If the Oslo Agreements have set the stage for the creation of a Palestinian state, the Wye Memorandum has gone a significant step toward solidifying the sovereignty of that state through two important concessions. It has granted the Palestinian entity a more coherent geographical configuration, encompassing a significantly greater degree of territorial contiguity. It has given the Palestinian Authority control of entry and exit of people and goods to and from its territory.

The Wye River Memorandum enabled the United States to extend a protective umbrella over the Palestinian entity and its authority. The American presence as an arbiter, inspector and guarantor is clear in the agreement. Some Palestinians see that the CIA presence is against them while some Israelis think that it serves the Palestinians because “the American involvement in virtually every aspect of implementation undermined the vital importance of ensuring maximal bilateral reciprocity and mutual responsibility in the execution of the undertaking in Israeli-Palestinian accords.”¹⁶⁹

In addition to the Wye River memorandum President Bill Clinton gave Netanyahu a series of unprecedented assurances in five letters, one from the American Secretary of State to Benjamin Netanyahu and four from the American Ambassador to Israel Edward Woker to Dani Naveh the secretary of the Israeli government.¹⁷⁰ The USA repeats in these letters its “strong commitment to Israel’s security” and that the USA will not adopt any position or express any views on the extent of the next Israeli

¹⁶⁸ *Jerusalem Post*, 27/10/1998.

¹⁶⁹ *Jerusalem Post*, 27/10/1998.

¹⁷⁰ For the letters of assurances addressed to Dani Naveh, see appendices, p. 390.

withdrawal from the West Bank. Also the USA agreed that "Israel alone will decide its security needs" and that the USA "opposes and will oppose" any unilateral declaration of Palestinian State. Clinton's domestic problems and scandals had forced him to seek Israeli's lobby support.

Signed in October, the Wye accords set up a three-phased framework for Israeli withdrawal from 13 percent of the West Bank, in return for security assurances and other measures from the Palestinians. During the first phase of implementation, which was carried out in full, Israel redeployed from 2% of area C (fully controlled Israeli territory) to area B (under joint Israeli-Palestinian control) and 7.1% of area B to area A (fully Palestinian-controlled territory). The Palestinians, in turn, shared their security plan with the USA and began implementing it. They also began confiscating illegal weapons and setting the stage for cutting the Palestinian Police. The PNC, meanwhile, reaffirmed the nullification of the sections of the Palestinian charter calling for Israel's destruction. During the second phase, the Palestinians continued implementing their security plan - but not to former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's satisfaction. His cabinet, citing the need for reciprocity and pointing out that Israel was scheduled to carry out the second part of the redeployment only after it was satisfied that the Palestinians had carried out their part of the deal, postponed the next withdrawal.¹⁷¹

The USA's direct involvement in the negotiation process increased during Netanyahu's period comparing to the Rabin-Peres period. The main reason for this is that Netanyahu's tough policies inflamed the situation and threatened the whole Middle East peace process. The movement on the peace process was an American interest and that can explain its more active role in both the Hebron and Wye River negotiations.

¹⁷¹ *Jerusalem Post*, 7/7/1999.

United States' Connection

The matter of the USA's knowledge and its giving the green light to the Oslo channel is beyond question for many reasons. The kind of "very special relations" between Israel and the United States and America's status as the only international superpower and regional hegemon made it impossible for the channel to succeed or even to start without the USA's blessing.

Terje Rod Larsen who played an important role in the Oslo secret channel is the one who can be aware more than any one else of any American role in the process. In an interview with the Middle East Insight he made it clear that no other party –a country, person or organisation- played a role in the peace process which could match the United States' role.

The American administration has played, is playing and must play the leading role as a third party in the peace process. There is no nation; there is no multilateral institution, which can replace the American role.¹⁷²

If it was easy to prove the USA's influence on the parties to attend the Madrid peace conference, thus proving the effect of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was much more difficult, but not impossible, to prove the USA's involvement in Oslo's secret negotiations.

It was neither possible or neither important nor desirable to leave the United States in the dark. It would be very unlikely that Israel would not have involved the USA in negotiations while they were bound by a strategic alliance. The Israelis, especially the Rabin government, could not afford to negotiate a deal and then surprise its only strategic ally and protector. However, the apparent absence of the USA during the first Oslo channel can be understood as part of a strategy. The USA would always support Israel and its need and demands concerning its existence, security and

¹⁷² Larsen, T., "Oslo Plus Five: The Spirit of Oslo, Interview," *Middle East Insight*, vol. xiii, no. 6, November 1998, p. 29.

requirement towards the settlement of its conflict with the Palestinians and Arab countries.

Obviously, Israel today would not be the powerful and prosperous nation it is without the US. And it would not long remain so if the US abruptly cut off its support. It is absurd to suggest that the US have no power to influence Israel to live up to its commitments and behave as a worthy US ally. Moreover, it is foolish to assert that the US, while supposedly not a party, is a 'full partner' in the peace process. It has never been a full partner, certainly not in the sense of being an honest mediator. Instead it has repeatedly deserted its own policies to side with Israeli policy against America's own interests and those of the Arab world.¹⁷³

Indeed, as John King pointed out, the USA was informed of the negotiations mediated by Norway and taking place in Oslo. As early as the second round of negotiations Yair Hirschfeld told Abu Ala that the United States gave the channel its blessing.¹⁷⁴

The American official in charge of the USA delegation at the multilateral negotiations, Dan Kurtzer, debriefed Hirschfeld. Like the Israelis, the Norwegians informed the USA about the Oslo track before it was completely underway.¹⁷⁵ Jan Egeland had already told Kurtzer in November 1992 that Norway was contemplating an informal link between Israel and the Palestinians. The United States apparently gave its blessing to the opening of another informal channel.¹⁷⁶ Even before that and particularly in early July, Peres told USA charge d'affair William Brown that Israel was going to reach a deal with the PLO.¹⁷⁷ Moreover during Christopher's visit to the region in early

¹⁷³ Neff, D., "The US and the peace process – hiding from reality," *Middle East International*, no. 558, 12 September 1997, p. 17.

¹⁷⁴ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 138.

¹⁷⁵ Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 26.

¹⁷⁶ King, (1994), Op. Cit., pp. 113-114

¹⁷⁷ Makovsky, (1996), Op. Cit., p. 27.

August 1993, two weeks before the Oslo agreement was initialled, Peres updated him about Oslo.¹⁷⁸ Peres even often tried to utilise the Americans to introduce proposals that he thought would be rejected if he was recognised publicly (or even by Rabin) as their source.¹⁷⁹

The Palestinians were concerned about the uncontrolled spread of information about the secret channel. Abu Ala told Hirschfeld that,

We are also anxious to keep it (the channel) secret, but we were surprised to find that Steve Cohen was aware of it and speaking about it in a way that embarrassed us, especially because he talked to people who have no relation whatsoever with matters of this sort.¹⁸⁰

Another account affirms that after each of the meetings in Norway, Deputy Foreign Minister Egeland made a report to the USA' State Department, while State Department official Dan Kurtzer was also monitoring the talks, so that the Americans must have known the detail of what was going on.¹⁸¹

Abu Mazen made it clear that from the beginning both the Israelis and the Palestinians agreed to inform other parties.

When the negotiations began in Oslo, the Israeli delegation suggested that the American administration and the Egyptian government should be informed. When the Palestinian delegation conveyed this suggestion to us in Tunis we agreed on condition that the Israelis would inform the American administration and that we would inform the Egyptian government. Shimon Peres duly told Warren Christopher and Dan Kurtzer.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁸⁰ Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 138.

¹⁸¹ King, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 105.

¹⁸² Abbas, (1995), Op. Cit., p. 185.

The secrecy of Oslo is an exaggerated story. Mahmoud Abbas said clearly that protecting the secrecy of the negotiations in the Oslo channel was impossible for entirely practical considerations. He disclosed that while Israel informed the USA, the PLO informed Egypt, Russia, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Morocco.¹⁸³

On the international level the co-sponsors could not be kept in the dark, and in any event we imagined that even if we did not tell them, their intelligence services would find out. As the Israelis had officially informed the Americans, we felt it incumbent on us to inform the Russians.¹⁸⁴

Jane Corbin pointed out that Norway informed the United States in early stage:

After Peres had broken the news that a peace deal had been concluded with the PLO, the Norwegian Foreign Minister was anxious to make it clear that Norway had kept America informed about the Oslo Channel. He reminded Christopher that Thorvald Stoltenberg and Jan Egeland had submitted general reports on the secret talks. In January Egeland had invited the Americans to participate, and Holst himself had given Christopher an early draft of the Declaration of Principles.¹⁸⁵

The fact that Peres tried to persuade the Americans to present the interim self-government agreement as an USA-brokered document gave the indication that the Israelis has done this before.¹⁸⁶

My emphasis on clarifying the fact that the USA was informed of the Oslo secret channel is due to the widely spread notion that the channel was a highly protected secret between Israel and the PLO. The American real involvement however increased following the Washington signing on 13 September 1993. The USA's role changed during the different stages of the process. From simply being kept informed during the

¹⁸³ Ibid., pp. 186-189

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁸⁵ Corbin, (1994), Op. Cit., p. 175.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 177.

secret channel, the USA became involved in the peace process in different degrees during the different phases of the negotiations. As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the American administration found itself obliged to make much intervention during Netanyahu government's stage. The American involvement in the Wye River negotiations for instance illustrates the USA's increased concern. The gradual development of the USA's role reflects its concern about its interests in the region that could be affected according to the march of the peace process. The New World Order that the USA had worked hard to create and impose, especially in the Middle East, required her to take a much more active role concerning the region's main issues, the most important of which is the Arab-Israeli peace process. The contradiction between its desire to present itself as the only superpower on one hand and its inability to force Israel to adopt a much acceptable approach concerning the peace process on the other damaged its position in the region. The USA has without a doubt a hegemonic position in the area, but was unable or unwilling or both to use this position against Israel for domestic reasons that we mentioned them repeatedly throughout this thesis. In sum one can argue that America has determined its interests to be the preservation of a friendly relationship with Israel and the achievement of peace in the region. The actual and specific features of that peace are not of interest to America and it will use its influence on Israel only to the extent that the peace process is not allowed to stall. It is unwilling to use its influence to force any specific conditions upon Israel. Therefore it ensures that one way or another American interests prevail over the regional efforts to make peace.

Conclusion

From examining the Oslo process in all its stages, it is important to draw some conclusions. The important point that has to be made here is that Israel succeeded in exploiting the international and regional atmosphere to achieve one of its long time goals of getting Palestinian and Arab recognition of its right to exist as a sovereign state within secure and recognised borders. As some Israeli leaders made it clear, the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 was the second biggest achievement for the Zionist movement after the establishment of the State in 1948.¹⁸⁷

Considering all the background of the Arab-Israeli and in particular the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and its history, the signing of such agreements by the PLO reflects how international and regional factors affected the PLO decision to accept it. The environment of the American dominated New World Order, where the only remaining superpower plays a hegemonic role especially in the Middle East, allowed the PLO very little space for manoeuvring. The PLO engagement in secret negotiations with Israel without any clear guarantees of positive results reflected its desperate need to survive the new circumstances of an unfavourable New World Order.

The USA hegemonic role in the New World Order was recognised not only by the PLO and other Arab parties but also by Israel. Ehud Barak the Israeli chief of staff and later Peres' Foreign Minister (November 1995-June 1996) and Israel's Prime Minister elect, as of May 1999 has also assessed and recognised the American vital role in the peace process.

The United States historically and currently plays a pivotal and vital role in the search for peace in the Middle East. By virtue of its recently attained status as the only global superpower of political clout, military power and economic strength,

¹⁸⁷ Shimon Peres referred to Oslo as such in his book *The New Middle East*, (London: Element, 1993)

the US plays a critical role as a facilitator, intermediary or broker, depending on who makes the definitions. The US is in unique and unparalleled position to advance its own interests by assisting the parties to attain or preserve theirs. The US has the manoeuvrability and latitude, as well as the capability to exert influence and project power in almost any regional conflict, and has historically done so –even when it contested the former USSR- in the Middle East since the 1950s.¹⁸⁸

The USA's direct or indirect involvement in the Oslo process was evident and can not be denied. Since its success in bringing the Arabs and Israelis together to the negotiation table in Madrid, the USA played an undeniable role in the peace process. It is important to say here that in contrast to common belief, the Madrid and Oslo are not totally different and separate processes. The overlap of personnel between Madrid and Oslo is evidence that the second process grew out of the first. Both Israel and the PLO tried to use the secret negotiation channel to achieve its own aims. The Israelis got secrecy out of it (enabling them to retreat if it did not work). The PLO got direct negotiations out of it (rather than having to go through Palestinians from the Occupied Territories). The secrecy aspect worked against the PLO while the recognition of the PLO did not work against Israel. In other words, the particular format of Oslo, while benefiting both parties, still favoured Israel more than the PLO, but it was not a format which the PLO could afford to resist. Both parties used the Oslo agreements to improve their positions and get out of their regional and international isolation. The PLO hoped that the agreement, despite its entire shortcomings, would be a step towards achieving the Palestinian national aspirations. Israel used it as an instrument to dismantle its isolation and to fully integrate in the region.

The several agreements and the whole peace process in its different stages reflect developments in the American dominated New World Order. The initial absence

¹⁸⁸ Barak, E., "Israel Opposition Perspective, Interview," *Middle East Insight*, vol. xiii, no. 6, November 1998, pp. 12.

of the American direct participation was partly part of its strategy to help Israel achieve its goals. Its commitment towards Israel's existence, survival, security and military superiority in the Middle East was the main element behind its entire policy. The United States' direct and gradual active role in the process since the signing of the DOP and throughout the last six years confirms its commitment to secure Israel's integration into the Middle East. The degree of its activity or in another words maximising or minimising of its role was dependent on how it sees the process going. When its absence serves Israel's tactical interests, it will excuse itself from involvement in the negotiation process. If the situation get worse and it seems that Arab anger will transfer to violence and create a situation where Israel's security could be threatened, the USA will rush to calm the situation by all means available on its position and weapons in its armoury. The United States is always willing to step-in when things get shaky. The Sharm al-Sheikh summit of the 'peacemakers' on March 13, 1996 was an example of this policy. Clinton's visit to Israel the following day where he addressed the Israeli Knesset in a show of support and promised Israel money and equipment was another confirmation. The American intensive involvement in the Wye Plantation meetings, with the active participation of the president himself is another example of attempting to ease the tension and reduce the risk of the situation getting worse, in addition to the fact that the administration tried to use the gathering for its own domestic agenda during that period.

United States' policies in the Middle East were of course designed to serve its interests, but the fact that Israel is the most important of these interests turned these policies to merely tools to serve Israel's strategy and thus created difficulties for the USA to be a honest broker or an unbiased mediator.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to define the World Order and examine its relations with and impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process. Although the Old World Order was examined, the main focus in this study was on the New World Order. More specifically I tried to understand how and where did the Oslo agreements and the peace process that came out of them fit into the larger relationship between the New World Order and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

One of the main objectives of this study was to show that the Oslo peace process was not a departure from the peace process initiated in Madrid but rather a continuation of it. The whole peace process (Madrid and Oslo) was shaped by and a result of the New World Order. In other words the Arab-Israeli peace process in the New World Order, just as in the Old World Order, has been determined by the character of, and changes at, the international system level. The thesis has argued that the Oslo Agreements and the peace process that emerged from them have been shaped by a New World Order in which America has played the role of a single, hegemonic, superpower. America's interests and preferences shaped the process, whether through direct or indirect American involvement, or through the indirect or direct acknowledgment by regional actors, of the nature of the New World Order.

For clearer understanding, it was vital to define the nature of the Old World Order and examine the impact of the Cold War on the region and its Arab-Israeli peace process. It was vital also to look at the New World Order and define its unipolar and hegemonic

nature. The United States' hegemony in the Middle East ought to be understood in order to assess its impact on the Arab Israeli peace process.

To examine and understand the impact of that hegemony on the peace process in the New World Order I went on to detailed study of both the Madrid and Oslo peace processes and subsequent agreements.

In the Old World Order, the distribution of power globally created a bipolar system where the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the world affairs with their struggle for power in the international scene. This 'Cold War' was the main feature of the international system prior to 1991. The neo-realist understanding of the Old World Order interpreted the Cold War period as one of a bipolar balance of power. The USA and the USSR exercised their power against one another through intermediary spheres of influence. The world lined up in two opposing camps throughout the whole period between the end of World War II in 1945 and the beginning of the New World Order in 1991. The impact of that Old Order on the Middle East was undeniable. The state alignment and patron-client relationships affected the way regional actors conducted their policies and pursued their interests. To advance and protect their interests in the Middle East, the superpowers penetrated the region through all means. The international conflict affected regional conflicts and vice versa. The Arab-Israeli peace process was almost non-existent. Those states that remained un-aligned sought to take advantage of super-power rivalries to advance their own interests; therefore, they too recognised a bipolar distribution and balance of power. The ability of the regional actors to play the rules of the game by using the superpowers competition on the one hand and the superpowers desire to use the conflict to advance its interests on the other victimised the peace process and restricted the possibilities for peace action.

Because the World Order is, by definition a stable distribution of power between major states as well as a pattern of behaviour or rules governing the behaviour of states, the New World Order is and will be for some time an American unipolar one. As Charles Krauthammer observed “the most striking feature of post-cold war is its unipolarity.” The United States emerged as the center of world power in an unchallenged position as the only remaining superpower. Its hegemony represents the new international distribution of power. The role of the USA in the New World Order is and will be for some time a global hegemon that determines the new rules of the game. The United States used the opportunities created by the end of the Cold War, to show its international domination and its ability to act unilaterally to impose its will, without fear of confronting another superpower.

The United States’ proclaimed New World Order was designed to protect its interests. The fact that Israel is one of the most important of its interests made the Middle East its main foreign policy priority. Israel and the Arabs in general and the PLO in particular played the rules of the new international system in the New World Order. Recognising the fact that the new distribution of power resulted in an American international unipolarity and regional hegemony allowed the parties to adjust their initial positions to meet these international and regional changes.

For the United States, as long as there is no peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, no country will be allowed to be strong enough to pose threat to Israel. Israel, according to the strategic imperatives of the United States, must be able to face any coalition between Arab countries.

The end of the Cold War and the second Gulf War allowed the USA to initiate a new peace process, which started at Madrid. The Madrid peace process was one of the symptoms of the New World Order and one of its implications. The only remaining

superpower hegemonic position the USA enjoyed in the New World Order enabled her to bring the parties together around the negotiation table. Its reluctance to use its hegemony to put pressure on Israel to make some territorial concessions in order to advance the process or at least to stick to its commitment contributed to Madrid's inability to achieve immediate agreements. As Tim Niblock made clear,

The parameters within which Arab-Israeli relations have been shaped and developed have begun to change. These 'changed parameters' are not incidental. They reflect, at least in part, changes in global international relations. The disintegration of the Soviet Union deprived Syria of the superpower ally which could have enabled it to pose a military challenge to Israel; gave Israel more leeway to experiment with policies it might have deemed too risky before; narrowed the range of strategic options open to the PLO; created new opportunities for Israel to benefit from cooperation with states in the wide region (e.g. the new states of Transcaucasia and central Asia), provided it could purvey a less discriminatory and oppressive image; and left the United States free to pursue its own preferred strategy on Arab-Israeli matters, uninhibited by fears that a superpower rival would exploit any initiative by undermining United States influence.¹

The Madrid peace conference however, played an important role in removing psychological barriers which, helped reaching other agreements. The long and hard negotiations and initial documents were used as basis for other separate negotiations in Oslo as it proved later.

The Oslo secret channel seemed for many to be a departure from the Madrid peace process. The fact of the matter is that the Oslo peace process was part of the much wider peace process initiated in Madrid. It grew out of it and achieved similar objectives even though through another format. The Clinton administration was aware of the Oslo secret negotiations. The PLO and Israel were negotiating a deal that needed to be acceptable to, and take account of the USA's interests.

¹ Niblock, T., "A Frame for Renewal in the Middle East?" in H. Jawad., *The Middle East in the New World Order*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 4.

The Oslo peace process fitted neatly into American interests in the Middle East and into its vision of how regional conflicts should be resolved. There was evidence that it was consulted and informed of the process. The Oslo agreements and the peace process that has emerged from them have been shaped by the American-led New World Order. This happened as a result either through direct American involvement or through indirect acknowledgment by regional parties of the nature of the New World Order. The Rabin-Peres government following the 1992 Israeli elections preferred the Norwegian mediation and agreed on the Oslo secret channel with the PLO. After difficult secret negotiations Israel and the PLO reached an agreement on the principles that will guide the peace negotiations. The Declaration of Principles signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 was seen as a real breakthrough. Negotiations on the interim agreement and its implementation process are still continued. The Cairo, Taba (Oslo II), Hebron and Wye agreements were needed to settle the many differences between Israel and the Palestinians. Sharm al-sheikh and many other agreements seemed to be necessary to settle many other difficult issues. It is clear that because of the close links between Israel and the USA, Israel acts as the regional power on behalf of its strategic ally the USA. Therefore the peace process has been balanced in Israel's favor. This can be seen in the texts of the Oslo agreements and the way the USA has not made Israel stick to its commitments under those agreements.

United States' interests and policy shaped the whole peace process. First, in the way participants acted and the strategies they adopted and secondly in the way the USA participated and acted. This resulted in the direct involvement of the USA in Madrid followed by indirect involvement in Oslo, then direct involvement again after Oslo agreement. The continuity of the process was further evidence of the American special role that it had acquired through its unipolar and hegemonic position.

Needless to say that all the peoples of the region need to live in peace, security and stability. Peace however can not be durable unless it is comprehensive and based on justice and real reconciliation. The future of the Arab-Israeli peace process is uncertain. Although a great part depends on the will of the peoples and states of the region, the international actors within the New World Order will have important impact on this future. If the USA hegemony continues, and taking into account the Israeli influence on USA policy, Israel will dictate what happens next. Any future settlement will be in Israel's favor. Jerusalem will remain as Israel always insisted its eternal united capital; the Palestinian refugees will not be allowed back to their homeland; Israel will not give up the Golan heights or even South Lebanon and with American help will maintain the regional power position it has enjoyed since the end of the Second Gulf War. Even if the unipolar world order turned within a reasonable time to a multipolar world order where a united Europe, China and Russia competed again with the USA, it might be too late for the Arab parties to take advantage of such changes.

Studying the impact of the New World Order on the Arab-Israeli peace process (1991-1999) can only open the gate to more research of these important issues. That the process is still at an early stage after eight years since the convening of Madrid conference shows how long the process is. The Oslo peace process concerns only the Israeli-Palestinian track, leaving open huge gap for studying the Syrian and Lebanese tracks. The final status negotiations and the expected progress and agreements will be an important and vital area to study. The comparison between the way in which the Arab-Israeli peace process takes shape within the different world orders will remain an important field of study to understand the interaction between the international and regional levels.

In a New World Order where Israel enjoys the support of the United States as the only remaining superpower, the Arabs and the Palestinians in particular will not get a

comprehensive, fair and just solution. For them it seems better to wait for another favorable New World Order. For Israel, however, while it succeeded in reaching a peace agreement with King Hussein of Jordan before he passed away, the failure to reach a peace agreement with Assad of Syria and a final settlement with Arafat might entail waiting a long time before new leaders acquire enough power and support to allow them to end this century-long conflict and reach historic reconciliation. The rules and conditions of the unipolar American-led New World Order that brought the parties together to negotiate peace might be the main obstacle on the road to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting Arab-Israeli peace. To conclude it might be safer not to predict and to leave the future in the hands of God. But like Dr Ali Errishi,² the son of my own beloved city Benghazi, and together with Minnie Louis Haskins, I like to say: "and I said to the man who stood at the gate of the year: Give me a light that I may tread safely into the unknown. And he replied: 'Go out into the darkness and put your hand into the Hand of God; that shall be to you better than light and safer than a known way.'"

² <http://www.Libyanet.com/v16Oct99.htm>

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The Middle East

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Excerpts of President George Bush'Address to Joint Session of Congress on the Middle East, Washington, D.C., 6 March 1991

...Tonight I come to this House to speak about the world - the world after war. The recent challenge could not have been clearer. Saddam Hussein was the villain, Kuwait the victim. To the aid of this small country came nations from North America and Europe, from Asia and South America, from Africa and the Arab world, all united against aggression.

Our uncommon coalition must now work in common purpose to forge a future that should never again be held hostage to the darker side of human nature.

Tonight In Iraq, Saddam walks amidst ruin. His war machine is crushed. His ability to threaten mass destruction is itself destroyed. His people have been lied to, denied the truth. And when his defeated legions come home, all Iraqis will see and feel the havoc he has wrought. And this I promise you: For all that Saddam has done to his own people, to the Kuwaitis, and to the entire world, Saddam and those around him are accountable.

All of us grieve for the victims of war, for the people of Kuwait and the suffering that scars the soul of that proud nation. We grieve for all our fallen soldiers and their families, for all the innocents caught up in this conflict. And, yes, we grieve for the people of Iraq, a people who have never been our enemy. My hope is that, one day we will once again welcome them as friends into the community of nations.

Our commitment to peace in the Middle East does not end with the liberation of Kuwait. So tonight let me outline four key challenges to be met.

First, we must work together to create shared security arrangements in the region. Our friends and allies in the Middle East recognize that they will bear the bulk of the responsibility for regional security. But we want them to know that as we stood with them to repel aggression, so now America stands ready to work with them to secure the peace.

This does not mean stationing U.S. ground forces on the Arabian Peninsula, but it does mean American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces. It means maintaining a capable U.S. naval presence in the region, just as we have for over forty years. Let it be clear: our vital national interests depend on a stable and secure Gulf.

Second, we must act to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. It would be tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Iraq requires special vigilance. Until Iraq convinces the world of its peaceful intentions - that its leaders will not use new revenues to rearm and rebuild its menacing war machine - Iraq must not have access to the instruments of war.

And third, we must work to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East. On the night I announced operation Desert Storm, I expressed my hope that out of the horrors of war might come new momentum for peace. We have learned in

the modern age geography cannot guarantee security and security does not come from military power alone.

All of us know the depth of bitterness that has made the dispute between Israel and its neighbors so painful and intractable. Yet, in the conflict just concluded, Israel and many of the Arab states have for the first time found themselves confronting the same aggressor. By now, it should be plain to all parties that peacemaking in the Middle East requires compromise. At the same time, peace brings real benefits to everyone. We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states - and between Israelis and Palestinians. The tactics of terror lead nowhere. There can be no substitute for diplomacy.

A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.

The war with Iraq is over. The quest for solution to the problem in Lebanon, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in the Gulf must go forward with new vigor and determination. And I guarantee you: No one will work harder for a stable peace in the region than we will.

Fourth, we must foster economic development for the sake of peace and progress. The Persian Gulf and Middle East form a region rich in natural resources with a wealth of untapped human potential. Resources once squandered on military might must be redirected to more peaceful ends. We are already addressing the immediate economic consequences of Iraq's aggression. Now the challenge is to reach higher - to foster economic freedom and prosperity for all people of the region.

By meeting these four challenges, we can build a framework for peace. I've asked secretary of State Baker to go to listen, to probe, to offer suggestions, and to advance the search for peace and stability. I have also asked him to raise the plight of the hostages held in Lebanon. We have not forgotten them, and we will not forget them.

To all the challenges that confront this region of the world, there is no single solution, no solely American answer. But we can make a difference for positive change.

But we cannot lead a New World abroad if, at home, it's politics as usual on American defense and diplomacy. It's time to turn away from the temptation to protect unneeded weapons systems and obsolete bases. It's time to put an end to micromanagement of foreign and security assistance programs, micromanagement that humiliates our friends and allies and hamstringing our diplomacy. It's time to rise above the parochial and the pork barrel, to do what is necessary, what's right and what will enable this nation to play the leadership role required of us.

The consequences of the conflict in the Gulf reach far beyond the confines of the Middle East. Twice before in this century, an entire world was convulsed by war. Twice this century, out of the horrors of war hope emerged for enduring peace. Twice before, those hopes proved to be a distant dream, beyond the grasp of man.

Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided - a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war.

Now, we can see a New World coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a **New World Order**. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against the strong ..." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations.

The Gulf war put this New World to its first test, and, my fellow Americans, we passed that test.

For the sake of our principles, for the sake of the Kuwaiti people, we stood our ground. Because the world would not look the other way, Ambassador [Saud Nasir] al-Sabah, to night, Kuwait is free.

Tonight as our troops begin to come home, let us recognize that the hard work of freedom still calls us forward. We've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars." Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission.

Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 20, no. 4, Summer 1991, issue 80, p. 180.

APPENDIX II

U.S.-Soviet Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference

October 18, 1991

After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.

Toward that end, the president of the United States and the president of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on 30 October 1991.

President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6:00 PM Washington time, 23 October 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference.

Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest.

The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited to attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will be represented by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send its secretary-general to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general.

The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues or results. The conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the parties.

With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once the agreed interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning in the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of resolution 242 and 338.

It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is their intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties that agree to attend.

The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve.

Source: Makovsky, D., *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord*, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 191.

APPENDIX III

Main Points of the U.S. Letters of Assurance on the Terms of the Madrid Peace Conference, October 1991

- **US letter of Assurance to Israel:**

1. The US sees the objective of the Middle East negotiation as the attainment of genuine peace and reconciliation between the peoples of the region, accompanied by peace treaties and full diplomatic relations.
 2. The opening conference will have no power to make decisions, hold votes, or impose positions.
 3. Negotiations will be direct only.
 4. The US will not support linkage between the various bilateral negotiations.
 5. No party need sit with another party against its wishes.
 6. The US has no intention of bringing about a dialogue between Israel and the PLO or negotiations between them.
 7. Palestinians taking part in negotiations must be residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip who accept phased direct negotiations in two tracks and are ready to live at peace with Israel.
 8. The US will not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state.
 9. Israel holds its own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, alongside other interpretations.
 10. Israel is entitled to secure and defensible borders.
 11. The US will take steps to enlarge the circle of peace in the Middle East.
 12. The US will take steps to bring the Arab economic boycott to an end and to have UN Resolution 3379 equating Zionism and racism annulled.
 13. The US will consult closely with Israel and show due consideration for Israel's positions in the peace process.
 14. The US reconfirms ex-president Gerald Ford's written commitment to ex-premier Yitzhak Rabin of September 1975 regarding the importance of the Golan Heights to Israel's security.
 15. The US would be ready to give its own guarantees to any border agreed upon between Israel and Syria.
 16. Israel is entitled to a secure border with Lebanon and Security Council Resolution 425 on Lebanon must be implemented in a manner assuring the stability and security of the border.
- The US is committed to Israel's security and to the maintenance of Israel's qualitative edge.

- **US Letter of Assurance to Syria:**

1. The peace conference and the talks that follow must be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
2. The object of the conference is to prepare for direct bilateral Arab-Israeli talks within two days and also for multilateral talks within two weeks. The bilateral talks will run on two parallel tracks: direct talks between Israel and the neighboring states, and direct talks between Israel and "the Palestinians."
3. The US intends to work actively towards a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict and do everything it can to keep the two-track process going in that direction. The US is not an advocate of linkage between the the "various forms of

negotiations,” but believes that speedy action in all negotiations to arrive at an agreement is needed and would serve the interest of a comprehensive settlement.

4. The conference will convene under US-Soviet auspices and can reconvene with the approval of all parties.

5. The role of the UN consists in the dispatch by the UN secretary-general of a representative to attend the conference as an observer. The US and the USSR will keep the secretary-general informed of the progress of the negotiations. Any agreements reached by the parties will be registered at the UN secretariat and communicated to the security council, whose endorsement will be sought by the participating parties. The US, cognizant of all parties’ interests in the success of this process, will not, as long as the process is actively under way, support any parallel or conflicting action by Security Council.

6. The final settlement can be reached only on the basis of mutual concessions during the negotiations. The US will throughout these negotiations continue to be committed to the fact that Security Council Resolution 242 and the land-for-peace principle are applicable to all fronts, including the Golan Heights.

7. The US does not intend to recognize or accept any unilateral action on the part of Israel vis-a-vis the extension of its laws, sovereignty or administration on the territory of the Golan Heights.

8. The US will continue to oppose Israeli settlement activity in the territories occupied in 1967, which remains an obstacle to peace.

9. The US is prepared to serve as guarantor of the security of whatever borders Israel and Syria agree on.

The US will continue to act as a mediator that genuinely seeks a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of recognition of all parties’ “needs and requirements.” The US and USSR will remain the “moving force” in this process to help the parties make progress towards a comprehensive peace settlement.

The US and USSR are ready to remain in constant touch with any of the parties at any time, and the US is also ready to participate in the negotiations in any of their stages with the approval of the parties involved.

- **US Letter of Assurance to Lebanon:**

An assurance that Security Council Resolution 425, which calls for an Israeli withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, has nothing to do with resolution 242 and will be treated as a separate issue.

As assurance that the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon are two separate issues, the former addressed by resolution 425 and the latter by the Taef agreement, which also calls for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon.

- **US Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians:**

- Palestinians and Israel must respect each other’s security, identity, and political rights.
- Bilateral talks will begin four days after the opening of the conference.
- Multilateral talks will open two weeks after the opening of the peace conference.
- We believe that Palestinians should gain control over political, economic, and other decisions that affect them and their fate.
- The US will seek to avoid prolongation and stalling by any party. All negotiations should proceed as quickly as possible toward agreement.
- The US doesn’t seek to determine who speaks for Palestinians in this process. We are seeking to launch a political negotiating process that directly involves Palestinians and

offers a pathway for achieving the legitimate political rights of the Palestinian people and for participation in the determination of their future. We believe that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation offers the most promising pathway toward this end.

- Palestinians will be free to announce the component of the joint delegation and to make a statement during the opening of the conference. They may also raise any issue pertaining to the substance of the negotiations during the negotiations.

- The US understands how much importance Palestinians attach to the question of East Jerusalem. Thus we want to assure you that nothing Palestinians do in choosing their delegation members in this phase of the process will affect their claim to East Jerusalem or be prejudicial or precedential to the outcome of the negotiations.

- The US is opposed to the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and extension of Israeli law on it and the extension of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries. We encourage all sides to avoid unilateral acts that would exasperate local tensions or make negotiations more difficult or preempt their final outcome.

- The US believes that Palestinians of East Jerusalem should be able to participate by voting in elections of an interim governing authority. The US further believes that Palestinians from East Jerusalem and Palestinians outside the occupied territories who meet the three criteria should be able to participate in the negotiations on final status. The US supports the right of Palestinians to bring any issue including East Jerusalem to the table.

- The purpose of negotiations on transitional arrangements is to affect the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority from Israel to Palestinians. Palestinians need to achieve rapid control over political, economic, and other decisions that affect their lives and to adjust to a new situation in which Palestinians exercise authority in the West Bank and Gaza. For its part the US will strive from the outset and encourage all the parties to adopt steps that can create an environment of confidence and mutual trust, including respect for human rights.

- Negotiations between Israel and Palestinians will be conducted in phases beginning with talks on interim self-governing arrangements. The talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreements within one year. Once agreed the interim self-governing arrangements will last for a period of five years. Beginning the third year of the period of self-governing arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. It is the aim of the US government that permanent status negotiations will be concluded by the end of the transitional period.

- Palestinians are free to argue whatever outcome they believe best meets their requirements. The US will accept any outcome agreed by the parties. In this regard and consistent with long-standing US policies, confederation is not excluded as a possible outcome of negotiations on final status.

- The US believe that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues that can only be reached through negotiations. In this regard the US has opposed and will continue to oppose settlement activity in territories occupied in 1967 which remain an obstacle to peace.

- Any party will have access to the sponsors at any time.

- We are prepared to work hard with you in the period ahead.

Source: Flamhaft, Z., *Israel on the Road to Peace, Accepting the Unacceptable*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp .201-205.

APPENDIX III

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the 'Palestinian Delegation'), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I

Aim of the Negotiations

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle east peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the 'Council) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the overall peace process and that final status negotiations will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II

Framework for the interim period

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III Elections

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observations, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the west Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

Transitional period and permanent status negotiations

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinians police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

Interim agreement

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the 'Interim Agreement').
2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian water Administration Authority, and any other authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII**Public Order and Security**

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of the Israelis to protect their internal security and public order.

Article IX**Laws and Military Orders**

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X**Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee**

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI**Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic Fields**

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII**Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt**

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of the admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII**Redeployment of Israeli Forces**

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside the populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV

Israeli Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV

Resolution of disputes

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Programs

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a 'Marshall Plan', the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

Miscellaneous Provisions

1. This Declaration of principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth of September 1993.

For the Government of Israel

For the P.L.O

witnessed by:

_____The

United States of America

The Russian Federation

Source: Abbas, M., Through Secret Channels: The Road to Oslo, Senior PLO leader Abu Mazen's Revealing Story of the Negotiations with Israel, (Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1995), p. 225.

APPENDIX V

GAZA-JERICHO AUTONOMY AGREEMENT

(CAIRO AGREEMENT) 4 MAY 1994

The Government of the state of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people;

PREAMBLE

WITHIN the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991;

REAFFIRMING their determination to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;

REAFFIRMING their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement through the agreed political process;

REAFFIRMING their adherence to the mutual recognition and commitments expressed in the letters dated September 9, 1993, signed by and exchanged between the prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO;

REAFFIRMING their understanding that the interim self government arrangements, including the arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area contained in this Agreement, are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security council Resolutions 242 and 338;

DESIROUS of putting into effect the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed at Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993, and the Agreed Minutes thereto (hereinafter "the Declaration of principles"), and in particular the Protocol on withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area;

HEREBY AGREE to the following arrangements regarding the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area:

Article I

Definitions

For the purpose of this Agreement:

- a. the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area are delineated on map Nos. 1 and 2 attached to this Agreement;
- b. "the Settlements" means the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 1;
- c. "the Military Installation Area" means the Israeli military installation area along the Egyptian border in the Gaza Strip, as shown on map No. 1; and
- d. the term " Israelis" shall also include Israeli statutory agencies and corporations registered in Israel.

Article II

Scheduled withdrawal of Israeli Military forces

1. Israel shall implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area to begin immediately with the signing of this Agreement.
2. Subject to the arrangements included in the Protocol concerning withdrawal of Israeli Military forces and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I, the Israeli

withdrawal shall include evacuating all military bases and other fixed installations to be handed over to the Palestinian police, to be established pursuant to Article IX below (hereinafter “ the Palestinian Police”).

3. In order to carry out Israel’s responsibility for external security and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis, Israel shall, concurrently with the withdrawal, redeploy its remaining military forces to the settlements and the military Installation Area, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, this redeployment shall constitute full implementation of Article XIII of the Declaration of Principles with regard to the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area only.

4. For the purpose of this Agreement, “ Israeli military forces” may include Israel police and other Israeli security forces.

5. Israelis, including Israeli military forces, may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Palestinians may use public roads crossing the settlements freely, as provided for in Annex I.

6. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security of Palestinians in accordance with this Agreement and Annex I.

Article III

Transfer of Authority

1. Israel shall transfer authority as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, hereby established, in accordance with Article V of this Agreement, except for the authority that Israel shall continue to exercise as specified in this Agreement.

2. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the protocol concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex II.

3. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of the agreed powers and responsibilities are set out in Annex II.

4. Upon the completion of the Israeli withdrawal and the transfer of powers and responsibilities as detailed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above and in Annex II, the Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area will be dissolved and the Israeli military government shall not prevent it from continuing to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified in this Agreement.

5. A Joint Civil Affairs coordination and cooperation committee (hereinafter “the CAC”) and two Joint Regional Civil Affairs subcommittees for the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area respectively shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, as detailed in Annex II.

6. The offices of the Palestinian Authority shall be located in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area pending the inauguration of the council to be elected pursuant to the Declaration of Principles.

Article IV

Structure and composition of the Palestinian Authority

1. The Palestinian Authority will consist of one body of 24 members which shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement, in accordance with this Article, and shall be responsible for the exercise of Judicial functions in accordance with Article VI, subparagraph 1.b. of this Agreement.

2. The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and may establish, within its Jurisdiction, other departments and subordinate administrative units as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. It shall determine its own internal procedures.
3. The PLO shall inform the Government of Israel of the names of the members of the Palestinian Authority and any change of members. Changes in the membership of the Palestinian Authority will take effect upon an exchange of letters between the PLO and the Government of Israel.
4. Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter into office upon undertaking to act in accordance with this Agreement.

Article V

Jurisdiction

1. The authority of the Palestinian Authority encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal Jurisdiction, as follows:

a. The territorial Jurisdiction covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area territory, as defined in Article I, except for Settlements and the Military Installation Area.

Territorial Jurisdiction shall include land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

b. The functional Jurisdiction encompasses all powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement. This Jurisdiction does not include foreign relations, internal security and public order of Settlements and the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and external security.

c. The personal jurisdiction extends to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction referred to above, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.

2. The Palestinian Authority has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.

3. a. Israel has authority over the settlements, the Military Installation Area, Israelis, external security, internal security and public order of Settlements, the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and those agreed powers and responsibilities specified in this Agreement.

b. Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for that end, shall continue to have the necessary

Article VI, subparagraph 1.1. of this Agreement.

2. The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, other departments and subordinate administrative units as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities. It shall determine its own internal procedures.

3. The PLO shall inform the Government of Israel of the names of the members of the Palestinian Authority and any change of members. Change in the membership of the Palestinian Authority will take effect upon an exchange of letters between the PLO and the Government of Israel.

4. Each member of the Palestinian Authority shall enter into office upon undertaking to act in accordance with this Agreement.

Article V**Jurisdiction**

1. The authority of the Palestinian Authority encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows:
 - a. The territorial jurisdiction covers the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area territory, as defined in Article I, except for settlements and the Military Installation Area.
Territorial jurisdiction shall include land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
 - b. The functional jurisdiction, encompasses all powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement. This jurisdiction does not include foreign relations, internal security and public order of settlements and the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and external security.
 - c. The personal jurisdiction extends to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction referred to above, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.
2. The Palestinian Authority has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.
3.
 - a. Israel has authority over the Settlements, the Military Installation Area, Israelis, external security, internal security and public order of settlements, the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and those agreed powers and responsibilities specified in this Agreement.
 - b. Israel shall exercise its authority through its military government, which, for that end, shall continue to have the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.
4. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and airspace shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
5. The provisions of this Article are subject to the specific legal arrangements detailed in the protocol concerning legal Matters attached as Annex III. Israel and the Palestinian Authority may negotiate further legal arrangements.
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters through the legal subcommittee of the CAC.

Article VI**Powers and Responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority**

1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Palestinian Authority, within its jurisdiction:
 - a. has legislative powers as set out in Article VII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers;
 - b. will administer justice through an independent judiciary;
 - c. will have, inter alia, power to formulate policies, supervise their implementation, employ staff, establish departments, authorities and institutions, sue and be sued and conclude contracts; and
 - d. will have, inter alia, the power to keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents.
2.
 - a. In accordance with the Declaration of Principles, the Palestinian Authority will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of

foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.

- b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority in the following cases only:
 1. economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex IV of this Agreement;
 2. agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Palestinian Authority;
 3. agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans detailed in Annex IV of the Declaration of principles or in agreements entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations; and
 4. cultural, scientific and educational agreements.
- c. Dealings between the Palestinian Authority and representatives of foreign states and international organisations, as well as the establishment in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 2.b. above, shall not be considered foreign relations.

Article VII

Legislative Powers of the Palestinian Authority

1. The Palestinian Authority will have the power, within its jurisdiction, to promulgate legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.
2. legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
3. legislation promulgated by the Palestinian Authority shall be communicated to a legislation subcommittee to be established by the CAC (hereinafter "the legislation subcommittee"). During a period of 30 days from the communication of the legislation, Israel may request that the legislation subcommittee decide whether such legislation exceeds the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority or is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
4. Upon receipt of the Israeli request, the legislation subcommittee shall decide, as an initial matter, on the entry into force of the legislation pending its decision on the merits of the matter.
5. If the legislation subcommittee is unable to reach a decision with regard to the entry into force of the legislation within 15 days, this issue will be referred to a board of review. This board of review shall be comprised of two judges, retired judges or senior jurists (hereinafter "Judges"), one from each side, to be appointed from a compiled list of three Judges proposed by each. In order to expedite the proceeding before this board of review, the two most senior judges, one from each side, shall develop written informal rules of procedure.
6. legislation referred to the board of review shall enter into force only if the board of review decides that it does not deal with a security issue which falls under Israel's responsibility, that it does not seriously threaten other significant Israeli interests protected by this Agreement and that the entry into force of the legislation could not cause irreparable damage or harm.

7. The legislation subcommittee shall attempt to reach a decision on the merits of the matter within 30 days from the date of the Israeli request. If this subcommittee is unable to reach such a decision within this period of 30 days, the matter shall be referred to in Article XV below (hereinafter “ the Liaison committee”). This liaison committee will deal with the matter immediately and will attempt to settle it within 30 days.

8. Where the legislation has not entered into force pursuant to paragraphs 5 or 7 above, this situation shall be maintained pending the decision of the liaison committee on the merits of the matter, unless it has decided otherwise.

9. Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this Agreement.

Article VIII

Arrangements for Security and Public Order

1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, the Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force, as set out in Article IX below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian border and the Jordanian line, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.

2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanism are specified in Annex I.

3. A joint coordination and cooperation committee for mutual security purposes (hereinafter “the JSC”), cooperation offices for the Gaza district, the Khan Younis district and the Jericho district respectively (hereinafter “ the DCOs”) are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at the request of either party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I.

Article IX

The Palestinian Directorate of police force

1. The Palestinian Authority shall establish a strong police force, the Palestinian Directorate of police force (hereinafter “ the Palestinian police”). The duties, functions, structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and operation, are set out in Annex I, Article III. Rules of conduct governing the activities of the Palestinian police are set out in Annex I, Article VIII.

2. Except for the Palestinian police referred to in this Article and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area.

3. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian police described in Annex I, Article III, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization or individual in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.

Article X**Passages**

Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Palestinian Authority regarding the Gaza-Egypt and Jericho-Jordan passages, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I, Article x.

Article XI**Safe Passage between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area**

Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area set out in Annex I, Article IX.

Article XII**Relations Between Israel and the Palestinian Authority**

1. Israel and Palestinian Authority shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organisations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
2. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall cooperate in combatting criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles.

Article XIII**Economic Relations**

The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the protocol on Economic Relations signed in Paris on April 29, 1994 and the Appendices thereto, certified copies of which are attached as Annex IV, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.

Article XIV**Human Rights and the Rule of law**

Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.

Article XV**The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee**

1. The liaison committee established pursuant to Article x of the Declaration of principles shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
2. The liaison committee shall be composed of an equal number of member from each party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary
3. The liaison committee shall adopt its rules of procedure, including the frequency and place or places of its meetings.
4. The liaison committee shall reach its decisions by Agreement.

Article XVI**Liaison and cooperation with Jordan and Egypt**

1. Pursuant to Article XII of the Declaration of Principles, the parties shall invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Government of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them.

These arrangements shall include the constitution of a continuing committee.

2. The continuing committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

3. The continuing committee shall deal with other matters of common concern.

Article XVII

Settlement of Differences and Disputes

Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article xv of the Declaration of Principles shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely:

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any subsequent agreement pertaining to the interim period shall be settled by negotiations through the liaison committee.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.

3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration committee.

Article XVIII

Prevention of Hostile Acts

Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders. In addition, the Palestinian side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts directed against the settlements, the infrastructure serving them and the military Installation Area, and the Israeli side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts emanating from the Settlements and directed against Palestinians.

Article XIX

Missing Persons

The Palestinian Authority shall cooperate with Israel by providing all necessary assistance in the conduct of searches by Israel within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area for missing Israelis, as well as by providing information about missing Israelis. Israel shall cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in searching for, and providing necessary information about, missing Palestinians.

Article XX

Confidence Building Measures

With a view to creating a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, and to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and

good faith, both parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith:

1. Upon the signing of this Agreement, Israel will release, or turn over, to the Palestinian Authority within a period of 5 weeks, about 5,000 Palestinian detainees and prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Those released will be free to return to their homes anywhere in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. Prisoners turned over to the Palestinian Authority shall be obliged to remain in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence.
2. After the signing of this Agreement, the two parties shall continue to negotiate the release of additional Palestinian prisoners and detainees, building on agreed principles.
3. The implementation of the above measures will be subject to the fulfilment of the procedures determined by Israeli law for the release and transfer of detainees and prisoners.
4. With the assumption of Palestinian authority, the Palestinian side commits itself to solving the problem of those Palestinians who were in contact with the Israeli authorities. until an agreed solution is found, the Palestinian side undertakes not to prosecute these Palestinians or to harm them in any way.
5. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area is approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable , will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September 13, 1993.

Article XXI

Temporary International Presence

1. The parties agree to a temporary international or foreign presence in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (hereinafter "the TIP"), in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
2. The TIP shall consist of 400 qualified personnel, including observers, instructors and other experts, from 5 to 6 of the donor countries.
3. The two parties shall request the donor countries to establish a special fund to provide finance for the TIP.
4. The TIP will function for a period of 6 months. the TIP may extend this period, or change the scope of its operation, with the agreement of the two parties.
5. The TIP shall be stationed and operate within the following cities and illages: Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, Deir El Ballah, Jabaliya, Absan, Beit Hanun and Jericho.
6. Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall agree on a special protocol to implement this Article, with the goal of concluding negotiations with the donor countries contributing personnel within two months.

Article XXII

Rights, Liabilities and Obligations

1. a. The transfer of all powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority, as detailed in annex 11, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to the transfer. Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Palestinian Authority will bear all financial responsibilities for these and for its own functioning.
- b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Palestinian Authority.

- c. Israel shall provide the Palestinian Authority with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
 - d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the Palestinian Authority and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its behalf.
 - e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of such a claim, the Palestinian Authority shall reimburse Israel the full amount of the award.
 - f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Palestinian Authority shall not bear financial responsibility.
2. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.

Article XXIII

Final Clauses

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
2. The arrangements established by this Agreement shall remain in force until and to the extent superseded by the interim Agreement referred to in the Declaration of Principles or any other agreement between the parties.
3. The five-year interim period referred to in the Declaration of Principles commences on the date of the signing of this Agreement.
4. The parties agree that, as long as this Agreement is in force, the security fence erected by Israel around the Gaza Strip shall remain in place and that the line demarcated by the fence, as shown on attached map No. 1, shall be authoritative only for the purpose of this Agreement.
5. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the interim agreement or on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the Declaration of Principles. Neither party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.
6. The two parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity of which will be preserved during the interim period
7. The Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and their status shall not be changed for the period of this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to change this status.
8. The preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof.

Done in Cairo this fourth day of May, 1994.

For the Government of the State of Israel

Yitzhak Rabin

Witnessed by:

For the PLO

Yasser Arafat

The United States of America / The Russian federation / The Arab Republic of Egypt
Source: Abdul Hadi, M., Documents on Palestine. Vol. II From the Negotiations in Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp. 175- 180.

APPENDIX VI

Letters of Assurance to Israel

November 4, 1998

Dear Dani:

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of Reciprocity/Parallelism, Permanent Status Negotiations, and Prisoner Releases. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State Department on October 29, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies.

On Reciprocity/Parallelism, the statement said: "Resolving the crisis of confidence between Israelis and Palestinians requires each side to fulfill a set of responsibilities based on the concept of reciprocity, i.e., both sides must carry out their respective obligations in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum. These obligations will be implemented or carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with the mutually agreed Time Line."

As for Permanent Status Negotiations, the statement said: "The US is highly sensitive to the vital importance of the permanent status issues to Israel's future. We recognize that the security of the State of Israel and the Israeli public is at stake, and the US commitment to Israel's security remains ironclad."

"We appreciate that if the US is invited by both parties to participate in the permanent status talks, which are to be conducted between Israel and the Palestinians on a bilateral basis, we will do so for the purpose of facilitating the negotiations."

"Only Israel can determine its own security needs and decide what solutions will be satisfactory."

"We also understand that any decision to convene or seek to convene a summit to resolve permanent status issues will need the agreement of both parties."

With regard to the issue of Prisoner Releases and the question of a "revolving door," the statement said: "We have had discussions with the Palestinians and they have given us a firm commitment that there will be no 'revolving door.'"

These public statements by the State Department represent our policies.

We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future.

Sincerely, **Edward S. Walker Jr.**

Ambassador.

Dear Mr. Naveh:

I wanted to provide further clarification of the understanding of the United States regarding one of the issues addressed in the Wye River Memorandum. With respect to the Palestinian side's provision of its list of policemen to Israel (II (C)(1)(a)), the US has been assured that it will receive all appropriate information concerning current and former policemen as part of our assistance program. It is also our understanding that it was agreed by the two sides that the total number of Palestinian policemen would not exceed 30,000.

Sincerely, **Dennis B. Ross.**

Special Middle East Coordinator

Dear Dani:

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issue of the 3rd phase of further redeployment. In this regard, the statement issued publicly by the State Department on October 27, 1998, is accurate and represents our policy.

Regarding the third further redeployment, the statement said: "During the discussions leading to this agreement, the US made clear to both parties that it will not adopt any position or express any view about the size or the content of the third phase of Israel's further redeployment, which is an Israeli responsibility to implement rather than negotiate.

"Under the terms of the memorandum, an Israeli-Palestinian committee is being established. Nonetheless we urge the parties not to be distracted from the urgent task of negotiating permanent status arrangements, which are at the heart of the matter and which will determine the future of the area.

"Our own efforts have been and will continue to be dedicated to that vital task."

This public statement by the State Department represents our policy. We will not change it and it will remain our policy in the future.

Sincerely, Edward S. Walker Jr.

Ambassador.

Dear Dani:

I wanted to confirm our policy on the issues of unilateral actions and the Charter of the PLO. In this regard, the statements issued publicly by the State Department on October 27, 1998, are accurate and represent our policies.

With regard to unilateral declarations or other unilateral actions, the statement said: "As regards to the possibility of a unilateral decision of statehood or other unilateral actions by either party outside the negotiating process that prejudice or predetermine the outcome of those negotiations, the US opposes and will oppose any such unilateral actions.

"Indeed, the US has maintained for many years that an acceptable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be found through negotiations, not through unilateral actions. And as we look to the future, that will remain our policy.

"For the present, we are doing all we can to promote permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis. And we are stressing that those who believe that they can declare unilateral positions or take unilateral acts, when the interim period ends, are courting disaster."

With regard to the PNC, the statement said: "The Wye River Agreement specifies that the members of the PNC (as well as the members of the PLO Central Council, the Palestinian Council, and the Heads of Palestinian Ministries) will be invited to a meeting which President Clinton will attend.

"The purpose of this meeting of the PNC and other PLO organizations is to reaffirm Chairman Arafat's January 22 letter to President Clinton nullifying each of the Charter's provisions that are inconsistent with the PLO's commitments to renounce terror, and to recognize and live in peace with Israel.

"This process of reaffirmation will make clear, once and for all, that the provisions of the PLO Charter that call for the destruction of Israel are null and void."

These public statements by the State Department represent our policies.

We will not change them and they will remain our policies in the future.

Sincerely, Edward S. Walker, Jr.

Ambassador

Source: The Internet: [Http://](http://)

APPENDIX VII

Palestinian-Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Taba agreement) (Oslo II) Washington, 28 September 1995

MAIN POINTS

The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (hereinafter "the PLO"), the representative of the Palestinian people;

PREAMBLE

Within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated at Madrid in October 1991;

Reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful co-existence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights;

Reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process;

Recognizing that the peace process and the new era that it has created, as well as the new relationship established between the two parties as described above, are irreversible, and the determination of the two parties to maintain, sustain and continue the peace process;

Background

...To date, preliminary agreements implemented pursuant to the Declaration of Principles include the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of May 4, 1994 which provided for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and the transfer of civil powers in these areas to a Palestinian Authority, and subsequent agreements giving the Palestinian Authority limited responsibilities for additional civil spheres throughout the West Bank. All these agreements are superseded by the provisions of the Interim Agreement.

The main object of the Interim Agreement is to broaden Palestinian self-government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-government authority (the Palestinian Council). This will allow the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a new era of cooperation and co-existence based on common interest, dignity and mutual respect. At the same time it protects Israel's vital interests, and in particular its security interests, both with regard to external security as well as the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank.

General

The Interim Agreement between Israel and the PLO, including its annexes, comprises some 400 pages, setting forth the future relations between Israel and the Palestinians. To the main body of the agreement are appended six annexes dealing with: security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of powers), legal matters, economic relations, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.

The agreement states that a Palestinian Council will be elected for an interim period not to exceed five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (i.e. no later than May 1999). The permanent status negotiations will deal with the remaining

issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with neighboring countries, etc.

Elections

The Council is an elected body and, accordingly, the agreement sets out arrangements for democratic elections to the Council by all Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip aged 18 or over, who are registered in the population register. The elections will take place 22 days after the conclusion of an IDF redeployment from populated areas in the West Bank...

The Palestinian Council

The Palestinian Council to be established following the elections will assume various powers and responsibilities in security and civil spheres in the West Bank and Gaza, as detailed below.

With the establishment of the Council, the Israeli military government will be withdrawn and the Civil Administration dissolved. The Council will assume responsibility for all rights, liabilities, and obligations in the spheres transferred to it. At the time Israel will retain those powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council...

Security and redeployment

The IDF will redeploy in the West Bank according to the timetables set in the agreement. In the first stage, designed to facilitate the holding of elections, the IDF will withdraw from the populated areas of the West Bank: the six cities –Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Kalkilya, Ramallah and Bethlehem (in the city of Hebron special security arrangements will apply as provided in the agreement) –and 450 towns and villages. At the end of this redeployment, there will be almost no IDF presence in Palestinian population centers.

In general, throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel will have overall responsibility for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements.

With regard to internal security and public order, the agreement established different arrangements for three types of area:

-Area "A" comprises the six cities listed above. In these areas, the Palestinian Council will have full responsibility for internal security and public order, as well as full civil responsibilities.

-“B” comprises the Palestinian towns and villages of the West Bank. In these areas, which contain some 68 percent of the Palestinian population, the council will be granted full civil authority, as in Area “A”. The Council will be charged with maintaining public order, while Israel will have overall security authority to safeguard its citizens and to combat terrorism. This responsibility shall take precedence over the Palestinian responsibility for public order.

25 Palestinian police stations will be established in specified towns and villages to enable the Palestinian police to exercise its responsibility for public order. The agreement contains provisions requiring that the movement of Palestinian police be coordinated and confirmed with Israel.

-In Area “C”, which comprises the unpopulated areas of strategic importance to Israel and the Jewish settlements, Israel will retain full responsibility for security and public order. The council will assume all those civil responsibilities not related to territory, such as economics, health, education, etc.

Further Redeployments

In addition to the redeployment of Israeli military forces described above, the agreement provides that a series of further redeployments are to take place at six-month intervals following the inauguration of the Council. In the course of these redeployments, additional parts of Area C will be transferred to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, so that by the completion of the redeployment phases, Palestinian territorial jurisdiction will cover West Bank territory except for the areas where jurisdiction is to be determined under the final status negotiations (settlements, military locations, etc.).

The Revocation of the PLO Covenant

The agreement contains an undertaking to revoke those articles of the Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel, within two months of the inauguration of the Council.

The Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence

The agreement provides for the establishment of a strong force, 12,000 in number, that will constitute the only Palestinian security force. The Security Annex specifies the deployment of the police force, the approved equipment and its modes of action.

The Security Annex specifies the commitment of Israel and the Palestinian Council to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and the prevention of terrorist attacks, according to the following framework:

- A. The Palestinian Police is the only Palestinian Security Authority.
- B. The Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expression of violence and terror.
- C. The Council will issue permits in order to legalize the possession and carrying of arms by civilians; any illegal arms will be confiscated by the Palestinian Police.
- D. The Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror.

Both sides, in accordance with this agreement, will act to insure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving the threat, or acts of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities.

Joint security committees will be established to coordinate between the IDF and the Palestinian police. Regional offices will operate 24 hours a day. Joint patrols will ensure free and secure movement on designated roads in Area "A". Joint Mobile Units will serve as rapid response units in case of incidents and emergencies.

Transfer of Civil powers and Responsibilities

The agreement sets out the arrangements for the transfer of agreed upon civil powers and responsibilities from the Civil Administration to the Council. In Area "C", power and responsibilities not relating to territory will be transferred to the Council; powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be gradually transferred along with the redeployments in these areas. The transfer of further civil powers and responsibilities is subject to detailed provisions insuring, among other things, the land rights of Israelis and the continued provision of services (electricity, water, telecommunications, etc.) to the settlements.

Freedom of Movement for Israelis

The IDF and Israeli will continue to move freely on the roads of the West Bank and Gaza. In area "A" Israeli vehicles will be escorted by joint patrols, Israelis may not in any circumstances be arrested or placed in custody by the Palestinian police, and may only be required to present identity and vehicle documentation. On roads that are jointly patrolled, any request for identification shall only be made by the Israeli side of a joint patrol...

Religious Sites

Responsibility over sites of religious significance in the West Bank and Gaza will be transferred to the Palestinian side. In Area "C" this will be transferred gradually during the "further redeployment phase", except for the issues which will be negotiated during the permanent status negotiations. Both sides shall respect and protect religious rights of Jews, Christians, Muslims and Samaritans to wit:

- A. Protecting the holy sites.
- B. Allowing freedom of worship and practice.

Jewish holy sites are listed in the agreement.

And defines access arrangements for the holy places located in Area "A" and "B". With regard to Rachel's Tomb in Bethlehem and Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, special arrangements are set out in the agreement which will also also guarantee freedom of access and freedom of worship.

Hebron

In view of the Jewish presence in the heart of Hebron and the sensitive historical and religious aspects involved, special arrangements will apply in this city. These arrangements will enable Palestinian police to exercise responsibilities vis-à-vis Palestinian residents while at the same time Israel will retain the powers and responsibilities necessary to protect Israeli residents living in Hebron and visiting the holy places.

There will be a redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron, except for places and roads where arrangements are necessary for the security and protection of Israelis and their movements. This redeployment will be completed no later than six (6) months after the signing of this agreement. Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

The status quo at the Tomb of the Patriarchs will remain unchanged, for the time being.

There will be a temporary international presence in hebron...

Water

The agreement contains an undertaking on the part of Israel to increase the amount of water allocated to the Palestinians by 28 million cu.m. Any further addition to either side will be based on an increase in the available water resources to be developed through international funding and channels, among them the tripartite American-Palestinian-Israeli forum which will hold its first meeting after the signing of the interim Agreement. The agreement provides for the establishment of a joint water committee that will manage water resources and enforce water policies, protecting the interests of both parties by the prevention of uncontrolled drilling and enforcing standards, etc.

Release of Prisoners

In order to foster a positive atmosphere as this agreement is being implemented, and to engender mutual confidence and a basis for cooperation between the two peoples, Israel will release Palestinian prisoners who are in Israeli custody in three (3) stages according to the following format:

Stage 1-Upon the signing of the agreement.

Stage 2-On the eve of elections for the Council.

Stage 3-At a later unspecified date.

Annex VII of the Agreement establishes the criteria which Israel will take into consideration when deciding upon the release...

Source: Bickerton I and Klausner, C., (New Jersey: Printice-Hall, 1998), pp. .307-310.

APPENDIX VIII

Hebron Agreement

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, January 1997

In accordance with the provision of the Interim Agreement and in particular of Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both parties have agreed on this Protocol for the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron.

Security Arrangements Regarding Redeployment in Hebron

1. Redeployment in Hebron

The redeployment of Israeli Military Forces in Hebron will be carried out in accordance with the Interim Agreement and this Protocol. This redeployment will be completed not later than ten days from the signing of this Protocol. During these ten days both sides will exert every possible effort to prevent friction and any action that would prevent the redeployment. This redeployment shall constitute full implementation of the provisions of the Interim Agreement with regard to the City of Hebron unless otherwise provided for in Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement.

2. Security Powers and Responsibilities

- a. (1) The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in Area H-1 similar to those in other cities in the West Bank; and
(2) Israel will retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area H-2. In addition, Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall security of Israelis.

- b. In the context – both sides reaffirm their commitment to honor the relevant security provisions of the Interim Agreement, including the provisions regarding – Arrangements for Security and Public Order (Article XII of the Interim Agreement); Prevention of Hostile Acts (Article XV of the Interim Agreement); Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence (Article II of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); Guidelines for Hebron (Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement); and Rules of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters (Article XI of Annex I to the Interim Agreement).

3. Agreed Security Arrangements

- a. With a view to ensuring mutual security and stability in the City of Hebron, special security arrangements will apply adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, in Area H-1, in the area between the Palestinian Police checkpoints delineated on the map attached to this Protocol as Appendix I (hereinafter referred to as “the attached map”) and the areas under the security responsibility of Israel.
- b. The purpose of the above mentioned checkpoints will be to enable the Palestinian Police, exercising their responsibilities under the Interim Agreement, to prevent entry of armed persons and demonstrators or other people threatening security and public order, into the above mentioned area.

4. Joint Security Measures

- a. The DCO will establish a sub-office in the City of Hebron as indicated on the attached map.
- b. JMU will operate in Area H-2 to handle incidents that involve Palestinians only. The JMU movement will be detailed on the attached map. The DCO will coordinate the JMU movement and activity.

- c. As part of the security arrangements in the area adjacent to the areas under the security responsibility of Israel, as defined above, Joint Mobile Units will be operating in this area, with special focus on the following places:
 - (1) Abu Sneinah
 - (2) Harat A-Sheikh
 - (3) Sha'ab
 - (4) The high ground overlooking new Route No. 35.
 - d. Two Joint Patrols will function in Area H-1.
 - (1) a Joint patrol which will operate on the road from Ras e-Jura to the north of the Dura junction via E-Salaam Road, as indicated on the attached map; and
 - (2) a Joint Patrol which will operate on existing Route No. 35, including the eastern part of existing Route No. 35, as indicated on the attached map.
 - E. The Palestinian and Israeli side of the JMU's in the City of Hebron will be armed with equivalent types of weapons (Mini-Ingram sub machine-guns for the Palestinian side and short M16s for the Israeli side).
 - F. With a view to dealing with the special security situation in the City of Hebron, a Joint Coordination Centre (hereinafter the "JCC"), headed by senior officers of both sides, will be established in the DCO at Har Manoah/Jabel Manoah. The purpose of the JCC will be to coordinate the joint security measures in the City of Hebron. The JCC will be guided by all the relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement, including Annex I and this Protocol. In this context, each side will notify the JCC of demonstrations and actions taken in respect of such demonstrations, and of any security activity, close to the areas under the responsibility of the other side, including in the area defined in Article 3(a) above. The JCC shall be informed of activities in accordance with Article 5(d)(3) of this Protocol.
5. The Palestinian Police
- a. Palestinian police stations or posts will be established in Area H-1, manned by a total up to 400 policemen, equipped with 20 vehicle and armed with 200 pistols, and 100 rifles for the protection of the police stations.
 - b. Four designated Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) will be established and stationed in Area H-1, one in each of the police stations, as delineated on the attached map. The main task of the RRTs will be to handle special security cases. Each RRT shall be comprised of up to 16 members.
 - c. The above mentioned rifles will be designated for the exclusive use of the RRTs, to handle special cases.
 - d. The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in Area H-1.
 - (1) Activities of the RRTs armed with rifles in the Agreed Adjacent Area, as defined in Appendix 2, shall require the agreement of the JCC.
 - (2) The RRTs will use the rifles in the rest of Area H-1 to fulfill their above mentioned tasks.
 - e. The Palestinian Police will ensure that all Palestinian policemen, prior to their deployment in the City of Hebron, will pass a security check in order to verify their suitability for service, taking into account the sensitivity of the area.
6. Holy Sites
- a. Paragraphs 2 and 3(a) of Article 32 of Appendix 1 to Annex III of the Agreement will be applicable to the following Holy Sites in Area H-1:
 - (1) The Cave of Othniel Ben Knaz / El-Khalil;

- (2) Elonei Mamre / Haram Er-Rameh;
 - (3) Eshel Avraham / Balotat Ibrahim; and
 - (4) Maayan Sarah / Ein Sarah
- b. The Palestinian Police will be responsible for the protection of the above Jewish Holy Sites. Without derogation from the above responsibility of the Palestinian Police, visits to the above Holy Sites by worshippers or other visitors shall be accompanied by a Joint Mobile Unit, which will ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the Holy Sites, as well as their peaceful use.
7. Normalization of life in the Old City
- a. Both sides reiterate their commitment to maintain normal life throughout the City of Hebron and to prevent any provocation or friction that may affect the normal life in the city.
 - b. In this context, both sides are committed to take all steps and measures necessary for the normalization of life in Hebron, including:
 - (1) The wholesale market – Hasbah – will be opened as a retail market in which goods will be sold directly to consumers from within the existing shops.
 - (2) The movement of vehicles on the Shuhada Road will be gradually returned, within 4 months, to the same situation which existed prior to February 1994.

8. The Imara

The Imara will be turned over to the Palestinian side upon the completion of the redeployment and will become the headquarters of the Palestinian Police in the City of Hebron.

9. City of Hebron

Both sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their understanding that the division of security responsibility will not divide the city. In this context, and without derogation from the security powers and responsibilities of either side, both sides share the mutual goal that movement of people, goods and vehicles within and in and out of the city will be smooth and normal, without obstacles or barriers.

Civil Arrangements Regarding the Redeployment in Hebron

10. Transfer of Civil Powers and Responsibilities

- a. The transfer of civil powers and responsibilities that have yet to be transferred to the Palestinian side in the city of Hebron (12 spheres) in accordance with Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement shall be conducted concurrently with the beginning of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Hebron.
- b. In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred to the Palestinian side, except for those relating to Israelis and their property, which shall continue to be exercised by the Israeli Military Government.

11. Planning, Zoning and Building

- a. The two parties are equally committed to preserve and protect the historic character of the city in a way which does not harm or change that character in any part of the city.
- b. The Palestinian side has informed the Israeli side that in exercising its powers and responsibilities, taking into account the existing municipal regulations, it has undertaken to implement the following provisions:
 - (1) proposed construction of building above two floors (6meters) within 50 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the list attached to this Protocol as Appendix 3 (hereinafter referred to as "the attached list") will be coordinated through the DCL.

- (2) Proposed construction of buildings above three floors (9 meters) between 50 and 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.
- (3) Proposed construction of non-residential, non-commercial buildings within 100 meters of the external boundaries of the locations specified in the attached list that are designed for uses that may adversely affect the environment (such as industrial factories) or buildings and institutions in which more than 50 persons are expected to gather together will be coordinated through the DCL.
- (4) Proposed construction of buildings above two floors (6 meters) within 50 meters from each side of the road specified in the attached list will be coordinated through the DCL.
- (5) The necessary enforcement measures will be taken to ensure compliance on the ground with the preceding provisions.
- (6) This necessary enforcement measures will be taken to ensure compliance on the ground with the preceding provisions.

12. Infrastructure

- a. The Palestinian side shall inform the Israeli side, through the DCL, 48 hours in advance of any anticipated activity regarding infrastructure which may disturb the regular flow of traffic on roads in Area H-2 or which may affect infrastructure (such as water, sewage, electricity and communications) serving Area H-2.
- b. The Israeli side may request, through the DCL, that the Municipality carry out works regarding the roads or other infrastructure required for the well being of the Israelis in Area H-2. If the Israeli side offers to cover the costs of these works, the Palestinian side will ensure that these works are carried out as a top priority.
- c. The above does not prejudice the provisions of the Interim Agreement regarding the access to infrastructure, facilities and installations located in the city of Hebron, such as the electricity grid.

13. Transportation

The Palestinian side shall have the power to determine bus stops, traffic arrangements and traffic signalization in the city of Hebron. Traffic signalization, traffic arrangements and the location of bus stops in Area H-2 will remain as they are on the date of the redeployment in Hebron. Any subsequent change in these arrangements in Area H-2 will be done in cooperation between the two sides in the transportation sub-committee.

14. Municipal inspectors

- a. In accordance with paragraph 4.c of Article VII of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, plainclothes unarmed municipal inspectors will operate in Area H-2. The number of these inspectors shall not exceed 50.
- b. The inspectors shall carry official identification cards with a photograph issued by the Municipality.
- c. The Palestinian side may request the assistance of the Israel Police, through the DCL of Hebron, in order to carry out its enforcement activities in Area H-2.

15. Location of Offices of the Palestinian Council

The Palestinian side, when operating new offices in Area H-2 will take into consideration the need to avoid provocation and friction. Where establishing such offices might affect public order or security the two sides will cooperate to find a suitable solution.

16. Municipal Services

In accordance with paragraph. 5 of Article VII of Annex 1 of the Interim Agreement, municipal services shall be provided regularly and continuously to all parts of the city of Hebron, at the same quality and cost. The cost shall be determined by the Palestinian side with respect to work done and material consumed, without discrimination.

Miscellaneous

17. Temporary International Presence

There will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH). Both sides will agree on the modalities of the TIPH, including the number of its members and its area of operation.

18. AnnexI

Nothing in this Protocol will derogate form the security powers and responsibilities of either side in accordance with Annex 1 to the Interim Agreement.

19. Attached Appendices

20. The appendices attached to this Protocol shall constitute an integral part hereof.

21. Done at this 15th day of January 1997.

For the Government of Israel

For the PLO

Source: Abdul Hadi, M., Documents on Palestine, vol. II From the Negotiations in Madrid to the Post-Hebron Agreement Period, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1997), pp. 317-320.

APPENDIX IX

MULTILATERAL TALKS

Dates of Meetings

Madrid Peace Conference

30 October - 1 November 1991

Multilateral Organizational Meeting

28-29 January 1992, Moscow

Multilateral Steering Group (co-chairs: United States and Russia)

- Round 1 27 May 1992, Lisbon
- Round 2 3-4 December 1992, London
- Round 3 7 July 1993, Moscow
- Round 4 15-16 December 1993, Tokyo
- Round 5 12-13 July 1994, Tabarka, Tunisia
- Round 6 17-18 May 1995, Montreux, Switzerland

Inter-sessional meetings

9-10 February 1994, Canada

22-23 January 1995, Cairo

Multilateral working groups

Water Resources (gavel-holder: United States; co-orgaizer: Japan and EU)

- Round 1 14-15 May 1992, Vienna
- Round 2 16-17 September 1992, Washington, DC
- Round 3 27-29 April 1993, Geneva
- Round 4 26-28 October 1993, Beijing
- Round 5 17-19 April, 1994, Muscat, Oman
- Round 6 7-9 November 1994, Athens
- Round 7 18-22 June 1995, Amman

Refugees (gavel-holder: Canada; co-organizers: United States, EU and Japan)

- Round 1 13-15 May 1992, Ottawa
- Round 2 11-12 November 1992, Ottawa
- Round 3 11-13 May 1993, Oslo
- Round 4 12-14 October 1993, Tunis
- Round 5 10-12 May 1994, Cairo
- Round 6 13-14 Decmber 1994, Antalya, Turkey
- Round 7 11-14 December 1995, Geneva

Arms Control and Regional Security (gavel-holder: United States and Russia)

- Round 1 11-14 May 1992, Washington, DC
- Round 2 15-17 September 1992, Moscow
- Round 3 18-20 May 1993, Washington, DC
- Round 4 2-4 November 1993, Moscow
- Round 5 3-5 May, 1994, Doha, Qatar
- Round 6 12-15 December 1994, Tunis

Conceptual basket

- Meeting 1 30 January-3 February 1994, Cairo
- Meeting 2 12-14 October 1994, Paris
- Meeting 3 29 May-1 June 1995, Helsinki

Operational basket

- Meeting 1 20-24 March 1994, Antalya, Turkey
- Meeting 2 7-9 November 1994, Dead Sea, Jordan
- Meeting 3 4-6 April 1995, Antalya, Turkey

Environment (gavel-holder: Japan: co-organizers: United States and EU)

- Round 1 18-19 May 1992, Tokyo
- Round 2 26-27 September 1992, The Hague
- Round 3 24-25 May 1993, Tokyo
- Round 4 15-16 November 1993, Cairo
- Round 5 6-7 April 1994, The Hague
- Round 6 25-26 October 1994, Manama, Bahrain
- Round 7 18-22 June 1995, Amman

Regional Economic Development (gavel-holder: co-organizers: United States and Japan)

- Round 1 11-12 May 1992, Brussels
- Round 2 29-30 October 1992, Paris
- Round 3 4-5 May 1993, Rome
- Round 4 8-9 November 1993, Copenhagen
- Round 5 15-16 June 1994, Rabat
- Round 6 18-19 January 1995, Bonn
- Round 7 12 March 1996, Amman

REDWG Monitoring Committee

- Meeting 1 17 January 1995, Bonn
- Meeting 2 26 June 1995, Cairo
- Meeting 3 15 December 1995, Brussels

Finance committee

- Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo
- Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn
- Meeting 3 1-2 April 1995, Amman
- Meeting 4 16-17 May 1995, Cairo
- Meeting 5 7 August 1995, Amman

Trade committee

Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn
Meeting 3 18 April 1995, Cairo
Meeting 4 25 June 1995, Cairo
Meeting 5 14-15 December 1995, Geneva

Tourism committee

Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn
Meeting 3 14-15 March 1995, Cairo
Meeting 4 11-12 July 1995, Haifa

Infrastructure committee

Meeting 1 5 December 1994, Cairo
Meeting 2 17 January 1995, Bonn
Meeting 3 6-7 June 1995, Amman

Source: Peters, J., Pathways to Peace: the Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks.

Appendix X

Clinton Statement at Signing of Israel-PLO Agreement

Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, Foreign Minister Peres, Mr Abbas, President Carter, President Bush, distinguished guests, on behalf of the United States and Russia, co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, welcome to this great occasion of history and hope. Today we bear witness to an extraordinary act in one of history's defining dramas, a drama that began in a time of our ancestors when the world went forth from a sliver of land between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. That hallowed piece of earth, and land of life and revelation, is the home to the memories and dreams of Jews, Muslims, and Christians throughout the world.

As we all know, devotion to that land has also been the source of conflict and bloodshed for too long. Throughout this century, bitterness between the Palestinian and Jewish people has robbed the entire region of its resources, its potential, and too many of its sons and daughters. The land has been so drenched in warfare and hatred that conflicting claims of history etched so deeply in the souls of the combatants there that many believe the past would always have the upper hand.

Then, 14 years ago, the past began to give way when at this place and upon this desk three men of great vision signed their names to the Camp David Accord. Today we honor the memories of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, and we salute the wise leadership of President Jimmy Carter.

Then, as now, we heard from those who said that conflict would come again soon. But the peace between Egypt and Israel has endured. Just so, this bold new venture today, this brave gamble that the future can be better than the past, must endure.

Two years ago in Madrid, another president took a major step on the road to peace by bringing Israel and all her neighbors together to launch direct negotiations. Today we also express our deep thanks for the skillful leadership of President George Bush.

Ever since Harry Truman first recognized Israel, every American president, Democrat and Republican, has worked for peace between Israel and her neighbors. Now the efforts of all who have labored before us bring us to this moment, a moment when we dare to bledge what for so long seemed difficult even to imagine: that the security of the Israeli people will be reconciled with the hopes of the Palestinian people, and there will be more security and more hope for all.

Today, the leadership of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization will sign a Declaration of Principles on Interim Palestinian Self-Government. It charts a course toward reconciliation between two peoples who have both known the bitterness of exile. Now both pledge to put old sorrows and antagonisms behind them and to work for a shared future, shaped by the values of the Torah, the Koran and the Bible.

Let us salute also today the government of Norway for its remarkable role in nurturing this agreement.

But above all, let us today pay tribute to the leaders who had the courage to lead their people toward peace, away from the scars of battle, the wounds and the losses of the past, toward a brighter tomorrow. The world today thanks Prime Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres and Chairman Arafat. Their tenacity and vision has given us the promise of a new beginning.

What these leaders have done now must be done by others. Their achievement must be a catalyst for progress in all aspects of the peace process, and those of us who

support them must be there to help in all aspects, for the peace must render the people who make it more secure.

A peace of the brave is within our reach. Throughout the Middle East, there is a great yearning for the quiet miracle of a normal life. We know a difficult road lies ahead. Every peace has its enemies, those who still prefer the easy habits of hatred to the hard labors of reconciliation.

But prime Minister Rabin has reminded us that you do not have to make peace with your friends. And the Koran teaches that if the enemy inclines toward peace, do thou also incline toward peace.

Therefore, let us resolve that this new mutual recognition will be a continuing process in which the parties transform the very way they see and understand each other. Let the skeptics of this peace recall what once existed among these people. There was a time when the traffic of ideas and commerce and pilgrim flowed uninterrupted among the cities of the fertile crescent. In Spain, in the Middle East, Muslims and jews once worked together to write brilliant chapters in the history of literature and science. All this can come to pass again.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr Chairman, I pledge the active support of the United States of America to the difficult work that lies ahead. The United States is committed to ensuring that the world in marshalling the resources necessary to implement the difficult details that will make real the principles to which you commit yourselves today.

Together, let us imagine what can be accomplished if all the energy and ability the Israelis and the palestinians have invested into your struggle can now be channeled into cultivating the land and freshening the waters, into ending the boycotts and creating new industry, into building a land as bountiful and peaceful as it is holy. Above all, let us dedicate ourselves today to your region's next generation. In this entire assembly, no one is more important than the group of Arab and israeli children who are seated here with us today.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr Chairman, this day belongs to you. And because of what you have done, tomorrow belongs to them. We must not leave them prey to the politics of extremism and despair, to those who would derail this process because they cannot overcome the fears and hatred of the past. We must not betray their future. For too long, the young of the Middle East have been caught in a web of hatred not of their own making. For too long, they have been taught from the chronicles of war. Now, we can give them the chance to know the season of peace.

For them, we must realize the prophecy of Isaiah, that the cry of violence shall no more be heard in your land, nor rack ruin within your borders. The children of Abraham, the descendants of Isaac and Ishmael, have embarked together on a bold journey. Together, today, with all our hearts and all our souls, we bid them shalom, salaam, peace.

Source: Bickerton, I and Klausner C., A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New Jersy: Prentic Hall, 1998), p. 274.

APPENDIX XI

The Washington Declaration between Jordan and Israel, July 25, 1994, Washington, D.C.

A. After generations of hostility, blood and tears and in the wake of years of pain and wars, his Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin are determined to bring an end to bloodshed and sorrow. It is in this spirit that His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, met in Washington today at the invitation of President William J. Clinton of the United States of America. This initiative of President William J. Clinton constitutes an historic landmark in the United States' untiring efforts in promoting peace and stability in the Middle East. The personal involvement of the President has made it possible to realise agreement on the content of his historic declaration.

The signing of this declaration bears testimony to the President's vision and devotion to the cause of peace.

B. In their meeting, His Majesty king Hussien and prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have jointly reaffirmed the five underlying principles of their understanding on an agreed common Agenda designed to reach the goal of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Arab States and the Palestinians, with Israel.

1. Jordan and Israel aim at the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours and at the conclusion of a treaty of peace between both countries.

2. The two countries will vigorously continue their negotiations to arrive at a state of peace, based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 338 in all their aspects, and founded on freedom, equality and justice.

3. Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines. In addition the two sides have agreed to act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions.

4. The two countries recognise their right and obligation to live in peace with other as well as with all states within secure and recognised boundaries. The two states affirmed their respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area.

5. The two countries desire to develop good neighbourly relations of cooperation between them to ensure lasting security and to avoid threats and the use of force between them.

C. The long conflict between the two states is now coming to an end. In this spirit the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel has been terminated.

D. Following this declaration and in keeping with the agreed Common Agenda, both countries will refrain from actions or activities by either side that may adversely affect the security of the other or may prejudice the final outcome of negotiations. Neither side will threaten the other by use of force, weapons, or any other means, against each other and both sides will thwart threats to security resulting from all kinds of terrorism.

E. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin took note of the progress made in the bilateral negotiations within the Jordan-Israel track last

week on the steps decided to implement the sub-agendas on borders, territorial matters, security, water, energy, environment and the Jordan Rift Valley.

In this framework, mindful of items of the Agreed Common Agenda (borders and territorial matters) they noted that the boundary sub-commission has reached agreement in July 1994 in fulfilment of part of the role entrusted to it in the sub-agenda. They also noted that the sub-commission for water, environment and energy agreed to mutually recognise, as the role of their negotiations, the rightful allocations of the two sides in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and to fully respect and comply with the negotiated rightful allocations, in accordance with agreed acceptable principles with mutually acceptable quality. Similarly, His Majesty King Hussein and prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin expressed their deep satisfaction and pride in the work of the trilateral commission in its meeting held in Jordan on Wednesday, July 20th 1994, hosted by the Jordanian prime Minister, Dr. Abdessalam al-Majali, and attended by Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. They voiced their pleasure at the association and commitment of the United States in this endeavour.

- F. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin believe that steps must be taken both to overcome psychological barriers and to break with the legacy of war. By working with optimism towards the dividends of peace for all the people in the region, Jordan and Israel are determined to shoulder their responsibilities towards the human dimension of peace making. They recognise imbalances and disparities are a root cause of extremism which thrives on poverty and unemployment and the degradation of human dignity. In this spirit His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have today approved a series of steps to symbolise the new era which is now at hand:
1. Direct telephone links will be opened between Jordan and Israel.
 2. The electricity grids of Jordan and Israel will be linked as part of a regional concept.
 3. Two new border crossings will be opened between Jordan and Israel – one at the southern tip of Aqaba-Eilat and other at a mutually agreed point in the north.
 4. In principle free access will be given to third country tourists traveling between Jordan and Israel.
 5. Negotiations will be accelerated on opening an international air corridor between both countries.
 6. The police forces of Jordan and Israel will cooperate in combating crime with emphasis on smuggling and particularly drug smuggling. The United States will be invited to participate in this joint endeavour.
 7. Negotiations on economic matters will continue in order to prepare for future bilateral cooperation including the abolition of all economic boycotts.

All these steps are being implemented within the framework of regional infrastructural development plans and in conjunction with the Jordan-Israel bilaterals on boundaries, security, water and related issues and without prejudice to the final outcome of the negotiations on the items included in the Agreed Common Agenda between Jordan and Israel.

- G. His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have agreed to meet periodically or whenever they felt necessary to review the progress of the negotiations and express their firm intention to shepherd and direct the process in its entirety.

- H. In conclusion, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin wish to express once again their profound thanks and appreciation to President William J. Clinton and his Administration for their untiring efforts in furthering the cause of peace, justice and prosperity for all the peoples of the region. They wish to thank the President personally for his warm welcome and hospitality. In recognition of their appreciation to the President, His Majesty King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin have asked President William J. Clinton to sign this document as a witness and as a host to their meeting.

His Majesty King Hussein

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

President William J. Clinton

Source: Flamhaft, Z., Israel on the Road to peace: Accepting the Unacceptable, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 221.

Appendix XII

Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, October 1994 [Excerpts]

PREAMBLE

The government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the government of Israel:

Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25 July 1994 and which they are both committed to honor.

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 318 in all their aspects;

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice, and respect for fundamental and human rights: thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Desiring to develop friendly relations and cooperation between them in accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their states and, in particular, to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Bearing in mind that in their Washington declaration of 25 July 1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them;

Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this treaty of peace;

Have agreed as follow:

Article 1 – Establishment of Peace

Peace is hereby established between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel (the parties) effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratifications of this treaty...

Article 3 –International Boundary

- a. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate...
- b. The boundary is the permanent, secure, and recognized international boundary between Israel and Jordan without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967...
- e. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of nutral change in the course of the flow of the river...the boundary shall follow the new course of theflow. In the event of any other changes, the boundary shall not be affected unless otherwise agreed...
- h. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Bakura / Naharayim area, which is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights , the parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I (b)...

Article 5 –Diplomatic and other Bilateral Relations

1. The parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty.

2. The parties agree that the normal relationship between them will further include economic and cultural relations.

Article 6 Water

With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all water problems between them:

1. The parties agree mutually to recognize the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River, Yarmuk River waters, and Arab/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities, and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall be fully respected and complied with;
2. The parties, recognizing the necessity to find a practical, just, and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of cooperation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other party;
3. The parties recognize that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international cooperation;
4. In light of paragraph 2A, with the understanding that the cooperation in water-related subject would be to the benefit of both parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the possibility of trans-boundary water transfers, the parties agreed to search for ways to alleviate water shortage and cooperate in the following fields:
 - a. Development of existing and new water resources increasing the water availability, including on a regional basis, as appropriate, and minimizing wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;
 - b. Prevention of contamination of water resources;
 - c. Mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;
 - d. Transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use;
5. The implementation of both countries' undertaking under this article is detailed in Annex II...

Article 9 –Places of Historical and Religious Significance

1. Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.
2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Moslem holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in the shrines.
3. The parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among the monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious tolerance and peace...

Source: Bickerton I and Klausner C., A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998), p. 305-307.



THE MIDDLE EAST

ZONE A, B, and C (OSLO II Agreement, 28 September 1995) & Further Redeployment (Hebron Agreement, 15 January 1997)

